Week 18 - Global Governance

Question 1

Drezner 2014

Answer 1

Global governance is

“A set of formal and informal rules that regulate the global economy and the collection of authority relationships that promulgate, coordinate, monitor, or enforce said rules.”

Question 2

Moschella and Weaver 2014

Answer 2

Global governance is

“An international rules-based framework through which economic actors resolve collective action problems and promote cross-border coordination and cooperation in defined issue areas.”

Question 3

Historical power shifts

Answer 3

US Share of world GDP:
- 1960: 40%
- Early 2020s: 23-24% (nominal) | 15-16% (PPP)
- 2028 estimate (IMF): 14.5%
- China forecast (PPP): 19.7%, EU: 13.65%
(Bertaut et al., 2023)

US Dollar share of foreign reserves:
- 2000: 72%
- 2022: <60%
- Still dominant: 90% of forex transactions involve USD

Question 4

Geoeconomic fragmentation

Answer 4

• A reversal of the greater integration of goods, services, capital, talent, or ideas.

Causes:
- Pandemic → supply chain disruption
- Russia-Ukraine war → exposed Europe’s energy dependence
- Waning political support for global trade integration

Question 5

Theoretical approaches to global governance - liberal institutionalism

Answer 5

Focus on formal institutions, rules, and expert-led governance

Examples:
- IGOs: IMF, World Bank
- Forums: G20, Financial Stability Forum
- NGOs: Amnesty, Greenpeace
- Private boards: IASB

Why Multilateralism Matters:
- Delivers public goods (e.g. open trade)
- Led by technocrats, not mass public
- Seeks to manage problems, not eliminate causes
(Cox and Jacobson, 1973)

Limitations:
- Underestimates politics, culture, traditional values
- Focus on elite preferences, not citizens
- Sees growth only in quantitative (GDP) terms

Question 6

Theoretical approaches to global governance - hegemonic stability theory

Answer 6

Developed in 1970s to explain Bretton Woods collapse

• Stability = led by a single hegemon
• Assumes hegemon provides global public goods, e.g. free trade
• US has filled this role post-WWII

Core Claim: “The poor exploit the rich” via free-riding on US leadership

Limitations:
- Self-fulfilling (US double standards cause decline)
- Ignores emerging powers, civil society, & networks
- Doesn’t reflect today’s multipolarity (US & China can’t replicate past unipolar hegemony)

Question 7

Theoretical approaches to global governance - postcolonial (antihegemonic) theory

Answer 7

Highlights exclusion and colonial legacy in governance institutions

Institutions (WTO, IMF, World Bank) retain power imbalance:
- US holds 16.5% World Bank votes
- Brazil: only 2.22% despite being a middle-income nation
- Western states: 58% of IMF votes

Key Moments & Arguments:
- Doha Round failed to address Global South discontent
- Postcolonial states have turned to alternatives:
- BRICS, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

Brzezinski (1997): warned of a “grand coalition” of China, Russia, Iran as a dangerous antihegemonic bloc

Limitations:
- Emerging economies are not a united bloc
- Methodological nationalism: assumes state = people
- Often neglects resistance/social movements

Question 8

US-China tensions

Answer 8

• Reflects classic rising vs declining hegemony dynamic

Flashpoints:
- Trade imbalances
- IP rights
- Technology transfer

China asserts interests; US resists => geopolitical competition

Question 9

Rodrik - central thesis

Answer 9

Global governance in international economics should be limited to clear cases of beggar-thy-neighbour policies and global public goods, rather than pursuing hyper-globalisation, which has historically prioritised corporate interests over domestic policy space and democratic accountability

Question 10

Rodrik

Beggar-thy-neighbour policies

Answer 10

Domestic policies that intentionally benefit one nation by harming others (EG currency devaluation to boost exports)

Question 11

Rodrik

Argument 1: Most economic policy should remain under national sovereignty

Content

Answer 11

• Rodrik argues that not all domestic policies that have cross-border effects justify global governance
• If taken to the extreme, the logic of cross-border spillovers would demand international oversight even over policies like education or speed limits, which is absurd
• Instead, only when national policies impose direct, intentional harm on others (as in BTN policies), or when national inaction leads to global undersupply of a public good (like climate protection), should global rules be applied

Question 12

Rodrik

Argument 1: Most economic policy should remain under national sovereignty

Example

Answer 12

Education affects comparative advantage, but Rodrik argues it should never be subject to global rules despite spillovers .

