Unit 3 AT04: Structures Endowments and Institutions in the Economic History of LAtin America (Coatsworth) Flashcards

(128 cards)

1
Q

What is the central argument of the essay regarding Latin American economic history?

A

The essay discusses the re-emergence of political economy and the long-term impact of structures, endowments, and institutions on economic growth and development in Latin America.

Highlights the interplay of social stratification, political power, and economic strategy.

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2
Q

What initial economic condition did Latin America share with Western Europe and the early United States?

A

Latin America likely had similar per capita incomes to Western Europe and the early United States until the eighteenth century.

This challenges theories of inherent early backwardness.

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3
Q

What economic trend occurred in Latin America after the independence wars around 1810?

A

Most of Latin America experienced little to no economic growth in the half-century after the independence wars.

Specifically, Mexican GDP per capita fell substantially after 1810.

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4
Q

When did sustained increases in GDP per capita begin in Latin America?

A

Sustained increases in GDP per capita began in most larger Latin American economies in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.

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5
Q

What was the overall performance of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) strategies?

A

Import-substitution industrialization (ISI) strategies generally performed poorly overall after a period of initial convergence.

This resulted in a decline in GDP growth rates in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

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6
Q

What does the emerging consensus suggest about openness to external trade and capital flows?

A

Openness to external trade and capital flows has generally promoted long-term economic growth.

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7
Q

How have high levels of inequality affected living standards in Latin America?

A

High levels of inequality have hindered improvements in living standards and contributed to high poverty rates.

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8
Q

What shift occurred in economic focus during the Washington Consensus period?

A

Microeconomic issues gained prominence over macrohistorical questions.

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9
Q

What is the Engerman and Sokoloff thesis?

A

The thesis argues that colonial factor endowments determined long-term development paths.

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10
Q

What is ‘crony capitalism’ as discussed in the essay?

A

‘Crony capitalism’ (or vertical political integration) is a system that facilitated economic growth in some contexts despite political instability.

It provided credible commitments to elites.

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11
Q

What lasting impact do colonial institutions have on economic development according to the essay?

A

Colonial institutions, shaped by conquest and enslavement, have had a lasting impact on economic development.

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12
Q

What economic performance is associated with the Washington Consensus period?

A

The Washington Consensus period has been the worst quarter century for Latin American economies since the nineteenth century.

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13
Q

What institutional deficiencies are seen as obstacles to growth?

A

Weak property rights and corruption are increasingly seen as significant obstacles to growth.

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14
Q

What political economic system emerged in the late nineteenth century?

A

A system characterized by weak institutions and concentrated wealth.

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15
Q

What potential change is suggested for the future of Latin America?

A

Latin America may be on the verge of a new rupture with the past, potentially leading to more equal societies and a more effective state.

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16
Q

What does the essay argue about the relationship between social stratification and economic strategy?

A

It highlights the connections between social stratification, political power, and economic strategy in Latin America.

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17
Q

Fill in the blank: The period of stagnation after independence requires explanations beyond _______.

A

simple external factors.

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18
Q

True or False: The failure of import-substitution industrialization supports state-led development models.

A

False.

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19
Q

What does the ‘Reversal of Fortune’ concept refer to?

A

It refers to the idea that regions that were most advanced before European colonization fell furthest behind after conquest.

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20
Q

What is the critique of the Engerman and Sokoloff thesis regarding landownership?

A

Landownership was not more concentrated in Latin America than in the thirteen British colonies.

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21
Q

What is one argument about the impact of colonial mortality rates on development?

A

Colonial areas with high death rates tend to have less-productive modern economies.

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22
Q

What is the significance of the Washington Consensus in Latin American economic history?

A

It represents a period of disappointing economic outcomes that questioned the effectiveness of neoliberal reforms.

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23
Q

What does the essay suggest about the need to revisit structuralist and dependentista texts?

A

It suggests that revisiting these texts may provide insights into current challenges.

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24
Q

What has refined our understanding of Latin America’s economic history in recent decades?

A

Significant research has improved knowledge of long-term trends in productivity and living standards, leading to a growing consensus on key patterns over the last three centuries.

