topic 2 Flashcards
(19 cards)
why did ch become pm in 1940
ch remained to still be somewhat of an outsider old criticisms and resentments remained but he did the upmost to remain loyal to chamberlain he also wanted to wage war vigerosly as b was unable to save poland
a small expiditionary force was sent to france but could not take initiatives and the french did not lauch the sort of offensive that characterised ww1 bolstered by an unexpected natzi sovet pact in 1939 german forces took western poland while to soviet union ocupied the east the soviet union aslo waged a winter war on filand after taking back the baltic states b considered sending help to finland and engaing on a war agsints germany and uusr at the same time unable to open a western front b looked at norway
ch had pressed for action in norway s its waters in the north sea were vital to the german getting to the seedish iron ore he proposed laying mines in the norwegian waters and action to prevent a possible german invasion f norway NC agreed to mining on 28 march 1940 but on march 1 hitler had already approved german invastion as a preemptive measure this began in april the germans invaded denmark and landed its forces in norway capuring the capital oslo but loosing 12 large ships in naval actons againsit b b army landings were not a succsess and there were disputes about methods and objectives foorces were forced to withdraw in early may forces in narvik achived very little and it finally fell on the germans o may 28 the campagin was poorly manged and brought back many meries of the galipoli campaign
the debate in the house of commons about norway led to major political change since sep 39 b achivments had been limited and the war had been called the phoney war by a us commentator the norwegian campagin was the first real initive and had failed however the debate was not souly focused on the norwigen campagin but on the government as a whole since war began it was obvious that the war effort was not being well cordinated there was ineefective minister for cordination of defences and a milteray cordiation comitted had not proved effective ad the ecomic planning had not been effective aprt from ch th egov did not have any experinced dynamic war ministers
the first day of debate saw a powerful intervention by sir rodger keyes in his admeral unifrom over 7 and 8 may NC came under some unexpected attacks from his own side especilay from leo amery he quoted oliver cromwellls worda to the rump parliament of 1653
you have sat too long for any good you have been doing dpart i say and let us have done with you in the name of god go-
despite this there was little indication that the debate would lead to NCs resgentaion labour took advantage of the unexpcted amount of criticsms by conservitve mps to force a vote this was basially a vote of confidence in chmaerlain
ch remained loyal to NC and amdmited his faliure suprislngly this made him more poplar the vote (about the conduct of the war but was really a vote of confifence) was 281 to 200 rather than its usual 200 strong majority over 40 conservitive mps had voted agsnist the gov and another 40 hd abstained
NC had not only been defted but the hostility agnsit him amungst his own mps had been exposed by may 1940 he was unwell and though he retained the respect and admiration of most his party there seemd to be a feeling that a new leader was needed only a inority of mps wanted ch to be mp for most lord halifax former forgien ecuatry and friend of the king was wanted t be pm
he was a peer and sat in the house of lords and would not have bene abale to lead the counrty without renouncing his tite in any case he knew he was ot fit for the job so therfore NC could not stay and lord halifax ould not step up making ch the only alternitive as well as backing froma group in his own party and support for labour leader stlee ensued chs promotion
Nc migh have carried on but labour did not wanted to serve under him - national fov
ch was not popular from labour but was seen as a leadr who would bring new determination to the war agaisnt hitler
10 may the news came that germany had inaded holdnad and belgim NC initally initally thought it was his duty to stay on but it was clear that the cabnit was not in his favour especally in infulentail kingsly wood
the king agsnit his jdugement appoitend ch as pm on 10 mau 1940 this was unexpected nd did not have solid spport his party and was plunged into the most seroiosu crisis b had face in mordern times
what was chs stnace towards war 1940
ch felt as though he wass destined to lead b he had first hand experine of war and confidnece in the ablity of b and its considerable empire ot wage war
13 may the situatio was dangerous but the army was intact the french had large forces and italy had not joined germany the british were only fighing on one front and ch had put tg a cembent of his own supporters he was highly dtermined to wage war energetically but his past record wasnt particulay resuuring
there was little enuthusiam from us president roosavlet for his appoitment and the cambinet and house of commons and contained many who liked and admired NC
the war moved quickley and on may 14 the germsn broke french defnces the prospect of sudeen defte for france seemd to become a reality if france was defted the british army would be isolated
hitler alredy defted poland and his treaty of freidnhsip meant that all forces would be agnsit b
by 28 may ch was facing profound challenges
the british had been cut off from french forces and had fallen back on dunkirk hoping to be evacuated the chances of resucing 300,00 troops seemed low given geman air supriroity and the possiblity of a german assult
the danger of itallian enetry to the war which would threten egypt and the suez cannal this would cut off b quikcets sea route to india ad its colonies in the far ast and make it difficult to dfend agsnit japan
