Models of government

Question 1

Explain Arend Lijphart’s theory on the two models of democracy

Answer 1

Majoritarian democracy
- Government by/for the people: gov by the majority
- No constraints on the will of the majority
- E.g. single-party gov in a parliamentary
system

Consensus democracy
- Gov by/for the people: gov by consensus
- Constraints on the will of the majority
- E.g. coalition gov/ a presidential system

Question 2

What is the difference between a parliamentary (majoritarian) vs presidential system (consensus)

Answer 2

Presidential- the executive branch is elected by voters and parliament doesn’t get to decide who is incharge of the executive power. (mid-terms in Congress don’t change the President)

Parliamentarian- the parliament is elected by voters and depending on which party gets the majority the PM and their cabinet will depend on this. (Elections can change the PM

Semi-presidential- the president is elected by voters who appoints a PM and government who are the majority party in parliament.
Republican president but socialist is head of parliament they must choose a socialist PM. Causes lots of gridlock and nothing gets done. France had to hold the elections at the same time to try and stop the issue of having two different parties.

Question 3

What are the 4 ideal types of democracy

Answer 3

Majoritarian- parliamentary, Single-party e.g “Westminster” model

Consensus- Presidential, Single-party e.g United States model

Consensus- Parliamentary, coalition e.g. Continental European model

Super-consensus- Presidential, coalition e.g. Latin America

Question 4

What are the pros and cons of the majoritarian and consensus system

Answer 4

Majoritarian
Pros- Decisive government (COVID), clear responsiblity (reduces corrutpion), electroal promises kept (credible)
Cons- Decisions too quick, “Elective dictatorship”, no compromises, threat to minority interests

Consensus
Pros- slow and makes deliberative decisions, broad political compromises, protection of minority interests
Cons- makes decisions too slowly, no clear responsibility, electoral promises broken, vetoed by minority groups

Question 5

Explain Lijphart’s (1994) findings on which type of democracy is better

Answer 5

Lijphart shows that consensus
democracies outperform
majoritarian democracies in
representativeness and equality.

But they perform no worse in
terms of economic performance
and stability which has been a common argument

Big fan of consensus as it better protects minority rights

Question 6

Understanding how goverment institutions work- the spatial model basic assumptions

Answer 6

1. Politics and policymaking can be conceptualised in a political “space” (eg, a left-right dimension).
2. Each actor (eg, a legislator or a party) has an “ideal policy” in this policy space.
3. When making a choice between different policies, each actor will vote for the policy which is closest to their ideal policy.
4. If no policy is agreed, the existing policy (the “status quo”) remains.

With no institutions: Policies should converge on the position of the “median voter” (the “median voter theorem”) (Black, 1958).

Question 7

Explain George Tsebelis’s theory on Agenda-setting power and veto power (2002)

Answer 7

Agenda-setting power
The right to make a proposal (at the beginning of the policy process), or
to propose an amendment
E.g. the gov in a parliamentary system

Veto power
The right to block a proposal
E.g. the median member of a parliament,
a party in a coalition gov, the median member of a second chamber, a supreme court, the median voter in a referendum

Question 8

Is Tsebelis’s theory accurate

Answer 8

Majoritarian Government: Dictatorship of the Majority Party so the policy will be implemented exactly how they want- no compromise

Consensus Government: Compromise, but Possible Gridlock. Government has to compromise as the other party in the colaition is a veto player. However, there will be a gridlock interval where any policy in that interval cannot be changed. Neither can agree to change any policy between our two preferences.

Empirical prediction- when we see greater space between veto players we’ll
get less policy making happen as there’s a larger gridlock interval

Question 9

What is George Tsebelis’s proposition

Answer 9

1. More veto players: less policy change
   E.g., coalition gov, presidential system, bicameralism, supreme court,
   central bank, referendum
2. Bigger policy distance between veto players: less policy change
   E.g., coalition gov between two ideologically similar parties vs coalition gov between two ideologically different parties

Both are due to the fact that both of these scenarios will increase in size of gridlock interval, meaning more policy status quo is likely to fall within it, thus leading to
less policy change.

Question 10

Testing Tsebelis’s Propositions (1999)

Answer 10

Observed the number of significant laws in 15 countries in Western Europe (labour laws) between 1981-1991

Measurement of veto players % ideological distance:
Single-party majority govs (eg, UK): 1 veto player
Coalition or minority govs: 2-plus veto players
“Distance” between veto players: left-right positions of parties
(using expert judgements of party positions)

Results:
Evidence is strongly consistent with his theory
Nice line- as we increase the range between veto players we get fewer laws passed (almost 1/2)
See the difference between minimum winning coalitionand non-winning. Minimum have a colaition partner which can easily force a vote of no confidnence

Question 11

What are the political implications of regime types

Answer 11

The regime impacts
- Policymaking
- Party cohesion
- Regime survival

Question 12

Case study- Kevin McCarthy

Answer 12

Faced a huge battle to get elected as the R Party was very divided between far-right wing & centrist wing. The coalition on the right made it challenging (17 elections).

Agreed on a strange rule that if any House members agreed they could force a new
election for House speaker. Tragic rule getting little down. Meant he got kicked out.

E.g. if we have a Biden policy on the left which Kevin wants to change this is possible as the wing set is pretty large meaning he can get R to pass it easily. However, if Kevin tries to do something the R care about (shift a policy on the right e.g. tax/immigriation). Any policy he proposes will immeditatley be blocked by C or E due to the polarisation of the R party.

Question 13

Policymaking: Who Has Agenda-Setting and Veto Power?

