Week 3 - Micro/ Meso Explanations of War - Collective Action Flashcards

(21 cards)

1
Q

Why rebel?

A

Dissatisfaction with the status quo

o Relative political, economic, social deprivation (Gurr, 1970)
o Political opportunity

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2
Q

What is the ideal scenario of a violent rebellion and why is it harder than it sounds?

A

Violent rebellion is an option to change the status quo.

  • Ideal scenario:
    o Find fellow disgruntled citizens to join your cause
    o Build an insurgency
    o Force government to concede
  • Sounds easier than it is. Why?
    o Rebellion may end victorious (Zimbabwe 1980)
    o But chances of losing are high (Chechnya)

-> In both cases participation is highly risky and costly.

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3
Q

What is a public good and what are its criteria?

A

Public good: A good that is hard or even impossible to produce for private profit. It meets two criteria:

  • Non-rivalry: its benefits fail to exhibit consumption scarcity; once it has been produced, everyone can benefit from it without diminishing other’s enjoyment.
  • Non-excludability: once it has been created, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prevent access to the good.
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4
Q

What is the relation of rebellion and public goods according to Kalyvas & Kocher 2007?

A

‘Rebel groups typically claim public goods as their goals, with secession, autonomy, democratization, and redistribution appearing to be the most common.’ (Kalyvas & Kocher 2007, 181)

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5
Q

Explain the rebels dilemma.

A
  • For rebellions to successfully organize, individuals have to participate.
  • But participation is costly! Why would anyone subject themself to these costs and risk?
  • If the rebellion should succeed, everyone would benefit from the system change, even those who don’t’ participate.

-> Free Riding!

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6
Q

Explain Free-Riding according to Olson 1965

A

For each individual, it may be rational to not contribute (or minimally contribute), but reap the benefits from others contributing (Olson 1965)

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7
Q

What are the (selected) solutions to the rebels dilemma?

A
  • Changing material incentives to participate
  • Ideology
  • Rebel institutions/ self-government
  • Introducing hierarchy (e.g. through decentralization)

(There are more, these were the selected in the slides)

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8
Q

What did Kalyvas and Kocher 2007 say regarding: Beyond initial rebellion: is free-riding really so free?

A
  • How costless is the nonparticipation in rebellion really?
  • The rebel’s dilemma is only valid if collective action is risky relative to nonparticipation
  • Relative risk of nonparticipation is dependent on government behavior:
    o Large-scale, indiscriminate violence by governments against civilians may increase cost of nonparticipation, and stimulate growth of rebellion
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9
Q

What did Parkinson 2013 say to the role of organizational and social context beyond the individual mobilization?

A
  • Not all rebels fight at the frontlines: public relations, smugglers, accountants, diplomats, informants, etc.
  • Everyday social networks (kindship, marriage, friendship, colleagues) central to mobilization, organization, growth, and resilience of rebellion
  • Social networks (e.g. among women) as backbone of rebellion
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10
Q

What did Shesterinina 2016 say to the role of social structures and threat perception beyond the individual mobilization?

A
  • High-risk mobilization particularly hard to explain, especially when rebels lack weapons, training, or other resources
  • How do individuals form their threat perception in civil war?
  • Social structures and networks filter information and lead to collective threat framing
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11
Q

When does a rebellion become a civil conflict?

A
  • Involves the state and at least one organized and armed non-state actor
  • A contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force [reaches a certain threshold] (see UCDP, as discussed in session 1)
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12
Q

What are the types of civil conflicts and what are the respective goals?

A

Territorial conflicts
- Separatist conflicts: Non-state actor wants to separate a territory to form an independent state (e.g. S. Sudan/Sudan)
- Irredentist conflicts: Non-state actor wants to detach a territory from one country and ‘reunite’ it with territory in/of another country (e.g. Catholics in Northern Ireland/Ireland, Serbs in Croatia/Bosnia-Herzegovina)

Conflicts about the government
- Non-state actors try to seize control of the government (e.g. Free Syrian Army in Syria)

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13
Q

Regarding the types of civil conflict, what are the types of warfare according to Kalyvas & Balcells 2010?

