‘Is Knowledge A Justified True Belief?’ Flashcards
(11 cards)
INTRODUCTION
(✓ Yes, with addition of epistemic virtue)
The traditional definition — knowledge = justified true belief (JTB) — captures much of what we mean by knowledge.
- however, it has been seriously challenged by Gettier cases, which show that JTB can be true without being knowledge.
With the addition of epistemic virtue theory (e.g. Sosa’s triple-A rating), the definition can be refined to overcome these objections.
- essay will assess: JTB, Gettier, infallibilism, No False Lemmas (NFL), and virtue epistemology.
PARAGRAPH ONE -
Gettier Problem (✗)
Edmund Gettier (1963): presents counterexamples where someone has JTB but still lacks knowledge.
- Smith and Jones — Smith has strong evidence Jones will get the job and that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket. He concludes: “The man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket.” But Smith gets the job — and he also has 10 coins. So: justified (he had reason), true, believed — yet it feels like luck, not knowledge.
Gettier shows JTB is not sufficient for knowledge — it allows for accidental truths.
- therefore, the JTB account is incomplete or false as a full definition.
PARAGRAPH TWO -
Infallibilism (✓)
To avoid Gettier cases, strengthen justification to infallible justification — i.e. you can only know what cannot be false.
- if a belief could turn out false, even hypothetically, you don’t really know it.
This blocks Gettier cases by raising the bar: if your justification leaves any room for error, it’s not knowledge.
- e.g. Smith’s belief in the Gettier case is fallible, so under infallibilism, he wouldn’t count as knowing.
Solves some cases by denying that the person had knowledge in the first place.
PARAGRAPH THREE -
Infallibilism (✓)
To avoid Gettier cases, strengthen justification to infallible justification — i.e. you can only know what cannot be false.
- if a belief could turn out false, even hypothetically, you don’t really know it.This blocks Gettier cases by raising the bar: if your justification leaves any room for error, it’s not knowledge.
- e.g. Smith’s belief in the Gettier case is fallible, so under infallibilism, he wouldn’t count as knowing.
Solves some cases by denying that the person had knowledge in the first place.
PARAGRAPH FOUR -
Problem with Infallibilism (✗)
Infallibilism sets the standard too high — it would exclude much of what we ordinarily call knowledge.
- we claim to “know” things based on strong but fallible evidence (e.g. “The sun will rise tomorrow” or “My car is outside”), even though they could theoretically be false.
Makes everyday knowledge impossible, pushing us toward scepticism.
- while it avoids Gettier, it does so by abandoning too much ordinary knowledge.
PARAGRAPH FIVE -
No False Lemmas (✓)
A more moderate solution: add a fourth condition — “no false lemmas” (NFL).
- lemma = a step in an argument. In Gettier cases, the reasoning includes a false step.
- rule = You can’t have any false assumptions in your reasoning.
In Smith and Jones: false lemma = “Jones will get the job.”
- so: knowledge = justified true belief + no false lemmas.
This handles original Gettier cases without making knowledge unattainable.
PARAGRAPH SIX -
Fake Barns Objection to NFL (✗)
NFL doesn’t solve all Gettier-style problems.
- Fake Barn County: Henry sees a barn and forms the belief “That’s a barn.” It is a real barn, but unbeknownst to him, he’s in an area full of fake barn façades.
His belief is justified, true, and doesn’t rely on a false lemma—he just doesn’t realise the context.
- but he still lacks knowledge, since it was luck he picked a real barn.
NFL fails because not all Gettier problems involve false lemmas - some involve epistemic luck in the environment.
PARAGRAPH SEVEN -
Virtue Epistemology (✓)
Knowledge = true belief formed through intellectual virtue.
- Ernest Sosa: Knowledge is like hitting a target due to skill, not luck.
Triple A rating:
- accuracy: Belief is true.
- adroitness: Belief formed through reliable cognitive process.
- aptness: Belief is true because of the reliable process.
In Gettier cases, beliefs may be accurate and adroit, but not apt (i.e. not true because of your cognitive ability).
- this elegantly captures the difference between knowledge and lucky belief.
PARAGRAPH EIGHT -
Objection – Still Doesn’t Solve Fake Barns (✗)
Some argue Sosa’s account also fails in the Fake Barn scenario.
- Henry’s vision is adroit and the belief is accurate.
But is the belief apt? If the environment is deceptive, can we say it was his cognitive ability that led to truth?
- critics say environmental luck still threatens aptness.
So perhaps virtue epistemology doesn’t fully eliminate Gettier problems either.
PARAGRAPH NINE -
Defence of Virtue Epistemology (✓ Strongest Answer)
Virtue epistemologists reply that aptness requires success because of ability in a suitable environment.
- in Fake Barn County, Henry’s success was not due to cognitive skill in a hostile environment—it was luck.
If Henry had enough awareness, a reliable method for distinguishing fake from real barns, then his belief could be apt.
- therefore, when properly interpreted, virtue epistemology handles Gettier cases, including Fake Barns.
Strongest theory so far: accounts for truth, justification, and reliability without collapsing into scepticism.
CONCLUSION
✓ Yes, if revised with virtue theory)
Original JTB definition is insufficient, as shown by Gettier cases.
- stronger definitions like infallibilism and NFL help but face practical or conceptual limits.
Virtue epistemology, especially with the triple-A model, gives the most convincing account — maintaining truth and justification, while eliminating epistemic luck.
- knowledge = justified true belief + epistemic virtue is the most accurate and complete account we have.