Question 13

Rodrik

Argument 1: Most economic policy should remain under national sovereignty

So what?

Answer 13

• This reorients our understanding of global governance in IE by stressing that domestic needs must take precedence unless global coordination is truly necessary
• It offers a more realistic alternative to one-size-fits-all rules imposed by hyper-globalist institutions

Question 14

Rodrik

Argument 2: Hyper-globalisation undermined democracy and development

Content

Answer 14

• Rodrik contends that hyper-globalisation imposed extreme constraints on national governments by redefining domestic laws as trade distortions
• This diluted decades-old social contracts and contributed to public disillusionment with globalisation and democratic institutions.

Question 15

Rodrik

Argument 2: Hyper-globalisation undermined democracy and development

So what?

Answer 15

• This shows that global governance can reinforce inequality and erode public trust if misapplied
• Unlike most economic models that praise liberalisation, Rodrik critiques how global institutions have undermined domestic reform and equity

Question 16

Rodrik

Argument 3: A meta-regime offers a more flexible, cooperative alternative

Content

Answer 16

• Rodrik proposes a “meta-regime” that encourages countries to explain and justify their policy choices rather than subjecting them to pre-set global rules
• This framework encourages trust and long-term cooperation while preserving national flexibility

Question 17

Rodrik

Argument 3: A meta-regime offers a more flexible, cooperative alternative

Example

Answer 17

US restrictions on Chinese semiconductors are evaluated as non-BTN under this regime if framed around national security, not economic harm

Question 18

Rodrik

Argument 3: A meta-regime offers a more flexible, cooperative alternative

So what?

Answer 18

• This redefines what effective global governance looks like: not maximal global rules, but selective coordination in areas of clear need
• It bridges the gap between sovereignty and cooperation

Question 19

Rodrik

Strengths

Answer 19

1. The author limits global governance to only beggar-thy-neighbour policies and global public goods
2. The author critiques how hyper-globalisation prioritised corporate interests over public welfare
3. The author proposes a flexible ‘meta-regime’ framework to balance sovereignty with cooperation

Question 20

Rodrik

Strength - The author limits global governance to only beggar-thy-neighbour policies and global public goods

Answer 20

• This is a strength because it offers a clear and realistic criterion for when global rules are justified, avoiding the overreach seen in hyper-globalisation
• This means governance becomes focused and effective, only intervening in cases of direct harm or shared international interest
• This is important/relevant to our understanding because it helps distinguish necessary global cooperation from unnecessary constraints on national policy
• It also provides insight that too much global governance can weaken national democracy and development

Question 21

Rodrik

Strength - The author critiques how hyper-globalisation prioritised corporate interests over public welfare

Answer 21

• This is a strength because it exposes how global rules have often been shaped by powerful private actors, not by collective or equitable goals
• This means the global economic order is not neutral, but structurally biased towards capital and against policy space for social protection
• This is important/relevant to our understanding because it challenges the idea that global governance is always in the public interest, especially for developing economies

Question 22

Rodrik

Strength - The author proposes a flexible ‘meta-regime’ framework to balance sovereignty with cooperation

Answer 22

• This is a strength because it offers an innovative model of global governance that respects national autonomy while promoting accountability and dialogue
• This means countries can pursue domestic goals while being transparent about policies that may affect others, reducing conflict without rigid rules
• This is important/relevant to our understanding because it reimagines governance as cooperative and adaptable, not hierarchical or one-size-fits-all
• It also provides insight which realist or neoliberal models miss: that trust-building and mutual explanation can be more effective than enforcement in managing global economic relations

