Lecture 7: Insurgency and counterinsurgency

Question 1

Insurgency is a form of

Answer 1

Civil war, describing how the civil war is fought

Question 2

Mao Tse-tung’s theory on Guerilla Warfare

Answer 2

3 stages of warfare:
1. Organization, consolidation, and preservation: political education, clandestine action in rural areas (gaining strength)

2. Progressive (and slow) expansion over time through: guerilla warfare, liberated areas, attack on towns, gradually gaining territory. Trying to use weakness of insurgency forces to their advantage by isolating smaller groups of the enemy in more favorable environment
3. Destruction of the enemy: mobile warfare/conventional war, capturing cities, defeating the enemy at last

Question 3

“The people are like water and the army like fish”

Answer 3

Mao Tse-tung: revolutionary war is 80% political, 20% military

Question 4

Ernesto Che Guevara’s foco theory of guerilla warfare

Answer 4

A small vanguard can replace the initial long over-time mobilization of peasants as it creates conditions for revolution (inspiring people to rebel); countryside is the battleground, and it is later adapted into urban warfare by thinkers/insurgents

Question 5

5 guerilla tactics

Answer 5

1. Hit and run
2. Targeting isolated patrols (must attack small numbers for it to be favorable)
3. Small-scale attacks
4. Taking weapons for police/soldiers they kill
5. Showing they are present, challenging the authority, highlighting to the public that the security forces can’t control the situation

Question 6

The identification problem in counterinsurgency

Answer 6

The government forces don’t know who’s an insurgent and who’s not, as insurgents try to hide from the other side and can bypass security checks

Question 7

Definition: Insurgency

Answer 7

Violent opposition to rule by a stronger force

Question 8

Insurgents try to…

Answer 8

Turn their weakness into strengths by concentrating on specific kinds of operation where they are at an advantage

Question 9

Both Mao and Guevara agree that for an insurgency to win, you need to

Answer 9

Treat the population well

Question 10

Insurgencies often happen at…

Answer 10

The beginning of civil war

Question 11

In what 5 ways did the British counterinsurgency against the communist insurgency in Malaya in 1948-1960 influence the current counterinsurgency doctrine?

Answer 11

1. Strategy of winning “the hearts and minds of the Malayan people”
2. Using village police and local militas for civilian protection (to secure civilian support for counterinsurgency)
3. Doctrine of “minimum force”
4. Carefully targeting violence against only insurgents to keep citizens in support of government (but in practice many civilian deaths)
5. Case of successful counterinsurgency, but only because they reached independent agreement with Malaya

Question 12

Which 4 laws of counterinsurgency did the French counterinsurgency in Indochina and Algeria create?

Answer 12

1. Insurgency is basically a competition for people’s support - counterinsurgency is 80% political, 20% military
2. Need to separate active minority supporting insurgency from population
3. Need to provide security to population
4. Intensive efforts and massive resources applied area by area, gradually pushing insurgents out of cities/towns

Question 13

5 characteristics of the US military counterinsurgency doctrine

Answer 13

1. Population-centric, focused on the defense of the population (not enemy-centric with offensive action against enemy)
2. Use of small commando detachments, not large conventional force
3. Focus on ground action, not airpower
4. Contribution of civilian agencies
5. Winning hearts and minds, not coercive violence (convincing people counterinsurgency is in their best interest)

Question 14

2 goals of counterinsurgency

Answer 14

1. Eliminate key insurgents and establish population control
2. Then pursue political objectives

Question 15

3-part counterinsurgent strategy: clear-hold-build

Answer 15

1. Separate insurgents from civilians (clear)
2. Protect civilians against insurgents (hold)
3. Provide public goods to civilians (build)

Question 16

What is important in order for counterinsurgents to solve the identification problem?

Answer 16

Good intelligence from the local population to provide information about insurgents

Question 17

2 general challenges to counterinsurgency and the solution

Answer 17

1. Slow and costly process (need to commit massive human and material resources)
2. Success depends on targeted attacks against militants and provision of services to civilians (indiscriminate violence may create accidental guerillas)

= good intelligence is necessary, but hard to obtain

Question 18

Article: Profile of a general (McChrystal) - main point of the article

Answer 18

He implemented the COIN strategy of winning hearts and minds and working with local leaders, but he lost backing from the US government for the strategy he wanted to pursue and was fired -> you must ensure that your strategy is pursued and invested in

Question 19

Definition: Parochial altruism

Answer 19

Individual sacrifice to benefit in-group and harm out-group

Question 20

How is parochial altruism related to insurgency?

Answer 20

If people believe in the insurgency, they are willing to sacrifice material benefits to support the cause (which goes against theories saying individuals are merely motivated by material benefits to comply)

Question 21

2 implications of the article on parochial altruism

Answer 21

1. Individuals are willing to incur costs on behalf of a cause or identity group
2. Violence inherent to COIN can harden dividing lines, reinforcing parochial behavior (making people even more willing to incur material costs to support the cause)

Question 22

4 advantages of being in an alliance with local forces in counterinsurgency

Answer 22

1. Access to local information
2. Multiplication of armed forces
3. Plausible deniability of responsibility for violence against civilians
4. Overcoming the challenge of parochialism temporarily

Question 23

3 dilemmas of alliances with local forces in counterinsurgency

Answer 23

1. Allies may not share counterinsurgents’ goals
2. Counterinsurgent gives up (some) control
3. May create conditions of corruption and violence

Question 24

COIN doctrine overlooks the challenges posed by

Answer 24

Parochialism

Question 25

Reading: how does the use of militias affect the fight against IS?

Answer 25

Militias can be effective in fighting because they have better local information and access, are willing to use more risky tactics, and are motivated by a desire to defend their community

However, militias are often formed along ethnic lines and can contribute to long-term instability and violence, undermining the government, and committing human rights abuses, reinforcing a circle of violence

Question 26

Reading: The Runaway General: The Profile That Brought Down McChrystal - Michael Hastings

Answer 26

General McChrystal was a master of counterinsurgency tactics but had a strained relationship with the Obama administration and was fired once the article came out

Question 27

Reading: Parochialism as a Central
Challenge in Counterinsurgency - Sambanis, Schulhofer-Wohl, and Shayo

Answer 27

Parochialism: the tendency to cooperate with and favor members of one’s group

Civilian support is key to insurgents’ success. COIN policies can make defeating insurgency harder by activating ethnic or sectarian cleavages. It’s assumed that civilians are incentivizes by material interests to cooperate, but fail to take into account parochial behavior

As violence hardens group identities, counterinsurgency can strengthen the power of ethnic or local parochialism. Indiscriminate violence and “collateral damage” can polarize the population and further harden group boundaries, making it hard to win the allegiance of the local population

Question 28

Reading: Who’s Fighting the Islamic
State? Five Things You Need to Know about Militias in Civil Wars - Jentzsch, Schubiger and Kalyvas
What are the five things?

Answer 28

1. Governments often take advantage of militias by strategically encouraging or restraining their use of violence against civilians
2. Not all governments collude with militias because of purely military incentives but for ideological ones as well
3. Militias aren’t simply submissive agents fully controlled by the state - they can be independent
4. How militias recruit and socialize their members has an enormous effect on how they behave
5. Almost every report about militias includes a story about their brutal tactics, often the use of child soldiers and sexual violence