Federalism Flashcards

1
Q

What is federalism?

A

(cf. Elazar 1997; Bednar 2009)

1) Geopolitical division – the country is divided into regional governments that are
constitutionally recognised and that cannot be unilaterally abolished by the central
government

2) Independence – regional and central governments have independent bases of authority, e.g. separate elections, courts, laws etc.

3) Direct governance – policy-making is divided between the regional and central
governments, such that each has some ‘exclusive competences’ over their citizens, e.g. as set out in a ‘catalogue of competences’

4) Territorial representation – regional sub-units are represented in the upper chamber of the
central legislature, and so have power over central government policy

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2
Q

What is the difference bewteen aysmetric and symetirc federalism?

A

Symmetric federalism is if every level has the same amount of power

Asymmetric federalism- if one has more power than the other

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3
Q

What is a unitary state?

A
  • geopolitical divisions decided by central government
  • may have independent elections, but not separate courts or laws
  • no direct governance, i.e. no ‘exclusive competences’ of sub-units
  • no territorial representation in central legislature
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4
Q

What is Devolution / Decentralisation (within a unitary state)

A
  • existence and powers of geopolitical divisions decided by the central government
  • (some) sub-units have independent courts and legal traditions
  • (some) sub-units have direct governance, i.e. exclusive power over some policies
  • over-representation of (some) territorial sub-units in upper house

Not constitutional so can be withdrawn

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5
Q

Two dimesonsions of federalism

A

2 scales

  1. Institutional/constitutional
    authority). Unitary or federal state.
    Constitutional question
  2. How much control is delegated
    to subnational units. Question on
    devolution of power/revenue

Kind of outcomes we see differ
substantially across the different
quadrants

Examples- China, Finland, India are unitary
and decentralised. Belgium, South Africa are very centralised in a revenue sense but
federal constitutionally

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6
Q

Why do governments decentralize?

Supply-side explanations

A
  1. Functional advanatges- Local govs can be better at mapping preferences to policies (Fiscal Federalism). But this comes at the cost of central government priorities- Know their communities better, easier for voters to communicate with local vs national gov,
    better translation of prefereneces of policies but not good reason for a
    politician as you lose power
  2. Institutionalized patronage and co-optation:
    - Decentralization can provide resources and power to politically important interests. (Give recongised power- co-opt elites/ ethnic groups)
    - Recentralization can sanction opposing interests. (Good tool for authoritarian- Putin clawing back control from powerful mayors/provinces . Sanction those against United Russia)
  3. Bargaining power
    Political fragmentation can make collective action by regional or ethnic interests
    more or less difficult- Want a democracy that forms bargains. If we want a consociational democracy we want federalism/decentralisation as it
    foces competing interests in society to compromise over policy in a way that is potentially better for consociational norm of
    democracy and maybe better for very conflictual socities
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7
Q

Why do governments decentralize?
Demand-side explanations

A
  1. Political marginalization: Marginalized regional or ethnic groups may seek decentralization for greater
    influence. Common especially in the face of secessionist threats- case study ethiopia
  2. Electoral manipulation: Politicians may create new political boundaries to make elections safer for local candidates (e.g., gerrymandering)- Incentive to redraw to cement political control. Big part of the adminsitrative boundaries in the US where state parties have had a lot of power in drawing them e.g. cement control over
    slavery 18/19 th century in the US
  3. Accountability: Voters may believe that decentralization makes it easier to hold local officials accountable- Only vote 4 years for central gov, not know whose responsible, vote on local issues so greater ability to sanction politicians. Have more information
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8
Q

Case study- Why did Uganda decentralise
Demand side

A

Took the history of Uganda as to
which ones split into new districts
and those that didn’t. Part of the sotry was Voters in particular regions that are left out
are demanding additional power.

See here is the probability that the
gov will agree to a district being
split based on their model. It’s these places that are very underrepresented within the existing gov and are very unequal on the
poorer side relative to other areas that tend to be split off.

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9
Q

Case study- Why did Uganda decentralise
Supply side

A

Museveni one of the most
successful autocrats. In power
since the 80s, centralised power,
no risk- why do it

Do it to help the marginalised communitites but also find those that support the NRM and are marginalised- those are the indivduals he will reward with decentralisation

See that twice the vote margin not vote for Museveni in those districts that are split off. Using decentrlaisation to reward those individuals that remain within the NRM and punish those which vote for oppoisiton candidates. Part of his strategy to ensure he remains in power

MP Atube states he is divding tribes or separating out the tribes from those who support him to those that don’t in order to reward elites communities that support him

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10
Q

Effects of decentrsliation- checks and balances

A

Vertical ‘Checks and Balances’ (e.g. Lijphart 1999; Tsebelis 2002) Dividing powers between the centre and sub-states is analytically the same as dividing powers between the executive & the legislature (presidentialiam), or between two legislative chambers (bicameralism).