japan was a possible threat to b possesions in south asia
gold reserves were running out and i was unclear if b could go on fighting
germany had bombed poland and the low countries there was considerable fear of large scale bombing
lord halifax who had been a major supporter of appeaement was still in the cabinet as forigen secutary and was makig discreet approches tp dicover what the geran terms for peace were
halifax proposals were rejected
halifax argued that it would be better to consider terms before france degree and before german bombing destroyed british aircraft factories the australian high vommisoner pleaded for an appeal to roosevelt for a peace conference but his memordum was firmly rejected by ch
the situation had improved by 4 june with the evacuation of 224,318 troops (british) and 11,172 of allies at dunkirk the cabinet had resisted french demands for more aircraft and air defence og b was possible belgium had surrendered and relations w france we’re very poor the cabinet memeberrs who favoured any negotiation had been sickened and ch made a very famous speech we will fight on the beaches we will never surrender
there was a direct appeal to usa
events moved quickest and even an offer of union whitch would have seen france and b becoming one country and pooling off their forces could not prevent a french surrender
once again there was talk of peace terms but by now these were not considered as a sorry sky possibility
there remarkable achievement of ch was to maintain war with no allies to watt is perceived as one of the greatest military powers
3 july
a massive gesture of defiance was made by the attack on the french fleet to prevent it falling into german hands
the raf has been bombing germany since it’s in bastion of the low countries and constuined to do so
a very bold decision was taken to send the british armed forces to egypt even when there was a real threat of german invastoon
the b achieved rapid victories against italy hitlers ally
the brunt of the wall fell when german defied to launch an air offensive in aug 1940 whitch had them aim of destroying the raf
however hitler and goring thought bombing cities would be better as they thought the population would not withstand bombing the morale woukd crack and that would mean the continuation of the british war effort impossible
in sep they diverted there attention form raf to cities whitch had the unintended effect of baking the raf to recover the strategies of air hugh dowding in mis kiding small groups of fighters and preserving the strengh by not pursuing german numbers over the channeling proved effective
but he had emailed who thought a large scale attack would work better
ch despite the success did not bavk him
dowdings dour personality did it help he was removed from command in no remeber with ch blessing
by the end of 40 b had enjoyed some victories in north africa and has defeated the german air offensive ch had established his position over his rivals and his orditory had become a weapon of war
his determination had prevented any negotiation w germany
b was standing alone against germany japan and italy with no allie’s with no commitment for help from usa and a population who had suffered the terrible losses from ww1 this was a massive achievement
what was special about chs leadership during the war
‘yeh pm expects all his majesty’s servants in high places to set an example of steadieness and resolution’ july 1940 sums up the very high levels of deviation and e gery demanded by ch
he was also facinated by imaginative ideas particularly from his special adviser fredrick ‘the prof’
kinder man even when scientific experts showed that many of his ideas such as germ warfare were impractical
ch worked irregular hours and exhausted his staff he revolutionsided methods and often insisted on peruvian and conscice paper work he insisted that ideas abs queries were presented on only one sheet of paper and woukd fire off demands in a massi of writen instructions
he was happy to dicattae from his bed from his bath
officials who could not keep up with ch or displeased him were dissmissed but there are still instances of people standing up to ch and being able to take advice
there were a number of key characteristics that cha carter listed chs leadership style
his belief in sestblishinh strong personal relationships with his allie’s his personal diplomacy was considerable and playing an important role for example in his relations with stalin and roosevelt he also replied on strong personal friendships with informal advisers
his mastery of broth written and spoken expression seen at its finest in 1940 and in many spec beds in the commons
a personal flamboyance no other b pm appeared in such an array of uniforms and costume from the famous one peice siren suit to the various naval and military uniforms he war to emphasizes that he was a war leader
he was the most well traveled of all his pms before him his wartime journeys undertaken at a considerable hazard and lack of comfort for a man of his age and showed his energy
his daring a ruthlessness marked him out from his predisceos thsi included his determination to fight on in1940 his desison to detour the french fleet even at the cost of thousands of lives of the former allie’s his suport of civilian bombing in germany hus plans to destroy german i gassers by poison gas his impactineve to delay any cakagin and his support for covert operstaions by suprise
what characterized chs relations with his generals
though ch wanted to influence the way the war was fought his military generals were all too aware of his military careeer
as a young man he had seen action in india cuba sa but he had little experience of command or stately or navy though this did not st op him giving orders to the navy when he was first lord of the afjerskity