Question 23

Rodrik

Weaknesses

Answer 23

1. The author underestimates the risks of leaving too much economic policy to national discretion
2. The meta-regime relies heavily on voluntary cooperation and reason-giving, which may be ineffective in practice
3. The author focuses more on critiquing hyper-globalisation than offering detailed alternatives for reforming existing institutions

Question 24

Rodrik

Weakness - The author underestimates the risks of leaving too much economic policy to national discretion

Answer 24

• This is a weakness because it assumes states will act responsibly when given autonomy, without fully addressing how national policies can create systemic global harm beyond obvious beggar-thy-neighbour cases
• This means problems like carbon emissions, financial instability, and labour exploitation may fall through the cracks if not covered by enforceable global rules
• This is weak in our understanding of global governance because it downplays the interconnected nature of economies and the need for broader collective oversight
• Liberal institutionalists might argue that global coordination should be wider, especially for long-term, diffuse challenges like climate change
• This leaves Rodrik’s framework vulnerable to criticism that it may protect sovereignty at the cost of global justice and sustainability

Question 25

Rodrik Weakness - The meta-regime relies heavily on voluntary cooperation and reason-giving, which may be ineffective in practice

Answer 25

- This is a weakness because it assumes countries will participate in good faith, yet real-world geopolitics often involve power asymmetries and strategic behaviour - This means powerful states could justify harmful policies under national interest while weaker states lack the leverage to challenge them - This is weak in our understanding of global governance because it provides little enforcement or accountability, limiting the regime’s practical impact - Power dynamics are central to global governance, and Rodrik’s framework lacks tools to counter hegemonic behaviour - This risks making the meta-regime too idealistic, offering norms without mechanisms to uphold them

Question 26

Rodrik Weakness - The author focuses more on critiquing hyper-globalisation than offering detailed alternatives for reforming existing institutions

Answer 26

- This is a weakness because while Rodrik convincingly diagnoses the problem, he provides limited guidance on how global institutions like the WTO, IMF, or World Bank should adapt or be rebuilt - This means his proposed regime remains largely theoretical, with unclear pathways for implementation in the current institutional landscape - This is weak in our understanding of global governance because reforming global rules requires more than principles, it needs concrete strategies and institutional redesign - Legitimacy and gradual reform depend on working within existing institutions rather than proposing parallel frameworks - This limits the applicability of Rodrik’s ideas for policymakers aseeking tangible entry points for change

Question 27

Sharma - central thesis

Answer 27

- The idea of the “rise of the rest” was overstated and poorly understood, because most emerging markets, including the BRICs, failed to achieve sustained high growth, and the assumption that they would converge with the developed world was rooted in exceptional rather than replicable circumstances - This challenges the foundations of global economic forecasting and reveals the limited effectiveness of global governance models that rely on universal convergence and institutional templates

Question 28

Sharma Argument 1: Sustained growth is rare - most emerging markets eventually stagnate Content

Answer 28

- Sharma argues that sustained high growth is the exception, not the norm - Most emerging markets - including the BRICs - showed temporary spurts of growth due to exceptional global conditions (like the 2000s credit boom), but historically, very few have managed to grow above 5% for more than one or two decades - This undermines global narratives of convergence that informed policy assumptions in the IMF and World Bank - Instead, global governance frameworks must recognise that uneven and unstable growth is typical

Question 29

Sharma Argument 1: Sustained growth is rare - most emerging markets eventually stagnate Examples

Answer 29

- Between 2008 and 2012, Brazil’s growth fell from 4.5% to 2%, Russia’s from 7% to 3.5%, and India’s from 9% to 6% - Only six economies (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) maintained over 5% growth for four decades

Question 30

Sharma Argument 1: Sustained growth is rare - most emerging markets eventually stagnate So what?

