MCPP & some Joint Planning Flashcards

Question

Commander's Initial Guidance

Answer 1

One element of Problem Framing. The commander’s initial guidance is different from his intent. It is formed from both the orientation and intent. It includes his initial thoughts on the environment and his initial understanding of the problem. It should include both friendly and enemy centers of gravity. There is no specific format but it should be briefed up front during problem framing.

Answer 2

One element of Problem Framing. Task analysis is the process of breaking tasks down into specified, implied, and essential tasks. The mission statement will primarily come from essential tasks.

Answer 3

Specified tasks are those derived primarily from the higher headquarters warning order or operational order.

Answer 4

Implied tasks are not specifically stated but are required or necessary in accomplishing the specified tasks.

Answer 5

Essential tasks can be either specified or implied in that they define mission success and apply to the force as a whole. They must be successfully completed to accomplish the mission.

Answer 6

A problem framing brief is a brief given from the staff to the commander for his review/approval of the completed products. A problem framing brief can take any form from a PowerPoint presentation to a discussion around a map or terrain model. The brief should include the following products: * Situation update to include the area of operations, areas of interest and influence, and the status of friendly forces * Updated IPB products * Higher’s mission and commander’s intent if possible. * Task analysis (specified, implied, and essential tasks) * Assumptions and limitations * Resource short-falls * COG analysis * RFIs * CCIRs * Proposed mission statement (for the commander to approve) * Warning order

Answer 7

The purpose of this step of the Marine Corps Planning Process is to develop several options for the commander based on the guidance and discussion from the previous step. This step allows the commanders and staff to begin to flush out their own shortfalls and develop specifics for how they plan on accomplishing the mission. The two broad and basic questions a staff or planning team should ask themselves when developing courses of action are, "What do we want to do?" and "How do we want to do it?"

Answer 8

Feasible - Does the COA accomplish the mission within the available time, space, and resources? Acceptable - Is the COA proportional and worth the cost in personnel, equipment, materiel, time involved, or position? Is it consistent with the law of war and is it militarily and politically supportable? Complete - Does the COA include all tasks to be accomplished? Does it address the entire mission? Distinguishable - Does the COA differ significantly from the other COAs? Suitable - Does the COA accomplish the purpose and tasks? Does it comply with the commander’s guidance?

Answer 9

Planners are responsible for ensuring each member of the MAGTF is assigned appropriate missions, battlespace, command relationships, and resources. The following factors should be considered when developing a course of action. * Establish a Battlefield Framework - divide into AO (Deep, close, & rear) and Sustaining, shaping, and decisive actions. ID ME, SE, Reserve, & Security. * Array initial forces * Assign Purpose then task * Task Organization - 2 levels down * Integrate (arrange in terms of time, space, and purpose) the actions of all elements of the force. * Determine Control Measures - ensure major subordinate commands have adequate battlespace and flexibility. * Consider the Adversary *

Answer 10

The COA refinement process takes place after the initial COAs have been reviewed by the commanding officer. Once the planning staff has received positive confirmation that they are within the operational intent of the commander they may then enter into COA refinement. These refined COAs will then be taken into the COA wargame. The COA refinement process consists of developing and refining information organized into four basic products: * COA graphic and narrative * task organization * synchronization matrix * supporting concepts

Answer 11

The COA graphic and narrative portray how the organization will accomplish the mission. Together, the graphic and narrative identify who (notional task organization), when, what (tasks), where, how, and why (intent). The COA graphic and narrative are essential and inseparable. Together, they help the commander, subordinate commanders, and the staffs understand the method by which the organization will accomplish its mission. During conventional operations, the graphic portrays the activities of the main and supporting efforts, critical maneuver control measures (such as objectives, boundaries, and phase lines), and fire support coordination measures. The narrative provides the purpose and tasks of the main and supporting efforts, the reserve, and the sequencing of the operation.

Answer 12

The task organization captures how the commander intends to structure the force’s resources to accomplish the mission. It can also establish command and support relationships. Proper task organization ensures each unit is properly constructed, sized, and equipped to support the commander’s CONOPS.

