Lecture 6 Flashcards
Decentralized cooperation
cooperation without hierarchical authority or centralized enforcement. Can be made possible by
Weak security dilemma
* Absolute gains
* Reciprocity
* Incentives
* Reassurance
* Shared identities
Weak security dilemma
linked to decentralized cooperation.
Jervis 1978
The strength of the security dilemma depends on:
1. Offense-defense balance: does current military technology
favour offense or defense?
2. Transparency of offensive vs defensive posture: Can states
observe and distinguish each other’s military posture?
Strong dilemma: offense dominant, low transparency
Weak dilemma: defense dominant, high transparency
States may focus on absolute gains
Snidal 1991
Anarchy does not force states to focus on relative gains when considering
cooperation. They are more likely to focus on absolute gains when:
1. Many states are involved in the cooperation.
* If few states, then more incentive to focus on relative gains.
* If more states, then more incentive to focus on absolute gains.
2. The consequences of cheating are not threatening.
* If cheating by Other is likely to be threatening, then more incentive to
focus on relative gains.
* If cheating by Other isn’t likely to be threatening, then more incentive
to focus on absolute gains.
linked to decentralized cooperation
Power of reciprocity
linked to decentralized cooperation.
Keohane 1986.
Reciprocity = an int’l norm that compromises by one state should be
balanced by compromises by others.
* Specific reciprocity: A and B make simultaneous compromises to
enable an agreement.
* Not dependent on trust, so there’s no credible commitment problem.
* General reciprocity: A makes a compromise to enable an agreement
with B on the understanding that B will make an equivalent
compromise later.
* Heavily dependent on trust, so requires shared identity or expectation
of an on-going relationship (distant shadow of the future).
Significance: Reciprocity enables cooperation without hierarchal
authority or centralized enforcement.
Incentives may promote cooperation
Linked to decentralized cooperation.
Positive incentives:
Benefits for those who cooperate or support cooperation.
Via:
* ‘Log rolling’: a deal with off-setting benefits for all
participants.
* Part of the deal benefits A, another part benefits B, etc.
* ‘Side payments’: compensation for any actor (domestic or
int’l) that doesn’t benefit from cooperation and could block it.
* Cooperation benefits A & B but C can block it, so A & B offer some
other ‘goodies’ to C so that it doesn’t block the cooperation.
Negative incentives:
Sanctions against non-cooperators
to reduce free-riding and credible commitment problems.
But it isn’t easy:
– no states want to be monitored & punished by others
– non-cooperation can sometimes be hidden
– few states want to do the punishing (it annoys partners)
Reassurance may overcome fear
Gross Stein 1991. Linked to decentralized cooperation.
Logic: If fear feeds the security dilemma, which makes
cooperation difficult, then reassuring words and actions can
promote positive identification and cooperation.
Strategy: Use words and actions (including self-restraint and deescalation) to make Other less fearful & allow focus on shared
interests. If reciprocated, it can create a positive spiral.
Shared identities facilitate cooperation
Risse-Kappen 1995
Linked to decentralized cooperation.
The ease of cooperation depends on the extent of shared
values and norms among states.
During the Cold War, cooperation between Canada, Europe
and the US was facilitated by shared values – problem-solving
through dialogue and openness to civil society – that
outweighed other interests.
Institutionalized cooperation
cooperation enabled or promoted by joint institutions
How international institutions promote cooperation:
* Reduce transaction costs.
* Shape expectations.
* Make commitments more credible.
* Facilitate reciprocity.
* Extend shadow of the future.
* Enable interlinkage of issues.
Reducing transaction costs
Linked to institutionalized cooperation.
Information: consolidate expertise, identify opportunities for
mutually-beneficial cooperation.
* Decision-making: promote regular contacts, set agendas, establish
decision-making procedures, encourage compromise.
* Sovereignty: ensure input into cooperation.
* Enforcement: centralize & de-politicize monitoring and sanctions.
Shaping expectations
Linked to institutionalized cooperation.