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25
What was the economic growth trend in Latin America during the half-century following the independence wars?
Little to no economic growth occurred, with some areas like Argentina and Chile beginning growth earlier than others.
26
When did sustained increases in GDP per capita generally begin in Latin America?
In the late 19th or early 20th century.
27
What is structuralism in the context of Latin American economic thought?
An approach focused on the connections between social stratification, political power, and economic strategy, emphasizing the impact of structures and institutions on development.
28
Why has there been renewed interest in structuralism?
Latin America continues to face economic stagnation and inequality, making structuralists' insights relevant once again.
29
What were the key features of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) in Latin America?
High levels of tariff protection and non-tariff barriers to foster domestic industries and reduce reliance on imports.
30
What was the outcome of the ISI strategy in Latin America?
While it initially led to some industrial growth, ISI ultimately faced limitations and underperformed overall.
31
How has the consensus regarding external economic ties in Latin America shifted?
The view has shifted to suggest that countries open to trade and capital flows tend to experience faster GDP growth.
32
What are two major consequences of high levels of inequality in Latin America?
* Slowed improvements in living standards * Persistently high poverty rates
33
What is the Engerman and Sokoloff thesis regarding economic paths in the Americas?
It argues that factor endowments in colonial Latin America led to wealth concentration and institutions favoring elites, hindering broad-based market participation.
34
What critiques are presented against the Engerman and Sokoloff thesis?
Significant GDP per capita divergence across Spanish colonies and the argument that land ownership was not necessarily more concentrated in Latin America than in British colonies.
35
What alternative explanations are provided for Latin America's institutional development?
Legacy of Old World policies adapted to New World conditions and the concept of 'crony capitalism' or 'vertical political integration' (VPI).
36
What current challenges does Latin America face in economic development?
Disappointing economic performance post-Washington Consensus, potential exhaustion of the late 19th-century political economy model, and risks associated with political and economic experimentation.
37
What is the Washington Consensus?
A set of ten free-market economic policy recommendations associated with the IMF and the World Bank.
38
What is the significance of 'vertical political integration' (VPI) in economic growth?
It describes a system where politically connected elites and government create mutually beneficial deals, fostering economic growth despite political instability.
39
Fill in the blank: The ___________ theory argues that underdevelopment in Latin America was a consequence of its dependent relationship with developed capitalist countries.
[Dependentista]
40
What does 'Path Dependence' refer to in economic history?
The idea that past events and decisions can have a lasting influence on future outcomes.
41
What is 'Latifundismo'?
The system of large landholdings concentrated in the hands of a few owners, seen as a structural obstacle to agricultural development.
42
What does 'Rent-Seeking' mean?
Activities undertaken to increase one's share of existing wealth without creating new wealth.
43
Main Arguments by Coatsworth in Structures and Endowments
* cocnern of external factors influencing internal dynamics (class formation, political coalition and resulting institutions) * Coatsworth pushes back on engerman: within spanish empire, huge variations in GDP per capita between colonies in 1800. Undermines institutions as sole proprietor. Cuba was the highest GDP per capita. Also challenges premise of land concentration - sig. indegeonous land owning in andes and low value of frontier land in argentina. Overall, reads that inequality and GDP per capita psotively linked in spanish. * Coatsowrth puts more emphasis on policies and practices imported by spanish; slavery, caste system and colonial elites. Elite wasn’t absolute, crown put limits such as preventing slavery after 1540s and protecting indigenous land. * Coatsworth; globalisation provided opportunity for modernisation and elite consolidation. Elite dominated growth was enabled through export growth model; dias integrated mexico with a booming US market through railways. Revisit structuralist texts with this. *
44
Evidence by Coatsworth in Structures and Endowments unit 3 insts
While described as a form of crony capitalism, the sources indicate this system produced economic growth2 . Under the Porfiriato, Mexico's GDP per capita likely returned to late colonial levels by the early part of the era and saw substantial increases, for example, from an estimated $674 or $642 in 1870 to $1,366 or $1,435 in 19005 1800, Cuba had a per capita income of $90 (in 1990 international dollars). Cuba, a slave colony with likely high inequality, had the highest income. Furthermore, the source argues that landownership (and wealth more generally) was not more concentrated in Latin America than in the thirteen British colonies. Mechanisms and Examples: The VPI model is seen as illuminating how self-interested deal making led to credible commitments against expropriation, encouraging capitalist investment. The creation of Banamex in the 1880s is cited as a case of insider deal making where the government gained revenue in exchange for granting privileges that couldn't be easily revoked However, the sources also note that the Díaz government used institutions like banks as part of a strategy for monetary, fiscal, and development objectives, suggesting the regime was not merely predatory but sometimes farsighted
45
What is the hypothesis from Prados in World Human Development
Growth and Development are not the same and have a weak relationship. Development encompasses broad factors such as freedom, longevity and education. conclusive findings: * Public policies played a crucial role in the improvement of health and education * Socialist experiences failed to sustain momentum and limited agency and freedom * Education and health played a huge role in catching up Differences in institutional form in Britain and US come from different circumstances and challenges the view that it was Britian's rigid institutions. Proposition that industrial planning by enterprise, financial institutions and the state has become increasingly important for competitiveness and growth its not established.
46
What are the main arguments from Prados on Growth vs Development
* HDHI, increases of same absolute size represent greater achievements the higher the level they take place * improvement of health (med tech) and education --> LR gains in human development * Social indicators have asymptotic limits * Trends in human dev. dont closeley mathc gdp per capita trends * Socialist countries restrict indv. choice --> only progress in basic needs * LR gains in dev. by progress of social dimensions, longevity and education. When reach asymptotes and income becomes main dimension.
47
What is the main evidence from *Prados* in Review of Income and Wealth
* Phases of globalisation dramatically improve GDP/capita but not on human development * Laissez-fair capitalism saw human development falling short of the economic advancement from globalisation and indsutrilisation * Nevertheless, long run upward trend in world human development is observed for both the UNDP indices ('hybrid' and 'old HDI) * Since 1950, advancement in human development has been hand-in-hand with economic growth * Rest reached human development of OECD in 150, by 2007. in 2007 real GDP per capita of Rest was similar to OECD by 1938
