Law

Question 1

Before comprehensive zoning, regulation of land use was based on what?

Answer 1

Nuisance laws: persons with real property are entitled to the quiet enjoyment of their land.

Noise, pollution, odor

Question 2

Welch v Swasey; 214 US 91 (1909)

Answer 2

The court established the right of municipalities to regulate building height.

Question 3

Eubank v City of Richmond; US Supreme Court (1912)

Answer 3

Setbacks are constitutional

Ordinance giving one set of property owners ability to impose setbacks through petition deprives other owners due process.

Court struck down the ordinance that allowed the owners of 2/3rds the land abutting any street to set the setback (building line).

Question 4

Explain police powers

Answer 4

These are powers of a state government to make and enforce all laws necessary to preserve public health, safety and general welfare.

Question 5

Hadacheck v Sebastian; US Supreme Court, 1915

Answer 5

The Court first allowed the regulation of the location of land uses.

This was a case on the constitutionality of zoning ordinances.

The court found that a zoning ordinance in Los Angeles that prohibited the production of bricks in a specific location did not violate the 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.

Question 6

Village is Euclid v Ambler Realty; US Supreme; 1926

Answer 6

Upheld zoning classifications if classifications were reasonable.

The Court found that as long as the community believed that there was threat of a nuisance, the zoning ordinance should be upheld (must be connected to public welfare).

The key question before the court was whether the Village of Euclid’s zoning ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the 14th Amendment.

The court upheld modern zoning as a proper use of police power.

Question 7

Nectow v City of Cambridge; 1928

Answer 7

Zoning ordinance was struck down because it had no valid public purpose.

Nectow owned property and entered into a contract to sell the land to a purchaser who wanted to use the land for commercial purposes.

Before the sale was completed the City of Cambridge passed a zoning ordinance that placed a 100 foot wide stop of Nectow’s property under residential zoning restrictions. Because of this restrictions, the sale failed.

The zoning ordinance had no valid public purpose (to promote health, safety, morals, or welfare of the public) and the court ruled that it was a violation of the due process clause of the 14th amendment.

Question 8

Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo; New York State Court of Appeals (1972)

Answer 8

Upheld the towns right to require PERFORMANCE STANDARDS to obtain a special building permit.

The courts decided that local governments can condition development approval on the provision of services.

The court upheld a growth management system that awarded points to development proposals based on the availability of public utilities, drainage facilities, parks, road access, and firehouses.

A proposal would only be approved upon reaching a certain point level. Developers could increase their point total by providing the facilities themselves.

Question 9

Construction Industry of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma; U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit (1975)

Answer 9

The Court upheld quotas on the annual number of building permits issued.

Question 10

Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay v. City of Livermore; California Supreme Court (1976)

Answer 10

Court allowed time phasing of future residential growth until performance conditions were met.

The Court upheld temporary moratoriums on building permits.

Question 11

Brandt Revocable Trust v United States (2013)

Answer 11

The Court found that the 1875 General Railroad Right-of-Way Act grants an easement for the railroad’s land. When the railroad company abandons the land, it should be settled as an easement and if the easement is abandoned, the easement disappears and the land reverts to the previous owner.

Question 12

Massachusetts v. EPA, Inc.; U.S. Supreme Court (2006)

Answer 12

The Court held that the EPA must provide a reasonable justification for why it would not regulate greenhouse gases.

Massachusetts argued that EPA was required to regulate these “greenhouse gases” by the Clean Air Act - which states that Congress must regulate “any air pollutant” that can “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”

Question 13

Rapanos v. United States; U.S. Supreme Court (2006)

Answer 13

The Court found that the Army Corp of Engineers must determine whether there is a significant nexus between a wetland and a navigable waterway.

Instead, Wetlands that are not adjacent to a traditionally navigable water must have a “significant nexus” with a one. This requirement is satisfied if the wetland has a significant effect on the water quality of navigable waters. Justice Kennedy suggested that Rapanos’s wetlands may be covered under the CWA if more evidence of a significant nexus were presented.

Question 14

SD Warren v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection; U.S. Supreme Court (2006)

Answer 14

The Court found that hydroelectric dams are subject to Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.

Do hydroelectric dams result in “discharge” under the meaning of Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act? Yes, “[w]hen it applies to water, ‘discharge’ commonly means a ‘flowing or issuing out.’ .

