churchills views on rearmerment and appeasement Flashcards
(10 cards)
chs views on rearmerment
january 1933 hitler became chancellor of germany
his views about the need to rearm and end the restrictions of the treaty of ersaills were well known alough he didnt rejct te idea of a nationalist dictatoship as his parise for mussolini was well know he became alrmend and spoke out on the dangers
why did he object so much?
he saw the new regime in germany as brutal for example the muder of apponets
he feared a repete of the situation prior to 1914 when germany thretend the peace of europe and had challenged britain by builidng up its naval fleet he wrote abt this in his book abt ww1 -he world crisis
he had been part of the governmt that made the treaty of versaills
was especially worried about air power and the germans buildig up an air force he understood the dangers of air warefair and feared b would be defenseless as colonlian sectuarty he had approed air attacks on iraqi rebeles in 1920 and knew the effects
ch used his positon as a backbech mp and his jounralism to utter warnings ab the need to rearm in his history of the second ww the gathering of the storm he quoted sppech to the commons he made in 1934
probelms with ch views
he himself was deeply responsbale for disarming in the 1920s and for maintaing the 10 year rule
the finacial crisis had nessitaed deep cuts in poverment spenditure
when poor ppl were suffering mand the 1934 means test provided stringent condions for the unemployed there would need to be a ery ompelling reason
many felt ww1 had orginated from arms race so saw in as dangerous it was also seen as unessacry
ppl thought it was unfair to restict germany especially as hitler was not responsible for the ww1
was not unreasonable to many that g should build up its armed forces especially as f has ery large forces and there was a possible threat from soviet union
seemd as though he was part of the pre 1914 oposition to germany
also his tendancy to exadurate figures and speak in alarmist terms reduced his credability
with support for the leauge of ntions strong many felt as though internatinal disputes hsould be let to disscussion
when olices and utternaces of hitler chnaged the go dd rearm on a exessive scale so after 1938 rearmermentbwas not an issue ad it seemed to many tat the gov had acted at the right time.
ch views on germany nd appeasemnet after 1933
his worries about the increasinly powerful and determind leader of germany led him to oppose the govs policy of trying to deal with hitlers grivences by negotation
in the 1920s ch found himself usig the phrase of appeasing the eurpoean hatreds this was becasue b had been a net gainer from ww1 shown its self as a world power good navy some oil rich places in its empire since 1918 all b had to do was maintain howvevr the war did not seem like vicotory given th amount of causalties and on going distrubances in eurpose it would only be a metter of ime until g and russsia wanted to ecover its lands
b could have maintained enough force to keep gains and meet any threats however b economic situation and public opinion permited thisinsetaed they put their faith in the loncarno pact and the leauge of nations
the b leaders in the 30s thus inherited a dangerous situation-made worse by ch who insisted on reducing arms in the 20s
developments in tanks and sir weponary meant that existig weaonary is outdated
but their was ittle money for upgrading the nation was also deeply hostile towards war
when the first agression appered in the far east in 1931 w the japsnise inavstion of china the tone was set for the decade
no suggestion of ay ilierly allinces w chia the situation was domestic
electoral popularity droe elections
baldwin admited that rearming meant the loss of the 1935 election
german rearmament in the 1930s
Hitler reinroduced conscription in the 1935-beaking treaty of versails
his numerically small forces remliterised the rhineland i march 1936
b were more anxious to stop f ation agasint germany that could lead to war
as g left the leauge of nations in 1933 this body could not act
italy alligned its self w b and face agsnit the g invastion of austri in april 1935
however mussolini was no longer really an ally as public opinion forced b to condem the invastio of etheopia in 1935
uable to stop g remaermanet the gov decided totry and limi it by agreemet
the angalo german naval tretay of 1935 had gien b approval to the g developing their fleet proided it was limited to only 35% of b fleet
this broke trety of versialls and loncarno
ch ws hrrifed as hthey might develop their flee more w out restricion
chamberlain and apeasement
took office 193 incoming pm
did not approe of b policy either but for diffrent reasons he saw reacting to evnts and peicemntal negotiation dangerous it seemd to him that forgien policy was drifing
his solution was to accpe that g did have legitimate grievences and negotiate ratioally about hem
he had litttle faith in international bodies such as the leauge of nations
he belivd that coming to a negotiated agreement would reduce the thret to b and give them time
public opinion in b and the empie would not support any decision unless eveything was done to negotiate