Answer 13

The synchronization matrix depicts the activities of the MAGTF and subordinate elements over time, and provides the commander with a snapshot of how units and tasks interrelate within all the elements of the MAGTF. It also displays the plan’s cohesion and provides detail that complements and amplifies the COA graphic and narrative. The synchronization matrix is an extremely important product because it serves as both a working document and a source document. It is a working document in the sense that the OPT continues to populate and refine it throughout the planning process, and serves as the primary document from which to conduct the wargame. Similarly, the synchronization matrix is a source document because the OPT needs to continually refer back to it as the complexity of the COA expands. The OPT uses the matrix as the basis for orders development, particularly Annex X (execution checklist).

Answer 14

The staff prepares supporting functional concepts for each COA to ensure actions are integrated and coordinated. Once the commander selects a COA, the supporting concepts provide the basis for such concepts as intelligence, fires, or logistics in the order or plan.

Answer 15

Here, the commander gives his guidance, expectations, and what criteria he plans on using when evaluating different COAs. This is an important step and requires both the commander to give his guidance as well as the staff ample time to prepare the wargame. The commander’s guidance may include which friendly COA’s he wants to see pitted against specific adversary COA’s. It may also include the style or technique he wishes his staff to utilize. If time is critical, he may specify specific events or times that he wants to see and task the planning element to focus only on those for the wargame. A commander may say, "I am particularly concerned with the movement from "X to Y," and "Speed is critical." This lets the planners know that when conducting the wargame, the commander wants to see a specific movement and how it is conducted. The second phase lets the player acting as the friendly force know that he needs to utilize speed and time to maximize tempo when executing the wargame.

Answer 16

This is the third step in MCPP and allows planners to fight each course action against the proposed adversary. The wargame will provide a better understanding of the friendly capabilities and limitations with regards to enemy actions and reactions. The purpose of wargaming is to improve the plan. It examines and refines the options in light of the enemy’s capabilities, potential action, and potential reactions. It also allows the commander and his staff to consider other factors peculiar to the operational environment, like population.

Answer 17

A formal wargame consists of a red cell, green cell, and friendly forces. It is conducted like a "game" with each element taking turns. The red cell can be a free thinking enemy or can have certain responses depending on previous enemy actions and experiences. An informal wargame can be a simple "what if" conversation the commander has with his staff and subordinate commanders. Though not ideal, it can be conducted if time is extremely restricted and is better than no wargame.

Answer 18

* Belt Method * Avenue-in-depth method * Box Method * Sequence of Essential Tasks

Answer 19

The belt method is conducted when events are expected to occur almost simultaneously. It is best utilized when the area of operations is broken down into well-defined cross-compartments or when the enemy is deployed in clearly defined echelons.

Answer 20

This method simply focuses on one avenue of approach at one time. It begins with the main effort. This method is best for offensive operations or when terrain inhibits mutual support.

Answer 21

This method focuses on a specific or critical area on the battlefield, like a raid site, an objective, or a landing. It is best utilized when time is constrained and when the commander wants to focus on critical areas or events.

Answer 22

This method highlights the initial shaping actions necessary to establish a sustainment capability and to engage enemy units in the deep battle area.

Answer 23

In the COA comparison and decision step, the commander evaluates all friendly COAs against established criteria, compares each course of action against each other, and then decides which COA he believes best accomplishes the mission. The commander may refine his mission statement and concept of operations (including his commander’s intent and essential tasks), and identify any branches of the chosen COA that should be developed. This step requires the involvement of the commander, his subordinate commanders, and their staffs as well as the commander’s principal staff from start to finish. As such, this fourth step of MCPP is often referred to as "The Commander’s Step."

Answer 24

The commander decides on a COA. In this step in the process, the commander may 1. select a COA, 2. modify a COA, 3. develop a new COA with parts of other COAs, or 4. discard all COAs and return to COA development

Answer 25

The purpose of this step is to translate the commander’s decision into oral, written, and/or graphic communication sufficient to guide implementation and promote initiative by subordinates. A form of detailed planning, the plan or order, once completed, becomes the principal means by which the commander expresses his decision, intent, and guidance. The orders development step in MCPP communicates the commander’s decision in a clear, useful form that can be understood by those executing the order. An order is a written or oral communication that directs actions and focuses a subordinate’s tasks and activities toward accomplishing the mission. Various portions of the order, such as the mission statement and the CONOPS, have been prepared during previous steps of the MCPP. The development of the order begins during problem framing and continues throughout the process.

