VI. Scope of Property - Rights and Restrictions Flashcards
(31 cards)
Emanuel v. Hernandez (Private Use Planning)
If an easement implied by prior use did not arise at the moment the property was severed, a change in circumstances after the severance cannot create such an easement.
Hernandezes build a fence over a driveway, blocking access to the Emanuels garage.
Berge v. State of Vermont (Private Use Planning)
Water access alone is generally not sufficient to defeat a claim for an easement by necessity.
State erected a gate, blocking gravel driveway, only access to Berge land was by water.
O’Dell v. Stegall (Private Use Planning)
A person claiming a prescriptive easement has the burden of proving his use of the land was adverse.
O’Dell could not prove his use of gravel road was adverse since Stegalls objected to use of the land.
Kienzle v. Myers (Private Use Planning)
An easement by estoppel exists where a property owner induces another to change position in reliance on a supposed easement, even if the property owner did not mislead the other party.
Marcus Cable Associates v. Krohn (Private Use Planning)
An express easement may only be used for the purposes specified in the easement’s terms according to their common meaning.
Preseault v. United States (Private Use Planning)
An easement is terminated if the easement is used in a way that is inconsistent with the easement’s original use and that was not reasonably foreseeable at the time the easement was established.
Deep Water Brewing LLC v. Fairway Resources (Private Use Planning)
In Washington, a covenant runs with the land if (1) it is enforceable between the original parties; (2) it “touches” and “concerns” the land; (3) it binds successors in interest; (4) there is privity between the original parties to the covenant and present disputants; and (5) there is privity between the original parties.
Gambrell v. Nivens (Private Use Planning)
A restrictive covenant binds remote grantees as an equitable servitude if the covenant touches and concerns the land, the original parties intended that the covenant run with the land, and the remote grantee had notice of the covenant.
Shelley v. Kraemer (Private Use Planning)
State court enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Association (Private Use Planning)
California law provides that common interest development use restrictions are enforceable unless unreasonable.
Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty (Land Use Regulation)
Municipal zoning regulations are constitutional, unless they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
Trip Associates v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (Land Use Regulation)
Increasing the frequency of a valid, nonconforming use of property is a permissible intensification of the use rather than an unlawful expansion of the use.
Increased frequency of adult entertainment.
Just v. Marinette County (Environmental)
A landowner does not have an absolute and unlimited right to change the essential, natural character of the land to use it for an unsuitable and unnatural purpose that would injure the rights of others.
National Audobon Society v. Superior Court (Environmental)
The public-trust doctrine preserves the state’s sovereign authority to protect public-trust uses, thereby preventing owners from acquiring a vested right that would allow them to harm the land.
Borden Ranch v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Environmental)
Ripping up soil in a wetland and depositing it back into the wetland may constitute a discharge of pollutants under the Clean Water Act.
United States v. Monsanto (Environmental - CERCLA)
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) imposes a strict liability scheme on site owners and waste generators for the response costs of the release of hazardous waste and permits imposition of joint and several liability in cases of indivisible harm.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter (Environmental-ESA)
The Secretary of the Interior possesses the authority pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to define the term “harm” broadly to encompass direct injury or death to endangered animals and indirect actions including the destruction of a species’ habitat and breeding grounds.
Juliana v. United States (Environmental-Public Trust doctrine)
Individuals have a fundamental constitutional right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life. (Under the public trust doctrine)
Express easement (Appurtenant or in-gross)
- Express easement by grant: This arises when the servient owner grants an easement to the dominant owner.
- Express easement by reservation: This arises when the dominant owner grants the servient land to the servient owner, but retains or reserves an easement over that property.
Implied Easement by prior use (SUN)
(1) Severance - severance of title to land held in common ownership
(2) Use:
* a. Existing and apparent use - easement must have been apparent, thus justifying the implication of intended use
* b. continuous use - prior use was continuous/permanent to justify continuation after severance
(3) Necessity - reasonable necessity for that use at the time of severance. (not possible for alternative access without substantial expenditure)
Scope of easement should be the same.
SUN
Easement by necessity (SN)
(1) Severance - severance of title to land held in common ownership.
(2) Necessity - Majority view: “reasonable necessity” at time of severance. (easement would be beneficial to owner)
Traditional view: “strict necessity” at time of severance. (owner has no legal right of access to her land/property is inaccessible without it)
* Terminates when easement no longer necessary
Implied easement
Prescriptive Easement (HOCA)
(1) open and notorious (O);
(2) adverse and hostile (H);
(3) continuous for statutory period (C);
(4) actual use
Limited to scope of adverse use that was basis of creation, generally not applicable to negative easements.
Similiar to adverse possession but no exclusivity required
Easement by estoppel - Irrevocable license (CRK)
(1) Consent - a landowner allows another to use his land, thus creating a license;
(2) Reliance - the licensee relies in good faith on the license, usually by making physical improvements or by incurring significant costs; and
(3) Knowledge of reliance - the licensor knows or reasonably should expect such reliance will occur.
Injustice can be avoided only be recognizing the easement.
CRK
Real Covenant (WITHVN or TWINVH)
(1) Writing - covenant must be in writing to be enforceable, compliant with SOF.
* Exception for equitable estoppel
(2) Intent - intent to bind successor (express language or implied intent if restriction on use of land)
(3) Touches and Concerns - Benefit “touches and concerns” land, usually physical aspect of land.
(4) Horizonal Privity - established if one party has an ownership interest in the other land. (Sold the land to them, easements, or tenants). A normal bare agreement does not count.
* [Mutual Interest/Landlord-tenant (& easements/co-tenants) (simultaneous privity)]
* Successive interest (include grantor/grantee) – almost all states apply
* Not required for benefits under modern rule. Only required for burdens.
(5) Vertical Privity - not established through adverse possession.
* Prevailing approach - transfer of same/lesser interest required for benefit to run
* Successor takes “entire estate”
* Excludes successor to lesser estate (e.g. tenant) and adverse possessor
(6) Notice - successor has notice of covenant/Recording Acts. No notice required for benefits, only burdens.
