Medications and Behavior > Criminal Procedure Chapter 1 > Flashcards
Criminal Procedure Chapter 1 Flashcards
Dual Court System
The United States has two court systems; one for federal cases and another for state cases
How many separate judicial systems does the U.S. have?
52
original jurisdiction
the case is brought to the court directly instead of on appeal
Rule of four
at least four justices must agree for the court to consider the case on its merits
Myth or reality… Anyone can appeal their case to the supreme court
Myth
en banc
as one body - how cases are decided
stare decisis
to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases
Judicial precedent
decisions of courts have value as precedent for future cases similarly circumstanced
dual sovereignty
federal and state governments are both considered sovereign
jurisdiction
the power of a court to try a case
venue
the place where a case is to be tried
Myth or reality… Double jeopardy prevents someone from being punished twice for the same act
Myth, it only prevents multiple punishments for the same act by the same sovereign or government.
Bill of Rights
the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution
double jeopardy
being punished more than once for the same offense
statutory law
law passed by legislatures
case law
law promulgated in cases decided by the courts
common law
law generally derived from ancient usages and customs or from judgments and decrees of courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing them.
judicial review
the power of courts to declare law or acts unconstitutional
rule of law
no person is above the law
incorporation controversy
issue of whether the Bill of Rights protects the public only against violations of rights by federal officials or whether it also protects against violations of rights by state officials.
Due process clause
Found in 14th amendment, prohibits violations of rights by either federal or state officers
selective incorporation
only those rights considered fundamental should be applied to the states
total incorporation
all the rights in the Bill of Rights should be held as applying to the States
total incorporation plus
in addition to applying all the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the States, other rights ought to be added, such as the right to clean air, clean water, and a clean environment
Case-by-case incorporation
examines the facts of specific case to determine whether there is an injustice so serious as to justify extending the provisions of the Bill of Rights to this particular case
case citation
indicates where a case may be found in legal publications
Criminal procedure
the process followed by the police and the courts in the apprehension and punishment of criminals
complaint
a charge made before a law enforcement or judicial officer alleging the commission of a criminal offense
arrest
the taking of a person into custody for the purpose of criminal prosecution or interrogation
citation
an order issued by a court or law enforcement officer requiring a person to appear in court at a specified date to answer certain charges
Summons
a writ directed to the sheriff or other officer requiring the officer to notify a person that he or she must appear in court on a day named and answer the complaint
bench warrant
a process issued by the court for the attachment or arrest of a person
booking
making an entry in the police blotter indicating a suspect’s name, the time of arrest, and the offense involved
Miranda warnings
the warnings about the right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel that must be given to a person who is under custodial interrogation
Myth or Reality… A police officer has to give the Miranda warnings to every suspect he or she arrests
Myth, only if they wish to interrogate the person
bail
the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure the accused’s attendance in court at a specified time
preventive detention
detaining a person in jail without bail with the purpose of preventing them from committing additional crimes
release on recognizance (ROR)
the release of a person without monetary bail
preliminary hearing
a hearing held before a judge or magistrate within a reasonably short time after arrest
discovery
the procedure used in a case to obtain information from the other party
exculpatory evidence
which tends to establish the defendant did not commit the crime charged
exculpatory evidence
which tends to establish the defendant did not commit the crime charged
nolle prosequi motion
a motion seeking dismissal of charges
indictment
a written accusation of a crime filed by the grand jury
information
a criminal charge filed by the prosecutor without the intervention of a grand jury
grand jury
a jury that usually determines whether a person should be charged with an offense
bill of indictment
a written accusation of a crime submitted to the grand jury by the prosecutor
arraignment
the appearance of an accused in court where he or she is informed of the charges and asked to plead
capias
a warrant issued by the court for an officer to take a defendant into custody
plea
an accused’s response in court to the indictment or information
nolo contendere plea
a plea of “no contest”
standing mute
when the accused refuses to enter a plea. The court will enter a not guilty plea on behalf of the accused
Alford plea
a plea in which the defendant claims innocence yet pleads guilty for other reasons
plea bargain
defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for a lower charge, a lower sentence, or other considerations
venire
a group of prospective jurors assembled according to procedures established by law
Voir dire
a process in which prospective jurors are questioned to determine whether there are grounds for challenge
challenge for cause
a challenge for the dismissal of a juror based on causes specified by law
peremptory challenge
the dismissal of a prospective juror for reasons that need not be stated
rebuttal evidence
Evidence presented to destroy the credibility of witnesses or any evidence presented by the other side in a case
Myth or reality… The defense gets to make the last closing argument, like in the movies
Myth, its the prosecution
motion
a request made orally or in writing, asking the judge for a legal ruling on a something related to a case
prima facie case
a case that is strong enough to prevail if it is not contradicted by the opposing party
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal
a motion filed by the defense seeking acquittal of the accused before the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient evidence to convict the defendant
motion for a mistrial
A motion filed seeking for the trial to be declared invalid before it is completed alleging improper conduct
sequestration
an order by the court keeping the jurors together during trial or deliberation and not allowing them to go home at night or weekends
verdict
the pronouncement of defendant’s guilt or innocence. A third pronouncement relating to mental health can occur in some states
hung jury
a jury that cannot agree to convict or acquit an accused
jury nullification
when a jury decides a case contrary to the weight of the evidence presented during trial
bifurcated procedure
a trial procedure where the guilt-innocence stage and the sentencing stage are separate
affirmation
the decision of the lower court is upheld on appeal
reversal
The decision of the lower court is overthrown on appeal
revers-and-remanded decision
the lower court’s decision is reversed but the lower court can hear further arguments and give another decision in the case
habeas corpus
a writ directed to a person detaining another commanding that person to produce the body of a person who is imprisoned or detained in court and explain why detention should be continued
felony
a crime usually punishable by death or imprisonment in a prison for more than one year
misdemeanor
a crime usually punishable with jail time or other non-prison penalties
probable cause
more than bare suspicion; it exists when the facts and circumstances within the officers knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.