48
What are the main HHDI main trends
* Alternative measures creates new insights including: 1) Substantial gains and much more intense in world human development are observed since 1870 and from 1913-70 2) Major advance from 1920-50 during economic globalisation backlash, due to education and longevity gains 3) Incomplete catching up by the rest from 1913-70 Variance in rests performance sinc 1) Up to 1913; steady and moderate progress 2) 1913-70; acceleration (apart from WWI) 3) 1970-90; sustained deceleration gave way to an expansion from 1990
49
What is Hurley's main hypothesis on European Catching up (1870-1913) in '*Patterns of European Industrilisation*'
* Based on Gerschenkron's theory of substitutions for prerequisites and the workings of Oliver Williamson analysis of hierarchical arrangements. * This all suggests that Britain's delayed adoption of mass production was because this organisation was inappropriate to British conditions. * Thus the state was not the critical factor.
50
What is Gerschenkron's theory
each country's position within a typology of economic backwardness required a substitution of the leader's prerequisites, creating endogenous institutional differences among national industrialisations. Even predicted that increasingly powerful industrialisation spurts in economies whose growth started late. Believed substutitive couldn't cancel the intial disadvantages and inappropiate for more advanced economies.
51
What are Hurley's main arguments on European Catching up in '*Patterns of European Industrilisation*'
* Britain industrilised witth markets, other substituted with hierachies leading to larger firms (Germany and US) better in LR. British atomistic industry inhibited rationalised * Not to do with simply institutions, diff came from diff obj circumstances e.g. British fail to adopt mass and heirachical due to adv econmy and lack of raw material supply * Inherent superiority of large hierarichal organisations, only adopted under favourable costs and marketing. Couldn't be overcome by industrial planning (Elbaum)
52
What are common critiques of Hurley's view that he deals with
British financial institutions didn't finance best industries like germans. BUT it was due to Britians sophisitcated arbitrage markets that made german banks inefficient. Firms in britain still found financing easy. British historical legacy, led to rigid institutions and excessive fragmentation. BUT monopoly wouldn't have installed new capital.
53
What is the evidence for Hurley's in '*Patterns of European Industrilisation*'
* In certain environments hierarchical organisations or firms have transaction cost advantages that encourage IB. Iron and steels brought the best plants to Germany and then to Russia Markets inferior when coordination breaks down in the possibility of transaction specific assets bejng opportunistically exploited American factors of raw materials, immigrant labour supply and mass cheap products —> favouring mass production and hierarchical (50% of labour force immigrants in 1917)
54
What is Abramovitz's main thesis
* Differences in productivity levels create a strong potential for convergence of levels, depending on SOCIAL CAPABILITY * Pace of realisation is dependent on conditions that influence the diffusion of knowledge, mobility of resources and the rate of investment * Rising social and political effects of rising wealth can itself weaken social capability * Attractions of goals other than growth increase as wealth increase.
55
What are Abramovitz's key arguments
* Tech backlog used by followers to catch up with greater gains * Backwardness comes from flatering social capability, countries can mold insts. to fit adaptability * Unequal abilities to pursue paths that are resource biased or scale dep * Leaders can outcompete followers attract their labour, followers can retard leaders growth (US + UK), UE as leaders lose markets. * Welfare state is a mode of conflict resolution to mitigate the costs of change that could induce resistance to growth.
56
What made the US a leader acc to Abramovitz
What made the US a leader?: 1) Technological change favoured large-scale production such as in the US 2) Leader in social capability WWI serious setback for many countries, but stimulus for US
57
What is the evidence for Abramovitz's key arguments
* Variance among productivity levels of 'follower' countries decline drastically over the century, from coefficient of 0.5 in 1870 --> 0.15 in 1979. This was continuous and had only one reversal. * Inverse rank correlation between the intial productivity levels in 1870 and susbeqent growth rates, reaching the correlation coefficient of -0.97 * Post ww2, enlarged social competence and greater experience with large scale production/finance to catch up - Post ww2 saw a chance for political reconstruction. * Rise of British cotton textiles ruined the Irish linen industry and attracted the Irish young men. Verdoon effect points to vulnerability of old industriest to progressive intl. industry.
58
What is Taylor thesis on rapid LA dev in the 19th cent, in '*External Dependence, Demographic Burdens and the Argentine Economic Decline after the Belle Epoque*'
The Rapid Economic Development in Latin America in the Belle Epoque (the 19th Century) was primarily **supported by foreign capital flows** that could support the burdens of population growth + immigration on the large savings gap compared to other export led countries like Australia.
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What are Taylor's main argument on LAmerican Dev. in the late 19th Cent.
* Potent immigration flows to Argentina --> higher dep. rates --> demographic burden depresses saavings --> increases savings gap --> inhibits capitaal deeping, formation and retards economic growth (+ **vulnerable to economic shocks**) * Argentina a late starter - longer for demographic transisition due to later developmental process. vulnerable to economic shocks associated with the Great War than other settler economies. Prior to Great War, Argentina relied on Britian as the banker to the world to make up its saving gap. --> Broke Britain in War --> Argentina lost capital flows to fill large savings gap --> never catch up w Australia
60
What is the evidence for Taylor's claims on LAmerican Dev. in the 19th Cent.
Migration contributed to nearly half of the net increase in population - wage premiium over 100% 1890-1939 comp. to Italy + Spaian Argentina heavily relied on foreign capital with foreigners owning 48% of its capital stock in 1913 compared to Australia's 20% Prior to the war capital intensity at a rate of 1.4% per annum from 1900-13 (capital deepening) --> after the war Argentina capital widening 0.6% per annum from 1913-1939 Argentina had a savings rate of 5% whereas Australia and Canada had around 15% A hueristic link between the savings rate gap and depnedncy shows that Argentina had a dep. 5% higher than the Australia-Canada avg. + savings rate of 11% lower 2/3 of the slow down of the Argentinian economy would have been eliminated if they had a higher savings rate --> sustaining capital deepening as the accumulation rate would've fallen to 4% which is above the populationr ate of 2.8%
61
What is Abad's main hypothesis on LAmerican economic dev. in the 19th Century
Postcolonial shocks explain the different inequality trajectories in Latin America. Intial conditions only mattered little
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What are the main arguments from Abad (uses ratio of land rent and unskilled wage to find the measure of inequaliity that conveys the earning power of the wealthy relative to earnings of the majority)