Int’l institutions shape actors’ expectations by establishing:
* rules that define acceptable & unacceptable behavior
* procedures for sanctioning unacceptable behavior
How do institutions make commitments more credible?
Linked to institutionalized cooperation.
Int’l institutions make states’ commitments more credible
by:
* monitoring: increasing transparency of (non-)compliance
* sanctioning: shaming & punishing non-compliance
Facilitate reciprocity
Linked to institutionalized cooperation.
Int’l institutions promote dynamics of reciprocity by:
* reminding states of shared identities & shared interests
in cooperation
* arranging complementary compromises (see specific
reciprocity)
* promoting on-going relationships (see general
reciprocity)
Extend shadow of the future
Linked to institutionalized cooperation.
Int’l institutions promote on-going relationships, which
encourages states to prioritize long-term gains from
cooperation over short-term gains from non-cooperation
Enable interlinkage of issues
Linked to institutionalized cooperation. Int’l institutions promote cooperation via multi-issue
‘package deals’ in which all actors compromise on some
issue(s) to achieve gains on other issue(s).
Hegemonic cooperation
Take advantage of hierarchy!
Hegemons and great powers have more resources and are
expected to lead, so they can promote cooperation.
Requirements for hegemonic leadership – some combination of:
* Capability: resources to promote negotiation, monitor
compliance, punish violators
* Willingness: political interest in promoting cooperation
* Legitimacy : acceptance by others of leader’s role and plans
3 forms of int. cooperation
Jahn & Graefrath (2023).
Minimal cooperation: States implicitly coordinate policies to
achieve mutual benefits.
– via mutual observation & policy adjustment over time.
– ex. US & USSR on non-deployment of anti-satellite weapons
* Thin cooperation: States explicitly coordinate policies to achieve
mutual benefits.
– via negotiation & agreement on policy adjustments.
– ex. US & USSR on anti-ballistic missile treaty
* Thick cooperation: States engage in joint pursuit of a shared goal.
– via shared commitment to joint activity and mutual support.
– ex. UK, US, USSR to defeat Nazi Germany
What motivates states to cooperate?
Several possible motives, alone or in combination:
1. Shared threats
2. Shared material interests
3. Shared identities
Shared sense of threat
Anarchy and interdependence make states vulnerable to threats
that can be reduced through cooperation.
* External military threat
– ex. Vietnam & US
* Internal political threat
– ex. Belarus & Russia
* Global threat
– ex. cooperation on climate change
Shared material interest
World economy creates opportunities for material gain
through cooperation.
* Gains from trade
– Cooperation improves economic efficiency,
so it benefits both state A and state B overall.
* Interdependence
– Policies adopted in state A affect conditions in state B,
and vice-versa, so cooperation benefits both by reducing
their vulnerability to external shocks.
* Class interests
– Certain types of cooperation reinforce capitalism and
thus benefit the transnational capitalist class.
Shared identities
Common history, culture or values makes cooperation natural.
* Political values, form of government
– ex. Community of Democracies
* Moral values, religion
– ex. Organization of Islamic Cooperation
* History
– ex. British Commonwealth of Nations
* Culture, language
What makes cooperation difficult?
It is costly.
Security dilemma.
Credible commitment problem.
Relative gains problem.
Free rider problem.
Pressure of 2 level games
Costly cooperation
Williamson 1990.
Information costs
– Identifying opportunities for mutual gain
* Decision-making costs
– Negotiating the terms of cooperation
* Sovereignty costs
– Compromises on autonomy to achieve cooperation
* Enforcement costs
– Monitoring behavior, punishing violators
Security dilemma
Jervis 1978.
Anarchy fear & insecurity defensive actions more fear
& insecurity difficulty of cooperation.
Credible commitment problem
Cooperation often requires that all focus on long-term interests (rather than
maximizing short-term gains), but states may not believe others’ promises to
cooperate.
mis-fit between short-term and long-term incentives
Why?
* States lack good information on others’ intentions and future actions.
– Other may be lying, trying to cheat or exploit me.
– Other may change its mind.
– Other may change its government.
* Today’s gains are more certain than future gains.