or offering opinionated strategic views in ww1 and the gap poi campaign in. 1915 was a massive disaster ( to take turkish capital invokved with anzac troops)
only the evacuation of the navy was a success this event forced ch to resign and he went to the western front as a colonel but he saw little action and left to pursue political intrigues in london furthermore the unsuccessful norway camgainnl
what dominated his cries of germans was at first his views from ww1 with heavy losses whitch he a tribute to politicians letting in gernerals like haig and letting them prupose there plans w out any supervision
he had also been gust rated by the cation of leading military’s officials during the 1930s appeasement in advising against decisive action due to their fears of being underparepaed and having a war on three fronts what influenced the herbals view was chs unpericanlity lack of realism and what they viewed as a mature strategy
his first few months as pm saw him making criticisms of military leaders abs issuing unrealistic orders whe the german force broke through frnech lines at sedan and their fast moving attack proved too much for thre french the british commander lord fort was forced to ignore chs orders in order to preserve the british forces a key decision that allowed b to keep on fighting
chs perstnacne of the defense of the port of calais seemed to be pointless from a military pov saw them lose valuable men chs desire to send a another force even when france was on the brink of defete was thwarted by a trless argument from chief of the imerperial general stafff sir john dill ch got rid of him as soon as possible
brooke
throughout the war ch constantly interfered with operational matters sacked able and thoughtful commanders and perfected military leaders w often doubtful ability’s but with the so called right attitude
the main burden of cha interference fell on the head of the army feild matashal sir allan brooke
brooole was a highly competent organizer and a through professional
however in temperament he was very diffrent from ch
he was conscious of the need to deploy british forces carefully and wanted to avoid heavy casualties he was often annoyed by ch thinking out loud and coming up with all sorts of military ideas his wartime diaries often written up after long and ex austin’s meetings give a sense of distraction these views are supported by many other senior officers
personal dealings with the opinionated charismatic ch tend to be tricky but when jt came to major decipns there were fewer disagreements to ch. and brooke
ch took a bold decision in 1940 it was not clear that after the fall of france hitler would invade b but ch decided to send a substantial amount of b military equipment to the middle east to deal with any potential threat to egypt the suez canal and the route to india the need to maintain b empire was not challenged by the military leaders as it was the role of the raf abs navy to defend the homeland brooke and others support his desist on they too had littlecenughsiams for a renewal of fighting in europe
wavell
the rapid victories in. organ africa in 1940 justified the decision to concerntraye fighting in north africa but ch gave little credit to commander wavell who he personally disliked
ch took forces away from him when intake in ages greece in 1940 and the cabinet made a decision to defend it and establish a new balkan front his troopers were taken off to a deeply flawed plan without proper planning and resources this was another expeditauojnthay failed when german forces invaded the british had to be evacuated to crete and were then defied by another german attack and forced out again the early success in north africa were thrown away abs wavelength did not have the resources to meet german forgives under romeo who were sent to africa he took the blame and was demoted
aunchinleck and montgomery
wavelets successor auchinleck was not pereoated for a premature attack on the germans and to chs annoyance he insisted on delaying it until he was prepared despite a through counter attack and effective defence he was sacked for his deep lays and not ring daring and aggressive
his replaymemat montgomery won over ch by his self confidence but insist on a very through perpetrations involving accumiling more than twice the men that rommel had before attacking at el alamein in oct 1942 ‘icy of the freud it for the first major british victory in the wa such have gone to auchinoegk hecate of the effectively perpetrations he had made however cigs dislike of them got monty favoured
he was very slow in following up victory after el alamein witch allowed the german to reteretbtintunsia but b/c cinfunines ti favour him
1943-44
The defeat of the Germans after protracted struggle in Tunisia lead to more British Army expeditions American and British forces first invaded and captions to sleep and then landed on Sunday to me there’s like to loan company slow progress right to Italy from the major task of defeat in the main German army is an invading Germany more British and American troops occupied but it did German troops in for zaraa she’s taking the main task of moving towards Germany the British commander so hold Alexander Millie shop assistant in maintaining the store advance but Churchill admired him for his calm leadership
there is little evidence that brooke or the generals were ehsr for the invasion of france that russia was urging ch and his ger aks did not clash about the overall strategy of war brooke thought than an invasion of france migbt sell not scudded and might lead to such heavy caulk ties that the war would be lengthened however the invasion of france could not be delayed indefinite and ch planned for it in the summer of 1944
