‘How Convincing Is Indirect Realism?’

Question 1

INTRODUCTION - (✓ Convincing)

Answer 1

Indirect Realism claims we perceive sense data caused by mind-independent (MI) objects.
We don’t perceive physical objects directly; we perceive them indirectly via mental representations (sense data).
- It’s a modern improvement over Direct Realism (DR): helps explain illusions, hallucinations, and perceptual variation.
- however, IR faces the “veil of perception” problem: if all we know are sense data, how can we know the real world?
But philosophers like Russell defend IR using inference to the best explanation.
Conclusion preview: IR is ultimately convincing, despite epistemological challenges.

Question 2

PARAGRAPH ONE - (✓ Strengths of Indirect Realism over Direct Realism)

Answer 2

Direct Realism (we perceive objects directly) fails to account for:
- illusions: e.g. pencil in water appears bent.
- perceptual variation: e.g. colour looks different under different lighting.
- time lag: e.g. stars seen now might no longer exist.
Indirect Realism solves these by stating we don’t see objects themselves, but sense data.
Sense data vary while the object stays the same – explains different appearances.
- hallucinations and illusions are still mental events – just misrepresentations.
Thus, IR gives a coherent account of complex perceptual phenomena and is more psychologically realistic.

Question 3

PARAGRAPH TWO -(✗ The veil of perception – scepticism about the nature of MI objects)

Answer 3

If we only ever perceive sense data, we never access MI objects directly.
- so how can we be sure that our perceptions reliably represent those objects?
Raises scepticism about:
- nature of objects (are they as they appear?)
- whether the external world is truly as it seems, or distorted.
Possibly leads to epistemic disconnection from the world – a major challenge for IR.

Question 4

PARAGRAPH THREE - (✓ Perceptions are practically reliable – defence against veil of perception)

Answer 4

Although we don’t access MI objects directly, we can rely on our sense data because they allow us to successfully navigate the world.
- we avoid danger, recognise people, use tools – perception works.
As Russell argues: even if we can’t “know” the object itself, we can infer that the external world causes our sense data.
Practical success of sense data-based perception gives us good reason to trust it, even if it’s not perfectly accurate.
- mirrors scientific models: not full reality, but useful representations.

Question 5

PARAGRAPH FOUR -
(✗ Berkeley’s criticism – no difference between primary and secondary qualities)

Answer 5

Berkeley argues against the distinction between primary and secondary qualities (Locke’s version of IR).
He says all qualities are mind-dependent:
- shape/size change with perspective just like colour or taste.
- if even primary qualities are subjective, there is no good reason to believe in MI objects.
Undermines IR’s assumption that at least some qualities reflect reality.

Question 6

PARAGRAPH FIVE - (✓ Defence: Primary qualities are more objective than secondary)

Answer 6

IR replies: Berkeley misunderstands the distinction.
Primary qualities (size, shape) are measurable, objective, and publicly agreed upon.
Secondary qualities (colour, smell) are subjective, vary between individuals.
Example —> Everyone can agree a table is 2m long (primary), but might disagree on whether it looks red or brown in certain light (secondary).
- this preserves the realism of primary qualities, making the external world inferable even if secondary qualities are mental.

Question 7

PARAGRAPH SIX - (✗ Veil of perception again – scepticism about existence of MI objects)

Answer 7

If we never experience the external world directly, how can we know it exists at all?
- opens the door to Solipsism – the idea that only my mind exists, and the external world might be a fiction.
Since all experience is in the mind, this scepticism is hard to disprove from within IR.
- arguably the strongest challenge to Indirect Realism.

Question 8

PARAGRAPH SEVEN -
(✓ Russell – External world is the best hypothesis)

Answer 8

Russell defends IR by arguing that belief in the external world is the best explanation for the coherence and regularity of experience.
- if there were no MI world, how could our perceptions be so consistent, predictable, and shared with others?
The alternative (no external world) is less plausible than trusting that an external world causes our perceptions.
- so even if we can’t prove the external world exists, we are rational to believe in it.
Inference to the best explanation is a powerful epistemic strategy in science and philosophy.

Question 9

CONCLUSION -
(✓ IR is convincing)

Answer 9

While Indirect Realism has challenges, especially the veil of perception, its strengths outweigh these.
- it successfully explains illusions, variation, hallucination, and is supported by Russell’s epistemic reasoning.
The key idea is that, though we only know sense data, this does not prevent us from justifiably believing in MI objects.
- the most crucial point is Russell’s best hypothesis argument, which grounds IR in rational inference.
Therefore, IR remains a convincing and pragmatic theory of perception, more robust than both DR and Berkeleyan idealism.