Single Paked Prefrences

Question 1

Single peaked preferences

Answer 1

Every individual has a most preferred alternative e.g an alternative that he prefers to any other possible one ( there is only one most preferred preference)
- there exists some alternative from every collection of three alternatives is not worst for all group members
They have a peak preference (most preferred) and their satisfaction falls as you move further away each side of that peak

Question 2

Single peaked preferences (what do you introduce)

Answer 2

We’re dropping universality ( unrestricted domain ) to obtain a particular type of individually rational prefrences and to obtain a socially transitive preferences - there is a restriction on the domain of preference ( condor et winner always exists as there is no preference cycling as you exclude certain preference structures

Question 4

Single peaked preferences ( what does every voter have)

Answer 4

Under this principle all choices are predetermined and it is a pois tison on a line ( decreasing on either side of the line will decrease the utility of the voter ) and its about the distance from the bliss point e.g temperature rising or falling or temperature

Question 5

What does restricting prefrences do

Answer 5

It violates unrestricted domain in AIT and on of the four rules needs to be sacrificed

Question 6

What is spatial representation of SPP

Answer 6

There are several alternatives that can be ordered on a lien e.g interest rate / bank
Budgets on department
How many hours to work on a project

Question 7

What is one dimensional prefrences

Answer 7

We are only focusing on one policy and one policy ( there are different prefrences for the same issues)

Question 8

What does the single peak prefrences graph look for

Answer 8

Bell curve with the bliss point being the middle and the axis y axis - u x axis x and the other prefrences are plotted along the x axis on either side of the bliss point

Question 9

When is a single peaked prefrences graph not have a bliss point

Answer 9

There is no highest utility and if you go left or right the utility may increase or decrease

Question 10

What is the definition on the single peake prefrences ( math edition)

Answer 10

Consider a finite set of Ω c R and let ω (αi ) ∈ Ω be individual i ’s
unique bliss point (ideal policy) over Ω. Then, the policy
preferences of citizen i are single peaked iff:
 For all ω’ and ω’‘∈ Ω such that ω’’
<ω’≤ω(αi) or ω(αi)≤ω’
<ω’’
, we
have U(ω’
;αi )>U(ω’’
;αi) .

The property ensures that individual preferences have to
be smooth.
In moving away from her ideal choice, the voter has to
prefer alternatives which are closer to the ideal point
more than alternatives that are further apart.

, we
have U(ω’
;αi )>U(ω’’
;αi) .

Question 12

Are single peaked preferences realistic

Answer 12

If prefrences are single peaked, aggregate preferences need to be transitive ( this violates rationality and gives cycling in pare wise majority voting)

Condorcet winner always exists and coincides with the median bliss point - and in most economic situations they are easily assumed to be and they are smooth
You need to say if it is restricted to single peaked

Question 13

What does a single peaked prefrences graph not graph look like with multiple voters

Answer 13

They will have a preferred bliss point and the middle point of all there winset is where the overall bliss point is ( between x and y)

Question 14

What is blacks median voter theorem

Answer 14

If all the voters preferences are single peaked on a single dimension and the most preferred point of the median voter is a Condorcet winner
- the median voter is the individual that splits the population in two groups of equal size

Question 15

What assumptions does MVT rely on

Answer 15

Single peaked prefrences : single dimension, all individuals participate in the vote and individuals vote honestly

Question 16

What is assumed in the spp

Answer 16

Assuming that cansiates actually represent want individuals vote for

Question 17

What are the different types of elections

Answer 17

Voting directly on economic policy : referendum
Selecting a political candidate as representative in legal strive bodies such as general elections

Question 18

Why may elections be effected by other factors

Answer 18

Voters may base ther choices on prefrences rather than policy
Voters may votre based on sympathy or ideology ( additional factors ) e.g that they feel closer to the candidate

Question 19

What is assumed in MVT

Answer 19

Convergence to the median voter or moderation suggesting there a centerist force

Question 20

Downsian policy convergence

Answer 20

Suppose that there are two parties A and B that first
announce a policy platform qA, qB ∈ Q c R and commit to
it and a set of voters that vote for one of the two parties.
If preferences are single-peaked, then the Nash equilibrium
is such that qA
ω = qB
ω = qM where qM is the median-ranked
bliss point.