Federalism therefore increases policy stability and dialogue, but at the cost of
gridlock.

(more veto players, forces compromise, ineffective legilsalation- time consuming)

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11
Q

Effects of decentrsliation- improves political accountability

A

Casey 2015/Weingast 1995

  • Voters may be better informed about local contexts. Politicians may likewise be more
    informed about the needs of voters.
  • Voters can therefore better monitor the performance of local than national politicians.
  • “Yardstick competition” can also provide information about local government
    performance
  • Better information leads to less corruption, identity voting and clientelism.
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12
Q

Effects of decentrsliation- hinders political accountability

A

Bardhan 2002/Treisman 2009)

(Less horizontal accountability, more vertical accountability)

  • Local authorities often have fewer checks on their power and are subject to less media oversight
  • Denser political networks may make clientelistic strategies easier to implement
  • Electoral competition is often weak in local contexts, and voting is often conditioned on
    personal connections
  • More levels of government may mean more opportunities for corruption- More layers of administrative authority makes it easier to hide things- blame other people if money is missing (bureaucracy/other assembly members/parliament). Lots of budgets/contractors/layers of authority hard to work out how much you were supposed to get
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13
Q

Case study- decentralisation on corruption

A

Fan et al. 2009

Very debated topic- can say that it appears to increase the numbers of bribes- consitent with the logic of personal relationships and hiding evidence.

Survey of corruption- see the effect of a standard deviation increase. See that an increase in decentralisation about 5% fewer say they never pay bribes, 1.5 and 2.5% say they’re sometimes frequently or most likley to pay bribes- significant increase in bribe payment. We are creating problems
with accountability not just solving

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14
Q

Case study- Decentralization and Health Outcomes

A

Grossman et al. 2017

Flip-side- the role of public services. Easier to request improvements at a local level
than a national representative. Evidence is consistent with this

Paper- takes the main decentralised countries in Africa and looks at adminsitraitve units that have split in comparison to those haven’t. Will compare
public policy outcomes (are the ones split off better than their neighbours that aren’t)

Measuring public health service-
water/service within communities. General reduction across sub-sahraran africa.

Malawi we don’t see this- failed
decnetralisation event

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15
Q

Effects of decentrsliation- preventing ethnic conflict

A

In divdied societies we often see decentralisation or federal states as its a way to try to hold a fractious country together & appeals to voters with diverse interests

Ethnic cleavages
If ethno-linguistic groups in a society are geographically concentrated, then decentralisation of power can give these groups autonomy over the issues they care about (e.g. education, media, language etc.)
Example: Canada, Belgium, UK, Spain, Nigeria

Decentralization can also reduce the political salience of ethnic divisions by forcing politicians to compete along non-ethnic lines. This may be advantageous in ethnically contentious societies.
Example: Sierra Leone, Kenya, Bosnia

Divergent policy preferences
More generally, some geographically concentrated social groups might have significantly divergent policy preferences from the national majority, and so prefer decentralised powers on these issues
e.g. median Scottish voter is to the left of the median UK voter, median Catalan voter is to the right of the median Spanish voter

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16
Q

Case study- Does decentralization increase accountability and reduce ethnic divisions?

A

Casey 2015

Sierra Leone fractious civil war that ended in 2002. Divided almost in half between the Mende who vote SLP & Tene who vote APC. Used decentralisation to break up control & dilute power so no ethnic group is controlling too much authority

Did it work- In National elections only about 15% vote across ethnic lines But in local elections nearly twice as many vote across
ethnic lines. Not perfect but has forced voting across ethnic lines

Did politicans campaigns change-
Conducted a big survey that
on possibly the 2002 election.
Results:
National level politicians spend a lot in viallages where they have have co-ethnics.
Nice linear line of the ethnic homogeneity and the amount of money spent in that
community

Local elections it’s a flat line.
The homogeneity of a community doesn’t infleunce your campaign as you don’t
have a strong incentive to camapign along ethnic lines

17
Q

Effects of decentrsliation- more efficient economy (Market Preserving Federalism)

A

Weingast (1995) federalism solves the “political commitment problem”: When local authorities have control over the economy, but not the movement of factors and goods, any kind of opportunism risks losing
investment.