Higher population --> more inequality Better terms of trade ---> more inequality External market conditions paired with particular factor endowments were decisive for inequality. Migration and annexation of land led to sizeable fluctuations. As countries increased their participation in world trade, the income distribution responded to changes in the country terms of trade The **rise in inequality** in Argentina and Urruguay is explained by the impact of **favourable terms of trade** and **international migration**. **Decline in inequality** in Mexico and Venezuela, explained by the imapct of **decreasing terms of trade** amplified by the **expansion of avaliable arable land**
63
What is the evidence for Abad's claims on LAmerican Economic Development in the 19th Cent
Consistent with Uruguay rent-wage ratio measure of inequaltiy rises from around 1 in 1850 to 6 by 1900. By 1880 one of 3 inhabitants of the country was foreign * Livestock by products accounted for almost 90% of total exports in Uruguay * Total exports increased seven-fold from the late 1860s until 1913 * IN argentina exports shifted from silver to animal with 98.6% of exports being of animal origin by the mid 19th century Argentina inequality ratio reached near 12 in the 1850s compared to 3 in 1830 * If terms of trade decline, inequality wouldve been 41.5% lower When there is no migration inequality would've decline only 34.7%
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What is Taylor's main hypothesis on Latin American ISI in *On the Costs if Inward Looking Development*
* Key differences in LA and EAsia was that interventions in EAsia were not price distorting and left incentives intact. * Latin American conditions seemed to reflect a desire to insulate domestic from market forces. * Poor performers '*confused support for industrialisation with support for industrialists*' and created distortions that raised capital prices and reduced quantities invested for the long run. * * East Asian miracles (Krugman) was epitomised from mustering impressively high investment rates and experiencing dramatic capital deepening * Institutional structure of America took the region down a low investment path in much of the postwar period.
65
What are Taylor's main arguments on Latin American ISI in *On the Costs if Inward Looking Development*
* Capital accumulation most imp. for LA growth, hindered by distrotions created by ISI * Structuralist school w micromanegment, regulatory appartus and variiegated nominal protection created even more intermediate price twists. * Great Depression exp encouraged ISI --> retreat from global economy --> LA share of trade secular decline * Combined with distortions, led to retardation and divvergence * Political conditions in the Asia-Pacific Region differed from America which had popular enfranchisement of competition interest groups lobbying for protection. Openness in Asia led to low black market premia, low tariffs, small capital price distortions and exchange rate stability. Latin America opposite, high black market premia (26%) tariffs (22%) capital price distortions (27%) and rates of depreciation (37% per annum).
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What is the **evidence** for Taylor's main arguments on Latin American ISI in *On the Costs if Inward Looking Development*
* Tariffs averaged over 100% were the norm by the end of the 1950s Brazil 1966 nominal 154% tariff on consumer durables that was effectively 285% * Asia pacific group reached 3.4% growth. Latin have 0.6% growth, five times slower. Policies that supress openness - reduce growth 2% Relative price of capital associated with presence of distortions at various points in the economy about 1/4 of any tariff-rate changes passes through into capital price. Latin America grow 1.5% slower due to the lower investment rates
67
What is the main hypothesis in Ha Joon Chang's '*The East Asian Model of Economic Policy* on the importance of the East Asian Development State in the rise of the Asian Tigers?
Immensely important, developed under late development constraints. Crucially, infant industry needed a well integrated export strategy East Asian model policies: 1. Pro-investment rather than anti-inflation 2. Control on luxury consumption 3. Strict control on FDI 4. Integrated pursuit of infant-industry and export-promotion 5. Use of exports to exploit scale economy 6. Productivity orientated view of competition Troubles in some East ASian countries come from departures from the tradional models.
68
What are the main arguments in Ha Joon Chang's '*The East Asian Model of Economic Policy* on the importance of the East Asian Development State in the rise of the Asian Tigers?
* Cultural arguments attribute recent phenomena to millenium old causes * Maintaing high investment at the cost of moderate inflation * Maintained strict capital control (lack of FDI reliance) * Banning of importing luxury products --> national community and low expenditure * Export integrated infant industry * Create oligopolistic structure --> domestic firm to world class capacity, maximising EoS to then open up. (productivity>competition) * Regulated TNC investment
69
What is the evidence of Ha Joon Chang's claims in '*The East Asian Model of Economic Policy* on the importance of the East Asian Development State in the rise of the Asian Tigers?
* Inflation Korea 17.4% in 1960s * Death sentences in Korea for major capital flight - during 1980s debt crisis none. * Korea & Japan had 2 lowest number of cars per capita comp. to any other developing country * Helped by undervalued currency for export success vs over-valued LAmerica * Korea no anti-trust until 1981, allowed collusive behaviour in 'promising industries' * TNC technology had to be screened and check for royalties or obsolete nature * Promotion of R&D in targeted areas
70
Ha Joon CHang on LAmerican failings?
Need export promotion strategy, emphasis by Prebisch Ignored for political reasons Development of industry w exports to acque cash to buy new tech. Stable supply of FX + tech allows for innovation.
71
Ha joon chang on industrial policy to increase productivity?
1. Organising mergers and market segmentation 2. SUbsidisng capital equiment 3. Subsidising R&D/training.
72
What is the main hypothesis in Balassa's '*The Lessons of East Asian Development* on the importance of the East Asian Development State in the rise of the Asian Tigers?
Stablle incentive system + gov. focus on exports --> lower labour and capital regulation and bureaucratic control -->Lack of discminiation against exports --> rapid export growth in Far Eastern NICs
73
What are the main arguments in Balassa's '*The Lessons of East Asian Development*' on the importance of the East Asian Development State in the rise of the Asian Tigers?
* fastest rates of export expansion --> fastest GDP growth --> inc capital:output --> highest savings rate * Growth of TFP +ve correlation w export expansion, -ve correlation with ISI * Choice of EAsia to export nondurable consumer goods while LAmerica focused on producing consumer durables which requires sophisticaed industry and a large domestic market (higher costs and tariffs) * EAsian Gov provided a modern infra, stable incentives and gov. bureaucracy that helps exports
74
What is the evidence for the Balassa's claims in '*The Lessons of East Asian Development*' on the importance of the East Asian Development State in the rise of the Asian Tigers?
* Korea share in nonfuel exports of the 12 counttries 0.9% to 17.3% (1963-84) while India's fell. * 1960 period Japanse TFP growth 4.5% compared to Argentinian 0.7% * Korean savings rate 32.5% 1973-84 * Barzilian market for manufactured goods was 1/6 of Germany's. * 1970 President park of Korea compelled investmetns in heavy engineering and chemicals --> 5% decline in GDP. * Public expenditure as a % of GDP is 4% in Korea vs 26% in Mexico
75
Centeno 'Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in 19th Century LAmerica' Arguments
Tillys war - tax relationship doesnt hold in LA LA financed wars through loans, commodity sales and custom duties NEw states lacked muscle to collect tax Central Gov failed to have a rs with parts of soceity that would support tax like with English Fuedalism