man of reasonable caution
refers to the average man or woman on the street. It does not refer to a person with training in the law
Myth or reality… police officers cannot use their experience and training in part to create probable cause
Myth, they can use it
Myth or reality… An anonymous tip cannot serve as the primary basis for the probable cause
Myth, it can if there is sufficiently corroborated by the police
level of proof
The degree of certainty required by the law for an act by government agents to be legal
reasonable suspicion
The quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person in similar circumstances to believe criminal activity is occurring
Exclusionary rule
States that evidence obtained by the government in violation of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure is not admissible in a criminal prosecution to prove guilt
Judge-made rule
A rule crafted by judges, not provided for in the Constitution
Harmless error
The evidence erroneously admitted by the trial court did not contribute to the conviction and there is another evidence to support the verdict
Myth or Reality: Anyone can claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if the prosecution seeks to use illegally seized evidence against them in court.
Myth
Standing
A legal concept that determines whether a person can legally file a lawsuit or submit a petition to the court.
Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
Once the primary evidence is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary evidence derived from it is also inadmissible.
Good faith exception
Evidence obtained by the police is admissible even if there was an error or mistake, as long as the error or mistake was not committed by the police, or, if committed by the police, it was honest and reasonable.
Inevitable discovery exception
Evidence is admissible if the police can prove that they would inevitably have discovered the evidence anyway by lawful means.
Purged taint exception
Evidence obtained is admissible if the defendant’s subsequent voluntary act dissipates the taint of the initial illegality
Independent source exception
Evidence obtained is admissible if the police can prove that it was obtained from an independent source not connected with the illegal search or seizures.
Reasonable suspicion
Not defined with precision by the Court, but is a less demanding standard than probable cause
Stop
detaining a person briefly so the officer can ask questions.
Myth v. Reality: A police may automatically conduct a frisk after he or she makes a stop based on reasonable suspicion.
Myth
Racial profiling
Any police-initiated action that relies on race, ethnicity, or the national origin of an individual instead of on individual acts or behavior
Drug Courier profile
A set of identifiers developed by law enforcement agencies describing the types of individuals who are likely to transport drugs
Frisk
A pat down for weapons. Needs reasonable suspicion
Plain touch doctrine
If an officer feels what he or she believes is a weapon, contraband, or evidence, the officer may expand the search or seize the object.
Fishing expedition
An act to see if some type of usable evidence can be found on the suspect
Stationhouse detention
Detention takes place at the police station and is used for obtaining fingerprints, photographs, conducting, police lineups, or securing identification or the other types of evidence
Duncan V. Louisiana (1968)
Rule of Law in question: 14th amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in all criminal cases (comes within 6th amendment)
Facts: Man was charged with and crime was punishable by max 2 years. Denied a jury trial by state of Louisiana. Sentenced to 60 days and $150.
Issue: Was the state of Louisiana obligated to provide a trial by jury?
Answer/Conclusion: Yes, a crime punishable by 2 years is a serious crime.
Boykin v. Alabama (1969)
Rule of Law: a guilty plea means waiving some rights. To be valid this must be done intentionally.
Facts: Petitioner pleaded guilty to 5 indictments for common law robbery. There was no testimony, character reference, or address by Boykin. He was sentenced to death. U.S. Supreme Court granted petition for certiorari even though the question of voluntariness was not raised.