Basic logic- the reason you might want to
decentralise is because it promotes
comeptition between different
administrative units

When local govs have to compete for labor and investment, federalism can also lead to ‘regulatory competition’: competition between states for better policies and better regulatory standards (e.g. Californian
environmental standards, known as a ‘California effect’)- California represents a large proportion of the US economy so by setting its standards high it forces
other states to set similar standards

18
Q

Criticisms of Market Preserving Federalism

A

Regulatory competition might lead to a ‘race to the bottom’, as states cut their regulatory standards, welfare costs, and taxes to attract businesses (the ‘Delaware effect’)

Also assumptions about local gov capacity and factor mobility may be unreasonable in many developing states. This may lead to a reduction in the quality of public services (Bardhan 2002)

19
Q

Case study- Market Preserving Federalism in China

A

Market preserving federalism can be a solution to the political commitment problem in authoritarian states by imposing costs on opportunism (Qian and Weingast 1995).

China is politically centralised but fiscally
very decentralised. Xiapoing gave lots of power over trade and inital control over tax.

Weingast argues this competition was good for China- worried about investment being captured. By decentrlaising economic authority China can create beneficial compeition and if any state becomes too
predatory then we can see capital to move across borders. Incentive for local authroites to raise as much tax. Allows China to grow its economy and protect property rights

Is Market Preserving Federalism an explanation for China’s institutional exceptionalism?
- Strong argument fiscal decentralisation allowed this
- Part of the reason authoritarian states
struggle is becacuse of the commitment problem. Somehow need to protect property rigts/ the interests of investors and create economic competition despite the centralised political control.
- Authoritarian states that do well
economically tend to be very institutionalised in a way that protects the interests of property rights
- Federalism is one way authoritarian states do this quite effectivley wih China being a key example of this

20
Q

Case study- Tigray Region, Ethiopia

A

One of the most violent civil conflicts which ended about a year ago with a peace agreement. About 200,000 killed. The issue was largley around the Ethiopian federal state (divded across ethnic groups). This region was of one the most powerful states. The conflict started in part because of the retrenchment of power by the central gov. Centred around who had control/veto power over international decisions of the state

21
Q

Case study- Northern Ireland

A

Number of ongoing debates in the UK about decentralisation/devolution of power. NI might have an end to the stalemate in Stormont which has been empty since the Brexit deal was signed. DUP might come back to enter so may have a gov in NI. Debate is orginates on the decentralisation/devolution of power. Issue partially driven by conflict- fights between the different factions with decentralisation at attempt to solve it.

22
Q

What is the current pattern for decentralisation?

A

Depending on the region there a different patterns. UK push for more. Eastern Europe there has been a general trend away from decentralisation that’s plateaued recently.

Interesting pattern is the global south. Sub-saharan Africa and a bit in the Middle East
there’s a trend towards greater decentralisation as an attempt to address the ills of democracy. But in southeast asia notably China and India we see the other direction as they both have centralised poltical and fiscal power

23
Q

Reading- Grossman (2017)- the effects of decentralisation on governance

A
  1. Encourages better redistribution- better public service (more efficient)- easier to address issues on the ground that are harder at the capital level
  2. Encourages yardstick competition- if the gov is in smaller groups it is easier for the public to look at how others are governed so it is easier to see who is messing up can encourage change to enact public policy/services
  3. Decentralisation is great as public service efficiency is increased and fosters competition between local entities- race to the top, not the bottom
  4. Too much- accountability is more challenging
  5. Works well in democracies
  6. Reaches authoritarian regimes- an incentive to create competition between elites to keep them in check. This means supporters will compete to ensure it is clear they are supportive and their area is supportive
24
Q

Reading- Grossman (2017)- pros of a federalist society

A

Good at easing ethnic tensions but needs to take into account the territorial concentration of the groups and not amplify preceding inequalities (Belgium- resentment between 2 ethnic groups)

When you don’t go local you have economies of scope

Better public services

Competition creates talented politicians/pluralism

Can experiment with policies

Ensures separation of powers/prevents tyranny

25
Q

Reading- Grossman (2017)- cons of a federalist society

A

More opportunities for corruption (especially in authoritarian regimes)

Inefficiency- if too much decentralisation (checks & balances)

More veto players- can lead to gridlock

Lack of territorial uniformity- can create tensions due to the differences in policies (access to abortions/drugs)- lack of national policy potentially on controversial issues

Sometimes, it is harder to hold people accountable- who is in charge of what