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Evidence in Centeno 'Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in 19th Century LAmerica'
British observer 'Peruvians treated Guano boom as if it would last forever; spending wildly and removing other taxes' Ecuador didn't develop double entry book keeping until mid 19th century Brazil ahd sig. opposition to census and elected official avoided fazenderio (area of large alndholders) Mexico Lorenzo Zavala overthrown for trying to put a direct tax
77
Saffird (State and Nation Making) arguments
Formation hinged on: 1. Economic Geography; physical terrain, avaliable resources, 2. Political geography; helped or hindered political control 3. Economic and Fiscal strength; reveneu generating capacity 4. Acceptance of political systems by public 5. Civil control of military 6. Role of church (political or ally) 7. Relative vulnerability of national to external power and attacks
78
Safford Chile Example
Economic Geography; unified in central valley. Long coastline for trade. Rich in resources. Invested in infastructure (Santiago to Velporaizo in 1853 railway) Political and Fiscal; unified political space. Fiscally strong from metal exports (half of gov. revenues), top per capita exporters, fiscally able to make state. Also constitution of 1840; powerful centralised president to maintain order and stability. Liberals still kept similat structure, lasted constitution till 1925 Military and Church: military under control. Civic guard prevented coups. Won war against peru in late 1830s. Church avoided state conflicts unlike in Mexico and Columbia But limited reach in south and west. Centralised gov --> resource wealth --> funds state apparatus Exports --> wealth --> powerful state
79
Safford Argentina Example
Economic Geography: Independence broke colonial ties to silver mines to upper Peru. Buenos Aires focused on salted beef, hides, wool. Buenos Aires and provinces diverged as interior provinces suffered from no silver trade. Buenos Aires monopolised that trade and port; wouldn't trade wealth. Political and Fiscal: Huge political imbalance between buenos Aires and interior provinces. Hindered national unity and fiscal integration; Buenos Aires disproportionate power. Juan Mandel de Rosas governor of Buenos Aires 1835-52; opposed national constitution, delay in consolidating national state. Created well funded military for Buenos Aires, stability limited to Buenos. Colonial trade disruption --> Buenos Aires Economic Dominance--> reluctance to unity --> delayed national unity Refusal of bueons aires to ratify 1853 constitution. Shift. Uruguary and brazil overthrow rosas.
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Safford COlumbia Example
Geography: Bad Andes terrain --> huge transport cost --> weakened unity and central gov. authority Political: Made it hard for Bogata to rule, esp as british imports undercut local produce. Gold exports but didn’t make much money for state --> state short on cash and relied on bad taxes Liberal and Conservative church split similar to Mexico from the attempt of centralised constitution by Bolivar in 1820s Military wasn't predatory or interventionist. Civil Wars mainly with Church (1876 Civil War over education) Profound persistence of the terrain.
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81
Douglas 'Order Disorder and Economic Change LA vs NA' Arguments
US colonies in 1700; tradition of local say in governance, clearer property rights, experience with representative assemblies --> formed federal structure with checks and balances for credible commitments Limit rent seeking - manipulating political system for advantages Spanish Colonies: centralised extractive colonial systems; less secure property rights, unsmooth transition, serious instability and strongmen with no consistent credible commitments. Arg 3: secure political order allowed for economic growth.
82
Coatsworth's 'Lost Decades: Postindp Performance in LA' Arguments
Lost Decades of Post-Indepence (1820s - 70s): lack of clear borders and huge military spending (77% of budgets). 1. Caudillismo (strongman rule) 2. Capital Flight 3. Fragmentation - Bulk Spanish colonies broke up into countries, hindering EoS and productivity. - Protectionism became the norm; LA had highest tariffs globally. LA no social group pushing for growth, wars weakened emerging buisness class. Stalemate. LA 1860s; liberals won. Decisive break, land reforms, church and state separation, breaking state monopolies. Achieving political stability through compromising with economci groups. Modern legal codes, reform, banking codes, tariffs. Growth followed 1.8% from 1870 - 1913. Fuelled by FDI. But came with exclusion of indigenous and poor; lacking universal suffrage.
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Coatsworth's 'Lost Decades: Postindp Performance in LA' Evidence
Huntington (1968), over 70 coups occurred between 1820–1920 in Latin America. LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project) data shows that countries with 19th-century caudillo legacies (e.g., Venezuela, Paraguay) have lower trust in political parties and higher support for military intervention even today LA had 0 capita growth from 1820 -70. Wages rose more sloly than GDP per capita in 1870s growth
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Prados De Escosura's 'Economic Performance in Post-Indp. Latin America' Arguments
Comparing LA to other global companies builds case of idea of lost decades not being so true. Implied average annual growth rate of 0.5% from 1820 - 1870. ; not really a lost decade. Chile , Uruguary acc compared well to US growth. But comparison is unfair due to different economic places. Should compare to other similar places. Kept pace with european periphery, faster than asia and africa
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Coatsworth and Williamsons 'Always Protectionist?Latin AMerica Tariffs from Indp. to Great Depression' Arguments
Consistently high tariffs for whole century Initially from need for cash then for Belle Epoque maintained then argued it was a retaliatory measure and then deliberate ISI Low colonial tariffs --> independence --> weak administration and wars --> tariffs for easy revenue Export economies --> urban interests gain influence --> tariffs remain
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Coatsworth and Williamsons 'Always Protectionist?Latin AMerica Tariffs from Indp. to Great Depression' Evidence
Mexico in 1890s under Lamon Lore tweaked tariffs to help texitles tobacco and improve new industry such as steel and machinery Chile passed a tariff law to pursure industry.
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Besley ' Why do Developing Countries Tax so little' Argumetns
Low tax revenue from administrative capacity Large informal sector; clear pattern from keane that informality means lower % of income tax as tax Reliance on foreign aid or primary resources 2. Gov. action needed for tax (improving tax base etc.) POlitical insts often have low contestability of power (conc. poltiical control), weak checks and balances, culture, staet buiilding, and a weak state LA: export dependence (customs easy), large informal sector, colonial legacy, caudilllismo tradition, lack of checks and baalances, social divisions, historic experiences of inflation and crises
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Besley ' Why do Developing Countries Tax so little' Evidence
Jenson's research says countries with high natural resource wealth mean tax capacity is much lower; same may occur for aid India income tax didn’t keep up with growth (piketty) reducing revenue. World Bank documented how China increased tax base by increasing levels Where political control is concentrated --> no progressive taxation or public services. Expect opposite in democratic powers (AJR) Swedishh 1500s example? Mapping land properly Peformance based pay for tax collectors in Pakistan?