Issue: Was an affirmative showing of voluntariness on the record necessary in order to conclude that Boykin had waived his rights>
Answer/Conclusion: Yes, Although the issue of voluntariness had not been raised, the court reversed Boykin’s conviction because there was no proof showing voluntariness.
Santobello v. New York (1971)
Rule of law: Promises by prosecutor in plea must be fulfilled.
Facts: Petitioner after negotiations with prosecutor withdrew not-guilty plea to plead guilty. Prosecutor agreed to make sentence recommendation. 6 months later, ne prosecutor recommended the maximum sentence and judge imposed. Petitioner tried to withdraw guilty plea unsuccessfully. Court granted certiorari.
Issue: Did the State’s failure to keep a commitment concerning the sentence recommendation on a guilty plea require a new trial?
Answer/conclusion: Yes, The Court found that when a plea rested on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, such promise had to be fulfilled. The Court concluded that the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution, in relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty, would be best served by remanding the case to the state courts for further consideration.
North Carolina v. Alford (1979)
Rule: The standard of validity of guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent choice.
Facts: Alford was indicted for first-degree murder. Alford’s attorney suggested guilty plea based off evidence and left decision to Alford. Prosecutor agreed to second-degree murder. Trial court excepted plea after hearing evidence from witnesses. Alford pleaded guilty because of death penalty not guilt. Court of appeals found Alford’s guilty plea involuntary because of motivation of fear.
Issue: Did the court of appeals err in holding Alford’s guilty plea involuntary due to motivation?
Answer/Conclusion: Yes, Supreme Court held that Alford’s motivation did not show that his plea was not from free and rational choice especially since he had competent counsel who told him to plea for a lesser sentence.
County of Riverside v. Mclaughlin (1991)
Rule: Generally probable cause within 48 hrs meets promptness requirement. Just because it is provided in 48 hrs. does not mean it meats constitutional muster. Promptness requirement is violated when arrested individual sows that probable cause
determination was delayed unreasonably
Facts: McLaughlin filed a law suit under 42 USCS saying the petitioners violated Gerstein v Pugh when they failed to determine probable cause in timely manner. The county combined it with arraignment procedures. Court filed to dismiss complaint claiming that Mclaughlin’s time for providing a prompt pc determination was past and failed to show the conduct would happen again. Court granted class certification after a second amended complaint came through and issued an injunction requiring those arrested without warrant be given a probable cause determination within 36 hrs. The county appealed and the court affirmed.
Issue: Did the County’s practice of combining probable cause determinations with arraignments within 48 hours of an individual’s arrest, excluding weekends and holidays, comport Gerstein’s promptness requirement?
Answer/Conclusion: The Court ruled that the County was entitled to combine probable cause determinations with arraignments, but the County’s policy of excluding weekends and holidays in computing the two-day period within which the combined proceedings must be offered—which exclusion could result in delays of up to 7 days—meant that the County’s regular practice exceeded the 48-hour period that was constitutionally permissible, and the county was not immune from systemic challenges, such as the challenge brought by McLaughlin.
Brinegar v. United States (1949)
Rule: Probable cause exists where facts and circumstances in officer’s knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has or is being committed
Facts: Officers patrolling a road leading from known sources of liquor supply to a probable illegal market saw a car with defendant a know liquor hauler. Officers had seen Brinegar loading liquor into car multiple times. Officer’s chased him and ran him off road. Brinegar admitted to having liquor and it was used in case leading to conviction. Brinegar appealed the constitutionality of the car search and that officers should be able to testify. Court of appeals affirmed conviction and Brinegar was given a writ of certiorari for 4th amendment rights.
Issue: Was Brinegar’s conviction proper?
Answer/Conclusion: Yes, Supreme Court affirmed. Brinegar’s comments showed probable cause for search. Also, officers knowledge was not based on hearsay. The officer’s testimonies were also declared proper in the pc hearing.
Spinelli v. United States (1969)
Rule: While hearsay can justify issuance of warrant. Supreme court sets a two-pronged test to determine the issuance. 1) application must set forth underlying circumstances. 2) officers must attempt to support claim that info is credible/reliable
Facts: Spinelli was convicted of traveling across state line from Il to Mo with intention of gambling activities against MO laws. Court refused to suppress evidence gained by search warrant. FBI’s affidavit said that Spinelli had 1) traveled to and from apartment building, parked, and only entered one. 2) Apartment contained two phones with different numbers under a different name than Spinelli’s. 3) Spinelli was known as a bookmaker and gambler 4) an informant had told FBI about Spinelli. On Appeal the US court of appeals for 8th circuit sustained search warrant. Spinelli was given a writ of certiorari and argued warrant was unconstitutional.
Issue: Was the search warrant valid?
Answer/Conclusion: No, Supreme Court found application for warrant inadequate because it did not have the underlying circumstances. Officers also failed to support their claim of credible information. Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case.
