‘Is Berkeley’s Idealist Account of Perception Convincing?’

Question 1

INTRODUCTION - (✗ No – not convincing overall)

Answer 1

Berkeley’s idealist account is ultimately unconvincing, despite some strengths.
- idealism: the view that reality consists only of minds and their ideas — material substance does not exist.
For Berkeley, “esse est percipi” – to be is to be perceived. Objects only exist in minds, not outside them.
- however, the view faces several serious issues – most notably its dependence on God to maintain object permanence.
Begin with background (Primary/Secondary qualities), present Berkeley’s view, then explore major criticisms (hallucinations, object permanence, God).

Question 2

PARAGRAPH ONE -
(✗) Background – Primary and Secondary Qualities / Indirect Realism

Answer 2

Before Berkeley, indirect realism (e.g. Locke) distinguished primary qualities (size, shape, motion – supposedly objective) from secondary qualities (colour, smell, taste – subjective).
- this implies a mind-independent world causing our perceptions.
- this creates issues: secondary qualities undermine direct realism, as they show perception is partly subjective.
However, primary qualities still suggest a world exists independent of the mind, which directly contradicts Berkeley’s idealism.
- this indirect realism sets up the debate Berkeley enters.

Question 3

PARAGRAPH TWO -
(✓) Berkeley’s rejection – All qualities are mind-dependent

Answer 3

Berkeley rejects the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
- argues that primary qualities (e.g. size, shape) are just as mind-dependent as secondary ones.
Example —> A coin looks round front-on but oval from the side — shape changes with perspective.
Without secondary qualities (e.g. colour), we can’t perceive or distinguish primary ones — e.g., we can’t judge shape without seeing colour boundaries.
- therefore, all perceptual qualities are mental, and thus nothing exists beyond perception.
- tThis is a key strength of Berkeley’s view — it avoids issues of indirect realism by claiming only ideas exist.

Question 4

PARAGRAPH THREE -
(✗) Misunderstanding of P/S distinction

Answer 4

Berkeley misunderstands the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
- Locke claims primary qualities exist in the object itself, while secondary qualities exist only in the perceiver.
Berkeley assumes that variability in perception = non-existence of primary qualities — but variation doesn’t imply non-existence.
Example —> A stick looks bent in water, but that doesn’t mean the stick is bent — we can still make objective judgments via science and measurement.
- Berkeley’s argument may confuse appearance with reality, weakening his position.

Question 5

PARAGRAPH FOUR -
(✗) Hallucinations and dreams

Answer 5

• how does idealism explain hallucinations and dreams?
  If perception is purely mental, then hallucinations should be as real as “normal” perceptions.
  But we know hallucinations are not real – they don’t correspond to shared reality.
• this raises the question: how do we distinguish between real perception and false mental images if all experience is just ideas?

Question 6

PARAGRAPH FIVE -
(✓) Berkeley’s response – Regularity and privacy

Answer 6

Berkeley replies that hallucinations and dreams are private, irregular, and incoherent.
- real perceptions are public, shared, and regular — part of a consistent and stable reality.
He suggests that we can distinguish hallucinations by their lack of coherence, their non-reliability, and the fact that others don’t perceive them.
- this provides a partial defence — though subjective, perceptions still follow consistent patterns (e.g. fire burns, apples fall).
- still, some might argue this does not fully solve the issue of how we determine what counts as “real.”

Question 7

PARAGRAPH SIX - (✗) Object Permanence

Answer 7

• if objects only exist when perceived, how can they exist when not being perceived?
• e.g. does a tree cease to exist when no one looks at it?
  This undermines scientific understanding, where objects are assumed to exist independently of perception.
• also counterintuitive: babies learn object permanence, suggesting we assume the existence of things when unseen.

Question 8

PARAGRAPH SEVEN -
(✓) Berkeley’s answer – God as the ultimate perceiver

Answer 8

Berkeley replies that objects continue to exist because God constantly perceives everything.- - God is an eternal mind, ensuring all ideas continue to exist even when no human observes them.
This saves object permanence within idealism.
- also explains regularity: the laws of nature are God’s consistent will.

Question 9

PARAGRAPH EIGHT -
(✗) Problems with invoking God

Answer 9

Berkeley relies heavily on God as a Deus ex Machina — solving philosophical problems by inserting a divine mind.
Critics argue this is circular or incoherent:
- if we can’t conceive of mind-independent existence, then how can we conceive of a non-human mind perceiving all things?
- if all ideas are mental, then the idea of God is also just an idea — so how do we know God is real?
This weakens Berkeley’s account significantly — his view collapses without God, yet his justification of God is unclear.

Question 10

CONCLUSION -
(✗ Not convincing)

Answer 10

Berkeley’s idealism offers a clever response to problems in indirect realism, especially by unifying all perception as mental.
However, it faces serious problems:
- fails to convincingly distinguish between appearance and reality.
- struggles with object permanence, hallucinations, and most critically, the dependence on God.
- his use of God feels like a philosophical shortcut, not a justified solution.
Therefore, Berkeley’s idealist account is ultimately unconvincing — it solves one set of problems only by introducing greater ones.