Answer 30

- This means global governance strategies based on one-size-fits-all templates (like the Washington Consensus) are flawed because they assume convergence is normal, when it is not - Effective governance must be tailored to the unpredictable and historically inconsistent growth patterns of individual nations

Question 31

Sharma Argument 2: The BRICs were never a coherent bloc - global governance overstated their unity Content

Answer 31

- Sharma dismantles the idea that the BRICs had much in common besides size - Their growth models, resource dependencies, and trade patterns are radically different, meaning they respond very differently to global shocks - Yet international governance frameworks and investors often treated them as a unified force in the global economy, distorting expectations and policymaking

Question 32

Sharma Argument 2: The BRICs were never a coherent bloc - global governance overstated their unity Examples

Answer 32

- Brazil and Russia benefit from high oil prices; India suffers from them - Russia’s billionaire class owns assets worth 20% of GDP - the highest wealth concentration among major economies

Question 33

Sharma Argument 2: The BRICs were never a coherent bloc - global governance overstated their unity So what?

Answer 33

- This reveals a weakness in global governance that relies on simplified groupings and static categories, which overlook economic heterogeneity - Institutions must adopt more flexible approaches when dealing with so-called blocs, recognising the internal contradictions within these groupings

Question 34

Sharma Argument 3: The illusion of convergence distorted global economic governance priorities Content

Answer 34

- Sharma critiques how global institutions projected convergence based on short-term booms, failing to account for political instability, bad governance, or macroeconomic volatility - He shows that most growth was driven by temporary capital inflows and commodity booms, not structural change - As a result, governance models assumed emerging markets would behave like the West once they reached middle-income levels, when in fact many lacked the institutions to sustain that development

Question 35

Sharma Argument 3: The illusion of convergence distorted global economic governance priorities Examples

Answer 35

- From 2003 to 2007, emerging market stock returns averaged 37% per year - driven by global optimism and easy money - After 2008, trade in emerging markets fell back to 2% of GDP, from 6% at the peak

Question 36

Sharma Argument 3: The illusion of convergence distorted global economic governance priorities So what?

Answer 36

- This means global governance should not assume institutional convergence based on temporary growth patterns - It should support capacity-building tailored to political realities and long-term structural reform, not simply encourage financial liberalisation based on temporary booms

Question 37

Sharma “Failure to…”

Answer 37

“…sustain growth has been the general rule”

Question 38

Rodrik Strengths

Answer 38

1. The author dismantles the myth of convergence that underpinned global governance models for emerging markets 2. The author exposes the dangers of treating the BRICs as a unified bloc in global governance discourse 3. The author links the rise and fall of emerging markets to exceptional global conditions, not replicable models

Question 39

Rodrik Strength - The author dismantles the myth of convergence that underpinned global governance models for emerging markets

Answer 39

- This is a strength because it challenges the dominant belief that developing countries will automatically catch up with the developed world by following liberal economic policies - This means Sharma refocuses attention on structural, political, and institutional barriers that block sustained growth - factors often ignored in convergence-based global policy frameworks - This is important/relevant to our understanding because many global institutions (e.g. the IMF and World Bank) shaped governance advice around the flawed expectation of steady upward development - It also provides that divergence, stagnation, and collapse are just as common as development, and governance must reflect this

Question 40

Rodrik Strength - The author exposes the dangers of treating the BRICs as a unified bloc in global governance discourse

Answer 40

- This is a strength because it shows how global economic institutions and investors oversimplified the diversity of emerging markets, assuming uniform progress and similar needs - This means BRIC-centric governance strategies failed to accommodate the internal contradictions and differing vulnerabilities of each country - This is important/relevant to our understanding because real global governance must be context-specific, rather than driven by media-friendly acronyms or investment hype - It also provides insight that lumping diverse economies together leads to bad policy, false forecasting, and weak institutional support

Question 41

Rodrik Strength - The author links the rise and fall of emerging markets to exceptional global conditions, not replicable models