Michigan v. Summers (1981)
Rule: A warrant founded on probable cause comes with authority to detain occupants.
Facts: Police officers executing a warrant ran into Summers, they requested assistance gaining entry and detained him while searching. After finding narcotics, Summers was arrested. He was searched and heroin was found. Summers moved to suppress the heroin under 4th amendment violation. Judge granted motion and court of appeals and supreme court affirmed.
Issue: Were Summers’ pre-arrest seizure and search constitutionally permissible?
Answer/Conclusion: Yes, Court reversed judgment of lower court because it was lawful for Summers to be detained until probable cause for arrest was found. Because of warrant for house, there was a probable cause for detaining house occupants.
Alabama v. White (1990)
Rule: RS is lesser standard than PC. RS can arise from less reliable info. Both factors, quantity and quality, are considered in the totality of the circumstances, the whole picture, that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.
Facts: The State sought review of a judgment holding that officers of Alabama police department did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop of respondent’s car based on an anonymous tip and that marijuana and cocaine seized were fruits of respondent’s unconstitutional detention.
Issue: Did the police officers have the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop of respondent’s car?
Answer/conclusion: Yes, When the officers stopped respondent, the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal activity. The investigative stop, therefore, did not violate U.S. Const. amend. IV. When significant aspects of the informant’s predictions were verified, there was reason to believe that the informant was honest and well-informed.
Maryland v. Pringle (2003)
UNANIMOUS DECISION
Rule: Substance of PC definition is reasonable ground for belief of guilt which must be particular to individual. PC is needed for arrest, and the court exams events leading up to arrest and from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amounted to probable cause.
FACTS: County police officer in Maryland stopped a relatively small car for speeding, the officer (1) observed a large amount of rolled-up money in the glove compartment when the driver-owner opened the compartment to retrieve the car’s registration; and (2) performed, with the owner’s consent, a search of the car that yielded $763 from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. None of the occupants when questioned offered info. All were arrested and later the front-seat passenger admitted the cocaine was his and no one else knew. Accused was convicted of possession and intent to distribute. Maryland Court of Special appeals affirmed. Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed saying officer lacked probable cause.
Issue: Does the warrantless arrest of an automobile passenger during a stop for speeding violate the Fourth Amendment, where a police officer, having seized $763 from glove compartment and cocaine from behind back-seat armrest, arrested all three occupants after each denied ownership of cash and cocaine?
Answer/Conclusion: NO, he Court explained that the probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances. The Court held that the officer here had probable cause to believe that defendant was in possession of the drugs. It was an entirely reasonable inference that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the drugs, and thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe defendant committed the crime of possession of drugs, either solely or jointly. It was also reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise among the three occupants, in view of the likelihood of drug dealing in which an innocent party was unlikely to be involved. The judgment holding that defendant’s arrest lacked probable cause was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Silverthorne Lumber Co v. United States (1920)
Rule: The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before a court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the government’s own wrong cannot be used by it to seek by subpoena evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution and to obtain an order commanding compliance with such subpoena.
Facts: Silverthorne and father were indicted. Meanwhile officers without authority went to their office and obtained evidence. U.S. made copies and photographs of evidence and framed new indictment based off what they found. District court demanded return of originals and even though evidence seized was seen as in violation of constitutional rights it ordered them to comply with subpoenas to bring originals to court.
Issue: Could the Government issue valid subpoenas on the basis of knowledge obtained from an unlawful search and seizure?
Answer/conclusion: No, Supreme court overturned district. since evidence was illegally gathered it could not be used. such use of the knowledge gained from unlawful means would reduce the Fourth Amendment to a mere “form of words.”
Elkins V. United States (1960)
held that all evidence illegally obtained by federal, state, or local officers could not be used. Destroyed silver platter doctrine.
Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
Facts: Mapp was convicted of possession of lewd things. Cops went to Mapp’s home under information that bomber was hiding there. Mapp refused to admit without warrant. Officers tried entering again 3 hours later breaking open door when there was no answer. Mapp’s attorney was denied access and search warrant was demanded by Map. An officer held up a paper saying it was the arrant but Mapp grabbed it and placed it in her bra. The officers got it back and she was handcuffed. A search revealed obscene materials and she was convicted. Mapp appealed and judge affirmed conviction. judge claimed it was prohibited under 4th amendment.
Decision: Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision was reversed.
Holding; Exclusionary rule that prohibits the use of evidence obtained as a result of unreasonable search and seizure is applicable to state and criminal proceedings.
United States v. Leon (1984)
Rule: he deference accorded to a magistrate’s finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that determination was based. Courts must also insist that the magistrate purport to perform his neutral and detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. Reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.