Answer 26

* Refine staff estimates and IPB products * Preparation of the order or plan * Orders reconciliation * Orders crosswalk * Commander’s approval of the plan

Answer 27

Orders reconciliation is an internal process during which the staff conducts a detailed review of the entire order. The purpose of reconciliation is to ensure the basic order and all the annexes, appendices, and other attachments are complete and in agreement. It identifies discrepancies or gaps in the planning that will require corrective action. Specifically, the staff compares the commander’s intent, the mission, and the CCIRs against the CONOPS and the supporting concepts, such as maneuver, fires, or support. The priority intelligence requirements and the intelligence collection plan must support the CCIRs.

Answer 28

Orders crosswalk is an external process in which the staff compares its order with the orders of higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders to achieve unity of effort and ensure the superior commander’s intent is met. Similarly, confirmation briefs and rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills can help a commander ensure his subordinate units nest within his plan or order.

Answer 29

Transition is the final step of MCPP. It may require a wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution. Transition is subject to the variables of command echelon, mission complexity, and most importantly time. The transition process enhances the overall situational awareness of the major subordinate commands or elements that will execute the plan or order. It also maintains the intent of the concept of operations, promotes unity of effort, and maintains or raises operational tempo. Transition is a continuous process that requires a free flow of information between commanders and staffs by all available means.

Answer 30

The confirmation brief (i.e.,the MSC/MSE briefing the higher MAGTF commander) is imperative to conduct a successful transition for those who will execute the mission. This allows the MAGTF commander to confirm how the MSC/MSEs plan to accomplish their assigned missions as well as identify gaps, discrepancies, and resource shortfalls that require mitigation or resolution. Ensure subordinate commanders conduct a confirmation brief of their plan to the higher headquarters so the MAGTF commander can identify gaps, discrepancies, and resource shortfalls between his and any subordinate commander’s plans

Answer 31

Rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills are a technique to review an order or selected aspects of an order. They can be conducted in a number of ways and can focus on the overall CONOPS or specific functional concepts, such as fires, aviation, collection, or logistics. For example, a large scale, MEF-level ROC drill can involve a terrain board the size of a football field with designated representatives walking through specific unit actions. A productive ROC drill is characterized by the willingness of participants to identify and address any gaps, discrepancies, and resource shortfalls that may arise. ROC drills can also serve as a venue for confirmation briefs.

Answer 32

An operational planning team (OPT) is a task-organized planning element that supports the commander and his staff’s decision-making process. Through its diverse composition, the OPT promotes an integrated planning effort that brings together the commander, his subordinate commanders, staff officers, and those subject matter experts necessary to develop comprehensive plans or orders. Integrating functional expertise ensures planners will consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information, resulting in a planning effort that is systemically coordinated and thorough.

Answer 33

IPB is a compilation of intelligence products which allow the commander and his planners to better understand the variables which will affect their mission. The IPB is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of the adversary, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By applying IPB, commanders gain the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space. * Defining the operational environment * Describing the effects on operations * Evaluating the adversary * Determining the adversary’s COAs

Answer 34

The modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) is a graphic of the battlespace’s effects on military operations. It is normally based on a product depicting all obstacles to mobility and it is modified as necessary. Modifications can include cross country mobility classifications, objectives, avenues of approach and mobility corridors, likely obstacles, defensible battlespace, likely engagement areas, key terrain, cultural factors, built-up areas, and civil infrastructure.

Answer 35

Adversary templates are models based on postulated adversary doctrine. They illustrate the disposition and activity of adversary forces conducting a particular operation arrayed on ideal terrain. Adversary templates depict the adversary’s nominal organization, frontages, depths, boundaries, and control measures for combat. They are usually scaled for use with a map background and they are one part of an adversary model. In irregular warfare, adversary templating will focus on pattern analysis, which involves tracking, analyzing, and identifying specific trends, such as improvised explosive devices or population support, over time.

