What is Knowledge Flashcards

1
Q

Ability knowledge

A

the kind of knowledge involved in skills and abilities, the knowledge of how to do things, eg I know how to ride a bike

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2
Q

Acquaintance knowledge

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the knowledge that involves direct contact with something in experience, like a person or place, its he knowledge of something, I know of Oxford

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3
Q

Propositional knowledge

A

the knowledge about some part of reality, the knowledge that, declarative statement, I know that fish have scales

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4
Q

Propositional knowledge has to be true

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P1: Knowledge is cognitive contact with reality (it is a relationship between a knower and reality).
P2: True propositions describe reality; false propositions do not.
C1: To be in cognitive contact with reality, what we know must be a true proposition - it must describe reality (If our proposition was false, we couldn’t say that we had cognitive contact with reality.)
C2: Therefore, in order for something to count as knowledge, it must be true.

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5
Q

Necessary and sufficient conditions

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If X is a necessary condition of Y, then if Y is true, X must also necessarily be true. E.g. being unmarried is a necessary condition of being a bachelor.
However, sometimes a necessary condition by itself isn’t enough to provide an adequate definition of something.
To use our earlier example, if someone is unmarried, do they have to be a bachelor?
In other words, can you think of someone who is unmarried but not a bachelor?
It appears that the condition of being unmarried is necessary, but not sufficient.
A is a necessary condition for B when you have to have A in order to have B. If you have A, you must have B.
A is a sufficient condition for B when if you have A you must have B too. Having A is enough, or sufficient, to guarantee that you have B.

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6
Q

Good and bad definitions (Zabzebski)

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Definitions should not be:
AD HOC: Coming up with a definition only to help solve a specific problem, e.g. defining knowledge as justified true belief that is not a Gettier counterexample.
CIRCULAR: it should not include the term being defined, e.g. ‘a table is a table’
OBSCURE: The terms in any definition should not be more obscure than the original term
NEGATIVE: Defining a term what it is not does not help, e.g. ‘knowledge is not ignorance’
A good definition must be informative.

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7
Q

Knowledge as Justified True Belief (JTB)

A

You can say that you know proposition p, if and only if:
Proposition p is true.
You believe that p.
Your belief that p is justified.
These three conditions are necessary and sufficient.
If you satisfy these conditions, you have knowledge.
If you have knowledge, you must satisfy all three conditions.

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8
Q

Why Belief as a necessary condition of knowledge

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Propositional knowledge involves a relationship between the person with knowledge and the proposition that is claimed to known.
To have knowledge is to take a proposition to be true. To take a proposition to be true is to believe it.
If this seems confusing, try imagining someone who claimed that something was true, but that they didn’t believe it.
This person wouldn’t make any sense to us at all.

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9
Q

Why Justified is a necessary condition of knowledge

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To justify a proposition is to offer reasons and evidence in support of accepting it.

A true belief that isn’t justified, or isn’t justified well, doesn’t really seem to be something we can call knowledge.
For example. I am on a jury and I decide that the defendant committed the crime simply because of the way they are now dressed in the courtroom
As it happen, the defendant is guilty. However, my justification wasn’t appropriate and so although I had a true belief, I did not have knowledge.

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10
Q

Why is Truth a necessary condition of knowledge

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If knowledge is cognitive contact with reality, then it simply must be true. If it is not true then, then it is not in contact with reality.
P1: Knowledge is cognitive contact with reality (it is a relationship between a knower and reality).
P2: True propositions describe reality; false propositions do not.
C1: To be in cognitive contact with reality, what we know must be a true proposition - it must describe reality (If our proposition was false, we couldn’t say that we had cognitive contact with reality.)
C2: Therefore, in order for something to count as knowledge, it must be true.

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11
Q

Is Justification a necessary condition of knowledge

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There are times when we say we ‘know’ something but can’t really justify it.
Think, for example, of people who ‘know’ they will go to heaven, or those who ‘know’ that their partner is faithful. Is there a legitimate justification for this knowledge? Or is it merely a strong belief?
What counts as suitable justification?
How can we say if a proposition is justified?
What would good justification look like?