Facts: Acting on the basis of information from a confidential informant, officers of the Burbank, Cal., Police Department initiated a drug-trafficking investigation involving surveillance of respondents’ activities. Based on an affidavit summarizing the police officers’ observations, Officer Rombach prepared an application for a warrant to search three residences and respondents’ automobiles for an extensive list of items. The application was reviewed by several Deputy District Attorneys, and a facially valid search warrant was issued by a state-court judge. Ensuing searches produced large quantities of drugs and other evidence. Respondents were indicted for federal drug offenses, and filed motions to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted the motions in part, concluding that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. Although recognizing that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith, the court rejected the Government’s suggestion that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, also refusing the Government’s invitation to recognize a good-faith exception to the rule. The Government’s petition for certiorari presented only the question whether a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be recognized.
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that there was no good faith exception to the U.S. Const. amend. IV exclusionary rule?
Answer/Conclusion: Yes, The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that the exclusionary rule should be modified to allow the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant, even if the warrant was subsequently found to be defective. The Court held that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule; that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity; that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not bar the use in the prosecution’s case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause; and that exclusion of the evidence in the present case on account of the magistrate’s erroneous probable-cause determination was inappropriate because the affidavit related the results of an extensive investigation and provided evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause.
Herring v. United States (2009)
Rule: To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. The exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.
Facts: Officers in Coffee County, Alabama, arrested petitioner Herring based on a warrant listed in neighboring Dale County’s database. A search incident to that arrest yielded drugs and a gun. It was then revealed that the warrant had been recalled months earlier, though this information had never been entered into the database. Herring was indicted on federal gun and drug possession charges and moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that his initial arrest had been illegal. Assuming that there was a Fourth Amendment violation, the District Court concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply and denied the motion to suppress. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the arresting officers were innocent of any wrongdoing, and that Dale County’s failure to update the records was merely negligent. Other courts have required exclusion of evidence obtained through similar police errors, so the United States Supreme Court granted Herring’s petition for certiorari to resolve the conflict.
Issue: Did the exclusionary rule suppressing evidence seized apply when an unlawful search was conducted as a result of an isolated negligent act on the part of the local police department?
Answer/conclusion: No, The Court held that when police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply. The Court posited that the fact that a search or arrest was unreasonable does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. The rule is not an individual right and applies only where its deterrent effect outweighs the substantial cost of letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free. The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by its deterrent effect varies with the degree of law enforcement culpability. According to the Court, to trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct had to be sufficiently deliberate such that exclusion could meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence was worth the price paid by the justice system. In this case, the Court ruled that the miscommunications were not routine or widespread; they were not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion.
Terry v. Ohio (1968)
Rule: The Court held that when police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply. The Court posited that the fact that a search or arrest was unreasonable does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. The rule is not an individual right and applies only where its deterrent effect outweighs the substantial cost of letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free. The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by its deterrent effect varies with the degree of law enforcement culpability. According to the Court, to trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct had to be sufficiently deliberate such that exclusion could meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence was worth the price paid by the justice system. In this case, the Court ruled that the miscommunications were not routine or widespread; they were not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion.
Facts: A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of “casing a job, a stick-up,” the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men “mumbled something,” whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner’s overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton’s outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under petitioner’s or Chilton’s outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that petitioner and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the officer for his own protection had the right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed.
Issue: Are the weapons admissible in evidence even though they were obtained under a warrantless “stop and frisk” search?
Answer/Conclusion: Yes The court affirmed petitioner’s conviction. The court ruled that despite the fact that the arresting police officer lacked probable cause to arrest petitioner at the time he made the “stop and frisk” warrantless intrusion upon petitioner that produced the weapon at issue, the search satisfied the conditions of U.S. Const. amend. IV: the officer had a reasonable suspicion, based upon his experience, that petitioner and his companions were about to commit a daytime robbery, and his belief that petitioner was presently armed, dangerous, and posed a threat to him and to others justified both the officer’s “stop” of petitioner and the “frisk,” or pat-down, of petitioner’s overcoat. Furthermore, the court ruled that the search of the outer clothing of petitioner and his companions was properly limited in time and scope in order for him to determine the presence of weapons and to neutralize the danger posed.
Florida v. Royer (1983)
Rule: Not all seizures of the person must be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime. Any restraint on the person amounting to a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment is invalid unless justified by probable cause. Terry created a limited exception to this general rule. Certain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of the stop.
