Chapter 8: Bayesianism and Pragmatic Arguments Flashcards

1
Q

Bayesianism

A

Has an epistemic and deliberative Component.

Epistemic Component: What one’s state of mind ought to be like.

Deliberative Component: How one ought to act given one’s state of mind.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

The Epistemic Component basically says one can believe ____________ one wants to believe as long as these _____________, or _____________ of _____________, are ______________ permissible, can be represented by a _________________ probability function, and those ___________ can be updated in accordance with ___________ ______________.

A

whatever; beliefs; combinations; beliefs; rationally; subjective; beliefs; Bayes’ Theorem.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Bayesian Epistemology

A

Provides structural restrictions on what one should believe, and how to revise beliefs in light of new information.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Bayesians maintain that all ______________ come in ________________, and, in that vain, ______________ probability is good account of how _____________ of ___________ ought to be revised.

A

beliefs; degrees; subjective; degrees; belief

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

The correct way for one to update their beliefs is using…

A

Bayes’ Theorem.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Issue of Bayesian Epistemology and how it can be resolved (See Notes)

A

Issue: How to caclulate prior probabilities.

Resolution: Even if 2 people have different priors, after enough experiments / iterations, the priors will converge towards eachother (such that they will essentially be the same prior/ close to the same).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Rational decision makers act AS IF they maximize subjective expected utility. What does this mean?

A

A decision maker doesn’t prefer an uncertain prospect over another BECAUSE she judges the outcomes of the uncertain prospect to be more favorable than the outcomes of another offer.

Her preferences are organized by structural axioms, giving her preferences well-organized structure, AS IF applying utility and probability function to her preferences

…such that a more preferred preference will always have a higher expected utility and less preferred preference will always have a lower expected utility.

Reasoning backwards, we realize the structural axioms gave the preferences a well organized structure, which allowed us to reason the preferences being described AS IF subjective probability and utility functions were used, which would be consistent with Maximizing Expected Utility.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Ordering Axiom

A

When there are 2 preferences, the decision maker must be able state a clear and unambiguous preference over another.

  • All such preferences are Asymetric and Transitive.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Remember, the Ordering Axiom doesn’t actually inform the decision maker of what _____________ they should _____________, they merely provide the necessary ______________ based on the _______________ you have already ____________.

A

preferenes; have; constraints; preferences; formed

E.g. Odering axiom won’t tell you to prefer red wine to white wine, they’ll just tell you that if you prefer red to white, then you must not prefer white to red (asymmetry).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

One’s preferences can be identified through ______________ _____________–it ultimately comes down to doing the act. This means that, among 2 unknown prospects, if one chooses ______ of the unknown prospects over __________, they necessarily ____________ the chosen prospect.

A

choice behavior; one; another; prefer

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Extracting Subjective probabilities and utilities from preferences over uncertain prospects GIVEN that they can somehow establish that the agent considers Event 1) and Event 2) to be equally likely states.

A

An agent considers R and ¬R equally probable, when they are indifferent between the prospect of (i) getting 200 units of utility if R occurs and 100 units of utility if ¬R occurs, AND (ii) getting 100 units of utility of ¬R occurs and 200 units of utility if R occurs.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Central Components to Bayesian Decision Theory

A

1) Transivity Axiom: If x≻y, and y≻z, then x≻z.
2) Completeness Axiom: x≻y or y≻x or x~y
3) Independence Axiom: If x≻y, then xpz ≻ ypz

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

How do we determine if the Bayesian preference axioms should be accepted?

A

They have to be Pragmatically Justified.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

For the Bayesian preference axioms to be ____________ ________________, they have to follow _______________ of ________________; they have to _____________ and ______________.

A

Pragmatically Justified; principles; rationality; practical; realistic

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

We say Bayesian preference axioms need to be ________________ _________________ because though at face value, these axioms have _____________ level appeal, there are cases in which they are proven to not be _______________.

A

pragmatically justified; surface; pratical

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Pragmatic Argument

A

Says if the decision maker doesn’t follow principles of rationality, they are certain to lose something (come what may).