Question 15

Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project Inc.; US Supreme Court (2015)

Answer 15

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to evaluate whether disparate impact is the appropriate standard in which to evaluate the impact of the Fair Housing Act. Inclusive Communities Project claimed that the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs was disproportionately granting tax credits to developments in minority neighborhoods and denying credits to developments within Caucasian neighborhoods. The Court held that Disparate impact is the appropriate standard to be applied to the Fair Housing Act. The result is that policies that even inadvertently relegate minorities to poor areas violate the Fair Housing Act.

Question 16

Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.; U.S. Supreme Court (1976)

Answer 16

The Court upheld a zoning scheme that decentralized sexually oriented businesses in Detroit.

Question 17

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego; U.S. Supreme Court (1981)

Answer 17

The Court found that commercial and noncommercial speech cannot be treated differently. The court overruled an ordinance that banned all off-premises signs because it effectively banned noncommercial signs.

Question 18

Members of City Council v. Vincent; U.S. Supreme Court (1984)

Answer 18

Aesthetics can satisfy advancing a legitimate public interest.

The Court upheld a Los Angeles ordinance that banned attaching signs to utility poles.

The Court found that the regulation of signs was valid for aesthetic reasons as long as the ordinance did not regulate the content of the sign.

If the regulation is based on sign content, it must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. The Court found that aesthetics does advance a legitimate state interest.

Question 19

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.; U.S. Supreme Court (1986)

Answer 19

The Court upheld a zoning ordinance that limited sexually oriented businesses to a single zoning district. The Court found that placing restrictions on the time, place, and manner of adult entertainment is acceptable. The ordinance was treating the secondary effects (such as traffic and crime), not the content. The Court found that the city does not have to guarantee that there is land available, at a reasonable price, for this use. However, the city cannot entirely prohibit adult entertainment.

Question 20

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000

Answer 20

The new act declares that no government may implement land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious assembly or institution unless the government demonstrates that imposition of burden both is in furtherance of compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

Question 21

Reed et al. v Town of Gilbert Arizona (2014)

Answer 21

The pastor of a church rented space in an elementary school and placed signs in the area announcing the time and location of the church services. Gilbert’s sign ordinance restricts the size, number, duration, and location of certain types of signs, including temporary signs. Gilbert advised the church that it had violated the sign code through the placement of the temporary signs. The church sued Gilbert claiming that the sign code violated the free speech clause in the First Amendment, as well as the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The US Supreme Court found that the city cannot impose a more stringent restriction on signs directing the public to a meeting than on signs conveying other messages. The Court found the sign ordinance was not content-neutral.

Question 22

United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Company; U.S. Supreme Court (1896)

Answer 22

The Court ruled that the acquisition of the national battlefield at Gettysburg served a valid public purpose. This was the first significant legal case dealing with historic preservation.

Question 23

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon; U.S. Supreme Court (1922)

Answer 23

Restrictions on use are not a taking provided they do not go too far.

The Court found that if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.

This was the first takings ruling and defined a taking under the 5th Amendment.

He reasoned the state exceeded its police powers by significantly diminishing the value of the land estates without having a strong public interest reason to do so.

Question 24

Berman v. Parker; U.S. Supreme Court (1954)

Answer 24

The Court held that aesthetics is a valid public purpose. The Court also found that urban renewal is a valid public purpose.

In 1945, Congress passed the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, creating the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, whose purpose would be to identify and redevelop blighted areas of Washington, D.C. Congress gave the new agency the power of eminent domain – the ability to seize private property with just compensation.

Berman and the other appellants owned a department store in one blighted area targeted by the commission and objected to the seizing of their property solely for beautification of the area. The landowners brought a civil suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the Act. Their case was dismissed. They then appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Question 25

Fred French Investing Co. v. City of New York; New York Court of Appeals (1976)

Answer 25

1st introduction of a TDR.

In this case, the city had put in place a regulation that required the placement of a public park on private property, leaving no income producing use of the property. The Court invalidated the regulation, but it was not ruled as a taking that should receive compensation.

Question 26

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. The City of New York; U.S. Supreme Court (1978)

Answer 26

Restrictions on use are legal as long as there is still some commercial value.

The Court found that the New York City Landmark Preservation Law as applied to the Grand Central Terminal did not constitute a taking.

Did the restriction against Penn Central constitute a “taking” in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

No. The Court held that the restrictions imposed did not prevent Penn Central from ever constructing above the terminal in the future. New York’s objection was to the nature of the proposed construction and not to construction in general implemented to “enhance” the Terminal. Preventing the construction of a 50-plus story addition above the station was a reasonable restriction substantially related to the general welfare of the city.

