Segregation 6 Flashcards
(16 cards)
What modeling framework do Card, Mas & Rothstein (CMR) build on for their tipping‐point analysis?
A variant of Becker & Murphy (2000)’s sorting & bidding model.
What key question do CMR investigate?
Whether overwhelmingly white neighborhoods “tip” (i.e. experience white flight) and become predominantly non-white once non-white share crosses a threshold.
What data do CMR use to test for white flight and tipping points?
Census tract data on non-Hispanic white population and minority share from 1970 to 2000.
In Chicago (1970–1980), how does the percent minority in 1970 relate to the change in non-Hispanic white population?
Tracts with minority share below ~10–15% saw stable or slight white gains; around ~15% minority there was a sharp drop in white population (“tipping”); at very high minority shares white losses lessen.
Do CMR find the same tipping behavior in other metro areas?
Yes—Los Angeles–Long Beach, Indianapolis, Portland–Vancouver, and Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon all exhibit similar “tipping” curves.
According to CMR, how have tipping-point thresholds changed over time?
They have increased over the 1970–2000 period (+).
How does the racial tolerance of whites affect the tipping point?
Greater white tolerance is associated with higher tipping thresholds (+).
How does the local crime rate relate to the tipping point?
Lower crime rates correspond to lower tipping thresholds (–).
What is the effect of a history of riots on tipping points?
Neighborhoods with fewer past riots have lower tipping thresholds (–).
How does population density influence tipping thresholds?
Lower density is linked to lower tipping thresholds (–).
What equilibrium types does Schelling’s original tipping model allow?
Only a two‐sided “unstable integrated” equilibrium—once the tipping share is reached, integration collapses entirely.
How do CMR extend Schelling’s model?
They permit one‐sided tipping—below the threshold integration is semi-stable, so neighborhoods can remain integrated if minority share stays under the tipping point.
Summarize the main take-aways from CMR’s tipping-point work.
Even mild white preferences can drive strong segregation. Tipping points are not fixed—they’ve risen over time with changing attitudes. Because tipping can be one‐sided, integrated equilibria can persist (semi-stable) as long as minority shares stay below the threshold.
What’s the difference between an unstable integrated equilibrium in Schelling’s model and a semi-stable integrated equilibrium in the Card-Mas-Rothstein (CMR) variant?
Unstable (Schelling):
The bid-premium curves intersect at a single interior point.
Any small increase or decrease in minority share beyond that tipping point makes everyone cascade to a fully segregated outcome.
Semi-stable (CMR):
One group’s bid curve is “one-sided” (flat at low minority shares), so the interior crossing can be stable from below but unstable from above (or vice versa).
Neighborhoods can remain integrated as long as minority share stays on the stable side of the tipping threshold.
According to Card–Mas–Rothstein (CMR), which factors shift the neighborhood “tipping point,” and in which direction do they move it?
Increase tipping point (+):
Passage of time (tipping threshold rises over historical periods)
Greater racial tolerance among whites
Decrease tipping point (–):
Lower local crime rates
Fewer past riot events
Reduced population density
What are the key lessons from Schelling’s segregation model?
Small preferences ⇒ big outcomes: Even mild desires to live near similar neighbors can produce extreme segregation.
* These preferences need not be overtly racist (they can stem from classism or a wish for “good schools”).
Initial conditions matter:
* A community that starts out segregated will remain so under weak integration preferences.
* Breaking segregation requires sufficiently strong pro-diversity preferences.