brooke was not out in charge that join our went to us verbal eisenhower and ch did not seem sympathetic to his leading herbals disappointment the planning underal morgan was one of the most important achievements of the war for witch morgan gets limited credit ch showed little appreciation for the detailed and meticulous planning but only for bright ideas such as deceiving the germans about the invasion sight
monty was still chs fav
compared to the us forces the british forces faced little resistance at d day on 6 june 1944 but were slow to break through from the beachhead to take the key port of caen therefor a dogged and costly campaign agasint a more felxablle german forces characterized the rest of the war
there was on exeption to the predominalnty cautious advance and that was another expidition airborne landings to outflank the germans by taking the brdiges at nijmegen edindhaven and arnhem leading to a possible invasion of the rhur despite montgomargys confidene in it and the us douts the operation went ahead nd failed flawed in planning execution and aim operation market garden in 1944 was the last hope for a end to the war ch had not managed to conrol th bad and costly ideas of his gererals
from 40-44 ch and his gereals had oupied germany in what was really minor military action in north africa while the german army was enaged and defted by massive losses from the russian army the war in north afric was aracterised by the pms clear loss in confidence by its generals it was dominated by his belif that the war would be somehow won in the mediterainian w out the b army destroying g fores in the west ch had exterted majoir infunece on the joit b and a allience and his outlloked influened the failed sadventure at armhem he did however provide onstant eergy \nnd determination forcng his generals to examine their pratices attitudes and plans baking ew and imaginitive ideas
eg the effetive ampaigns o deive the g about landing place for the invasion of france in 1944
how effective were chs strategic deisions during the war in the medrtraian
the importae of north africa
b had a long histroy of concern with the medertrainian as a vital trade route this had increased with the building of the suez canal which beae a majoir link to india
before 39 b miliaty leaders were intensly conerned about the mediternaina and the danger italy might pose if allied with g italy joined the war in 1940 and invaded southern frane italy had toops in its north afrian olonies libya bordring on egypt she had a n=major naval base in taranto
b controled enterance to the mediterainain at gibralter but there was a danger that the franco spainsih leader might threaten control by joining hitler in the w\r b had possetion in the of the suez canal unoffical control of egypt controoled palistine dominated iraq and transjordan and had a colony in somalia as well as mediteraina terties the suez canal was a major link to b asian colonies espailly india it was also a key defene of oil suplies frm the middle east
1940 it was the defense of the empire and the routeway too the empire that dominated miliatry hinking an important part of that was the suez canal and the route to india from 1942 another dimentio was added germany had gone to war with russia 1941 and had diven russia onsiderably far back south if a north afrian attack by germany broke through into egypt the german froces could link up with te other german fores in russia and seure vital oil suplies in southern russia and middle east the outome of the entire war was thus at stake
b fores were highly sucsessful against the itlians in NA but faed a more seroius enamy in the form of german afrika korps and its cmmander general urwin rommel but for ch the medertraina was more than nA he oped for a balakn frot in it was greee yugoslava and turkey anf to ahive that it sent fores when italy inaved in 1940
a front i greece would draw german resores and prospects of a greatly inreased b influnee in south east europe greatlgy increased
ch had staked much on the attack in turkey in 1915 to open the sft underbelly of europe
however in 40-44 as well had 1915 it proved to be no such soft uderbelly as b forces were defted in greece and forced out NA proved to be a difficlut battle ground when the troops were fsed with the well eqipt fore under a strong leader by 1941 egypy was under treat
in the vent that rommel was too short of men and suplies to take egypt ad was forced abck to el alamain after dec 1941 b had to take the us into acount ch was determined to persue the mediterainan strgey while the us miliatry favoured rapid invasion of frane
the american general marshal saw little point in wasting resorces in the med and argued for taking pressure of rusia and establishing a western front
ch and the war in italy
1943 considerable resources were devoted to an invasion of sicily by b and us forces this failed to prevent the germans retreating to the mainland
with north africa gibraltar malta cyprous sisily in allied hands the medertaonan was secure by 1843 italy had been wracked by defeats and was no longer a serious threat the germans weee established in italy but the british had naval supremacy and considerable air power
what was even the point in extending the campaign to take italy
16 allied divisions were now occupied in fighting in italy with the germans having roughly the same number of forties there was no question of a smaller allied force holding how italy it was the allies who were now tied down finally italy had fallen
by a decisive deference of the german forgives in france rather than italy it’s self and n invasion of geeky
it was not until june 1944 that b and the us launched the long swiped s say invasion of occupied france thus the bulk of the war was in europe
but why was there a delay on a western front
such high casualties were expected that an invasion of france was put off for as long as possible the more russia was wearing germany and the more the allied bombing campaign was hitting german city’s the fewer lossses there might be