A
  • Conventional warfare: military technologies between state and non-state actors are symmetric. Non-state actors can directly confront the state.
  • Irregular warfare: (or insurgency/asymmetric warfare): asymmetric military capabilities that priviledge the state. Non-state actors can challenge and harass the state, but lack the capacity to confront in a direct and frontal way.
  • Symmetric, non-conventional warfare: both sides lack advanced military capabilities (e.g. in case of weak states)
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14
Q

Regarding the types of civil conflicts, what about the number of actors?

A
  • Conventional two actor conflicts with one non-state armed group challenging the state
  • Multi-actor conflicts
    o Multiple non-state actors
    o External supporters (on either side)
    o Tend to last longer
    o Veto players make solutions harder (Cunningham 2006)
    o Infighting, free-riding?
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15
Q

Summarize civil conflicts as dynamic processes, the implications of this and what was said as more generally to this.

A
  • Civil conflict is only possible if at least two armed actors (government and non-state) are involved
  • Implication:
    o To understand conflict, we have to look at rebel behavior, government behavior, and interaction (⇒ strategic interaction)
    o Both rebel behavior (and characteristics) and state behavior (and characteristics) crucial to understanding civil conflict

More generally: conflict outbreak, dynamics, duration, and termination are highly complex, may be driven by different factors, and therefore need to be analyzed separately.

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16
Q

What are the political economy explanations of civil war onset?

A
  • Collier & Hoeffler (1998, 2004): opportunity structure favorable to greedy bandit rebellion
  • Fearon & Laitin (2003: 88) “the conditions that favor insurgency, in particular state weakness marked by poverty, a large population, and instability”
  • Both explanations:
    o focus on structural conditions
    o mechanism: rebellion individually beneficial
    o unit of analysis: country-year
    o GDP per capita main indicator for both!
    o Subsequent, related work: natural resources (diamonds, contraband, oil, etc.) that create political economies of conflict that sustain long conflict
17
Q

What role does ethnicity play in civil conflict? Explain nationalism and the approach of cederman, wimmer and min.

A
  • Nationalism: ‘collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit’ (Michael Hechter)
  • Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010)
    o Drawing on Gurr (1998, 2000)
    o Distinction between included and excluded groups
    = Grievances: politicized ethnicity -> collective action
    = Appropriate unit of analysis: group-level
18
Q

Name some consequences of civil conflict and the key predictor of future conflict.

A
  • Economic consequences (development in reverse)
  • Social consequences (health and education)
  • Long-term psychological consequences
  • Forced internal and international displacement
  • Risk of long-term militarization and violence, beyond conflict
  • Conflict recurrence: previous conflicts as key predictor for future conflicts
19
Q

Explain the assumption and the aims of conflict prediction.

A
  • Assumption: with enough lead time, policymakers (both domestic and international) and first responders could make better choices of how to deal with upcoming crises, and possibly even work to prevent them.
  • Conflict prediction aims to build models that will help assesses the probability of civil conflict. These models may aim at predicting conflict onset, escalation, continuation, and geographic diffusion.
  • To build prediction models we need to have some theoretical understanding about why and how conflict occurs
  • But: Significant relationship does not mean something is also useful for prediction
  • To evaluate explanations for conflict: test the predictive power!
20
Q

Explain Early warning and early action with regard to civil conflict.

A
  • Early warning: Can our explanations for civil conflict onset help us explain where and when conflict is likely to erupt? -> Empirical (scientific) question
  • Early action: How can we use early warning to prevent and mitigate the escalation of political violence into civil conflict? -> Political question
21
Q

What did Parkinson argue regarding success prediction of a rebellion?

A
  • Parkinson argues that ‘although back-end military practices such as resupply, logistics, and finance are understudied, these roles are central to sustaining rebellion’ (p. 430)