Answer 13

Presidential system
Agenda-setter: any member of parliament (sometimes president)
Veto: majority in parliament * president
Parliament proposes, president accepts/rejects

Parliamentary system
Agenda-setter: gov (usually)
Veto: majority in parliament (and head of state)
Gov proposes, parliament accepts/rejects

Semi-presidential system
Agenda-setter: president via gov
Veto: majority in parliament
President/government proposes, parliament accepts/rejects

Question 14

Examine policymaking in parliamentary systems (dictatorship of gov)

Answer 14

The gov has a majority in the parliament (usually).

The gov has a monopoly on agenda-setting power (also controls the legislative timetable, limits the amount of time spent on non-gov business, eg, “private
members’ bills”).

The gov can enforce party cohesion, via carrots and sticks.
Carrots: promotion to ministerial office
Sticks: a “vote of no confidence” or parliamentary dissolution

Govs dominate parliaments in parliamentary systems. E.g. govs almost never lose legislative votes, and almost no
amendments are adopted without government support

Question 15

Examine policy-making in a presidential system (unified or divided gov)

Answer 15

Unified gov: If the president’s party/coalition commands a majority in the parliament,
then the president can set the legislative agenda. Legislative proposals are made by senior members of the president’s party, on behalf of the president. But, unlike in parliamentary systems, coalitions have to be built issue by issue, because the
president cannot enforce party cohesion.

Divided gov: If the president’s party/coalition does not command a majority in the parliament, then either the parliament dominates or there is gridlock.
The leader of the majority party/coalition in the parliament can set the legislative agenda, and the president will not veto if a proposal is closer to the president’s ideal point than the status quo. But “gridlock” will occur if parliament tries to change policy in one direction and the president tries
to change policy in the other direction.

Question 16

Examine party cohesion on policy-making in both systems

Answer 16

Parliamentary Systems
Parties in gov can enforce party cohesion
Carrots: promotion to ministerial office
Sticks: a ‘vote of no confidence’ or parliamentary dissolution
Party leaders can prevent MPs from standing at the next election
MPs depend on the performance of their government for their re-election
-> MPs are scared of ‘party whips’

Presidential Systems
Presidents in gov cannot enforce party cohesion
No possibility of promotion
President cannot dissolve the parliament or ask for a ‘vote of no confidence’
Separate election => members of Parliament are less dependent on the
performance of the President for their re-election

Question 17

What was Carey’s findings on party cohesion across countries (2007)

Answer 17

Empirical predication- the two systems should differ substantially in the extent to
which they follow the party line. President little Parliamentary a lot.

On average a MP in parliamentary votes with 92% opposition 8% but in Presidential its about 75% or 63% depending on whether its divided or not

Question 18

Map of Voting in the UK and US- party cohesion

Answer 18

1997-2001 under the Bliar gov Labour votes very closley as a block. Conservatives have a fair amount of cohesion but still see defection (no vote of no confidnece/ high positions). Also, why SNP and Lib Dems see defections

1993-1995 the House saw a united Congress- all D. Despite a strong control we
still see Democarts voting all over the map. Much less cohesive due to a lack of party discipline within presidential systems

Question 19

Explain Juan Linz’s view that presidential regimes are prone to breaking down (1990)

Answer 19

High gridlock and less effective policymaking compared to parliamentary systems

Minority govs may be seen as less
legitimate

Dual legitimacy: both president and parliament can claim democratic legitimacy

Winner-takes-all nature of presidential election: discourages compromise between branches ofn gov

Lack of mechanisms for conflict resolution (eg, a vote of confidence)

Question 20

Explain Horowitz’s response to Linz’a view of presidential regimes peril (1990)

Answer 20

Parliamentary systems could also be “winner-takes-all”.

Minority gov could also emerge in a parliamentary system.

Parliamentary systems with multiparty system and coalition govs could also be prone to gridlock and inefficiency.

Too much emphasis on the collapse of Latin-American presidential
democracies?

Concludes Linz’s argument is one against the “winner-takes-all” arrangement under democracy, not presidentialism specifically; avoiding minority govs can help address these challenges.

Question 21

Describe Cheibub and Limongi’s research on the similarity of government in both systems

Answer 21

Comparing regime surivial across
both

Results- with a majority gov parliamentary systems fair slighly better than presidential. However, with coalitions govs the results are very similar.

Linz reading is not presidential systems
are bad but that there’s something wrong with winner take all systems with lots of
veto players and minority govs which can be bad in times of instability

Question 22

Explain Linz’s view on the advantages and disadvantages of presidential system

(reading)

Answer 22

Presidential system disadvantages:
- Being stuck with them and their majority for a fixed number of years (5-7) is not the best way to deal with people’s issues
- If a president dies you can’t choose the successor instead it’s often their running mate who would finish their term
- Change every few years due to restrictions on term dates
- Legitimacy- the winner takes it all, despite only getting 51% you have the power

Advantages
- More flexibility as they can react to events/people’s moods (can form new coalitions)
- Right for the electorate to choose successors if the PM dies/resigns
- Stability- same person with the same mindset enacting coherent policies. - Debatable as they can lead to a dictatorship of government if they have a strong majority allowing the PM to have free will
- Less gridlock- so more policy consensus meaning more can be achieved (Obama Healthcare)
- Legitimacy- no winner takes it all. Can represent more diversity- e.g. didn’t vote for Sunak/Truss

Question 23

Explain Tsebelis’s veto player theory

(reading)

Answer 23

Definition- An individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for changes in status quo.

Veto players in a parliamentary regime- the PM/majority party, the head of state (queen), the Upper house (Lords), the judiciary

Veto players in a presidential regime- the president, other parties if they have a big enough majority, the Upper house (Senate), the judiciary

Main findings- the greater the number of veto players the less policy change due to a bigger gridlock interval (issues on which the veto players cannot agree to change). And the greater the ideological difference the less policy change is enacted. Under this theory of less veto players parliamentarian systems can be more effective.