Facts: After purchasing a one-way airline ticket to New York City at Miami International Airport under an assumed name and checking his two suitcases bearing identification tags with the same assumed name, Royer went to the concourse leading to the airline boarding area, where he was approached by two detectives, who previously had observed him and believed that his characteristics fit the so-called “drug courier profile.” Upon request, but without oral consent, Royer produced his airline ticket and driver’s license, which carried his correct name. When the detectives asked about the discrepancy in names, Royer explained that a friend had made the ticket reservation in the assumed name. The detectives then informed Royer that they were narcotics investigators and that they had reason to suspect him of transporting narcotics, and, without returning his airline ticket or driver’s license, asked him to accompany them to a small room adjacent to the concourse. Without Royer’s consent, one of the detectives retrieved Royer’s luggage from the airline and brought it to the room. While he did not respond to the detectives’ request that he consent to a search of the luggage, Royer produced a key and unlocked one of the suitcases in which marihuana was found. When Royer said he did not know the combination to the lock on the second suitcase but did not object to its being opened, the officers pried it open and found more marihuana. Royer was then told he was under arrest. Following the Florida trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of the suitcases, Royer was convicted of felony possession of marihuana. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Royer had been involuntarily confined within the small room without probable cause, that at the time his consent to search was obtained, the involuntary detention had exceeded the limited restraint permitted by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, and that such consent was therefore invalid because tainted by the unlawful confinement.
Issue: Was the consent to the search given by Royer effective?
Answer/conclusion: No, The United States Supreme Court held that Royer’s consent was involuntary because Royer was being illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage. When the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police room while retaining his ticket and driver’s license, Royer’s was effectively seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993)
Rule: Under the plain-view doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object—i. e., if its incriminating character is not immediately apparent—the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.
Facts: After leaving a Minneapolis, Minnesota apartment building which was considered by police officers to be a place of cocaine traffic, or a “crack house,” defendant Timothy Dickerson began walking toward a marked squad car in which two police officers were patrolling. Upon making eye contact with one of the officers, Dickerson abruptly halted, began walking in the opposite direction, and turned and entered an alley on the other side of the building. The officers pulled the squad car into the alley and ordered Dickerson to stop and submit to a pat-down search. The search revealed no weapons, but the officer who conducted the search felt a small lump in the front pocket of Dickerson’s nylon jacket. As the officer later testified, the officer examined the lump with his fingers, and “it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane.” The officer then reached into the pocket and retrieved a small plastic bag containing one-fifth of one gram of crack cocaine. Dickerson was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Prior to trial in a Minnesota county court, Dickerson moved to suppress the cocaine. Denying the motion, the trial court ruled that the officers were justified in stopping Dickerson to investigate whether he might be engaged in criminal activity, and frisking Dickerson to insure that he was not carrying a weapon. It also ruled that the officers’ warrantless seizure of the cocaine, after the officer who searched Dickerson “formed the opinion” that the small lump was cocaine, was supported by “plain feel” and hence did not violate the Federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. Dickerson was tried and found guilty. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed concluding that the seizure of the cocaine was unconstitutional and declined to adopt a “plain feel” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota expressed the view that the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement did not extend to the sense of touch and even if a “plain feel” exception was recognized, an examination of the record indicated that the officer who searched Dickerson did not immediately recognize the lump in Dickerson’s pocket as cocaine, but rather that the officer determined that the lump was contraband only after squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the contents of the pocket, which the officer already knew contained no weapon.
Issue: Did the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement extend to the sense of touch?
Answer/Conclusion: NO, The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the state supreme court’s judgment that the police officer overstepped the bounds of the “strictly circumscribed” search for weapons allowed under Terry v. Ohio when the officer retrieved a lump of cocaine from Dickerson’s pocket. It held that: (1) consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective pat-down search of a person whom the officer has briefly stopped based on the officer’s reasonable conclusion that criminal activity may be afoot with respect to such person, where the officer is justified in believing that the person is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others nearby, so long as the officer’s search is strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others; but (2) in the case at hand, the Fourth Amendment did not permit the seizure of the cocaine where (a) the officer determined that the lump was contraband only after squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the contents of the pocket, which the officer already knew contained no weapon, and (b) because the officer’s further search of the pocket was constitutionally invalid in that it was not authorized by Terry v. Ohio or any other exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the seizure of the cocaine that followed likewise was unconstitutional.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1997)
Rule: Once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.
Facts: While on routine patrol, two Philadelphia police officers observed respondent Harry Mimms driving an automobile with an expired license plate. The officers stopped the vehicle for the purpose of issuing a traffic summons. One of the officers approached and asked respondent to step out of the car and produce his owner’s card and operator’s license. Respondent alighted, whereupon the officer noticed a large bulge under respondent’s sports jacket. Fearing that the bulge might be a weapon, the officer frisked respondent and discovered in his waistband a .38-caliber revolver loaded with five rounds of ammunition. The other occupant of the car was carrying a .32-caliber revolver. Respondent was immediately arrested and subsequently indicted for carrying a concealed deadly weapon and for unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. His motion to suppress the revolver was denied; and, after a trial at which the revolver was introduced into evidence, respondent was convicted on both counts. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed respondent’s conviction, however, holding that the revolver should have been suppressed because it was seized contrary to the guarantees contained in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Petitioner Commonwealth then sought a review of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision.