Answer 36

A situation template is an adversary template that has been modified to depict adversary dispositions based on the effects of the battlespace and the pursuit of a particular COA. This template accounts for the adversary’s current situation with respect to the terrain, training and experience levels, logistic status, losses, and dispositions. Normally, the situation template depicts adversary units two levels down and critical points in the COA. Situation templates are one part of an adversary COA model.

Answer 37

The event template is derived from the situation template and depicts the named areas of interest (NAIs); areas where activity—or lack of activity—will indicate which COA the adversary has adopted. Event templates contain time phase lines that depict movement of forces and the expected flow of the operation. Movement rates depend on the terrain (MCOO) and the adversary COA (DRAW-D [defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, delay]).

Answer 38

The event matrix depicts the types of activity expected in each NAI, when the NAI is expected to be active, and any additional information to aid in collection planning.

Answer 39

The decision support template is normally developed during COA wargaming. It is derived from adversary, situational, and event templates. The decision support template depicts decision points, time phase lines associated with movement of adversary and friendly forces, the flow of the operation, and other information required to execute a specific friendly COA.

Answer 40

The decision support matrix provides a recap of expected events, decision points, and planned friendly actions in a narrative form. It shows where and when a decision must be made if a specific action is to take place. It ties decision points to NAIs, TAIs, CCIRs, collection assets, and potential friendly response options. The decision support template and matrix may be refined as planning progresses after the wargame.

Answer 41

# Define the Operational Environment - Identify the limits of the Commander's Area of Operations - Identify the limits of teh Commander's Area of Interest - Identify Significatn charcteristics within the Area of Operations and Area of interest for further analysis - Evaluate Current Operations and intelligence hodings to determine additional information eneded to complete IPB - Initiate proceses necessary to acquire the informaiton needed to complete IPB

Answer 42

Describe Environmental Effects on Operations/Describe the effects on opeation * Analyze the Environment * Terrain Analysis * Analyze the Military Aspects of Terrain * Key Terrain * Observation and Fields of Fire * Cover and Concealment * Obstacles (severely restricted, restricted, and unrestricted terrain) * Avenues of Approach * Evaluate the Terrain's effect on Military Operations * Concentric Ring, Belt, Avenue in Depth, Box * METOC (Weather) * Civil Considerations (ASCOPE) * Areas * Structures * Capabilities * Organizations * People * Events

Answer 43

Evaluate the Threat/Adversary *

Answer 44

1) Desired Outcome 2) Actions intended to achieve the desired outcome 3) Resources to be used 4) Control Process (to supervise execution)

Answer 45

close relationship between two parts that affect each otherL

Answer 46

Modular or asynchronous - little to no interaction between two parts.

Answer 47

The distribution of power through dynamic interaction, both cooperative and competitive policy refers to the conscious objectives established within the political process

Answer 48

In general, the President frames strategic context by defining national interests and goals in documents, such as the National Security Strategy of the United States of America presidential policy directives, executive orders, and other strategic documents, with additional guidance and refinement from the National Security Council/Homeland Security Council (MCDP 1-0)

Answer 49

The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America is published by the Secretary of Defense and outlines how Department of Defense will support objectives, providing a framework for other Department of Defense policy and planning guidance, such as contingency planning, force development, and intelligence (MCDP 1-0)

Answer 50

The Chairman periodically publishes The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, which is prepared in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Service Chiefs, and the combatant commanders. The National Military Strategy describes the strategic environment and articulates the National military objectives. (MCDP 1-0)

Answer 51

Science of planning - the systematic study of a problem by breaking it down into its component parts

Answer 52

Creativity and judgment in integrating the parts into a cohesive whole

Answer 53

First, strategy translates policy objectives into military terms by establishing the military strategic aim. What political effect must our military forces achieve? What enemy assets must our tactical forces seize, neutralize, threaten, or actually destroy in order to either bend the enemy to our will or break him completely? The operational commander's principal task is to determine and pursue the sequence of actions that will most directly accomplish the military strategic mission. It is important to keep in mind that the military strategic aim is but one part of a broader national strategy. MCDP 1-2 p. 10

Answer 54

A campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. MCDP 1-2, p. 4 Usually, a campaign is aimed at achieving some particular strategic result within a specific geographic theater.

