week 11 part 1 Flashcards
Waldron’s basic argument
(a) Rights and Bills of Rights
What does waldron say about moral rights
a moral claim that people have the right to shelter is a claim about the importance of their getting shelter. It is not a claim about the importance of their being assigned shelter in accordance with a specific type of legal or bureaucratic procedure
Waldron’s basic argument
(a) Rights and Bills of Rights
What does waldron say about moral rights
If someone believes in moral rights, what does that mean
does not mean she is demanding legal rights
he begins his case against bills of rights by distinguishing between
a commitment to rights and a commitment to bills of rights.
Waldron shows that the link between the idea of rights and constitutional rights can be broken at several points. He argues, first, that a
fundamental commitment to individual rights need not necessarily result in the derivation of a range of more concrete rights (such as protection of freedom of speech, freedom of religion etc) as normative recommendations
Waldron shows that the link between the idea of rights and constitutional rights can be broken at several points. He argues, first, that a
fundamental commitment to individual rights need not necessarily result in the derivation of a range of more concrete rights (such as protection of freedom of speech, freedom of religion etc) as normative recommendations
Waldron shows that the link between the idea of rights and constitutional rights can be broken at several points.
first, that a fundamental commitment to individual rights need not necessarily result in the derivation of a range of more concrete rights (such as protection of freedom of speech, freedom of religion etc) as normative recommendations,
Secondly
that even where it does so, there is nothing in the recognition of those moral rights that necessarily leads to the recognition of legal rights
Waldron shows that the link between the idea of rights and constitutional rights can be broken at several points.
Thirdly
a commitment to the position that an individual should have a legal right to something does not establish that the legal right should be a constitutional righ
Does a person who is in favour of a legal right always have a reason to demand extra level of protection?
not necessarily
To secure constitutional protection, it is difficult and long. will either have to agitate for constitutional reform or, if there is already a Bill of Rights, persuade judges to recognize the new right under existing heading
Does a person who is in favour of a legal right always have a reason to demand extra level of protection?
second reason for Waldron
textual rigidity
With that less articulate, less formulaic heritage of right-based concern, people can discuss issues of rights and limited government, issues of abortion, discrimination, whatever terms seem appropriate to them, free from obsession with the verbalism of a particular written charter
Waldron
(b) Rights and Disagreement
What is there disagreement
a theory of justice and rights and theory of authority.
(b) Rights and Disagreement
Theories of justice needs to be
complemented by theory of authority
- (b) Rights and Disagreement*
- Theories of rights/justice must therefore be supplemented with theories of authority.
why
When people disagree about theories of justification, we need theories of authority. Any argument about justice needs a decision procedure to make actual decisions.
A theory of authority must not reintroduce disagreements about rights: eg, ‘make the decision that the majority chooses, so long as it does not violate individual rights’
- (b) Rights and Disagreement*
- Theories of rights/justice must therefore be supplemented with theories of authority.
How can theory of authority reintroduce disagreement when ‘make the decision that the majority chooses, so long as it does not violate individual rights’.
People who disagree inter alia about rights will disagree about what that theory of authority requires, and that latter disagreement
- (b) Rights and Disagreement*
- Wollheim’s paradox of democracy
Everyone must concede that there will sometimes be a dissonance between what they take to be the right choice (theory of justice) and what they take to be the choice yielded by the decision-procedure they regard as legitimate (Theory of authority)
- (b) Rights and Disagreement*
- In the end, the legitimacy of JR is understood in terms of a
theory of authority
- (b) Rights and Disagreement*
- In the end, the legitimacy of JR is understood in terms of a
theory of authority
- (b) Rights and Disagreement*
- Anyone whose theory of authority gives the Supreme Court power to make decisions
face up to the paradox that the option she thinks is just may not be the option which, according to her theory of authority, should be followed
(b) Rights and Disagreement
- Wollheim’s paradox of democracy
- give example
same citizen to assert that A ought not to be enacted, where A is the policy he voted against, and A ought to be enacted, because A is the policy chosen by the majority.
(b) Rights and Disagreement
- Wollheim’s paradox of democracy
- give example
same citizen to assert that A ought not to be enacted, where A is the policy he voted against, and A ought to be enacted, because A is the policy chosen by the majority.
(c) The Right of Participation
it compromises the right of every individual to have a share in the making of decisions that affect them
(c) The Right of Participation
Give rights to individuals in liberal argument
Give rights to individuals in liberal argument b/c you think its possible for them to make good decisions about their own destiny. Why would you deprive them of capacity to engage in what rights require
(c) The Right of Participation
how does judicial review limit participation
Worked tirelessly for same sex marriage, built coalition, political pressure. Assume it is yes. Parliament enacts law giving access. Then judiciary comes in and invalidates it