widepred belif that if negotains like this took plce in 1914 ww1 would never have hapended
chamberlain looked at the situation as it wasthe cheifs of the armed forces had told the gov that b could not fight a war agasint germay italy and japanat the same time due to lack of resiurces
there was a small army with massive commitments in the empire the navy could not commit to home defencse and a world wide war
chamerblains solution was to proactivley negoated w germany while buildig up defenses just inase tat failed
this had the support of most of hisparty
labour opposton noy supported rearmerment
labour wanted collective security
those who oposed appeasement were a minority and ch found himself once agasi in this group
german expantion
with news that g had introduced conscription in 1935 and exeeded the aircraft terms set by treaty of vesails was greeted with dismay by ch
for him priorty was dfense agsinst german threat
this was made less redible to the publicby hitlers well thought out indiifernece to regaining g collonies in africa and he pacific if hitler demanded the european lands it had lost b would not be difrenctly thrwatened
and many ppl felt as though it was not b concern as these lands contained german speekers
breking of versails or endug restrictons did notpose an obvious threta to b
however the long standing b interest of not seeing any one power dominate eurpose remained36 olympics held i berlin at this time was seen as a normal country
abdicatio crisis distrcation in 36
noy until 38 (chamberlin pm now) that the next crisis took place the annexaton of austria by germany
went against treaty of versisls
stilll lmited grounds for any action b eactions were mild
the greater problem was a now more confident hitler stred up unrest amoung the german speeekers in czecholslovakia and complained about their illtreatment in speeches and protests to their gov
the so called sudentenland had never been a apart of germany there were many g speekers all over eurpoe incuding northan italy czechoslavakia had alliences with soviet union and france remvig bordr would make her defenseless b did not oblige to act but the french were
if he f supported the czechs who had a large army of 35 divisons there would be awar in eurpoe that could not be ignored chamberlains gov but pressure on the chez to make consessions
and as agitaion grew among the german speekers in zech and hitlers speechers became more war like NC decdied to fly oto see hitler to negotaite an agreement
however given that b was not directly involved and an agreement involved another indipendet country this was dubious on grounds of validity and morality
little discuion of internatoonal community and no involvement of leauge of nations chamberlain acted virtually alone
in an attempt to avoid a discussion abt maybe joining a war having negotaed a self goverment of the sudennland
hitler then sensing b would do nothing outmauveed b and repudiated it and instilled full union of german seeking areas witing germay
in the face of this humilation b made some preperatons for war though not fully there was muh relif when mussolini offered mediation and four power confrence in muncih in spetember 1938
there was little sttemptss to resist hitlers demands the confrence had bee the suggestion of hitlers fellow dicataor with who he allied with in the not very binding pact of steel
Nc purused personal diplomacy and asked hitler to sign a pact guarnateeing future consultaion
he regared this as a somewhat diplomatic triumph
he waved a cheered to crowds on his return andnclaiming hed secured peace for our time
there was a tremendous admiration for his efforts
however when imidate relif subsied there was growing cocern ch meorably expressed it when he said in a debate that munich s was a defete for b
b remarmerment was now accelerated and a gowing number of people began to loose faith in any atempt to negaotate w hitler the german occupationof bohemia and moravia and the dismemeberment of the defenseless cechs in march 1939 was a sign of things to come
NC was now forced into a sort of gesture politics that hed hoped to avoid and offred a numbr of guarntees to europena states icuding poland b coud not possibly defnd poland from german sttempts toregai the lands lost in versails he guarentess was virtually meaningless it annoyed hitler so was unwise for poes to accpet
by now ch had stopped the crtism and was trying to bhild brigdges
hss prestige was rising as the man who stood firm against hitler even though his alternitive polices werent etriesly realistic
munich- was ch realistuc
when hitler began backing the demands of the germans in the sudentenland there were a number of options open to britain
the first was to remain uninvolved
ch was strongly against this attitude
because b was a major european power a signatory to the threats of versailles whitchurch would be broken by any territorial change the the czech
but germany gaining more self governance would not be a reason to intervene
b was not committed to czech formally the danger that france and the ussr might act would then mean b would have to decided weather to take part or not
