Indirect realism Flashcards
(9 cards)
What is the argument of indirect realism?
The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects. This means that we don’t see the outside world directly—instead, we experience mental images or sensations (sense-data) created by our mind. So, our awareness of the real world is always filtered through our perception.
What is John Locke’s primary quality distinction?
A primary quality is one that a mind-indpendent object has which gives it the power to cause ideas in the mind, that resemble the property the object really has.
What is John Locke’s secondary distinction?
A primary quality is one that a mind-indpendent object has which gives it the power to cause ideas in the mind, that do not resemble the property the object really has
What are some examples of John’s primary distinction?
when we talk about the shape of an object we are talking about the power/property it has to produce (shape) ideas in our minds which resemble the way the object is.
What are some examples of John’s secondary distinction?
For example, when we talk about the colour of an object we are talking about the power/property it has to produce (colour) ideas in my mind which do not resemble any properties the object has.
What is John’s variation argument?
An object cannot be perceived as spherical to one hand and cubical to the other. However, an object can be perceived to be cold to one hand and warm to the other. (i.e. bucket)
What is John’s Conceivabillity argument?
An object cannot be conceived of as existing without a shape. However, an object can be conceived of as existing without a colour.
What is John’s Multi-sensory argument?
An object can be perceived to be spherical by more than one sense. However, the same object cannot be perceived to have a colour by more than one sense.
How does John conclude his argument to support his PQ and SQ distinction.
These three reasons give us good reason to think that our ideas of shape resemble properties that the objects really have whereas our ideas of colour do not. Therefore, our representation is an accurate resemblance of an object’s primary qualities but not an accurate resemblance of its secondary qualities.
