Probalistic Voting

Question 1

Why is median voter therom seen as unrealistic

Answer 1

The existence of non policy factors for voting e.g. ideology, appearance competence, likability, tone of voice, scandal of events (not necessarily about policy bit about perception)

Question 2

Who developed the pro allistic voting model

Answer 2

Lindbeck and weibull

Question 3

What is the difference between the MVT and the probalsitic voting theorem

Answer 3

• MVT is only about policy/ platform whereas probalsitc voting adds subjective perceptions on top of prefrences on policy
• they both predic convergence but the probalistic voting theorem has a different mechanism ( the swing voter ) predict convergence towards the less ideological voter is slightly different form the median voter therom that predicts convergence towards the medina voter - this determines policy)

Question 4

How do candidates work for probalisitic voting theorem

Answer 4

There are 2 candidates - and the majority winner wins and each candidate is opportunistic and only cares about winning
Candidates can independently determine their policy platform and two issues unlike the MVT ( is more of a multi dimensional model )

Question 5

What does voting behaviour depend on

Question 6

What do candidates decide

Answer 6

They decide independently but simultaneously their policy platform and unlike MVT they are allowed to have more than one policy (multi dimensional issues)

Question 7

What are the three types of voters

Answer 7

Poor yp
Middle income ym
Rich yr
Indexed by J: (p,m,r)
Income yp<ym<yr

Question 8

What does voting behaviour depend on

Answer 8

Policy component in the group-specific utility, UJ(XA, YA), UJ(XB,YB).
- Individual ideology towards a candidate, σiJ.
- Candidates’ average popularity before election (“the shock”), δ.
- Voter i in group J votes for B if UJ(XB,YB)+ σiJ+ δ> UJ(XA, YA)

Question 9

Voters ideology

Answer 9

Uniform distribution function
[-0.5ΦJ,0.5ΦJ] centered on a neutral
ideology (σ=0) with a group-specific density ΦJ.
 σiJ > 0 means that voter i is ideologically closer to B.
 σiJ < 0 means that voter i is ideologica

Question 10

The shock

Answer 10

Before election, there may be a shock δ affecting
candidates’ average popularity.
 The outbreak of scandals or other news may reduce one
candidate’s popularity, while increasing the others.
 For simplicity, we assume that it follows a uniform
distribution function [-0.5 Ψ,0.5 Ψ] centered on a neutral
ideology (δ =0) with a group-specific density Ψ.
 δ > 0 means that the shock favours B.
 δ < 0 means that the shock favours A.

Question 11

What does the policy function look like for candidates A and B (policy platform)

Answer 11

(XA, YA) and (XB,YB).

Question 13

What do the candidates know before the election

Answer 13

they know the distribution of individual ideology, but
they do not know their average popularity from the shock,
which is realised soon before the election. What they know is
how likely they are to be caught into a scandal.

Question 14

What is the timeline for candidates

Answer 14

• announce policy platform
• then there might be a shock
• election takes place and the voters choose their pefered candidates
• winner implements their policy platform

Question 16

What is the seing voter

Answer 16

• they are indifferent about voting for A and B after seeing their policy platforms and the average popularity
  Ideology: 𝜎𝐽 > 𝑈𝐽(𝑋𝐴, 𝑌𝐴) − 𝑈𝐽(𝑋𝐵, 𝑌𝐵) − 𝛿
  Small change in their policy platform will affect their vote ( not always a at the median like MVT)

Candidates set their policies before the average popularity is
known, which means they do not know who the swing voter is.

Question 17

What are the candidates strategies

Answer 17

Candidates have to set their policy platform before the average
popularity is known, so they maximise the probability or being
elected subject to the only unknown factor – scandal

Question 18

How to know how many people vote for A

Answer 18

The area of point A is everyone to the left or right of the seing voter depending on where point A is

Question 19

When would A win the edition

Answer 19

When the ara is greater than 0.5 therefore they can calculate the size of the scandal they can afford to win (threshold of the scandal) Therfore A would not want to have any scandal

Question 20

What is the equation for maximising the probability of wining

Answer 20

Pr (Па > 1/2) = Pr (б < б).

Question 21

How does the density affect the sing voter

Answer 21

Th larger the density of the less ideological group ( a group that is more indifferent) is Therfore more likely to be a swing group that attracts politicians

Question 22

How does policy convergence happing the thPVT

Answer 22

Both candidates will want to set there policy platform to align with the swing voter leading to policy convergence

Question 23

How is the mechanism for PVT different from MVT

Answer 23

• one is based on convergence to the swing less ideological voter and the other is to the median voter
• the election could also be decided by the size of the shock
• ## the densiduty of the group determines whether it is worth going after the swing voter given there impact on policies

Question 24

Examples of PVT

Answer 24

Swing states in the US (do swing states get more resources) - each states have different weights (density)
Stomberg 2008- visited Florida Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, penn more than known
According to PVT more time should be spent in swing states as they can determine wins
Lancinese 2013

Question 25

Larcinse et al 2013

Answer 25

Small states have more political powers ven though the population density is low The amount of funds allocated to a state does not align with number of swing voters are in that state Under PVT the large populations with the most swing voters should get the most the most distributive goods Electoral bacttelground hypothesis Partisan supporter

Question 26

Stomberg 2008

Question 27

Larcinese et al. (2013)

Answer 27

They want to test whether ideological distributions (independent variable) affect targeted government spending (dependent variable). - Why? Because measured ideology is affected by the level of federal spending for each state, which is the dependent variable ⇒ Endogeneity issue! - The amount of funds allocated to a state does not depend on the numbers of swing voters. They find that spending has little or no effect on voters’ choices, while ideology has large effects.