17
Q

Types of Pragmatic Arguments

A

1) Money Pump Argument
2) Dutch Book Argument

18
Q

Money Pump Argument

A

“You can be pumped of all your money” because your preferences are circular.

Several finite iterations of A≻B and B≻A will leave you bankrupt.

Violates Transitivity (A≻B, B≻C, A≻C)

19
Q

Dutch Book Argument

A

If your probability assignments G and ¬G violate certain axioms, viz. mutual exclusivity (Ch. 6) Av¬A = 1, such that the sum of G and ¬G are greater than 1, then you could be offered a betting on the probabilities of G and ¬G in which you will certainly lose.

20
Q

The Money Pump Argument illustrates that permitting preferences that are _______-_______________ will result in _________________ of ___________ nature. HOWEVER, one can deny _________________ and still avoid _____________ preferences.

A

not-transitive; outcomes; cyclic; transitivity; cyclic

21
Q

Criticism of Transitivity Axiom

A

Incommensurability:

  • Incommensurable means the things can’t compared by same standard.
  • Let’s say x≻y, and y≻z and x and z are incommensurable
    (i.e. x = large amount of money, and z = health).

Therefore we can’t draw the conclusion that x≻z because money and health may be incomparable (incommensurable).

22
Q

Criticism to Completeness Axiom

A

Completeness axiom says that between two things/options, the decision maker MUST prefer one over the other, or be indifferent between the two.

  • This is a hard principle to apply between things that are seemingly incomparable (i.e. the government deciding between savng $10 million or a life).
23
Q

Improvement Argument (Completeness)

A

When a decision maker believes the options over which he is to state comparisons are of equal value, the idea is that adding an arbitrary benefit to one of the options will tip his preferences in one direction.

  • Decision maker has choice between saving $10 million dollars, or saving a life. He doesn’t prefer the $10 mil to the life, nor the life to the $10 mil.
  • This is NOT to say he’s indifferent between the two options; he holds options at equal value.
  • It follows then that by adding an arbitrary benefit, this should tilt the agent’s preferences in one direction.
24
Q

Samuelson’s Revealed Preference Theory

A

Preferences are revealed by choice behavior.

  • When a decision maker chooses one option/thing over another, it can be inferred, she prefers the chosen option AT LEAST AS MUCH as the options/things she didn’t choose.
25
Q

Single-Attribute Scale

A

All outcomes of a set of alternatives are compared on a common-single scale.

                                                                    Attribute 1 Alt. 1 -- Saving Life                                                 ? Alt. 2 -- Saving $10M                                             ?
26
Q

Multi-Attribute Scale

A

Avoids criticism of how certain alternatives like money or saving a life are incommensurable by comparing the set of attributes by different units of comparison fair to the attributes.

            Attribute 1      Attribute 2      Attribute 3        Attribute 4 Alt. 1             1                          3                      1                            2 Alt. 2             3                          1                      3                            1 Alt. 3             2                          2                      2                            2
27
Q

Addictive Criterion

A
  • Decision maker assigns equiprobable weights to each attribute.
  • Allows them to rank alternatives after multiplying attribute weights (1/4) times value of alternatives.
              Attribute 1 (1/4)      Attribute 2 (1/4)      Attribute 3 (1/4)        Attribute 4 (1/4) Alt. 1                   1                               3                                 1                                    2 Alt. 2                   3                               1                                 3                                    1 Alt. 3                   2                               2                                 2                                    2
28
Q

Direct way to assign weights to the attributes

A
  • Ask the decision maker to assign weights to each attribute.
    • Althought it is pretty optimistic to think the decision maker can develop accurate numerical weights.
29
Q

Sophisticated way to assign weights to the attributes

A

Decision maker makes pairwise comparisons to between each of the attributes to normalize there relative importance.

30
Q

Issue of Direct and Sophisticiated way to Assign weights to attributes.

A

How is that the decision maker is able to make direct (real) comparisons between a set of alternatives across different (individuated) scales (based on different attributes), yet they’re not able to make a direct comparison between alternatives on a single-common scale?

31
Q

Criticism to Independence Axiom (See Notes)

A