ISSUE: Did the seizure of the evidence (i.e. revolver) violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution?
Answer: No, According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the order to get out of the car, issued after the respondent was lawfully detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The State’s proffered justification for such order - the officer’s safety - is both legitimate and weighty, and the intrusion into respondent’s personal liberty occasioned by the order, being at most a mere inconvenience, cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety. Furthermore, the Court noted that under the standard enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, that is, whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate”, there is little question the officer was justified. The Court ruled that the bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimms was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer. In these circumstances, any man of “reasonable caution” would likely have conducted the “pat-down.”
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000)
Rule: An officer may, consistent with the U.S. Const. amend. IV, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the U.S. Const. amend. IV requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. The officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.
Facts: Defendant fled upon seeing police officers patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Two of the officers caught up with him, and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. Defendant was arrested when officers discovered a .38-caliber handgun. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, but the appellate court reversed. The state supreme court agreed, concluding that sudden flight in a high crime area did not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop.
Issue: Does a sudden flight in a high crime area create a reasonable suspicion which can justify a Terry stop?
Answer/Conclusion: yes, The Court found that nervous, evasive behavior was a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, and that headlong flight was the consummate act of evasion. The Court found that the determination of reasonable suspicion had to be based on common sense judgments and inferences about human behavior, and that officers were justified in suspecting that defendant was involved in criminal activity based on his presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking and his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. The Court concluded that defendant’s presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking and his unprovoked flight upon noticing police created a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop.
Supreme Court Justices
1) Sonia Sotomayor
2) Clarence Thomas
3) John G. Roberts
4) Samuel A. Alito
5) Elena Kagen
6) Amy Coney Barrett
7) Justice Neil m. Gorsuch
8) Brett M. Kavenaugh
9) Ketanji Brown Jackson
Marbury v. Madison
Rule:The Constitution of the United States establishes certain limits not to be transcended by the different departments of the government. The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written
Facts: Marbury and others were elected by John Adams but did not get there commissions. Madison was asked for them and affidavits were made.
Ramos v. Louisiana (2020)
Reversed decision so there is a right to jury unanimously
Dunkan v. Louisiana (1996)
Rule: The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in all criminal cases which, were they to be tried in a federal court, would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.
Facts: Defendant was charged with simple battery, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment and a $ 300 fine. Defendant sought trial by jury, but because the Louisiana Constitution grants jury trials only in cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed, the trial court denied the request. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to serve 60 days in the parish prison and pay a fine of $ 150. After the state supreme court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, defendant sought review in the federal court.
Issue: Was the State of Louisiana obligated to provide a trial by jury in this case?
Answer/Conclusion: Yes, The Court held that a crime punishable by two years in prison was a serious crime and not a petty offense. Consequently, defendant was entitled to a jury trial and the trial court erred in denying it. In so ruling, the Court opined that the right to trial by jury guaranteed defendants in criminal cases in federal courts by the U.S. Const. art. III and by the Sixth Amendment was also guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants tried in state courts.
Challange for cause
bias or prejudice
Peremptory challenge
Without good reason.
Probable cause for a jury
A reasonably prudent person would believe that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested has committed that crime.
What is the order for suspicion?
Possibilty/hunch
reasonable Suspicion (articulable)
Probable cause
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
absolute certainty
What is the test for probable cause?
The focus in determining probable cause is not on the certainty that a crime was committed, but on the liklihood of it. You dont have to be right; but you do have to be reasonable.
What person is reasonable suspicion based on?
an officer and their experience
What 4 areas is probable cause required?
1) arrest with a warrant
2) arrest without a warrant
3) searches and seizures of property with a warrant
4) Searches and seizures of property without a warrant.
Who determines probable cause in arrest with warrant?
A magistrate
Who determines probable cause in arrest without warrant?
the officer
What 3 ways is probable cause established?
1) Through officer’s knowledge of particular facts and circumstances
2) Through information given by a reliable third person
3) Through information plus corroboration by officer
Illinois v. Gates (1983)
Rule: The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for concluding” that probable cause existed.
Facts: Prior to the defendants’ trial on charges of violating state drug laws, a Circuit Court in Illinois ordered the suppression of all items seized from the defendant’s home and automobile on the ground that the affidavit submitted in support of the application for a search warrant was insufficient to show a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant. A copy of an anonymous letter informing the police of the defendants’ alleged drug trafficking activities and details as to an alleged imminent transaction was attached to the affidavit which contained corroborating data collected by the police in an independent investigation. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the suppression order. The Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the letter and affidavit were inadequate to sustain a determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the search warrant was based on a confidential informant’s tip that did not satisfy the purported “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” prongs for probable cause, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment.
