Final Flashcards

(100 cards)

1
Q

decision making

A
  • conscious selection among a number of options, often with uncertain outcomes
  • not everything is controlled by a conscious decision –> some choices = habit
  • there is a diff between deciding and doing
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2
Q

actually carrying out actions are determined by

A
  • motivation

- context

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3
Q

normative decision

A

the objectively right decision

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4
Q

rational decision

A

one that follows certain basic principles of consistency and coherence

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5
Q

utility

A

how much value something has for you

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6
Q

expected value

A

amount (of money usually) you expect to gain/lose as a result of a decision

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7
Q

Expected utility theory

A

to compare 2 options

1) consider the possible outcomes associated with each option
2) estimate your utility (value) of each outcome
3) estimate the probability of each outcome
4) Multiply probability by utility for each outcome + add up all the outcomes
5) the total is that options expected utility

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8
Q

Expected Utility Theory Example

A

Two sandwiches. Compare outcomes for each one:
P(crab salad is good) * Utility of good crab salad + P(crab salad is bad) * Utility of bad crab salad
P(liverwurst is good) * Utility of good liverwurst + P(liverwurst is bad) * Utility of bad liverwurst
Choose sandwich with highest overall utility*.

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9
Q

Roulette Example

A

38 numbers: 1 - 36 (black & white) plus 0, 00.
Bet $1 on black
Expected Value is calculated as Prob(outcome) * value of that outcome

Winning: 18/38 * $1 = $.4737
Losing: 20/38 * $-1 = -$.5263 Expected value (sum) = $-.0526

So, why do people play, if they expect to lose 5% of their stake on each bet?

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10
Q

Test of Expected Utility Theory (The Allais Paradox)

A

Which lottery would you prefer? {expected utilities}

A. Probability .40 to win $100 [.4 * U100]
B. Probability .50 to win $70 [.5 *U70]
–> If people choose A over B, then .4 * U100 > .5 * U70

C. Probability .80 to win $100 [.8 * U100]
D. Probability 1.0 to win $70 [.8 * U100]
–> If people choose D over C, then .8 * U100 < 1 * U70

the fact that people prefer A to B and D to C is like saying that A > B but 2A < 2B. Inconsistent/irrational

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11
Q

Attraction Effect: Choosing a Graduate School

A

A. Harvard
—–>Excellent reputation; poor financial support
B. Indiana
—–>OK reputation; excellent financial support
C. Dartmouth
—–>Good reputation; bad financial support

OR

A. Harvard [same as above]
—–>Excellent reputation; poor financial support
B. Indiana [same as above]
—–>OK reputation; excellent financial support
D. Iowa
—–>Bad reputation; good financial support

  • this also seems irrational
  • the presence of an option you’re not going to choose should have no effect on which of the other options seems better
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12
Q

Explanation for Attraction Effect

A

People want to be able to justify their decisions

-Hsee (1999)

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13
Q

Hsee (1999): Record

A

-Asked subjects whether they would prefer to receive a Beatles CD or Barbra Streisand CD for being in his experiment (Beatles)
-Other subjects were told that they could do one
experiment for 90 points or another for 50 points the Beatles CD cost 50 points, and Streisand 90 (Streisand CD)
-even though they preferred the Beatles.
Hey, it’s worth 40 more points!

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14
Q

Shafir (1993): 2 Vacation Reservations

A
Option A (bland)
Option B (mixed)

Half subjects asked to option to keep; half asked which to cancel

-Keep question
Option B (mixed) is kept (67%)

-Cancel question
Option B is canceled 48% (i.e., is kept 52%)
i.e., Option B drops by 15% from “keep” to “cancel”

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15
Q

Shafir Summary: Are we irrational?

A
  • Choices aren’t consistent in the Allais Paradox
  • People change which option they choose depending on third option they aren’t going to choose
  • People change their choices depending on whether they decide to keep or get rid of 1 of 2 options
  • This sort of inconsistency does not meet standards of rationality, according to many.
  • Framing effects
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16
Q

Framing effects

A

-How the choices are described or the context they’re put into a affects which one is preferred.