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Cardenas 'State Capacity in LA' Arguments
Fiscal Capacity stunted by elites LA underdeveloped even comapred to EAsia. elites stop tax and spending to maintain status quo --> political participation much lower in LA. Democracy exists but didn’t change de facto power Democracy correlation with tax significantly weaker with v high income inequality
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Cardenas 'State Capacity in LA' Evidence
Engermann & Zolt: much longer for land wealth tax in LA than USA World Bank Report: Authoritarian took much longer to do spending as it could empower rivals LA to rest of world --> underdeveloped. 8.3% less of their GDP in total taxes, 6.5% in income. Also a large gap with East Asia
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Centeno 'Republics of the Possible' Arguments
Liberalism was a face; lacked power to challenge oligarchs Brown Areas: Central Authority weak, lots of people in LA Lack of external wars like in EU. Mismatch between expectations and weak initial capacity. 4 Dimensions of State Strength: 1. Territory Allocation; can state control land 2. Economic Prosperity; can state effectively tax 3. Infrastructure Power: does state have organisational capacity to regulate and build Symbolic Power: respect and loyalty LA lacked all Chaos post independence --> survival and world economy for revenue --> compromises with local elite --> state lacked muscle and infrastructural power --> no shared citizenship and national identity.
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Centeno 'Republics of the Possible' evidence
1. Territory Post independence had ttons of internal conflicts (spain threats and internal competition, caudillas) 1860s managed to a degree, 1900s had nominal control but administrative reach weak 2. Ecnomic Capacity Indp. Wars costly and ruined trade routes, followed by civil wars Slow rail road development in spain and LA; transport sttill weak; thus abililty to tax was worse. 3. Infrastructure Power Gaining territory by compromises made building real infrastructure much harder; gov. jobs done through cliientism. Huge resistance in effective bureaucracy 4. Symbolic Power Lacked shared unity; encipient nationalism devoid of social content --> 'fictious liberalism' big gap between ideals and realities. Failure to bridge gap meant state wasn’t liked by many
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Bertola and Williamson's 'Globalisation in Latin America before 1940' Arguments
Maintained high tariffs, had a varying impact dependent on area - Zones benefitted differently Temperate Lowlands: Land intensive exports --> drove up land values --> land owners win. However European immigrants meant labour wages suppressed --> globalisation worsened existing inequalities in the temperate low lands Tropical Lowlands; worse terms of trade --> small elite reinforced Highlands. Mixed Picture; areas w high endowments saw FDI with unequal growth. Areas lacking saw no FDI
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Bertola and Williamson's 'Globalisation in Latin America before 1940' Evidence
- Early 1800s shipping a ton of goods England to keto (landlocked, in Andes) could cost 21 pounds, only 2 pounds to Buenos Aires Experienced significant boom in 1820-90: 2x terms of traded, yet maintained high tariffs
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Bignon's 'Big Push or Big Grab? Railways in Latin America 1865-1913' Arguments
Cycle is More money gov had --> more railways --> more money gov. has Late 1880s Argentina Brazil had large railway. Geography represented barrier. Institutional stability needed for huge long-term investment and market couldn't coordinate this --> gov had to provide big push. Other side is big grab where funds for this went to rent seeking. Study suggests that both big push and grab happened. Was gov funding a benefit? Vital due to market failure. Big grab, but benefits so important Short-term shocks could have very long shadows disrupting the cycle
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Bignon's 'Big Push or Big Grab? Railways in Latin America 1865-1913' Evidence
Numbers found that two way relationship did exist. Limited initial revenue was a very strong barrier to this. Short term shocks damaged this. Could derail railway expansion for a long time. Brazil's guaranteed dividend policy, but very high social rate of returns so high By ww1, often LA countries got 70% of revenue from export import Ecuador railway development after cocoa rose. Peru railway development fell after guano reserves fell. Small but sustained improvements better. Columbia 3% increase in capacity for revenue could've reached Argentina railway density.
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Bertola's 'Income Inequality in the Southern COne' Arguments
Roots of high inequality come from colonial legacy; authoriatian states, no public goods, elitist extraction Distinction between settler (argentina, uruguay) and lsave economies (brazil), settler saw initial less inequality. Southern Cone grew through extraction of resources unlike technological change Railroads --> cheaper shipping --> global demand for land intensive products --> land rents rose faster than wages Resource basesd systtems --> commodity lottery -> depends on demand for products e.g. Argentinian meat, brazillian coffee, chilean nitrates --> globalisation potential to reinforce rather than reduce inequality
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Bertola's 'Income Inequality in the Southern COne' Evidence
Consistnetly showed increase in Gini coefficient in southern cone from 1870-1910 Gaps between top and bottom 10% also showed widening Southern Cone economies grew sig. but varied a lot; Argentina faster than EU, US even faster. Inequality also rising Brazil census data shows population and economic activity towards dynamic south and south east with coffee IPF analysis shows inequality had a capacity for even higher than 1870
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Bertola's 'State Led Industrilisation' Arguments
2 main stages WW2 and after the war up till 1980; high growth period and average annual GDP of about 5%. Biggest jumps in productivity Huge social shifts: population tripled, and urban share went up to 2/3 Industrialisation Periods: 1. Pragmatic ISI Post WW2 2. Classical up to Mid 60s; consicouns planniing but fx struggles 3. Mature mid 60s up to 80s. Strategies ddiverge around export or import focus ECLAC provide intellectual firepower for this idea; gave ISI a strong rationale. Legally involved in policy and integration --> led to Latiin Ameriica Free Trade Association inequality stayed stubbornly high Big Downside: LA share of global trade fell sig. BoP crisis and a laack of Fx, inflation (brazil, southern cone linked ot budge deffiicitts espec after oil shocks in 70s LA tech gap maintained the same with little innovation esp comapred to SE
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Bertola's 'State Led Industrilisation' Evidence
“The repeated boom-and-bust cycles of commodity exports created policy frameworks oriented around fire-fighting rather than pre-emptive institutional building.” — Bértola & Ocampo (2012) * Slow period in depression 0.6% annual * Then goes to 5% Population 100 - 349 million Urbanisation 32 --> 65% Textiles, food, cement, oil refineries ---> cars. Export as a % of GDP fel State development bank in Chile Columbia and mexico in 1830s LA manufactured exports grew as a share
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Hirschman's 'The Political Economy of ISI' Arguments
