Task 2 Flashcards

(35 cards)

1
Q

What is the “hard problem” of consciousness?

A

Explaining why and how subjective experience accompanies cognitive processes.

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2
Q

What are examples of “easy problems” of consciousness?

A

Explaining how the brain processes stimuli, integrates information, and generates reports on internal states.

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3
Q

Why does Chalmers argue we should take consciousness seriously?

A

Because redefining the hard problem into an easy problem avoids the true challenge of explaining subjective experience.

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4
Q

What is meant by “qualia”?

A

The subjective, qualitative aspects of conscious experience (e.g., the redness of red).

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5
Q

What would be surprising about consciousness if we only knew physics?

A

There is no physical reason to postulate conscious experience without first-person evidence.

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6
Q

How does Chalmers define a conscious being?

A

A being is conscious if there is something it is like to be that being.

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7
Q

What are the two main concepts of mind?

A

The phenomenal concept (conscious experience) and the psychological concept (mind as an explanatory basis for behavior).

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8
Q

How does the psychological concept of mind define mental states?

A

By their causal roles in behavior, not necessarily by their conscious qualities.

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9
Q

What philosophical tradition considered all mental states to be conscious?

A

Descartes’ philosophy, which viewed unconscious mental states as contradictory.

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10
Q

How did Freud challenge earlier views on the mind?

A

He proposed that many mental activities, such as desires and beliefs, can be unconscious.

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11
Q

What was the behaviorist view of consciousness?

A

Behaviorists rejected introspection and focused only on observable, objective explanations for behavior

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12
Q

How does functionalism define mental states?

A

By their causal roles—how they interact with stimuli, behaviors, and other mental states.

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13
Q

What is an example of a mental concept with both phenomenal and psychological components?

A

Pain—its phenomenal aspect is its unpleasant experience, while its psychological aspect is its role in behavior (e.g., causing withdrawal).

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14
Q

How can we test whether a mental notion is primarily psychological?

A

By asking if the concept can exist without an associated phenomenal quality (e.g., learning can happen unconsciously).

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15
Q

How does the division of mental properties split the mind-body problem?

A

Into an easy problem (explaining cognitive functions) and a hard problem (explaining subjective experience).

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16
Q

What is the “mind-mind problem”?

A

The challenge of linking psychological (functional) mental states with phenomenal (experiential) states.

17
Q

What are the two types of consciousness according to Chalmers?

A

Psychological consciousness (functional properties like reportability and introspection) and phenomenal consciousness (subjective experience).

18
Q

What is the difference between introspection and reportability?

A

Introspection is the awareness of internal states, while reportability is the ability to verbally describe them.

19
Q

How does attention relate to consciousness?

A

Attention enhances awareness, but one can be phenomenally conscious of things without actively attending to them.

20
Q

What is “awareness” in relation to consciousness?

A

Awareness refers to functional access to information, while consciousness includes subjective experience.

21
Q

Can awareness exist without consciousness?

A

Yes, one can be aware of facts without experiencing them phenomenally.

22
Q

How does self-consciousness differ from general awareness?

A

Self-consciousness is awareness directed at oneself as an individual entity.

23
Q

Why does Chalmers argue that consciousness is a natural phenomenon?

A

Because all natural phenomena should have a scientific explanation, even if we have not yet discovered it.

24
Q

Why does Chalmers reject redefining the hard problem into an easy problem?

A

Because doing so avoids addressing the real mystery of subjective experience.

25
How does the existence of qualia challenge physicalist explanations of consciousness?
Qualia are subjective experiences that cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone.
26
Why is defining consciousness difficult?
Because any definition relies on equally complex concepts, leading to circular definitions.
27
What happens if we fully assimilate the phenomenal mind into the psychological mind?
We trivialize the problem of conscious experience by ignoring subjective qualities.
28
What happens if we fully assimilate the psychological mind into the phenomenal mind?
We limit the role of mental states in explaining behavior.
29
What was a key limitation of behaviorism in explaining consciousness?
It ignored subjective experience, focusing only on observable behavior.
30
How does computational cognitive science relate to earlier behaviorism?
It continues the idea that explaining behavior does not require explaining subjective experience.
31
How does functionalism define mental states?
By their causal roles—how they interact with stimuli, behaviors, and other mental states.
32
What problem does functionalism fail to address?
Why certain mental states feel a certain way (i.e., the problem of qualia).
33
What is the explanatory gap?
The difficulty in explaining why physical processes give rise to subjective experiences.
34
What is an example of a primarily psychological mental state?
Learning—because it can occur without conscious awareness.
35
What is an example of a primarily phenomenal mental state?
Emotions, since they involve rich subjective experiences.