Answer 41

- This is a strength because it explains that much of the BRICs’ success was tied to temporary booms (e.g. commodity prices, easy credit), not sustainable domestic reforms - This means global governance frameworks must stop assuming that short-term growth equals long-term transformation - This is important/relevant to our understanding because it highlights how governance must be cautious of timing, global cycles, and the volatility of external dependence - It also provides insight that copying past success stories without regard for historical context leads to misplaced optimism and poor governance outcomes

Question 42

Rodrik Weaknesses

Answer 42

1. The author offers strong critique of convergence myths but provides no alternative vision for global governance frameworks 2. The argument overemphasises economic volatility and underemphasises the role of global institutions in shaping outcomes 3. The critique is overly BRIC-focused and misses broader insights into global governance challenges for smaller or lower-income states

Question 43

Rodrik Weakness - The author offers strong critique of convergence myths but provides no alternative vision for global governance frameworks

Answer 43

- This is a weakness because while Sharma dismantles the BRICs narrative and convergence theory, he does not suggest what more adaptive global governance should look like - This means the argument stops at critique without proposing how institutions like the IMF, World Bank, or WTO should change their approach to policymaking in the Global South - This is weak in our understanding of global governance because it doesn’t help redesign current models, it only warns against past mistakes - Institutionalist economists might argue that constructive reform proposals are essential for global institutions to evolve - This limits the usefulness of Sharma’s analysis for policymakers seeking direction on how to govern a diverse, post-BRIC global economy

Question 44

Rodrik Weakness - The argument overemphasises economic volatility and underemphasises the role of global institutions in shaping outcomes

Answer 44

- This is a weakness because Sharma attributes emerging market failures mainly to domestic mismanagement and external cycles, without analysing how global governance structures (e.g. trade rules, debt regimes) constrain policy space - This risks individualising blame rather than recognising systemic constraints built into global economic governance - This is weak in our understanding of global governance because it downplays how institutional design and power asymmetries shape development trajectories across countries - Unequal global rules - not just internal failings - often limit the scope for sustained development - This weakens the critique’s structural depth and makes it seem overly focused on growth metrics rather than systemic economic justice

Question 45

Rodrik Weakness - The critique is overly BRIC-focused and misses broader insights into global governance challenges for smaller or lower-income states

Answer 45

- This is a weakness because the text centres on the largest emerging markets, but says little about how global governance affects less prominent economies - This means the analysis may not generalise well to countries that are heavily aid-dependent or excluded from investment narratives - This is weak in our understanding of global governance because it overlooks how rules affect the most disadvantaged economies, not just those that attracted attention during the 2000s boom - Global South scholars might argue that focusing on BRICs distorts global governance debates, as most countries don’t fit that mould - This narrows the scope of the argument and limits its relevance for debates about inclusivity in global institutions

Question 46

Wolf - central thesis

Answer 46

Wolf argues that global governance institutions like the WTO and IMF are necessary but flawed tools to manage the tensions between national sovereignty and global economic integration, especially as economic decisions by states impact others in an interdependent world

Question 47

Wolf Argument 1: Global Economic Institutions Are Necessary Due to Sovereignty Conflicts Content

Answer 47

- Wolf explains that international institutions emerged post-WWII because unilateral actions by powerful states or hegemonic struggles could lead to war - The IMF and WTO help coordinate and stabilise trade and monetary systems among sovereign states to avoid this - The EU is cited as the most developed form of such cooperation, but the WTO and IMF are critical global models

Question 48

Wolf Argument 1: Global Economic Institutions Are Necessary Due to Sovereignty Conflicts So what?

Answer 48

- This shows that global economic governance is not about idealism, but about preventing conflict and chaos in a deeply interdependent system - It highlights why we need institutions to mediate between self-interest and global public goods like stability

Question 49

Wolf Argument 2: The WTO’s Expansion Has Created Both Liberalisation and Overreach Content

Answer 49

- Wolf supports the WTO’s role in promoting trade liberalisation, especially for small countries that benefit from multilateral rules - However, he warns that deep integration risks undermining regulatory diversity and could impose rules that are politically or economically intolerable for developing states - The “single undertaking” principle forces countries to accept entire packages, which may be unfair or unrealistic

Question 50

Wolf Argument 2: The WTO’s Expansion Has Created Both Liberalisation and Overreach Example

Answer 50

The WTO system expanded to agriculture, services, TRIPs, and sanitary standards, reaching into domestic policy (deep integration)

Question 51

Wolf Argument 2: The WTO’s Expansion Has Created Both Liberalisation and Overreach So what?