-Inconsistent with expected utility theory (and most rational theories), because it’s the actual choices that should matter—not how they’re
described.
-Classic examples often compare gains and losses

-People really hate losses

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17
Q

Tversky & Kahneman (1981) : Framing Effect Example

A

-unusual disease is expected to kill 600 people this year.
-2 alternative programs have been proposed to combat the disease.
A. 200 people will be saved.
B. 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 that no people will be saved.
C. 400 people will die.
D. 1/3 probability that no people will die, and 2/3 that 600 people will die
A: 72% B: 28%
C: 22% D: 78%

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18
Q

General Pattern of Risky Choices

A
  • People like certainty when it comes to gains
  • take a small sure gain over a gamble for a larger amount.
  • prefer risk when it comes to losses
  • take a gamble on a larger loss over a sure smaller loss.
  • isn’t necessarily irrational
  • unless it leads to different decisions, as in the disease problem
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19
Q

McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky (1982): dying framing (actual stats of the time)

A

100 people having surgery for lung cancer
– 10 die during or shortly thereafter
– 32 will die by one year
– 66 will die by five years

100 people having chemotherapy
– none die during treatment
– 23 die by one year
– 78 die by five years
• Note that surgery is worse immediately but better in the long-term

–58% chose surgery in dying frame and

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20
Q

McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky (1982): survival framing (actual stats of the time)

A

Of 100 people having surgery
– 90 live through treatment
– 68 survive one year
– 34 survive five years

Of 100 people having chemotherapy
– all survive treatment
– 77 survive one year
– 22 survive five years
• All subjects (patients, doctors, students) chose
surgery more often in this (survival) framing
than in the dying framing
– 75% in survival frame
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21
Q

Tversky & Kahneman (1981): Loss Aversion

A

Decision 1:
A. a sure gain of $240
B. 25% chance of gaining of $1,000
75% chance of gaining nothing

Decision 2:
C. a sure loss of $750
D. 75% chance of losing $1,000
25% chance of losing nothing

A: 84% B: 16%
C: 13% D: 87%

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22
Q

The Endowment Effect (economist Richard Thaler)

A

-Once you have something, you value it a lot more than you would if you didn’t have it
-Owners of something think it is worth more than
potential buyers of something think it is

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23
Q

Status Quo Bias: Reasons

A

1) Current situation is considered “normal” and so is not perceived as loss or gain, even if it’s terrible
Any change will involve losses + gains
Add loss aversion and the status quo often seems better than any change

2) Status quo may have official sanction (employer, government, other institutions). car insurance example in text
“The current situation must be better, or else they wouldn’t make it standard.”

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24
Q

Tversky & Kahneman, 1981: Mental Accounting

A

-people group transactions into categories

jacket: $125
calculator: $10
-Would you walk 15 minutes to save $5 on this purchase?
-jacket 29%
-calculator 68%
-$5 seems worth different amounts, depending
on context

You’re going to the theater and discover that you’ve lost your $50 ticket.
Will you buy another to see the play?
vs.
You’re going to the theater and discover that a $50 bill fell out of your wallet.
Will you still buy a ticket (cost = $50) to see the play?
46% yes in first case vs. 88% in second*