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12
Q

Is Truth a necessary condition of knowledge

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If knowledge involves cognitive contact with reality, it seems impossible for it to be false. (If it was, it would not be in contact with reality.)

However, relativism may challenge this.
In essence, relativism is a rejection of talk about ‘truth’ without qualification; instead relativists talk about what is ‘true for’ someone, or for a particular society.

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13
Q

Is Belief a necessary condition f knowledge (weak version)

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I may be under confident about the knowledge I have.
E.g. I am asked a question in an exam, and I’m not really sure that I know the correct answer but I write what I remember from my revision.
As it turns out, however, what I wrote was correct - I did have knowledge.
It would seem wrong though to say that I genuinely believed the answer. It seems that I had knowledge but without belief.

However, I actually did have belief, even if I didn’t realise it. It was unconscious or tacit belief.
So belief was present, even if it didn’t actually appear that way

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14
Q

Is Belief a necessary condition f knowledge (strong version) Belief is never knowledge, Plato argument one

A

Plato came up with two arguments to demonstrate why belief and knowledge are different.
First argument:
P1: Knowledge is infallible; it must be true.
P2: Beliefs can be mistaken. We can believe things that are true or false.
C1: Knowledge and belief have different powers (they do completely different things).
C2: Knowledge and belief are different.

Response:
Even if knowledge is always true and belief isn’t, this does not mean that they have different ‘powers’.
It simply means that knowledge is always justified true belief, whereas belief can be true, false, justified or unjustified.
Knowledge just happens to be a particular type of belief, that’s all.

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15
Q

Is Belief a necessary condition f knowledge (strong version) Belief is never knowledge, Plato argument two

A

P1: There are two realms of existence: the constantly changing world that we perceive through our senses, and the unchanging perfect world of the forms (or pure ideas).
P2: If something is constantly changing, our understanding of it can change from true to false.
P3: Knowledge must always be true.
C1: We cannot have knowledge of the changing realm of the senses.
C2: We can only have knowledge of what is not changing.
C3: Knowledge and belief have different ‘objects’.
C4: Therefore, knowledge and belief are not the same.

Response:
Plato assumes that because the objects in the sensible realm are changing, any understanding of them cannot be true.
This doesn’t make sense, though. For example; Let’s say that at 8am I have a book with 100 pages in it and then at 1pm I decide to tear 50 pages out. The book is undoubtedly changing.
However, is it really correct to say that I can’t make a truthful claim about the number of pages in the book simply because the nature of the book changes?
Surely, I would just have to be more precise when I make my truth claim, e.g. ‘It is true that at 8am there were 100 pages in my book.’ And then ‘It is true that after 1pm there were 50 pages in my book.’
This example shows that it is possible to have a true understanding of things that change.
Which means that knowledge and belief do not necessarily have different objects.
Which means that Plato’s argument doesn’t work.

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16
Q

Gettier case - the job interview

A

Smith and Jones have applied for the same job. The president of the company tells Smith that Jones will get the job. Smith sees that Jones also has 10 coins in his pocket. Because of this observation, and because of what the president had told him, Smith formulates the proposition: ‘The person who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket.’ This is undoubtedly a justified belief.
However…
It then turns out that what the president of the company said was false and it is Smith who is offered the job! And then when Smith checks his pocket, it also turns out that he has 10 coins in his pocket. In this situation, Smith’s’ justified belief that ‘the person who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket’ has turned out to be true; the person who was offered the job did indeed have 10 coins in his pocket. And yet it appears that this is a lucky true belief. Smith’s justification for it is completely disconnected from why it turned out to be true. Because of this, we would’t say that his belief was knowledge. The three conditions, J, T & B, are, therefore, not jointly sufficient to account for knowledge.

17
Q

Disjunctions

A

A disjunction is an ‘either/or’ claim. For example:
‘Either Madrid is the capital city of Spain or Ouagadougou is the capital of Burkina Faso’ is an example of a disjunction. The two options are known as ‘disjuncts’
This particular disjunction is true if any one of the three conditions below is met.
1. Madrid is the capital of Spain, or
2. Ouagadougou is the capital of Burkina Faso, or
2. Both 1 and 2 are true.

