Week 7 Flashcards

1
Q

In game theory we assume

A

All agents maximise utility

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2
Q

Dominant strategy

A

If U(s1) > U(s2)

S1 dominantes S2; in every scenario, expected utility for S1 is greater than S2

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3
Q

weakly dominant

A

If U(s1) >= U(s2)

S1 weakly dominantes S2; in every scenario, expected utility for S1 is greater than or equal to S2

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4
Q

Define a Nash equilibrium

A
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5
Q

Determine if a decision state is in Nash equilibrium

A

If choosing to change the state leads only to worse scenarios for each agent, that agent will not change its decision

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6
Q

Pareto optimality

A

An outcome ω is not Pareto optimal if there is another outcome ω’ that makes everyone as happy or happier

You can’t move away from Pareto efficiency without making at least one agent worse off
^^^** this is important bit

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7
Q

Social welfare

A
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8
Q

Normal form game

A
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9
Q

Payoff matrix

A
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10
Q

Common payoff game

A

U_i(a) = U_j(a) for all a in A_i x A_j

In every scenario, participants get equal utility

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11
Q

Misanthropes coordination game

A
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12
Q

Constant sum game

A

U_i(a) + U_j(a) = c ; for all a in A_i x A_j

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13
Q

Zero sum game

A

U_i(a) + U_j(a) = 0 ; for all a in A_i x A_j

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14
Q

Choosing probabilities for a mixed strategy

A
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15
Q

Represent Nash equilibrium in matrices

A
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