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25
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981: Mental Accounting
Different rules for di erent kinds of money $1,000 inherited from grandfather won in lottery earned found on street -isn’t $1,000 the same no matter where it came from?
26
Herbert Simon: Is it possible to make optimal decisions?
Ideal decisions require massive computations Decision making itself involves a cost, in time and effort, which must be factored into the benefit of making better decisions
27
satisficing
choosing the first acceptable alternative you find
28
Heuristics
are rules of thumb that may be helpful but that may not always give the right answer.
29
Availability heuristic/salience heuristic
-decide how likely something is by how easily it comes to mind. -will be accurate to the degree that frequent and likely events come to mind faster or more strongly than infrequent, unlikely events.
30
Tversky & Kahneman (1973)
-Subjects read one of two lists of names: 19 famous men, 20 less famous women OR 19 famous women, 20 less famous men -Subjects then had to estimate whether there were more men or women on each list. -Other subjects took a surprise memory test on the lists: they recalled 12 of 19 famous names but only 8 of 20 less famous names
31
Thompson, Reyes, & Bower (1979): jury decision-making task
-Subjects read the testimony from a (fictional) trial -The prosecution or defense evidence was made vivid or pallid, depending on condition. -Subjects made their decisions immediately, or next day What should the difference be?
32
Hamill, Wilson, & Nisbett (1979): prison guard
- Subjects viewed interviews with a “prison guard” (guard was humane or inhumane) - Subjects are told that the guard is typical or atypical of guards at that prison - Later attitude test about guards
33
Jensen et al., 2014
1. male reproductive‡ 2. breast 6. bladder‡ 10. blood/leukemia* 14. head/brain* *These get more media attention than their frequency indicates. ‡These get less attention. Media attention moved cancers up in people’s estimates of their frequency.
34
Problems with availability
- Things that are memorable or salient are not always the most common or likely - Sometimes, the most valuable information is dull, unmemorable, complicated, or not easily found - Sometimes a really interesting, memorable, striking example is not typical - However, it probably is true that things that come to mind are more likely than things that don’t come to mind, in general.
35
Representativeness Heuristic
-Based on similarity or typicality -If something seems similar to other examples of X, you may decide that it is an X -Again, it is probably a generally useful heuristic, but there are cases in which it is misleading (e.g., stereotypes)
36
Representativeness
-People’s judgments were predictable by representativeness (stereotypes) Base rates tend to be ignored. -Base rates = overall frequency/probability of different outcomes
37
The conjunction fallacy
- P(A&B) must be no greater than P(A) or P(B) - in every case that A&B is true, A is true as well. Thus, P(A) must be at least as large as P(A&B) - any simple option should be ranked higher than a conjunction including it - Let’s consider three options 1) Linda is a bank teller 2) Linda is a bank teller who helps organize anti-Trump protests 3) Linda helps organize anti-Trump protests P(Linda is a bank teller) > P(Linda is a bank teller & helps organize anti-Trump protests) but most people make the opposite judgment! representativeness!
38
Type 1 Reasoning
intuitive fast mostly unconscious automatic
39
Type 2 Reasoning
reflective slow mostly conscious controlled
40
Critique of Heuristics & Biases (Gigerenzer & Todd)
-Too much emphasis on errors -Evolutionary Argument -How bad could decision making really be? After all, we are all alive. -Perfect decision-making is impossible in the real world. -Heuristics have “ecological rationality” -human decision making is as good as it can be, i.e., optimal. (Compare to Simon’s concept of satisficing.)
41
Critique of Critique
- Have you actually looked at the world? or at people? - Does anything about our decision making really seem optimal? - Consider the last financial crash (2007-8) Improvement -You can only improve your decision making if you recognize that it could be improved. If it’s optimal already, then nothing can be done.
42
Chase & Simon (1973)
* Gave experts and novices chess boards to look at for 5 seconds. * Subjects then had to recreate them on a real board. * Some of the boards had randomly-placed pieces (why?)
43
pattern matching
chess masters do not consider many more alternatives than novices do, nor do they necessarily calculate more deeply into the move sequence (de Groot, 1965). • Instead, they seem able to recognize a position as good or bad, and what its strengths and weaknesses are.
