Epistemology II - The structure and value of knowledge

Question 1

Agrippa’s trilemma

Answer 1

Justification of beliefs in terms of other beliefs is impossible because of three impossible horns and should be rejected

Horns:
(1) Infinitism
(2) Foundationalism
(3) Circular justification/coherentism

Question 2

Animal knowledge

Answer 2

Sosa’s externalist conception of knowledge in terms of apt beliefs

Question 3

Apt

Answer 3

In the case of animal knowledge, beliefs are not ‘justified’, according to Sosa, but rather ‘apt’ in the sense that they have more often than not instrumental value

Question 4

Basic beliefs

Answer 4

Beliefs that do not require further justification, because they are infallible

Question 5

Coherentism

Answer 5

A belief is justified holistically because it is part of a web of beliefs that is coherent

Question 6

Externalism

Answer 6

Justification does not require access

Question 7

Fondherentism

Answer 7

Susan Haack’s combinatino of foundationalism and coherentism, avoiding their respective problems

Question 8

Foundationalism

Answer 8

Knowledge in general and in science in particular rets on a solid foundation of (infallible) basic beliefs

Question 9

Holistic justification

Answer 9

Justification of a belief by its coherence with and within a web of beliefs

Question 10

Infinitism

Answer 10

Justficiation can, at least in theory, go on ad infinitum, so that the need for further justification diminishes and eventually disappears

Question 11

Instrumental value

Answer 11

Value as a means to realize another goal

Question 12

Internalism

Answer 12

Justification requires access

Question 13

Intrinsic value

Answer 13

Value regardless of usefulness

Question 14

Isolation problem

Answer 14

Coherent web of beliefs can get completely detached from reality

Question 15

Linear justification

Answer 15

Inferring the justification of a belief from one or more other beliefs

Question 16

Myth of the given

Answer 16

Sellar’s objection to foundationalism that, on the one hand, sensory experiences as such are infallible, but that they cannot offer linear justification, and on the other hand, perceptual beliefs (=interpreted sensory experiences) can offer linear justification, but are not infallible

Question 17

New demon problem

Answer 17

Thought experiment showing that the reliability of the belief formation is not a necessary condition of its justification

Question 18

Reflective knowledge

Answer 18

Sosa’s internalist conception of knowledge

Question 19

Regress argument

Answer 19

Argument that an infinite regress is impossible

Question 20

Reliablism

Answer 20

True beliefs are justified if they are formed in a truth conducive and hence reliable way

Question 21

Truth-conduciveness

Answer 21

Resulting more often in truths than in falsehoods

Question 22

What is meant by ‘access’ to justification?

Answer 22

Being able to think and/or reflect upon justification

Question 23

What is evidentialism?

Answer 23

Your belief is only justified when you have reasons/proof for it

Question 24

What is non-evidentialism?

Answer 24

Leaves space for justified beliefs without direct evidence, such as faith, intuition or dependable instincts

Question 25

What do skeptics try to point out using Agrippa's Trilemma?

Answer 25

Skepticism about the possibility of justification

Question 26

What is the structure of knowledge in foundationalism?

Answer 26

Pyramid-structured -> all higher order knowledge rests on lower order knowledge with a foundation of basic beliefs

Question 27

What is the parallel between empiricism and foundationalism?

Answer 27

Empiricism can be seen as a specific kind of foundationalism that sees sense data as its most basic knowledge

Question 28

What is the so-called 'dogma of empiricism'?

Answer 28

All knowledge should start with what is given to us through sense data

Question 29

What is Russell's distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquintance? To which of the horns of Agrippa's Trilemma does it belong, and why?

Answer 29

Knowledge by description = synthesis of facts of knowledge through acquintaince Knowledge by acquintaince = direct, non-inferential experiences Belongs to foundationalism, because it sees knowledge by acquintance as more fundamental than knowledge by description

Question 30

What are the main criticisms on foundationalism? (2)

Answer 30

1. Sellars: there is no 'pure' infallible sense-data that can serve as the foundation of knowledge 2. Sensory experiences are inferentially sterile -> some amount of interpretation is always needed to generate propositions

Question 31

What is Sellar's criticism of foundationalism?