Industrialisation by stages; ending with making consumer goods --> hopefully make backward linkages However EU, these linkages started before or during it.; LA was less dynamic Gerschenkron says Industrialisation in late times needed a big push. LA late late only focused on consumer goods, less capital and less institutional backing. Initial phase (exuberance) led to easy success and fuel unrealistic expectations Led to exhaustion, replacing easy goods is easy, but replacing intermediate and capital goods is harder.. Stuck with high cost consumer industries dependent on importing capital --> worsens BOP Barriers to backward linkages: Economical: - Industrialists worried about reliance, location and quality of local imports - No incentive to go after local as input imports have low tariffs - Technological strangeness; diff knowledge base, skills Politically: - Immediate interests may have been to status quo rather than industrialisation - Gov. planners (technicos) pushed harder for backwards linkages e.g. Brazil forced this compared to Mexico
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Hirschman's 'The Political Economy of ISI' Arguments' evidence
Prebisch 1949 --> 60s talking about how LA had an industrial sector with no specialisation and super protected Brazil in 50s shows Gershenkron big push; big investment in steal and capital goods. Staged Sequential Industrialisation --> resistance to innovation, exporting and backward linkages Happened w/o social upheavel. New industrial class weaker --> hurt export promotion efforts and disappointment w outcome
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Sachs ' Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America' Populist Cycle Summary
Cycle of populism. High income inequality -- > intense political pressure --> improve working class income --> poor policy choices 'Populist policy cycle' which starts well and ends badly Urbanisation --> urban based political leaders (peron) --> appealed directly to urban class (ISI, industrilisation) --> urban centric populist redistribution Preferred distribution rather than true redistribution like land reform and taxes.
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Sachs on two sector model and effect of expansionay fiscal poliocy chain on it
expansioanry fiscal policy --> boosts demand for no export sector --> pushes up nominall wages --> import the same so real wages increase as price of tradeables rise --> export sectors less valuabale --> exports fall and import demand rises --> trade deficits --> fx reserves drained --> BoP crisis and devaluation --> imports more expensive and hammers real wages --> new floating fx rate --> sustained high inflation --> financing through printing money and other extreme attempts
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Sachs on Argetina in 1940s under Juan Peron
1. Argentina; 1940s under Juan Peron Expansionary polic, fixed fx, protectionism for urban workers -> urban wages up 62% in 3 years By 48 farm output falling, inflation and bad rate --> economy contracted Peron admitted to overspending
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Sachs on Salavador Alende in Chile 1971-3
Strong urban support --> huge expansionary fiscal policy --> GNP grew 9% in 71, 17% increase in real wage in same year By 72 growth negative, inflation 152% and no reserves. By 72 inflation at 500% and amlitary cou
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Sachs on Peru's Alan Garcia 1985-88
Suspended foreign debt payments, froze fx, increase urban wages --> 8% GDP growth in 86 , real wage increase 20% Trade defficit, no reserves --> hyperinflation riising 100% in one month Sept 1988
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O'Donnel 'Delegative Democracy' DD definition
Delegative Democracies (DD) - meet basic checklist (elections, sufferage) but de facto power differs to representative democracies Difference comes from colonial legacy and socioeconomic problems that democracies inherit ; argentina, peru, Ecuador, Bolivia Delegative form is enduring and sticky; economic crises reinforce it
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O'Donnel 'Delegative Democracy' Arguments
DD presidents try and change terms to allow for re election e.g. Garcia in Peru. DD success is about the person but the institution. Modern DD traced to old caudillismo, populism, strongmen rulers Conditions of democratisation much more different in post WW1 in Europe compared to LA in 1980s, transitioning in hyperinflation and stagnation. --> sense of urgency Long crises create a prisoners dilemma --> undermines societal trust as everyone looks out for each other
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O'Donnel 'Delegative Democracy' Evidence
Language by presidential candidates; outsiders and saviours --> once elected --> ignore legislature and judiciary Argentina Peru show how economic expansion then harsh austerity Huge sweeping reform; crusado plan in Brazil Urgua and Chile; stronger institutions constraint presidents --> incremental policy (Uruguay President Sanguinetti pursued incremental economic policies, negotiated with congress, same with Chilke under President Alywin) Only Uruguay and Chile revived earlier political insitutions such as congress to give sonsitutional restrictions and create checks and baalnces. Even successful presidents like Sanguinettti and Alywin failed to promote constituional reform for relection. Incumbents never lasted past more than one cycle.
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Kaufman's 'How Societies Changer Developmental Models or Keep them' Arguments
Initial shift to ISI was reactive to global depression. Economic outcomes in LA defined by the variation in political economy. Moving away from ISI pre-70s was tough for LA due to resistance from industrialists benefitting from ISI --> ECLAC, Growth of Industrialists, Urban Class growth all gave power to ISI Vested interests against EOI: ECLA interests, industrialists, politically easy to keep domestic consumption and jobs happy. Compared to East Asia (SK and Taiwan), colonialism and war weakened the dominant classes there -> led to autonomous powerful states --> could push EOI with less internal opposition --> symbiotic state and industrial rs East Asia greater reliance on US --> aligning with US open economy + received aid through Cold War Pressure Large doemstic markets --> less pressure to look outside for growth.
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Kaufman's 'How Societies Changer Developmental Models or Keep them' Arguments
For 6 main countries, industrial output jumped but imports dropped as a % of GDP 1929 - 47 Political Coalitions shifted in response to fallout; not uniform. Highlights relations between industriialists, elite, new government Manufactured exports for agrentina and brazil succeeded in 1940 but didn't go into globla markets Compare share of manufuactured exports, lagged really behind SEA Argentina stog go cycle under Peron for ISI and failing ISI determined by political elites interaction
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Grandin's 'The Third Conquest of Latin America' Arguments
1. US actively promoted free market rules e.g Chile under authoritarian Pinochet Chicago Boys implementing Friedman monetary -- US support for regime and Friedman. --> Tied to Cold War and US fear of socialist regimes 2. Neoliberal reforms had -ve social and economic reforms e.g. deep recession, high unemployment in Chile under Chicago Boys --> worsening inequality and rising debt Dismantling of earlier dev. Models - rapidly tearing these down left them vulnerable (global market swings, capital flight) --> foreign investors prioritised US funding training of LA economists at Chicago. Influence of IMF and World Bank (conditions for structural adjustment programmes - fiscal austerity)
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Coatsworth's 'Liberalism and Big Sticks: The Politics of US Interventions in Latin AMerica 1898 - 2004' Arguments
