week 9 Flashcards
Do babies recognise the valence of social interactions
Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom (2007).
a. Animated Climber + Helper (left) / Hinderer (right)
b. Looking time test events: Climber sits with Helper vs Hinder
c. Inanimated object
d. Neutral habituation events: the neutral character does not interact with Climber
Measuring infants’ toy choice and looking times
6- and 10-month-old infants
prefer helper to hinderer
prefer helper to a neutral individual
prefer a neutral individual to hinderer
> > Preverbal infants assess individuals on the basis of their behaviour towards others.
Young infants prefer prosocial to antisocial others
Hamlin & Wynn (2011)
To ensure that infants’ preferences were based on the social aspects of the characters’ behavior, a matched “Inanimate Control” condition was included –an inanimate pincer performed the same physical actions on the box as the Protagonist,
Infants preferred the puppet who help versus hinder an agent to achieve its goal (measured by reaching or looking).
Social evaluation is fundamental
Some failed attempts to replicate these findings
However, a recent meta-analysis by Margoni and Surian found he infants show a significant preference for prosocial over antisocial actors
Physical assault is wrong
Infants also negatively evaluate actors who physically harm others.
Kanakogi et al. (2013) found that 10-month-old infants preferentially reached for the victim over the aggressor. They also preferred the victim over a neutral bystander, but the bystander over the aggressor.
Using human actors, Buon et al. (2014) found that 10-month-oldes avoid someone who has physically assaulted a third party.
Punishment and Reward
We tend to think bad individuals deserve punishment and good individuals should be rewarded.
Altruistic punishment and rewarding is of key importance for human cooperation (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2004).
Using the same “opening a box” game, Hamlin et al. (2011) showed that before 2 years of age, toddlers direct their positive behaviours (e.g., giving a treat) toward Helper and negative behaviours (e.g., taking a treat away) toward Hinderer.
Evidence for an innate “moral core”?
Based on these findings, Hamlin (2013) suggested some aspects of human morality are innate.
What is the role of the self in this core?
Infants may be able to evaluate who might treat them well or poorly, but mature morality requires navigating conflicts between self-interest and the greater good. (Woo & Hamlin, 2023)
E.g., would infants prefer a fair distributor over someone who favours infants themselves?
A two-step sequence (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013)
Toddler second- personal morality: young children before about 3 years of age may not really understand social norms
Their cooperative and prosocial behaviour are based on interactions with specific individuals
Pre-schoolers’ norm-based morality: 4- and 5-year old children operate with an agent- neutral, norm-based morality in which all individuals are equal players
They become truly moral agents, understanding that social norms apply to everyone
What’s involved in moral judgment?
The morality of a given action is not always obvious.
Consider a girl who tries to steal food in a shop. Is this action morally wrong?
What her intention is
What consequences her action cause
How she felt about it
What situational factors lead to her action
What the moral norms are
Piaget’s Theory of Moral Judgment
Piaget initially studied children’s moral reasoning by observing children playing games that often involve dealing with issues of rules and fairness.
He also interviewed children about their thinking about questions such as
What constitutes a transgression of a rule
What role a person’s intentions plays in morality
What punishment are just
Piaget’s two stages of moral development
Frist stage - Heteronomous morality
Children at this stage (normally younger than 7 years) regard rules and duties to others as unchangeable “givens.”
Justice is whatever authorities (adults, rules, or laws) say is right.
What determines whether an action is good or bad are the consequences of the action, not the motives or intentions behind it.
Second stage - Autonomous morality
At around ages 11 or 12, children enter the second stage – They understand rules are the product of social agreement and can be changed.
Fairness and equality are considered important when constructing rules.
They consider individuals’ motives and intentions when evaluating their behaviour
Critique of Piaget’s Theory
Some empirical support - as children age, they increasingly take motives and intentions into account (e.g., Berg & Mussen, 1975)
However, it underestimated children’s ability to appreciate the role of intentionality in morality (Nobes et al., 2009)
Fairness in distribution
Rochat et al. (2009) examined 3- and 5-year-olds’ fairness in distributing candies across 7 cultures
3-year-olds optimize their own gain, while 5-year-olds generally show more fairness in sharing.
Blake & McAuliffe (2011) investigated 4- and 8-year-olds’ inequity aversion using a economic game where children could accept or reject unequal allocations of candy.
4- to 7-year-olds rejected disadvantageous offers, but accepted advantageous offers. By contrast, 8-year-olds rejected both forms of inequity.
Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Reasoning
Heavily influenced by Piaget’s ideas, Kohlberg was interested in how children’s moral reasoning develops over time.
In a longitudinal study, he assessed the moral reasoning of three cohorts of boys (beginning at ages 10, 13, and 16, respectively).
He presented children with hypothetical moral dilemmas and then asked them questions about issues involved.
Heinz’s dilemma
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her… the druggist paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug.
The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000… He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, “No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from it.”
So Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife.
Kohlberg’s Three Levels (Six Stages) of Moral Reasoning
Based on the interviews, Kohlberg (1976) proposed that there are three levels of moral reasoning, each of which has two stages within it.
Preconventional level
Preconventional moral reasoning focuses on avoiding punishment and getting rewards.
Stage 1: Obedience and Punishment Orientation
what is seen as right is obedience to authorities.
A child’s moral actions are motivated by avoidance of punishment.
Stage 2: Instrumental & Exchange Orientation
What is right is what is in the child’s own best interest.
They understand equal exchange, but this reciprocity is self-serving (e.g., you hurt me, so I hurt you).
Conventional level
Conventional moral reasoning focuses on compliance with social duties and laws.
Stage 3: Relationship and Interpersonal orientation
Good behaviour is doing what’s expected by people who are close or what’s expected from a given role
To maintain approval and good relations with others.
Stage 4: Social Order and Conscience Orientation
Good behaviour involves fulfilling one’s duties, upholding laws, and contributing to one’s group or society
To maintain social order and keep the social system going
Postconventional level
Postconventional moral reasoning focuses on ideals and moral principles
Stage 5: Social Contract and Individual Rights Orientation
Upholding rules that are in the best interest of the group, impartial, or were mutually agreed upon by the group.
Unjust law should be changed
Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principles
Commitment to self-chosen ethical principles that reflect universal principles, such as life, basic human rights, justice and equality
Development of moral reasoning over time
Kohlberg argued that these stages are discontinuous and hierarchical. That is, each new stage reflects a qualitatively different, more advanced way of thinking.
Kohlberg and his colleagues (Colby et al., 1983) followed 58 boys into adulthood and found that moral reasoning changed systematically with age.
Critique of Kohlberg’s Theory
Contribution
demonstrating that children’s moral reasoning develops in systematic ways.
useful in understanding how cognitive processes contribute to moral behaviour.
Criticism
It overlooks cultural differences (e.g., Snarey, 1985)
People’s moral reasoning is often inconsistent across situations (Rest, 1979)
It does not recognize gender difference (Gilligan, 1982)
Kohlberg’s theory is too focused on individual rights and justice; it overlooks the ethic of care and relationships, which Gilligan (1982) argued is more common in women’s moral reasoning.
Social Domain Theory of Moral Development
Contemporary perspectives on children’s moral development are greatly influenced by social domain theory (Turiel, 2014).
The theory argues that moral reasoning develops not in distinct stages but through gradual changes shaped by the child’s social interactions with peers and adults, as well as through direct socialization by their parents (Smetana & Jambon, 2018)
A distinction is drawn between the child’s developing concepts of morality and convention
Three different domains of social knowledge
Social domain theory distinguishes three different domains of social knowledge.
Personal domain: Knowledge related to actions where individual preferences are the main consideration; no right or wrong choices
Societal domain: knowledge of rules and conventions that maintain societal order
Moral domain: knowledge of right and wrong, fairness, justice, and individual rights apply across context and override rules or authority
Support for social domain theory
There has been growing evidence for the social domain theory.
By age 3, children generally believe that moral violations are more wrong than convention violations (Smetana & Braeges, 1990).
By age 4, they believe that moral transgressions, but not societal transgressions, are wrong even if adult authorities have not said they are wrong (Smetana & Braeges, 1990).
Children aged 4 to 9 years consistently rate moral transgressions (e.g., hitting, teasing, or unfair distribution) as morally wrong, even when the transgression is perpetrated against a bully (Smetana & Ball, 2019).
Some Challenges to Social Domain Theory
The distinction between moral and conventional domains is not clear-cut.
E.g, There is no substantive domain distinction among religious Hindus in India (Shweder, et al.,1987)
Social domain theorists pay little attention to starting states.
E.g., Babies are predisposed to be prosocial (Hamlin, 2013)
Moral Cognition is not always conscious, effortful, and reflective.
E.g., Some argue moral evaluations result from gut intuitions (Haidt, 2001)