Question 21

What is the result of downsian policy convergence convergence theorem

Answer 21

Intuitively both candidates or parties would have to move towards the centre - towards moderate postions and abandon extreme positions - agglomeration at the centre ( hotel lines principle of minimal differentiation (1929) in stability in competition

Question 22

How do voter vote

Answer 22

Voters will observe the two candidates and will pick the candidate/ party that is closest to the re bliss point - if they are indifferent then it will be 50/50

Question 23

How is the winner decided

Answer 23

The winner with the majority votes will be the winner and if the votes tie then a coin is tossed ( Nash equilibrium) - bliss point

Question 24

What is the downsian environment

Answer 24

Parties are motivted only by winning
Payoffs are equal to benefits of winning with the probability of
winning taken into account: 𝑉 = 𝜋𝑎
Where 𝜋 is the probability of winning and 𝑎 represents the benefits
from office (𝑎 > 0).
Both can dites make a simultaneous binding commitment announcing their policies

Question 25

Look at slide for Nash equilibrium reasoning

Answer 25

Neither party can gain more votes by changing their policy given the other partys desicion if both parties converge towards the median voter ideal point ( if one party deviates they lose creating a disincentive to move away from the MV) - only holds if there are two parties - one policy - single peaked preference - full voter tunrout 2 cases: (1) same posistion/ distance away from the MV a move closer will get them more votes 2) different starting points a move towards will increase winning chance

Question 26

What is application for the MVT

Answer 26

Meltzer and Richards Redistributive taxation - In a democracy, redistribution policy (e.g. taxation and transfers) is chosen by majority voting. If the median income is below the mean, the median voter prefers redistribution, because they benefit more than they pay. As inequality rises, so does demand for redistribution.

Question 27

What are the results of Meltzer and Richard’s 1981

Answer 27

Income tax rate - policy driven between the median and the mean - having a lot of inequality the median voter can gain a lot form setting a higher tax rate Greater inequality should lead to more redistribution They believe one dollar and one vote - in reality privilege vote dominates when the income of this group increases and th redistributive policies tilt towards this groups preferred policies

Question 28

Paradox of redistribution

Answer 28

Look at the slides - through historical period it works but it doesn’t work for all countries US has large amount of inequality and has little redistribution The poor may not vote as much as the rich Voters care more about other policies other than just redistribution

Question 29

Explanation for the problem of one dollar one vote

Answer 29

Karabarbounis (2011) proposes the idea that income is strongly correlated with various measures of political participation.  One dollar, one vote implies that political influence is increasing in income.  Since different income groups have conflicting goals regarding the redistribution of resources, we should expect the effect of inequality on redistribution to vary, depending on what part of the income distribution is changing.  This is an attempt at explaining the “paradox of redistribution”

Question 30

What is the empirical result karabarbounis 2011 x

Answer 30

- As the rich becomes wealthier, there is less redistribution. - As the middle class becomes wealthier, there is less redistribution. - As the poor becomes wealthier, there is more redistribution. - Strong evidence that one dollar one vote ans the political influence increases with income

Question 31

What is the interpretation of Kara (2010)

Answer 31

The economic significance of the three inequality ratios is large.  Findings for the Rich and Middle-class support Meltzer and Richards (1981), but not for the Poor. Let us interpret the results.  The starting point is that there is the well-known proposition that an individual’s most preferred size of redistribution is inversely related to individual income.  The poor prefers more redistribution than the median and the median prefers more redistribution than the rich.  The results we see above confirm this for the Rich and the Median group. As they get richer, their preference is lower redistribution.

Question 32

Political participation

Answer 32

- political participation increases with income e.g transportation, time off job, know the vote is taking place, know the policies - the poorer you are the less tine you have to engage in politics

Question 33

MVT drawbacks

Answer 33

Needs to be an odd number of voters There needs to be a one dimensional political preference ( convergence is not as clear when their are more political problems as there are even ore preferences to look at

Question 34

More MVT drawbacks

Answer 34

Assumes there are two candidates / parties but there are papers treat have more but convergence is not as clear It also assumes that parties and politicians only care about wining and dont care but anything else

Question 35

Evidence for MVT

Answer 35

Results are mixed - can be seen as fairly robust ut the more niche the issues it it starts to fall apart ( look at slides)