Answer 31

Sellar's acknowledges that sensory experiences are infallible, but that any access we have to our sensory experiences is always through some (minimal) form of interpretation

Question 32

Why are sensory experiences inferentially sterile, and what does this mean for foundationalism?

Answer 32

Sensory experiences are mere experiences and not yet propositions -> cannot be used in the justification chain of foundationalism To be able to build inferences, sense experiences have to be (minimally) interpreted, rendering them fallible

Question 33

What kinds of coherence can coherentism demand (2), and which one is more suited, and why?

Answer 33

1. Logical consistency 2. Explanatory coherence Logical consistency is insufficient -> it guarantees consistency, but lacks justificational power. Explanatory coherence does have the power to justify beliefs in a network of belief

Question 34

What are the main criticisms of coherentism? (2)

Answer 34

1. Its flexibility allows one to maintain any belief by making alterations elsewhere in their network of beliefs 2. Isolation problem: webs of belief may be internally coherent, but be wholly detached from external reality

Question 35

What is a common objection to infinitism? What is the counterargument to this?

Answer 35

The epistemic subject is finite, and therefore cannot entertain an infinite justification chain Counterargument: it is not necessary that the epistemic subject actually has the whole justification chain in mind -> this only has to be possible in principle

Question 36

What is an alternative to the three horns of the dilemma? What are its constituent parts, and why is it useful?

Answer 36

Fondherentism = foundationalism + coherentism It counters the respective disadvantages of its constituent parts

Question 37

What is the role of sensory experiences in fondherentism? How does this differ from foundationalism?

Answer 37

Subjective experiences serve as hints -> not an absolute foundation, but still very relevant, because they inform/direct our way of thinking Differs from foundationalism, because it sees subjective experiences as most basic/certain to the formation of further beliefs

Question 38

What is the advantage of the integration of coherentism in fondherentism?

Answer 38

Determines whether beliefs fit in the network of our beliefs; combined with foundationalism, which ensures that networks of beliefs remain grounded in reality

Question 39

What do radical skeptics urge us to do through Agrippa's Trilemma?

Answer 39

They show that definitive justification cannot be reached -> this urges us to postpone judgment

Question 40

Which problem does Pyrrhonian skepticism have with abduction?

Answer 40

Abduction = inference based on the best explanation, but: there is no way to determine what the 'best' explanation is

Question 41

Which two types of value can be attributed to knowledge?

Answer 41

1. Intrinsic value 2. Instrumental value

Question 42

What is the stance of someone that sees intrinsic value of knowledge?

Answer 42

Knowledge is valueable by itself, without depending on usefulness of applicability

Question 43

What is the stance of someone that sees instrumental value of knowledge?

Answer 43

Knowledge is valuable because it helps us act

Question 44

Which view on justification does Agrippa's Trilemma assume?

Answer 44

Internalist view -> it requires access to justification

Question 45

Which view on justification does reliablism assume?

Answer 45

Externalist view -> justification is dependent on factors external to the epistemic subject

Question 46

What does justification depend on in reliablism?

Answer 46

The relability of the method used to attain true beliefs

Question 47

What determines whether a method is reliable in reliablism?

Answer 47

Its success in the external world

Question 48

What are characteristics of reliable methods in reliablism?

Answer 48

More often than not leading to true beliefs

Question 49

Which challenges can be raised to reliablism? (4)

Answer 49

1. Generality problem -> how do we determine which method is which, and under which circumstances which method is reliable? 2. The New Demon Problem: thought experiment that shows that reliability of belief formation is not a necessary condition of its justification 3. Brain-in-a-Vat (BIV): we need to be sure about the existence of an external world and our perceptual relation to it before we can say anything about the reliability of our perceptions -> if our perception is unreliable, any belief-forming process that comes after them is too 4. Problem of unknown reliability: what if the method used to arrive at knowledge is dependable, but one cannot fully know that it is dependable?

Question 50

Which kinds of knowledge does Sosa distinguish? (2)

Answer 50

1. Animal knowledge: externalist conception of knowledge in terms of apt beliefs (no reflection) 2. Reflective knowledge: internalist conception of knowledge that requires reflection upon the belief-forming processes involved