Module 3: Household Formation, Bargaining, and Inequalities Flashcards
(20 cards)
What is a household?
- a group of people (related or unrelated) who live together and share resources such as income, food, and housing
- not just neutral spaces of care and cooperation, also include conflict and inequality
- they are shaped by norms, power relations, and economic roles
- involved in both production and consumption > but not all production in the household is valued or seen as work
What are the different forms of household formation?
- extended family
- nuclear family
- single parents
- communal/community
How do gender roles shape how households are organized and how they function?
- gendered division of labour (men as providers and women as caregivers)
- influence on household structure (men seen as the head of household and main decision-maker)
- cultural and legal norms (inheritance laws, mobility restrictions may limit where women can go or whether they can work)
What is meant by intra-household bargaining power?
- the relative ability of one household member to influence household decisions compared to others (who has the leverage)
- determines who gets what, who does what, and whose preferences prevail
- shaped by access to resources, legal rights, social norms, etc.
Why are people often uncomfortable with the idea of bargaining in households?
- Belief in shared interests:
- assuming families share interests and act selflessly
- assume bargaining is competitive and about fighting
- in reality, it doesn’t have to be aggressive, people in households just have different preferences and need to negotiate differences which can be a cooperative experience - Misconception about bargaining being a formal business like negotiation (like a round table discussion):
- in reality, many decisions are made without formal discussion
What is a basic definition of the two different types of intra-household bargaining models?
- Unitary Model: treats the household as a single decision-making entity with one utility function > criticized for ignoring internal power dynamics
- Collective Models (cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models): assumes individuals have distinct preferences and make decisions through cooperative or non-cooperative bargaining
What are the features of the traditional approach Unitary Model?
- household members share preferences, which are represented by a single utility function
- household resources and incomes are pooled > one common budget constraint
- the household head (man) is altruistic and oversees the distribution of resources within the family
- assumes no conflict
What are the key critiques of the unitary model?
- neglects the distinct preferences, resources, roles, and bargaining power of each household member
- ignores intra-household dynamics, like gender roles or power imbalances
- fails to see households as spaces of both cooperation AND conflict
- resources and income are often not pooled and shared equally > ignores if one member controls the income (whoever earns more)
- policies based on this model can fail or have unintended outcomes by not considering how benefits are distributed within households > will reinforce gender inequality
What are the features of the Cooperative Bargaining Model (collective model)?
- individuals have different preferences and cooperates in decision making
- there are binding contracts and negotiations > decisions are respected once they’re made - no backing out
- uses a Nash bargaining framework from game theory
- the person’s bargaining power is determined by their threat point (fallback position)
- Pareto efficiency is reached: the model assumes full cooperation leading to Pareto efficient outcomes > no one will be made better off without making the other person worse off
Explain what the Divorce Threat Point is
- aka their threat point / outside option / fallback position
- refers to the level of well-being / utility that each spouse would get if cooperation were to break down and they left the marriage
- depends on the resources each has if the marriage ends
- the stronger a person’s outside option (income, assets, employment), the more power they have within the household to influence decisions
- if u (inside option) < v (outside option), then she is better off leaving and therefore has higher bargaining power in the relationship
- they have more power to negotiate for better treatment and more resource share
*if u > v , then she is better off staying in the relationship and therefore has less bargaining power in the relationship
- they may feel they have no choice but to stay, even if they are unhappy
What are the features of the Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model (collective model)?
- there is no binding and enforceable contracts
- they make decisions based on self-interest, without cooperation (therefore it can be inefficient)
- here the outcomes may not be Pareto efficient (they may be inefficient)
ex. wife decides to stop doing extra chores without discussing this choice with her husband
What is the threat point referring to with non-cooperative models?
- based on withholding cooperation
How do the focuses of the cooperative and non-cooperative differ?
cooperative model: focus is the welfare outside the household
non-cooperative model: focus is the behaviour inside the household
What are the critiques of the collective bargaining models?
- Oversimplification of intra-household dynamics
- imply two rational individuals > ignores emotions
- dynamics are not just shaped by fallback positions but also by hierarchy, patriarchy, cultural expectations, and norms
- women may lack the freedom to leave even if they’re economically active - Doesn’t address the simultaneity of household decisions and processes
- says little about gender relations beyond the household > how external institutions shape bargaining power in the household
- neglect qualitative determinants of bargaining power > power also shaped by perceptions, social norms, emotional dependency, etc.
- says little about the role of social norms and perceptions > norms can limit women’s ability to make demands
- assumes households exist in isolation > outside factors influence decision making
- they don’t analyze the process of household decision-making > only show us the outcomes (but how are decisions reached?)
What are the 2 types of factors that influence how strong a person’s fallback position is?
Quantifiable factors: visible measurable
- earned income (employment)
- economic assets
- communal resources
Non-quantifiable factors: intangible
- social support systems
- support from NGOs
- support from the State
- social norms
- social perceptions
List the factors that affect intrahousehold bargaining power
- Earned income
- Employment and education > expands job opportunities, strengthens social networks, increases knowledge, provides independence, can change attitudes about gender roles
- Economic assets
- Communal resources
- Access to external support systems > social networks, community groups, safety net, support from NGOs, support from the state
- Laws > property ownership and inheritance
- Emotional bonds of care work > making it harder to leave (more vulnerable to exploitation)
- Social norms > what can be bargained about, men as breadwinners, social acceptability of bargaining, bargaining over norms
- Social perceptions > undervaluing women’s contribution and ignoring their individual needs, employers making assumptions about women working part-time
Explain how context matters in terms of bargaining power factors
- not all factors weigh equally in every household
- some things matter more in one place or time than another > depends on context
- ex. in some places, land ownership may be the most important bargaining tool but it’s not the same everwhere
Explain the dual use of the cause or effect of women’s decision making
From surveys and studies it has been observed that either:
- women’s participation in the decision-making process can sometimes be used as a proxy for their bargaining power (as an explanatory variable for their bargaining power)
OR - it could be used as an outcome of bargaining power (a result of an underlying factor like asset ownership)
- There’s confusion because some studies use decision making as an effect and some use it as an outcome or both, without clarifying → depends on how survey questions are structured/phrased
What are some of the problems with empirical methods for studying decision making in households (ex. surveys)
- varying question wording (who decides vs. who has the final say) yields different results
- joint decision-making may not imply equal power or agency
- men and women often disagree on who will decide
- women may be responsible for decisions but under constrains of fear, norms, or expectations
- responses can be unclear
- contradictory answers from the husbands and wives
- coding all joint decision-making as a positive thing, but joint decisions are complex and often unequal > saying it’s just positive can mask male dominance
- women may report joint decisions even when they have little or no say
How do we move forward to better use methods for studying decision making in households?
- use mixed methods: combine surveys with qualitative data (don’t just depend on survey data alone)
- understand households as embedded in institutions, cultures, and gender norms