18
Q

Gettier case - Smith, Jones, Brown, the Ford and Barcelona

A

Smith has strong evidence for the belief that ‘Jones owns a Ford’. Smith’s justification for this is as follows: Smith remembers that Jones has always driven a Ford.
a) Jones recently offered a lift to
b) Smith while driving in a Ford.
The proposition ‘Jones owns a Ford’ is, therefore, a justified belief.
Smith has another friend, Brown.
Smith doesn’t know where Brown is. Smith creates three random premises about Browns location:
a) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston
b) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona
c) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk
Because Smith has a justified belief that Jones owns a Ford, he is justified in believing all three of these propositions.
However…
It turns out that Jones doesn’t in fact own a Ford. He was driving a rented car when he offered a lift to Smith. And then by coincidence, it turns out that Brown is indeed in Barcelona. Disjunction b is true, but for reasons that are not connected to Smith’s initial justification.
We again appear to have a justified true belief that does not count as knowledge.
There I no connection between the justification for the belief and it being true.

19
Q

Adding another condition - no false lemmas (J+T+B+N)

A

A ‘lemma’ is a premise that is accepted as true in an argument.
In the job interview example, the president falsely told Smith that Jones would get the job. Smith then used this false information to conclude that the person with 10 coins in his pocket will get the job. Smith’s belief that ‘Jones will get the job’ is, therefore, a false lemma and is what was responsible for Smith’s conclusion not counting as knowledge.
In the example of the Ford and Brown being in Barcelona, the false lemma was the belief that Jones owns a Ford.
If it is false lemmas that are responsible for justified true beliefs not counting as knowledge, then perhaps our definition of knowledge will be correct if we add another condition, no false lemmas.
We may now be able to say that you know p iff
1. p is true
2. you believe that p
3. our belief that p is justified, and
4. you did not infer that p from a false belief, is the ‘no false lemmas’ condition, or N.
Perhaps the sufficient conditions for knowledge are JTB +N

20
Q

Problems with the no false lemmas condition

A

However, there are Gettier cases that satisfy the ‘no false lemmas’ condition and still can’t be counted as knowledge. Zagzebski’s example; Dr Jones has good evidence that her patient, Smith, is suffering from virus X. Her belief that Smith has virus X is justified because the symptoms and lab tests are consistent with the virus and no other known virus produces these results. She has a justified belief. However, Smith’s symptoms are actually caused by the unknown virus Y that produces symptoms and blood results that are also consistent with virus X. As chance would have it though, Smith has also recently caught virus X. This makes Dr Jones’ diagnosis a justified true belief.
The proposition ‘Smith has virus X’ is true. The justification offered for this proposition is the results of the blood test. However, the blood test results are the way they are because Smith has virus Y. The justification is disconnected from the proposition.
This is another example of a Gettier case, i.e. a justified, true belief that doesn’t count as knowledge. However, in this example, there are also no false lemmas. All of the evidence was true: Smith did have the symptoms and the blood test was accurate. There were no false beliefs informing any of Dr Jones’ reasoning.
It seems that we can satisfy conditions J, T, B and N and yet still not have knowledge.

21
Q

Another example against JTBN - fake barn county

A

In ‘fake barn county’, the locals create fake barns that look identical to real barns. Henry is driving through fake barn county, but he doesn’t know the locals do this. Henry often thinks “there’s a barn” when he looks at the fake barns. These beliefs are not knowledge, because they are not true – the barns are fake. However, on one occasion Henry looks at the one real barn and thinks “there’s a barn”. This time the belief is true
It’s also justified by his visual perception of the barn. And it’s not inferred from anything false.
According to the no false lemmas definition, Henry’s belief is knowledge. But this shows that the no false lemmas definition must be false. Henry’s belief is clearly not knowledge – he’s just lucky in this instance.