Question 27

Agins v. City of Tiburon; U.S. Supreme Court (1980)

Answer 27

Substantially Advances

Two prong test — A taking if: (i) does not substantially forward state interest or (II) denies owner an economically viable use of their land.

The appellants had acquired five acres of unimproved land for residential development. The zoning ordinance placed the appellants’ property in a zone with density restrictions (one single-family residence per acre). The appellants brought suit against the city in state court, alleging that the city had taken their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking a declaration that the zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional.

The Court upheld a city’s right to zone property at low-density and determined that the zoning was not a taking.

Question 28

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles; U.S. Supreme Court (1987)

Answer 28

Money damages could be appropriate for a temporary taking.

Did the ordinance violate the Fifth Amendment (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth) which prevents government from taking private property for public use without providing just compensation to the owner of the property?

Yes. The Court held that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Noting that the fate of the Church’s property had been in limbo for over six years (the suit which it had filed in 1979 had been denied a hearing as late as October of 1985), Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that, because the church was unable to use its property during this time, a “taking” of the property had occurred.

Question 29

Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis; U.S. Supreme Court (1987)

Answer 29

Nature of state’s interest in regulation is a critical factor in determining whether a taking has occurred.

Pennsylvania’s Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act prohibits coal mining that causes subsidence damage to pre-existing public buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries.

The Act requires that 50 percent of the coal beneath four protected structures be kept in place to provide surface support. The Coal Association alleged that this constituted a taking.

The Court found that the enactment of regulations did not constitute a taking and was justified by the public interests protected by the Act.

Question 30

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission; U.S. Supreme Court (1987)

Answer 30

The question before the Court was whether the California Coastal Commission’s requirement that owners of beachfront property seeking a building permit need to maintain beachfront access constitutes a property taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Court agreed that a legitimate interest is served by maintaining a “continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the coast,” but that California must provide just compensation to beachfront property owners for the public use of their land.

Because the Nollans’ request to rebuild their home did not further the government’s interest in overcoming a perceived psychological barrier to using the beach, the condition was a regulatory taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Question 31

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council; U.S. Supreme Court (1992)

Answer 31

Restrictions on use must show nexus to nuisance.

The Court found that there is a taking if there is a total reduction in value (no viable value left) after the regulation is in place (except where derived from the state’s law of property and nuisance).

The Court found that Lucas purchased the land prior to the development regulations being put in place, and so the regulation constituted a taking.

Question 32

Dolan v. Tigard; U.S. Supreme Court (1994)

Answer 32

Required a reasonable relationship between conditions and impact.

The Court overturned an exaction that required dedication of a portion of a floodplain (to create a greenway and bicycle path) by a commercial business that wanted to expand. The Court found that there was not enough of a connection between the exaction requirement and the development. Conditions that require the deeding of portions of a property to the government can be justified, but there has to be a clear relationship between the nature and extent of the proposed development.

The “rough proportionality” test was created from this case: “an exaction is legitimate only if the public benefit from the exaction is roughly proportional to the burden imposed on the public by allowing the proposed land use.”

Question 33

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency; U.S. Supreme Court (1997)

Answer 33

Property owners need not sell their development rights before claiming the regulatory taking of property.

The Court, in this case, was answering the question of whether an owner must attempt to sell their development rights before claiming a regulatory taking of property without just compensation

Must property owners attempt to sell their developmental rights before claiming the regulatory taking of property without just compensation, in accordance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

No. The Court ruled that Suitum did not have to attempt to sell developmental rights before filing a regulatory taking suit

Question 34

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd.; U.S. Supreme Court (1999)

Answer 34

The Supreme Court upheld a jury award of $1.45 million in favor of the development based on the city’s repeated denials of a development permit for a 190-unit residential complex on oceanfront property.

The development was in conformance with the city’s comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. The court found the repeated denials of permits deprived the owner of all economically viable use of the land.

Question 35

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island; U.S. Supreme Court (2001)

Answer 35

The question before the Court was whether a property owner who acquired title to a property after regulations were in place could still bring a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment.

May a property owner who acquired title to the property after it was subject to wetlands regulations still bring a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment?

Yes.

The property owner claimed inverse condemnation against the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council because the landowner was denied a permit to fill 18 acres of coastal wetlands to construct a beach club. The Supreme Court found that acquisition of title after the effective date of regulations does not bar regulatory taking claims.