Issue: Did the lower courts err in their decision to suppress evidence alleged to be obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Answer/Conclusion: Yes, Holding instead that probable cause was determined by a traditional totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the Court reversed the judgment of the lower courts. The Court posited that probable cause determinations were not susceptible to the rigid, technical methodology that had been read into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Court held that the elements of an informant’s veracity and knowledge should be understood simply as issues that could illuminate the common sense inquiry of whether there was probable cause to issue a search warrant. The Court concluded that the informant’s recitation of detailed facts, though relating to innocent activities, when corroborated by observation by police officers, afforded probable cause to believe that respondents had drugs in their possession; therefore, the evidence obtained should not be suppressed.
United States v. Arvizu (2002)
UNANIMOUS DECISION
totality of circumstances when making stops
Allows officers to draw on own training
Defendant was stopped on a road commonly used by smugglers.
Agent found drugs
Issue: Did the Federal border patrol agent have reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was engaged in an illegal activity?
Answer/Conclusion: Yes, The United States Supreme Court held, however, that suppression of the drug evidence was not required, since the totality of the circumstances warranted the stop for further investigation of defendant’s vehicle, regardless of whether the facts taken in isolation appeared innocent. It was reasonable for the agent to make common sense inferences from his observations and his experience that defendant was attempting to avoid the checkpoint, rather than taking his family on a recreational outing.
Florida v. Harris (2013)
UNANIMOUS DECISION
Asks if a drug-detection dog’s alert to exterior of vehicle give officers probable cause to conduct a warrantless search?
Answer is yes because probable cause is a flexible common-sense test that looks at totality of circumstances.
Weeks v. U.S
first application of exclusionary rule to all federal prosecutions.
Silver platter doctrine
permits federal courts to admit evidence illegally seized by state law enforcement and handed over to federal officers
Illinois v. Rodriguez
1) woman calls saying she is involved in domestic abuse
2) brings cops to residents where it happened
3) door was locked but she had key and said our apartment
4) woman gave consent to search
5) officers found cocaine and drugs paraphenalia
6) issue was that woman did not have authority to give consent
7) rodrigues tried to have the information suppressed but evidence was allowed because lady had Apparent authority
The exclusionary rule deals with what amendment?
The 4th
Nix v. Williams (1984)
1) williams was arrested for murder of 10 yr girls
2) after search for child, williams was identified, found, brought back and talked without an attorney present.
3) He did a Christian burial speech
4) this was seen as a violation of his 5th amendment rights
5) Court held to inevitable discovery because body would eventually be found.
6) Could not use statement but could use body.
Wong Sun v. United States (1963)
1) Sun was arrested without probable cause
2) relaesed on ROR
3) Returned voluntarily days later to make a statement
4) was admitted because it was not linked to arrest
Taylor v. Alabama (1982)
1) Individual told police that OMAR committed the robberies
2) Tip was insufficient for warrant
3) people could not identify omar
4) Finger prints were taken and matched those on stolen items
5) Omar admitted to the robberies but appealed to have statements suppressed because of fruit of illegal arrest
6) Courts suppressed info
United States V. Cruiz (1980)
Photographs were taken
2) unlwaful arrest
3) man was identified by victim twice
4)
State v. Obremski (1974)
1) Parents reported a runaway
2) Friend leads police to where girl is
3) girl was found in guy’s apartment
4) he was found guilty because her testimony was not suppressed
5) testimony was not repressed because it had nothing to do with the search
What are 8 situations where the exclusionary rule does not apply
1) Violations of the knock and announce rule
2) Private searches
3) Grand jury investigations
4) sentencing
5) arrest based on probable cause that violates state law
6) Violations of agency rules
7) noncriminal proceedings
8) Parole revocation hearings
What are arguments for the Ex rule?
It deters misconduct
What are arguments against Ex rule
Its wrong to make society pay for officer’s mistake.
Its not used in other countries
What is an alternative to Ex rule
Admit evidence then deal with wrongdoing of police
Hibil v. Sixth Judicial district Court of Nevada
1) In Nevada you must give names
2) Hiibil was arrested for refusing to give name
3) Claimed violation of 5 and 4 amendment
4) It did not violate 4 due to reasonable suspicion
5) it did not violate 5 because a name is not incriminating
Brown v. Oneonta (1999)
1) officer stopped black men due to description
2) Plantiff sued on alleging racial profiling in violation of the Equal protection clause
3) Court dismissed claim