22
Q

Infalliblism - strengthening justification

A

Infallibilism argues that for a belief to count as knowledge, it must be true and justified in such a way as to make it certain. So, even though Smith has good reasons for his beliefs in the Gettier case, they’re not good enough to provide certainty. Certainty, to philosophers like Descartes, means the impossibility of doubt. In the Gettier case, Smith might have misheard the interviewer say he was going to give Jones the job. Or, even more extreme, Smith might be a brain in a vat and Jones may not even exist! Either of these scenarios – however unlikely – raise the possibility of doubt.

23
Q

Formal argument in favour of infallibilism

A

P1: No one can know what is false. (We know that knowledge must be true.)
C1: Therefore, if I know that p, then I can’t be mistaken about p.
C2: Therefore, for justification to secure knowledge, justification must guarantee truth.
C3: Therefore, if I am justified in believing p, I can’t possibly be mistaken.
C4: Therefore, if it is possible that I am mistaken, then I can’t be justified believing that p.
C5: Therefore, infallibilism is true.

24
Q

Problem with infalliblism: too strict

A

If we only accept infallible justifications then we seriously restrict what we count as knowledge. (There aren’t that many justifications that we can say are infallible.)
Think about propositions that we claim to know like ‘water boils at 100°C’. Although it seems like a clear cut case of knowledge, it may be that your science teachers have been lying; it may be that you are wired in to a virtual reality and that water doesn’t even exist; it may even be the case that all the thermometers in the world are inaccurate and so on. In other words, it can be doubted.
We might even end up by saying that we can never have knowledge! The idea that we can never have knowledge is known as scepticism.
It’s worth remembering that when most of us use the word knowledge, we mean it to include more than those things about which we can have absolutely no doubt.
If we are happy to restrict our understanding of knowledge in this way, then infallibilism works. However, most of us wouldn’t want to think that knowledge can be restricted to the very few propositions that we can justify without any possibility of doubt.