Answer 51

This underscores the balance global governance must strike - universal participation is good, but overreach can harm legitimacy, especially when developing states are forced into one-size-fits-all commitments

Question 52

Wolf Argument 3: The IMF’s Role in Financial Crises Reveals Institutional Flaws Content

Answer 52

- Wolf admits the IMF made mistakes, including imposing generic fiscal tightening during the Asian crisis and underestimating the risks of capital account liberalisation - However, he defends the IMF as a necessary lender of last resort, especially for states without access to private capital - He criticises the USA’s dominance over IMF decisions but argues that without the IMF, countries would be left to negotiate directly with the US Treasury

Question 53

Wolf Argument 3: The IMF’s Role in Financial Crises Reveals Institutional Flaws Example

Answer 53

The IMF’s role in the Asian Financial Crisis: recommended austerity, high interest rates, and conditionality that worsened recessions in South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand.

Question 54

Wolf Argument 3: The IMF’s Role in Financial Crises Reveals Institutional Flaws Stats

Answer 54

The number of bilateral investment treaties rose from ~400 in 1990 to 1,300 by 1997, illustrating how global financial liberalisation outpaced coordinated governance, reinforcing the IMF’s struggle to manage crises effectively under investor-driven rules.

Question 55

Wolf Argument 3: The IMF’s Role in Financial Crises Reveals Institutional Flaws So what?

Answer 55

- This reveals how global governance can be both a stabiliser and a power amplifier - helpful in theory, but harmful in practice if dominated by few states or ideologies (e.g. US/Wall Street) - It raises questions about reform, transparency, and whether these institutions truly serve all

Question 56

Wolf Argument 4: Global Governance Must Expand to New Domains Like Investment, Migration, and the Environment Content

Answer 56

- Wolf calls for multilateral frameworks on foreign investment, labour migration, taxation of transnational companies, and climate justice - He notes that the world currently operates on bilateral treaties or informal arrangements in these areas, which creates inequality and undermines coordinated global policy - He suggests some direction is already being taken by the EU and OECD on tax cooperation

Question 57

Wolf Argument 4: Global Governance Must Expand to New Domains Like Investment, Migration, and the Environment Example

Answer 57

Proposal for migrant-receiving countries to share income tax revenue with migrant-sending states to offset loss of human capital

Question 58

Wolf Argument 4: Global Governance Must Expand to New Domains Like Investment, Migration, and the Environment So what?

Answer 58

This expands the concept of global governance, showing it’s not just about trade and finance but must include movement of people, environmental costs, and fair taxation - otherwise, governance will remain partial and imbalanced

Question 59

Wolf Argument 5: The Imperfect Nature of Institutions Does Not Undermine Their Necessity Content

Answer 59

- Wolf concludes that no global institution will ever be fully democratic, fair, or effective - but that’s not a reason to abandon them - Without the WTO, powerful countries would impose rules unilaterally - Without the IMF, small states would be at the mercy of financial markets or US interests

Question 60

Wolf Argument 5: The Imperfect Nature of Institutions Does Not Undermine Their Necessity So what?