Question 36

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. et al. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency et al.; U.S. Supreme Court (2002)

Answer 36

A three-year government moratorium on development is not a “taking” of private property that requires payment of compensation.

Justice Steven’s “Land use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some tangential way - often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as “per se” takings would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.”

The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency imposed two moratoria on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while the agency formulated a comprehensive plan for the area. A group of property owners sued, claiming a taking.

The Court found that the moratoria did not constitute a taking requiring compensation.

Question 37

Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc.; U.S. Supreme Court (2005)

Answer 37

Severity of the burden! Takings clause

Does a regulation amount to an unconstitutional taking “if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests?”

No. Takings clause challenges to regulations had to be based on the severity of the burden that the regulation imposed upon property rights, not the effectivness of the regulation in furthering the governmental interest. The Court insisted that its ruling did not “disturb any of its prior holdings.”

The “substantially advances” formula put forth in Agins was inappropriate for determining whether a regulation amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking.

Question 38

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams; U.S. Supreme Court (2005)

Answer 38

In this case, the respondent argued that the city had violated a telecommunications act by discriminating against a commercial enterprise.

The Court ruled that a licensed radio operator that was denied a conditional use permit for an antenna could not seek damages because it would distort the congressional intent of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Question 39

Kelo v. City of New London; US Supreme Court (2005)

Answer 39

The Supreme Court ruled that economic development, even if it involves taking land for private development, is a valid use of eminent domain. The Court reasoned that it is not in a position to determine the amount or character of land needed for a particular public project.

Question 40

Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection (2009)

Answer 40

The Supreme Court ruled that submerged lands that would be filled by the state for beach reclamation did not constitute a taking of property without just compensation (in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).

Question 41

Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Management (2012)

Answer 41

Mr. Koontz requested a permit from the St. John’s River Water Management to develop additional land beyond what was allowed under the original permit. St. John’s agreed to issue the development permit on the condition that Koontz deed the rest of his property into a conservation area and complete additional mitigation work. Koontz refused to undertake the mitigation work and St. John’s denied the application. The key question facing the Court was whether the government is liable for a taking when it denies a permit until a landowner agrees to dedicate land for public use.

The Supreme Court found in favor of Koontz, noting that there was no specific regulation requiring the dedication and mitigation work and that a taking had occurred.

Question 42

Munn v. Illinois; U.S. Supreme Court (1876)

Answer 42

Illinois regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing maximum rates for their use.

Did the state-imposed rates deny the warehouse and elevator owners equal protection and due process under the 14th Amendment?

No on both counts. Waite, for the Court, took a broad view of the state’s police power. He argued that the states may regulate the use of private property “when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good.” Waite resurrected an ancient legal doctrine to support his view: “When property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only.”

The Court found that a state law regulating pricing did not constitute a taking and violation of due process.

The Court established the principle of public regulation of private businesses in the public interest. The Court found that the regulation of private property does not violate due process when the regulation becomes necessary for the public good.

Question 43

Mugler v. Kansas; US Supreme Court (1887)

Answer 43

Court validated state and local government actions that properly protect the public health, morals and safety.

***upheld the state’s use of “police power”

A Kansas law prohibited the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor. Mugler was arrested for making and selling beer. This case was decided together with Kansas v. Ziebold.

Does the Kansas law violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

According to Harlan, the Kansas prohibition does not infringe on Fourteenth Amendment rights. Though Mugler has an abstract right to make liquor for his own use, such a right could be conditioned on its effect on others. Here the state legislature may exercise its police powers.

Question 44

Village of Belle Terre v. Boaraas; US Supreme Court (1974)

Answer 44

Upheld power to prohibit more than two unrelated individuals from residing together as single family; thus extended concept of zoning under police power to include community’s desire for certain types of lifestyles.

The Court upheld a regulation that prohibited more than two unrelated individuals from living together as a single-family. The court found that a community has the power to control lifestyle and values. The Court thus extended the concept of zoning under the police power to include a community’s desire for certain types of lifestyles.

Does an ordinance restricting land use to “one-family” dwellings violate the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. The Court held that the Village of Belle Terre’s ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the ordinance was not arbitrary, did not unreasonably apply to some individuals and not others, and was reasonably related to a rational state objective.

The Court also held that the ordinance did not violate the Due Process Clause because it did not deny anyone a fundamental right such as the rights to travel, association, and privacy.