25
Replace ‘justified with ‘reliably informed’ Reliabilism (R+T+B)
Infallibilism sets too high a standard for knowledge as it requires justification to be infallible. This means that there are many things that we cannot claim to know. Perhaps in order to loosen this condition, we need to replace justification with ‘reliably informed’. According to reliabilism, you know that p iff: 1. p is true, 2. you believe that p, and 3. your belief is produced by a reliable cognitive process. Some sources are reliable because they deliver a high percentage chance of certainty. 1. Memory 2. Introspection 3. Testimony 4. Perception using the senses 5. Simple arithmetic
26
Benefits of reliabilism
It is more lenient than infallibilism and so it allows for more of what we ordinarily call knowledge to be included in our definition of it. It allows us to say that animals and young children have knowledge. Animals and young children may not be able to justify their beliefs through evidence or complicated reasoning, but they use other reliable cognitive processes when forming their beliefs. Much more in line with our intuitive/everyday understanding of what knowledge is. Reliabilism is an externalist theory. As long as the process which produces a belief reliably produces true beliefs then no further understanding or complex justification is required. I may not be able to justify my faith that my senses are not deceiving me. As long as my senses are reliable, I can claim to have knowledge when I use them. No ‘internal’ understanding or justification of the reliable cognitive method is required. In other words, I don’t need to be able to know that I know! So a) Reliabilism gives us an account of knowledge in which justification is not required. b) Reliabilism allows for the subject (knower) to have knowledge without knowing that they have knowledge.
27
Dr Jones counter to reliabilism
Think back to Dr Jones and viruses X and Y. When she formulated the proposition ‘Smith had virus X’ she was using an extremely reliable method: blood tests that are correct in the overwhelming majority of cases. And yet she didn’t have knowledge!
28
Fake barn County counter to reliabilism
In ‘fake barn county’, the locals create fake barns that look identical to real barns Henry is driving through fake barn county, but he doesn’t know the locals do this Henry often thinks “there’s a barn” when he looks at the fake barns These beliefs are not knowledge, because they are not true – the barns are fake However, on one occasion Henry looks at the one real barn and thinks “there’s a barn” This time the belief is true Henry has also used a reliable cognitive process to reach this conclusion; he has used his visual sense perception. Like all other Gettier examples, the fact that this belief is true is a matter of luck; it is accidentally true and so cannot count as knowledge.
29
Adding a ‘third condition’ will never guarantee that we have knowledge. (Zagzebski)
Doesn't apply to infallibilism Zagzebski claims that this is because the ‘third condition’ is always independent of the truth. Although it is closely connected to the truth, it is independent of it and cannot therefore guarantee it. She says that it doesn’t matter how we add to the conditions for knowledge, we will always be able to construct Gettier cases that show that the definition is inadequate. Formula 1. Choose a definition of knowledge that involves TB + a third condition, e.g. reliably informed, no false lemmas etc. 2. Now imagine a scenario in which this definition is used to make a knowledge claim but it turns out to be false due to bad luck, e.g. Henry believes he’s seen a barn but in fact he’s just seen a facade. This is not knowledge because it is false. 3. Now imagine a scenario in which this definition is used to make a knowledge claim that turns out to be true due to good luck, e.g. Henry believes he’s seen a barn when in fact it is the only real barn in Fake Barn County. This is not knowledge because it is a Gettier problem. In both cases, the definition of knowledge remains the same (TB + third condition) and yet the truthfulness of the propositions is quite accidental. This is a demonstration that any ‘TB + third condition’ will always be susceptible to Gettier problems. Zagzebski claims that this shows that all definitions of knowledge of the form we have been looking at are susceptible to Gettier style problems because the Truth condition is disconnected from the Third condition
30
Virtue epistemology as knowledge
Virtue epistemology is an attempt to define knowledge whilst avoiding Gettier problems. It does so by explicitly linking the justification condition to the truth of the belief. In this way, there can be none of the lucky true beliefs that cause Gettier problems. The justification condition is changed very radically. Knowledge is justified in terms of the intellectual virtues and vices of the knower. Intellectual virtues are character traits, tendencies, or DISPOSITIONS to use reliable processes to gain knowledge. If a friend is intellectually virtuous, then we tend to believe what they say. If a friend often uses unreliable processes (vices), we tend not to fully believe the things they tell us because they may not be fully justified. According to virtue epistemology, you know that p iff: 1. p is true, 2. you believe that p, and 3. p is true as a result of you exercising your intellectual virtues. Gettier cases are what happens we have a belief that is accurate (true) and typically arrived at via skillful means (they are adroit). However, there is no connection between the truth of the belief and the means by which it was made. Gettier cases are lucky true beliefs. Because lucky true beliefs are impossible according to virtue theory, there is no possibility of Gettier cases arising.
31
Sosa AAA as knowledge
Accuracy refers to whether the target is hit or not. (Note that the archer may get lucky and accidentally hit the target.) Adroitness refers to the skill of the archer. (Note that a skilful shot doesn’t guarantee accuracy; there may be a sudden gust of wind!) Aptness refers to the situation in which the shot hits the target (is accurate) because of the skill of the archer (her adroitness). Accuracy: An accurate belief is a true belief. Adroitness: An adroit belief is one that was formed on the basis of intellectual virtue (using a reliable intellectual process). Aptness: An apt belief is a true belief that is true because it is adroit.
32
Fake Barn County as a problem for Virtue epistemology
Henry uses his intellectual virtues (relying on his clear visual impression of a barn) to believe that there is a barn. This is an Accurate belief. It is Adroit (he exercised his intellectual virtues). It is Apt (it is true because it is Adroit). And yet it is only accidentally true and so doesn’t count as knowledge.
33
Sosa's response to fake barn county problem
He argues that Henry does have knowledge. He does, after all, have an apt belief when he identifies the barn. However, because Henry is unaware of the unusual context, he is unable to tell if his belief is apt or not, or make a judgement about whether it is lucky or not. Sosa refers to this form of knowledge as animal knowledge, as opposed to reflective human knowledge. Animal knowledge: This is when the subject has an apt belief, but she is unable to tell that her belief is apt. This is the case for Henry in Fake Barn County. Human Knowledge: This is when the subject has an apt belief and is able to tell that her belief is apt. This is fully reflective knowledge.