1. Security used as justification, but claims seem thin. 2. Money; protecting US companies, saving capitalism 3 of 41 linked to trade 3. Main driver: Domestic Politics Supply: How easy it is to intervene Demand: Domestic Politics, Global Strategy; US wanted to project power globally. Domestic political wins was easy. Cold War; wanted reliable allies instead of democratic. --> political priosners iin LA exceeded in Europe.
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Kahler's 'POlitics and INternational Devbt' Arguments
Political (Kahler's Hypothesis): 1. Ensuring Stability of System; powerful states leaning on borrowers, lenders of last resort 2. Regulation: supervising banks to protect savers 3. Adjustment: policy changes to service debt. Ability and willingness is also political. Hard Regimes; political muscle to push through austerity whereas soft regimes lack it. Points to domestic politics as resistance to fundamental reforms e.g. US only forced into action through threat to their own system, scope only limited to crisis management rather than fundamental reform. North tried to stop LA debtors forming a coalition
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Coatsworth's 'Liberalism and Big Sticks: The Politics of US Interventions in Latin AMerica 1898 - 2004' Evidence
1898 - 1994 --> 41 successful governments in LA 1 governments every 2 years for 100 years Kennedy didn’t think missiles in Cuba didn’t effect the nuclear balance despite Khruschev. Castro regime better Reagan used soviet missiles and domino effects in Nicaragua. Most experts dismissed. Nicaraguan gov. even offered to sign treaty. Lyndon Johnson Dominican Republic; scared of republican criticism of losing it. 1920s; Nicaragua revolt was linkted to mexican soivet plot agaisnt the Panama canal; NYT wrote about Bolshevik wedge. But Russia lacked diplomatic relations. Chile 73' where US policies worsened economic problems to destabilise disliked gov.
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Kahler's 'POlitics and INternational Devbt' Evidence
Politics within debtors: Intense pressure from IMF vs domestic political collapse --> couldn’t have united front Mexico; established authoritarian system PRI and technocrats (hard) --> executed reforms Argentina: new democracy, huge pressure from unions, anger on public policy (soft) ---> resisted adjustments Peru banks tried to force adjustment on their own in the 70s but failed despite flashing warning signs. Soft authoritarian regimes used finance to buy social peace and avoid reforms Mexico 82 collapse led to FED bridge loans and CB, G5 emergency cash, IMF used structural adjustment and pressured involuntary lending to private banks.
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Ocampo's 'Latin America's Growth and Equity Fustrations during Structural Reforms' Arguments
Hypothesis: Some wins (lowered inflation, higher exports) economic growth was low and unstable --> social outcomes disappointing and even got worse Northern: Manufacturing for US, high import content Southern: Primary production, trade within LA Lacked stable FDI; boom and bust. Social spending rose 10 --> 14%. Modest improvements, continued too 80s. Access to education same, same with coverage Labour: rising unemployment. Big jump in informal sector employment --> worsened inequality Poverty rate higher than 1980s. Chile and Uruguay better at translating growth into poverty
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Ocampo's 'Latin America's Growth and Equity Fustrations during Structural Reforms' Evidence
Slump from 98 - 2002 ; per capita gdp shrank by 3.6%. Growth rate was half pre debt crisis overall xport volumes grew by 9% and FDI increased. But export sectors didn't have any backward linkages nor technological links. Labour productivity stagnant. Before debt was growing at 2.5% per year. Privatised gains didn't diffuse --> economic dualism. Labour: rising unemployment. Big jump in informal sector employment --> worsened inequality Poverty rate higher than 1980s
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What did Fernando Fajnzybler call the economic dualism
Fernando Fajnzylber called this the "modernization of backwardness" — modern industries emerging without transforming the broader economy. In Mexico, NAFTA liberalization led to the expansion of the maquiladora export sector, but domestic SMEs were crowded out, leading to a two-track economy.
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How did structural adjustment effect Bolivia
In Bolivia, SAPs under the “shock therapy” model reduced inflation drastically, but malnutrition and unemployment among indigenous populations spiked.
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What did Micheal Centeno cal the privatisation and institutional hollowing after the SAPs of 1990
Scholarly support: Miguel Centeno (1997) referred to this process as the "death of the state" in Latin America — states became administrators of austerity, not engines of development. R&D investment remained below 0.5% of GDP on average across Latin America, compared to over 2% in East Asia.
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Gallagher's 'China Matters'
China isnt really challenging LA position as primary vs manufactured goods; but potential along the road. Not much sig. fdi because of China. Sometimes even positive link. But China is capturing more of the FDI, but attract different sources and no evidence of trade off. Mexico different as it is manufacturing based; commerical competiton and china takes up a large compeittion w FDI. Shifting from electrical FDI. China's rise is reinforcing trade deficits and primary specialisation Columbia China deficit 10x total deficit Mexico; chinese manufacturing exports faster than any other country
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Gasparini 'Rise and fall opf income inequality in LAtin America' arguments
Rise in 80s and 90: External shocks + austerity--> regressive impact, sometimes oligarchs did even better Market orientated reforms: Reforms had small regressive impact (liberalisation, labour) 90s: Technological use made high skilled workers more in demand, reduce demand for less skilled labour --> worsening inequality. Less skilled workers also had less bargaining power. Fall in 2000s Decline across wide range of countries not just left leaning gov. or because of commodity boom Confluence: improved macroecnomic stability, improved growth and job creation, expansion of basic education from 80s and 90s, shocks of 90s subsided Policy: active labour market policies (improving minimum wages, labour unions), progressive social spending (Conditional Cash Transfer) CCT's provide direct cash payments dependent on sending kids to school, health checkups - very well targeted to poorest houses.
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Gasparini 'Rise and fall opf income inequality in LAtin America' Argentina case
6 phaes of inequality: Opening up saw sig. inequality. 2001 crisis again Post 2002 inequality fell towards low intensive sectors, strengthening labour instituions, emergency programme spending
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Gasparini 'Rise and fall opf income inequality in LAtin America' Brazil
Didn't see ihigh inequality in 90s as tariffs alr low and labour insts. Consistent steady fall in gini coefficient, income of poorest 10% grew faster than top 10%. Narrowing of wage differentials across economic sectors and geographical Economic transfers and increasing coverage Minimum wage increases and CCTs. Earlie expansion of 80s paid off
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Gasparini 'Rise and fall opf income inequality in LAtin America' Mexico
Saw same inequality increase in 90s liberalisation (skill premium, labour structure) After Nafta, gini went to 1980 level Progressa; CCT programme. Happened w even slow growth. Income growth fasterst for bottom 10% Changes in hourly wages and more equal education distribution.