44
Experts
- generally know more of the underlying principles of the domain - this is principles of strategy and tactics.
45
Problem-solving approaches of novices and | experts in physics
Experts: spend much time analyzing the type of problem it is and then working forwards from that Novices: generate equations that might be used to find the missing information—working backwards
46
Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser (1981):physics problems grouping
Asked subjects to categorize physics problems • Subjects were graduate students in physics or undergrad who had received an A in the intro course • Subjects read problems and grouped them into related groups.
47
How do you get to “see through” superficial similarities?
- Solve lots of different kinds of problems | - Superficially, the problems will not be similar, but the underlying principles will presumably be the same
48
Ross (1984)
Taught learners how to solve 6 types of probability problems (e.g., permutations), each with an example (rolling dice, matching photographs, etc.) Then he tested them on new problems that either -matched in content the original one (e.g., both dice) -had new content, not used before -mismatched the content (i.e., matching a different kind of problem) Subjects had to say how to solve the test problem, but didn’t have to solve it.
49
Ross (1984) RESULTSZ
* Matching content: 76% correct * New content: 43% correct * Mismatching content: 22% correct * If people had been using only the abstract principle, they would have scored identically in all three types * Novices tend to rely on superficial aspects of problems (e.g., dice vs. photographs) to figure out how to solve them, even if these aspects are irrelevant
50
expertise is domain-specific
Listening to Mozart will not make you better at math. | • Experts at chess are not necessarily experts in golf, math, or literature
51
2 sides of expertise
1) pattern-matching: suggests perceptual skill | 2) Deep underlying principles: suggests abstract knowledge
52
Why isn’t pattern matching enough?
1) New and complex situations by definition can’t be learned in advance 2) You have to be able to reason through what to do in such situations 3) Some domains are not as perceptual or motor- based as others
53
Experts develop automaticity
1) Perceptually (pattern matching in chess, radiology, etc.) 2) Motorically (e.g., musicians, athletes, surgeons, butchers, typists) 3) In solving problems (diagnosticians, statisticians, mechanics)
54
John Anderson: 3 stages of skill learning
1) Use declarative knowledge (slow) 2) Develop procedural knowledge from the declarative (automatized, fast) 3) Refine and enlarge (chunk) the procedural knowledge (slowly increase speed)
55
How long is procedural knowledge refined?
FOREVER -Herbert Simon: expert is someone who has seen 10,000 examples of something
56
Ericsson et al. (1993) study of violin players: Who will become an expert?
``` see text -world class players: 7,410 hours of practice -very good players: 5,301 hours of practice ```
57
Gawande (2002) p.19
“Surgeons, as a group, adhere to a curious egalitarianism. They believe in practice, not talent. People often assume that you have to have great hands to become a surgeon, but it’s not true... • Attending surgeons say that what’s most important to them [in students] is finding people who are conscientious, industrious, and boneheaded enough to stick at practicing the one difficult thing day and night for years on end.”
58
Winner (2000): Is it just practice?
“Children who work the earliest and hardest may well be those with the highest level of talent. Most children cannot be cajoled to play music or think about math problems for hours on end, but highly gifted children often cannot be cajoled away from such activities."
59
Limits of practice: is it “talent” that sets these children apart or their urge to master the skill?
Answer may depend on the domain Perhaps anyone can learn to be a fast cigar roller, with only 20 million trials of practice But can anyone become Yo Yo Ma or Jerry Rice with enough practice? Probably not, but maybe you could become very good Cognitive variables may be an important part of the answer, but not the only part motivation physical skill personality may all be important
60
Duncker (1945)
You have a box of tacks, a book of matches, and a candle (plus other items, in some versions). Goal: Attach the candle to the wall. problem: functional fixedness
61
creative solution to a problem is
1) novel | 2) relevant (=successful?)
62
4 stages of “insight” problems
1) Preparation and hard work on the problem (unsuccessful) 2) Incubation 3) Insight (aha!) 4) Verification
63
Nine-dot Problem
Draw four straight lines without lifting your pencil from the paper that goes through each dot.