Answer 60

- This reminds us that global governance is a constant balancing act - Reform is necessary, but abandoning institutions altogether would worsen inequalities and fragment global economic cooperation

Question 61

Wolf Strengths

Answer 61

1. The author defends international institutions as essential mechanisms for managing sovereignty in an interdependent global economy 2. The author recognises and addresses institutional overreach, especially in the WTO, without rejecting the legitimacy of multilateralism 3. The author expands the concept of global governance beyond trade and finance to include emerging issues like migration, investment, and taxation

Question 62

Wolf Strength - The author defends international institutions as essential mechanisms for managing sovereignty in an interdependent global economy

Answer 62

- This is a strength because it reframes global governance not as an idealistic ambition but as a practical necessity to prevent disorder in a world of sovereign states - This means global institutions like the WTO and IMF are not optional add-ons but foundational to the functioning of the global economy - This is important/relevant to our understanding because it challenges realist critiques that dismiss cooperation as unrealistic and shows how institutions mediate power without erasing sovereignty - It also provides insight which realist theories don’t: that institutional governance can preserve both order and fairness in a system marked by deep asymmetries

Question 63

Wolf Strength - The author recognises and addresses institutional overreach, especially in the WTO, without rejecting the legitimacy of multilateralism

Answer 63

- This is a strength because it acknowledges that deep integration - such as TRIPs and sanitary rules - can infringe on domestic policy space, particularly for developing countries - This means the critique is balanced: Wolf supports liberalisation but warns against one-size-fits-all enforcement and overextension of global rules - This is important/relevant to our understanding because it highlights the limits of global governance and the need for flexibility within multilateral frameworks

Question 64

Wolf Strength - The author expands the concept of global governance beyond trade and finance to include emerging issues like migration, investment, and taxation

Answer 64

- This is a strength because it identifies overlooked areas where cross-border cooperation is urgently needed but institutionally underdeveloped - This means Wolf anticipates future governance gaps and pushes for more inclusive frameworks that reflect 21st-century challenges - This is important/relevant to our understanding because it shows that global governance must evolve with changing economic realities to stay effective and equitable - It also provides insight that labour flows and environmental harm are as globally consequential as tariffs and subsidies

Question 65

Wolf Weaknesses

Answer 65

1. The author downplays how power imbalances within global institutions distort governance outcomes 2. The author assumes liberalisation is a universal good without deeply engaging with alternative development models 3. The author offers limited concrete proposals for institutional reform despite recognising governance failures

Question 66

Wolf Weakness - The author downplays how power imbalances within global institutions distort governance outcomes

Answer 66

- This is a weakness because Wolf acknowledges US dominance in the IMF but does not fully explore how structural inequalities shape decision-making across global governance institutions - This means he risks portraying institutions as neutral arbiters rather than arenas where powerful states often shape rules in their favour - This is weak in our understanding of global governance because it underestimates how global institutions may reproduce rather than resolve inequality - Global governance must be analysed through the lens of power, not just functionality or cooperation - This limits the critique’s ability to explain why developing countries often resist global governance frameworks imposed from the top down

Question 67

Wolf Weakness - The author assumes liberalisation is a universal good without deeply engaging with alternative development models

Answer 67

- This is a weakness because Wolf frames global governance as a vehicle for liberal trade and finance without critically assessing how these policies have failed or harmed some economies - This means the analysis overlooks how trade openness and capital account liberalisation can exacerbate inequality and reduce policy space - This is weak in our understanding of global governance because it promotes one-size-fits-all prescriptions rather than context-specific approaches to development - Post-Keynesian economists might argue that development requires selective protection, industrial policy, and state-led planning, none of which Wolf engages with - This narrows the potential for reforming global governance to support alternative paths to development beyond liberal orthodoxy

Question 68

Wolf Weakness - The author offers limited concrete proposals for institutional reform despite recognising governance failures

Answer 68

- This is a weakness because although Wolf identifies problems like IMF mishandling of crises and WTO overreach, he does not provide detailed strategies for reform or enforcement - This means the text remains largely diagnostic rather than prescriptive, with little guidance for how global governance can be made more democratic, inclusive, or responsive - This is weak in our understanding of global governance because reforming institutions requires actionable proposals for structure, scope, and accountability - Institutionalist thinkers would argue that legitimacy and trust in global governance depend on This limits the practical relevance for policymakers seeking pathways for progressive institutional change