ch did not favour staying out of conflict but rejected the second option of talking steps to prevent war by purswadibg the czechs to make consessions and purswadibg hitler to accept those consessions whitch were short of outright annexation
there were considerable objections to this it assumed it was possibly to meaningfully negotiate w hitker
it ruled out collective security and that b thought league of nations was now irelevent
it rules out a possible grand alliances of country’s ready to stop german aggression
the moriality of handing over virtual control of part of another country’s territory endangering the anti hitler germans who liked the czech abs giving to into agressive agitation was a problem
it was the latter point that moved ch
his view was that it was moral cowerdice to give into angers soon that a firm stand with both the league and a widespread alliance of other nations was nessicary and that b had only shown weakness whitch woukd envourga e further german expansion idly the idea that poland might be the next on the list was not discussed by ch as ch did not see an end to the friendly relations between poland and germany discussed in 1934
ch implied that b might or should go to war
at the very least he thought there should be a forceful response whitch opposed germany and made in conjunction with an alliance of other nations
arguments against chs view
the idea that b should have gone to war in 1938 is where ch a alaysia breaks down
if opposition to hitker had led to war who would b allies be there had been no discussion w france or any other county’s
the b did not have an expaeditipnary force ready to go it’s troops were tried down peaceb keeping in its empire espiecally palestine
any movement for war meant that ityaly and japan would take advantage and used it as an oportunity to to threaten b vital interests eyst suez and india south east asia and australia whitch would not be easily y defended ch had veery little understanding of the vunrablity of b and his speech’s in 1938 didn’t take into account that japan needed raw materials of western colonies due to expansionist war in china
ch had been hostile to ussr that was undergoing internal change in the 30s it was unlikely that a meaningful alliance would be formed with stalin given that concerns about russian activities in the spanish civil war and the distrust w communinism
france had looks consistently to b for exudes on not acting there were no plans for a 1914 french style attack on the germans and little hope of linking up the czech for resistance opinion in france was oppsed to any action whitch risked a request of the heavy losses of the first world war
the smaller nations in eastern eurpoe would not have been militarily effective even if they had decided to join b in the war many of them more conserned w russia
maniory og usa opinion favoured isolationism and the nutrality acts passed by the congress prevented them supplying other countries in engaged in war let alone joining us cincerns lay in japan
ch expressed enthusiasm for league of nations that had proved consigalnty effective since 1931
in many ways ch could propose no real alternative to appeasing his christina in house of commons were quick to point out the flaws in his logical his tehy priv hit the mark hehe he spoke of moral defers as it summed up lord of the concerns about the guthrie that cristics if chamernline felt
the situation after muinch
public and political opinion changed after munich in 1938 if munich were resorted then european democracy had no real further and neither did b position as a great power
public opinion began to swing after munich and the events of march 1939 and the end of czech confirmed the mood ch position had become less unrealistic because opinion both in b and the empire vital of b were in war began to change by 1939 conscription planning of air eases and the formation of bef and a larger airforces began to make war more possible
the b govs guarantee to poland did not make war invenitable but it would be hard for any i bastion of poland not to lead to british intervention hitker made a non agression pact w ussr in shusg whitch meant that he could be sure of being able to defeat poland w oiy russian intervention and he gambled that invasion of poland would not lead to military action between f and b ones there was a possibility that they would not go to war the lands gained by poland in 1919 where the ones closest to german hearts and their recovery would not be complete the destruction of the treaty of versailles and open ester wars expansion
german forces invaded poland on sep 1939 and chamberlain asked ch to become a member lf the inner war vape mint but on 2nd there was a still no b deceleration of war in ch own words it thought it probable that a last minute effort was being made to persevere peace however the commons make it clear that any last minutes concession by b was u acceptable and that unlitmamyik was issued for germany to wild raw and on 11am 3rd b delcrrrd war
with that changed ch ceazy to be an outsider and he renter the government as first lord of the admiralty f as he was practical and he worked w his former emailed il same job in 19339 ans 1914