64
Smith & Blankenship (1991): Gave people problems with or without a misleading hint
* Subjects got two chances to solve the problem, either with incubation or not * Incubation particularly helped the group that got the misleading hint * Incubation may allow de-activation of old, incorrect solutions, so new ideas can be considered.
65
Ward, Smith, & Finke: Creative Cognition Approach/Alien creation task
-examples are often based on very familiar concepts with one or two modifications add, delete, or change a property of a known object
66
Ward et. al. (2002): conceptual expansion task
1) Some subjects list as many category members as they can (tools, fruit, or animals) 2) Other subjects make a new example of the category that might be found on an alien planet. The tool people were told to think of a tool for aliens who had no appendages prediction: The availability (i.e., typicality) of items in the category will predict whether they form the basis for a novel tool, or whatever.
67
Ward et al. results
-availability of the item in the listing task predicted whether people would use it in making novel tools for aliens --> 68% mentioned earth tools -If subjects were told to use their wildest imagination and not to feel bound by what is found on earth, it made little difference --> 48% mentioned earth objects
68
Ward et al. Conclusions
- When people try to be creative, they are limited by starting with examples that they already know. - present concepts give us a good idea of what “creative” ideas they will come up with. - further evidence for the importance of typicality in concepts.
69
Creative Conclusions
- even new inventions often conform to old products and ideas - making the item really new is done in small steps - -> consistent with the creative cognition approach
70
Who is creative? “Big Five” personality variables
openness to experiences is important conventional–original unadventurous–daring conforming–independent unartistic-artistic people high on this trait are characterized by curiosity, sensation seeking, rebelliousness
71
Maddux & Galinsky (2009)
• Individual differences approach ➢ compare those who have lived abroad to those who have not • Duncker candle problem • Difficult negotiation problem (requiring thinking out of the box) • Living abroad predicted success on both problems; Foreign travel did not ``` • Experimental approach ➢ primed different experiences (across subjects) ➢ tested effect on a creativity test • Conditions. Think about... ➢ living abroad ➢ traveling abroad ➢ day in your life at home • Then did the Remote Associates Task ```
72
Remote Associates Test: What word do these have in common?
(Easy) cottage, Swiss, cake (Hard) right, cat, carbon
73
Speech perception: The first step phonology
Refers to the identification of speech sounds, syllables, and other small units study of speech sounds
74
phoneme
- basic unit of speech sounds - sound and articulatory-based unit - not letters
75
Phonology Rules
•Different languages have different rules about • Rules are based on properties of the sounds such as – voicing – place of articulation what sounds can be used and how they can be combined.
76
spectrogram
represents how the sounds frequencies change over time
77
Optimistic Theory of Speech Perception
• one-to-one relationship between sounds and phonemes – each phoneme has a single sound – each sound picks out only one phoneme
78
Problems with optimistic theory
• Individual differences in speakers • Coarticulation – [si] vs. [su] – speech segmentation – we don't put spaces between words when we speak – occurs even across word boundaries (hard to say when one word stops and the other begins
79
The Motor Theory of speech perception
* believes that “speech is special” * speech production is implicitly used in speech perception, to solve the coarticulation problem * you work backwards to identify the action that made the speech sound (hence the name) * McGurk effect
80
Perception of voicing in speech
Generally but by no means perfectly related to Voice Onset Time (VOT) – amount of time between onset of voicing and rest of the sound (opening of vocal tract) • In English, voiced consonants start voicing at about the same time as the rest of the sound (= 0 VOT) • unvoiced consonants don’t start voicing until 40 ms or so afterwards
81
Top-down and bottom-up perception
Top-down perception can be used to solve some of | the problems of speech perception
82
Syntax
-grammatical structure of sentences -specify the phrases possible in the language -helps resolve ambiguity -In many languages, nouns and adjectives must agree in gender or number (not English)
83
Semantics
meaning of sentences (and words)
84
Sentence Ambiguity/ "attachment ambiguities"
