Class 7: Policy preferences Flashcards
(36 cards)
Wiedemann: What does he set out to do?
Propose a new explanation of why countries with majoritarian electoral regimes redistribute less in response to inequality than those with PR systems
Wiedemann: What is his main argument regarding why countries with majoritarian electoral regimes redistribute less in response to inequality?
Interaction between electoral rules and spatial inequality undermines the political logic of redistribution in majoritarian systems
When inequality is spatially concentrated and clustered in a small number of highly unequal districts, the median district is less unequal than the nation as a whole.
This undermines demand and supply for redistributive policies, as increasing support for redistribution is concentrated in a few districts, and political parties target the median voter (who is exposed to less inequality and thus less supportive of redistribution).
Left-wing parties therefore choose more centrist and less redistributive platforms to fend off competition from the other party even when spatial inequality is growing
Wiedemann: What is the Robin Hood paradox?
Rich democracies with high levels of inequality tend to redistribute less, while more equal countries tend to distribute more
Wiedemann: What can be used to explain cross-national variation in the relationship between inequality and redistribution?
Political institutions and electoral rules which amplify the effect of spatial inequality on preference formation and vote choice
Wiedemann: What faulty assumption do most theories on why inequality has not led to redistribution share?
Society is divided into equal-sized and homogenously distributed groups, and political parties represent the groups’ shared interests -> ignores electoral and economic geography which explains why inequality has not led to higher levels of redistribution
Wiedemann: Research methods and findings for cross-national data
Cross-national OECD data on 252 regions in 25 countries
DV: Extent of country’s level of national redistribution (difference between pre- and posttax gini coefficient)
IV: Spatial concentration of pretax inequality; plurality/PR
= countries with a PR electoral system redistribute more on average than countries with plurality rule + they redistribute more in light of inequality than plurality countries
Wiedemann: Research methods and findings for national data
UK survey data 2014-2020 + geographic data on inequality
DV: Redistribution preference (government should/should not try to make incomes equal)
IV: Constituency-level inequality
= an increase in local inequality is associated with more support for redistribution, but national inequality has no effect
= this only holds for Labour voters -> Labour supporters are driving force behind demand for redistribution in unequal constituencies
=inequality is concentrated in densely populated constituencies in large cities
Wiedemann: Research methods and findings for manifesto data
Comparative Manifesto Project data
DV: parties’ policy stance on social policy and redistribution
IV: party type, electoral regime, regional inequality
= left-wing parties respond to increases in regional inequality with a more pro-redistributive policy stance in PR systems, but not in plurality systems -> their platforms continue to respond to the median voter who is less exposed to inequality and therefore less likely to demand redistribution
Scheiring et al.: What is the general disagreement about the causes of the rise of populism?
Whether it is caused by economic or cultural factors
Scheiring et al.: What is populism?
Thin-centered ideology that frames the fundamental political cleavage between the elite and the pure people
Scheiring et al.: What is economic insecurity?
The risk of economic loss faced by workers and households as they encounter the unpredictable events of social life
Scheiring et al.: Research methods
Systematic review and meta-analysis of the causal evidence that economic insecurity significantly influences populism from 36 studies
Scheiring et al.: What are their 5 main findings?
- There is significant heterogeneity, with most studies analyzing the West and the populist radical right
- All 36 studies report a robust causal link between economic insecurity and populism
- Redistribution creating higher economic security dampens voters’ enthusiasm for populism
- Cultural backlash is not an alternative mechanism but a mediator -> skepticism towards liberal values and democracies is a manifestation of distress driven by economic insecurity
- Significant evidence of publication bias, but relationship still significant after controlling for it
Scheiring et al.: What do they conclude based on their results?
That juxtaposing economic and cultural explanations for the rise of populism is less productive than exploring their interactions
Hager et al.: What is NIMBYism?
Opposition to new housing projects and influx of new residents into the neighborhood, to protect the value of their assets + racial undertones
Hager et al.: What is the arguments that rent control would increase or decrease NIMBYism?
Increase: Rent control encourages tenant to stay by reducing their mobility (increased competition within rent-controlled market, higher prices outside), leading to a desire to preserve the neighborhood and less motivation to support new housing to bring down rent prices
Decreases: Rent control provides economic and residential security and thus may assuage fears about displacement and gentrification
Hager et al.: Research methods, incl. IV and DV
Natural experiment in Berlin with 2020 implementation of rent control law which froze all rents and retroactively lowered rents for contracts above a given threshold
Rent control only applied to apartments built before 2014, which arbitrarily separates residents into groups affected/not affected by the policy -> regression discontinuity design
Rent control only applied to apartments charging rents above a threshold, which arbitrarily separates residents intro treated and non-treated -> regression kink design
DV: Preferences toward local-level construction and immigration
Hager et al.: What are their main findings?
Rent control led to a significant decrease in tenant NIMBYism
Hager et al.: What is the mechanism - why does rent control make tenants less NIMBY?
Rent control reduces fears of gentrification (extra income helps tenants absorb rising prices) and displacement (security over future rents). The drop in NIMBYism is strongest where rent cuts are larger and in heavily gentrified areas
Hager et al.: How does this study contribute to policy feedback literature?
Polices like rent control can shift public attitudes in unexpected ways, creating new supportive constituencies and altering cleavages in housing politics
Colombo et al.: What is a problem with the usual studies showing that economic inequality leads to dissatisfaction with democracy?
They assume that ordinary people know how high national inequality is, how it has been changing, and where they fit in the income distribution
Colombo et al.: What is a better way to measure whether inequality affects system support?
Local-level inequality measures
Colombo et al.: Research methods, incl. IV and DV
Longitudinal two-wave panel survey and cross-sectional OLS
DV: 3 types of political support: satisfaction with democracy, trust in state institutions, trust in politicians
IV: Local economic inequality measured as Gini coefficient of the local income/wealth distribution for “micro-contexts” within 100-1000 m
Colombo et al.: What are their 3 main findings regarding the relationship between inequality and system support?
No consistent evidence for a relationship between the measures of local economic inequality and indicators of political system trust
And no evidence that inequality matters differently for people across income groups
Only significant effect was positive relationship with contact with politicians