Question 45

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation; US Supreme Court (1977)

Answer 45

***Regulation effectively denying housing to people based on rase, immigration status or national origin is unconstitutional.

The Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC) contracted with the Village of Arlington Heights (“Arlington”) to build racially integrated low-and moderate-income housing.

When MHDC applied for the necessary zoning permits, authorizing a switch from a single-to a multiple-family classification, Arlington’s planning commission denied the request. Acting on behalf of itself and several minority members, MHDC challenged Arlington’s denial as racially discriminatory.

Was Arlington Height’s denial of a zoning request, necessary for the creation of low-and moderate-income housing, racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause?

Perhaps. While indicating that Arlington’s zoning denial may result in a racially disproportionate impact, the evidence did not show that this was Arlington’s deliberate intention. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further consideration.

Question 46

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel; New Jersey Supreme Court (1975)

Answer 46

Communities in growing areas must take their fair share of the region’s growth (New Jersey).

The Court found that Mount Laurel had exclusionary zoning that prohibited multi-family, mobile home, or low- to moderate-income housing. The Court required the town to open its doors to those of all income levels.

Question 47

City of Boerne v. Flores; U.S. Supreme Court (1997)

Answer 47

This case challenged the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The City of Boerne, Texas prohibited a church in a historic district from enlarging. The Supreme Court ruled that the act was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional powers that exceeded the enforcement powers of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the end, the city and church came to an agreement to leave 80 percent of the church intact and allow a new 750-seat auditorium on the rear of the auditorium.

Question 48

In the 1932 case Bove v Donner-Hanna Coke Corp, the courts declared:

Answer 48

Owner not permitted to make unreasonable uses of premises to the material annoyance of a neighbor, if the latter’s enjoyment of life or property is materially lessened.

Question 48

The court decision Calvert Cliffs v U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 1971:

Answer 48

Overturned approval of nuclear plant because the AEC did not follow NEPA; gave NEPA strength

Question 49

Loreto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp (1982) determined that:

Answer 49

If regulation causes a physical invasion of privacy then it is a taking

Question 50

In 1990, the Supreme Court verdict for the case Cohen v. Does Plains concluded that:

Answer 50

Zoning cannot be used to give churches an advantage over commercial establishments; Church could have day care but commercial entities couldn’t

Question 51

Moore v City of East Cleveland (1977) concluded that:

Answer 51

Cities cannot define “family” so that the definition prevents closely related individuals from living with each other

Grandmother and Grandson

Question 52

What is Fair Share?

Answer 52

Fair Share Plan means that plan or proposal, by which a municipality proposed to satisfy its obligation to create a realistic opportunity to MEET ITS FAIR SHARE of low and moderate income housing needs of its region.

Question 53

Kavanau v Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1997), it was decided that:

Answer 53

Regulation that leaves some economically beneficial uses may still be a taking.

Question 54

Souther Burlington County NAACP v Township of Mount Laurel (II) (1983) saw the court reaching which conclusion?

Answer 54

Regulations do not prevent a jurisdiction achieving a fair share of regional growth, but affirmation measures should be used to ensure that a fair share goal is reach.

Question 55

Which of the following cases was a test of the 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses?

• Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon
• Metromedia v City of San Diego
• Hadacheck v Sebastian
• Young v American Mini Theaters

Answer 55

Hadacheck v Sebastian was a zoning case testing whether a Los Angeles zoning ordinance violated the 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.

The Supreme Court found that the ordinance prohibiting the location of a brick manufacturing plant in a specific location in the city did not violate the 14th Amendment.

Question 56

What program evolved out of efforts to implement planning requirements of the Housing Act of 1949 and became a signature program expanding local planning across the United States?

Answer 56

Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954 provided funding for local comprehensive planning, leading to communities across the country developing comprehensive plans.

Question 57

The Doctrine of Inverse Condemnation

Answer 57

A taking can occur without formal eminent domain proceeding.

Question 58

The term “Inclusionary” as defined in the land-mark Mt. Laurel Case means an obligation to provide what?

Answer 58

The community’s regional fair share of residences for all classes possibly wishing to live there, particularly for family’s of low and moderate income.

Question 59

Cheney v Village 2 at new hope

Answer 59

Upheld the use of planned unit developments

The court in 1968 found that planned unit developments are acceptable if the regulations focus on density requirements rather than specific rules for each lot.

Question 60

What cases dealt with zoning?

Answer 60

Euclid v Ambler and Nectow v City of Cambridge