Not only words are ambiguous. Sentence ambiguity often involves a sentence that has two different syntactic structures. • I saw the student looking through my binoculars. • I saw the student looking through my binoculars.
85
General Syntactic Strategies of Comprehension
1) Use function words to guess the structure articles, prepositions, auxiliary verbs 2) Use syntax to guess what’s coming next late closure (txt)
86
Syntactic Strategies & Ambiguity
People often don’t notice that sentences are ambiguous because a syntactic strategy picks one structure, and you don’t notice the other
87
Garden Path Sentences
Sentences that are grammatical but syntactically misleading - start one way but end another - usually not ambiguous.
88
Basic Semantic Strategy
• Identify content words and use them to build propositions that make sense a top-down strategy
89
Theoretical Approaches to Syntax and Semantics in Sentence Comprehension
I. Syntax first First identify the major phrases and clauses, and then input this to the semantic strategy. Advantage: syntax is more regular than semantics II. Interactive Use both syntax and semantics in parallel. Advantage: semantics can help prevent syntactic errors like garden paths
90
Garnsey et al. (1997)
Plausible version: The historian read the manuscript had been destroyed in the fire. Readers slow down when they get to “had been.” They were garden-pathed! Sad. -shows evidence of the syntactic strategy to take the noun phrase after the verb as being the direct object (not the beginning of a complement) Implausible version The historian read the statue had been destroyed in the fire. Readers do not slow down when they get to “had been” in the implausible version. The syntactic strategy has been overruled by meaning. control version has the word that inserted
91
Garnsey et al. (1997) Results
The syntax is the same across sentences, but the plausibility of the direct-object interpretation apparently influenced the sentence structure readers perceived. This gives evidence for the interactive or parallel view of comprehension, as semantics influenced syntax.
92
Grice’s (1975) Conversational Maxims
Quality Do not say what you believe to be false Do not say that for which you lack sufficient evidence Quantity Make your contribution as informative as is required Do not make your contribution more informative than is required Relation • Be relevant ``` Manner • Avoid obscurity of expression • Avoid ambiguity • Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity) • Be orderly ```
93
Sound Exchange Errors (Garrett, 1975)
So, while you do the cooking, Bill snovels show, does he? (sn-sh exchange) You’re not a pujin pitter-downer, are you? (I-u exchange) Children interfere with your nife lite. (t-f exchange) Glear plue sky. (Fromkin, 1971)
94
Conclusion from speech production studies
- Words are assembled from scratch every time they’re said - All these speech errors show that people are retrieving the speech sounds and putting them together when they say a word - They must not be retrieving an entire motor sequence, or else they couldn’t make these exchanges -Errors are based on both meaning and sound When people make word errors, the words typically sound similar -However, the words are often related in meaning too—more than predicted by chance
95
Bock, Nicol & Cutting (1999): Complete-the-sentence task
The actors in the soap opera... plural subject, singular local noun The actor in the soap operas... singular subject, plural local noun (Possible completion: “was/were overpaid”) Results: 1% errors in first case but 10% in second. Plural can overcome singular but not vice versa!
96
1) Repetition priming 2) associative priming 3) syntactic priming
1) Reading notebook helps you see that word in a briefly-presented display 2) Reading doctor helps you identify nurse as a word 3) Hearing or producing a syntactic form increases the chance that you will produce it again - even with completely different word
97
General form of syntactic priming expts
* Mixed sentence-picture displays * People read sentences, which contain primes * They describe pictures * Measure the effect of the prime on picture description e.g., Sentence: The governess made the princess a pot of tea. Picture of a boy handing a guitar to a man
98
Dative sentences
-double object construction The governess made the princess a pot of tea (Agent - Verb - Indirect object – Object) -prepositional construction The governess made a pot of tea for the princess. ( Agent – Verb – Object – Prepositional phrase)
99
Transitive sentences
* Active: The dog broke the vase. | * Passive: The vase was broken by the dog.
100
Ferreira et al. conclusions
• Syntactic priming must be procedural - - long lasting, like implicit memory effects - -even though it’s an abstract form of priming, because there’s almost no overlap of words