the long struggle in italy was not anticipated and the allies hoped that bold landings might speech the processes this was not true
b policy was to maintain b dominance over theed to preserve links this was vividly shown by the so called percentages agreement that ch made w stalin in 1944
sicily and italy seemed more logical from the perusing of german forces after the battle of el alamein in 1942
how justified was the bombing of geeky
alternative to invading france was lowering german moragermany had previously used civilian bombing in poldan in 1939 and the low counties and belgium and france in 1940 the bliz
the was conderable public pressure to take the war in the same way germany had
the raf bomber comman had been created with a bomber offensive in mind abs was fear tinshownthatbiy could hasten the end of the war
however there were some problems
a specialist report in 1942 had indicated that binning was not effective or precise enough to substantially range german industrial productions
the blitz had not civiallan morale in b tgeee was little chance it would estroy german moral either so many had supported butler many germans saw hitkerr qs a supposed genius and that he could stop russia
ethical obligations to killing large numbers of cubialsj brave objections by bishop bell of chichester
harris deliberately aimed at much destruction of german cities as possible by assembling large forgives of numbers within incendiaybbimbs deliberyaky for making fire storms there was a considerable loss of life in major city’s like hamburg’s and industrial city’s such as the rhur in feb 1945 the dearth toll was around 40,000
total for b was 60,595 but 400,000-600,000 died in binning rwaida in germany
the bombing of dresden that housed many refugees at the time led to cricticimsn it remains a controversial act of the war even ch had doubts
how importanat was chs role in the war 1944-45
ch had severe anxieteies and doubts about the invasion of france was egar to be with his forces as soon as possible but by this stage of the war the nature of conflict had changed and after standing alone in 1940 b found itself dominated by a rich more powerful us whos strgegy had to be agreed b was also aware that the ussr had ade victories possible due to teir massive forces and scarfices in wering the germans down after the normandy landings b forces b was now a junior partner in the gand allience the b tried one last imaginitive plan called operation market garden but it fell fol due to poor planning the unexpected prence of german devision and some muddeled thinking about possible outcomes after the arnhem disaster there was no alternitive but too go forward at a pace directed by us commander eisenhower
ch found himself sidelined in meetings of thebig three and he had to exept at the yalta confrence feb 1945 some very unpaletable decisions insted of dfending the integarty of poland a british aim in 1939 ch had to accpet that its frontries were moved westwards and that stalin took back eastern poland russian prionsers of war who haf fought on the german side were sent back to stalin for punishment ch was forced to watch stalin ignore a rebelion in warsaw agaisnt german rle the germans had crshed the rising killing many people off and killed off any of those spirited enogh to provide oposition to later russian rele he was upset rosolvelt paid little attention to his warnings of russian domination in post war europe
even with the importance of the main eropean campagin being established in 1944 ch still saw the mediterainian as key and sent troops gagainst comunist risings in greece stalin tre to his agreemet w ch did not interfefre b forces already streched by the miliatry forces in by the advance into germany the defence of infis and a war in burma againts japanes now entered a campagin to defdnd the greek monarchy
how important were the reconstrction policies of ch gvernment and what role did he play
it was not enterily clear what the war was being faught for in 1944
initally the war had been for poland but polands wishes were being ignored and here was very possiblity of rssian domination
b had seemed to be the defender of civilised values but subjected german cities to hevy bombings
b was in allience w the communist ussr but a campagin in greee against communuism was going on at the sme time
a war to preseve b indipendce of action was ending and the us was controlling military stragey and lage numbers of us soligeres were based in b
a ar to presever the teritorial integrty of the empire had seen much of the east empire lost to te japainese in 1942 us hositile to b imperialism
it is not supprising that attention was increasinly given too ensuring that post war b should have a better place by radical social reforms there were hopes that the massive national effort that had gone into war would now go into post war reconstrction this had failed after ww1 and there was a determination amoug b people that the faliure would not be repeted ch thogh a well known socil reformer pre 1914 saw discussion on what happens after vitroy as a distraction too victory neverless the wartime coalition that ch headed made substantail pregress in planing pst war b and pVED TE WAY For some important socila changes
ths the war had forced the state to exted medical ervices care for the homeless plan for future extention f the wellfare state make provisons for mre town and country planning and reform education there was a dtermination to not return to the disspaoitments of ost ww1
the key document was a report by william bevergae in 1942 called the berberrge report though the conservitives a a whole supported this many feared the growth of the state the reporte was debated in 1943 febuary ch expressed his conecerns about the cost but the conservitives and liberals accpeted the social service state thogh labor did not think it went far enough