Answer 55

describes how time, space, and purpose connect these operations.5 Usually, a campaign is aimed at achieving some particular strategic result within a specific geographic theater. MCDP 1-2

Answer 56

The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force. It involves the establishment of military strategic objectives, the allocation of resources, the imposition of conditions on the use of force, and the development of war plans.7 (MCDP 1-2)

Answer 57

This concept captures the essence of our design and provides the foundation for the campaign plan. It expresses in clear, concise, conceptual language a broad vision of what we plan to accomplish and how we plan to do it. Our intent, clearly and explicitly stated, is an integral component of the concept. Our concept should also contain in general terms an idea of when, where, and under what conditions we intend to give or refuse battle. The concept should demonstrate a certain boldness, for boldness is in itself "a genuinely creative force."4 It should focus on the enemy's critical vulnerabilities. It should exhibit creativity and avoid discernible conventions and patterns; make use of artifice, ambiguity, and deception; and reflect, as Churchill wrote, "an original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten."5 It should create multiple options so that we can adjust to changing events and so that the enemy cannot discern our true intentions. It should be as simple as the situation allows. It should provide for speed in execution—which is a weapon in itself. Each campaign should have a single, unifying concept. Often a simple but superior idea has provided the basis for success. Grant's plan of fixing Lee near Richmond while loosing Sherman through the heart of the South was one such idea. MCDP 1-2 p. 44-45

Answer 58

Competition is a fundamental aspect of international relations. As states and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their own interests, they continually compete for advantage.2 Nations and other political actors pursue their interests constantly and in a variety of ways. Competition results when the interests of one political group interact in some way with those of another group. These interactions take place in a dynamic environment. Each move an actor makes towards fulfilling an interest changes that ecosystem. Any interaction of interests changes the situation as well

Answer 59

Competitions are often labeled as “zero-sum” or “positive-sum.” A zero-sum rivalry means that if one group achieves its goal then the rival group cannot achieve its own. A good example of zero- sum competition is when two nations struggle over the ownership of an island; in most cases only one of them can physically control it at a time. Positive-sum means that more than one group can make progress toward fulfilling interests or achieving goals at the same time. For example, two nations may compete economically, but both may see their gross domestic product (GDP) increase simultaneously. MCDP 1-2

Answer 60

For the Marine Corps, this is step 3 of design. (1. Describe the current and desired states of the operational environment. 2. Define the problem set. 3. Produce the operational approach. 4. Reframe throughout planning and execution.) The commander’s operational approach concludes the initial iteration of problem framing. The operational approach is broad, overarching guidance that the commander conveys through the commander’s intent and COA development guidance. The operational approach requires the input and synthesis of both design and the staff actions. The operational approach is an expression of what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. This visualization reflects the commander’s understanding of the situation and his/her hypothesis for achieving the overall purpose. Put another way, the better the commander understands the situation and problem set, the more self-evident the solution. (MCWP 5-10 p. 16)

Answer 61

A center of gravity is a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Depending on the situation, centers of gravity may be intangible characteristics, such as resolve or morale; they may be military units, such as armored forces or aviation; or they may be the cooperation between two arms, the relations in an alliance, or forces occupying key terrain that anchor an entire defensive system. In counterinsurgency operations, the center of gravity may be the support of the local population. MCDP 1-0, 3-14

Answer 62

As they explore options for attacking an adversary’s source of power, commanders ask themselves, “Where is the enemy vulnerable?” Of all the vulnerabilities a commander may seek to exploit, some are more critical than others. The commander should focus his/her efforts against a critical vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy. Center of gravity and critical vulnerability are complementary concepts. The former looks at the problem of how to attack the enemy system from the perspective of seeking a source of strength, the latter from the perspective of seeking weakness. A critical vulnerability is a pathway to attacking the center of gravity. MCDP 1-0, 3-15

Answer 63

Assumptions are suppositions about the current situation or about future events assumed to be true in the absence of facts in order to continue planning and allow the commander to make a decision concerning a COA. They apply to friendly, neutral, and enemy/adversary situations as well as the environment. Assumptions must answer the following: * Is it logical? * Is it realistic? * Is it essential for planning to continue? * Does it assume away an enemy/adversary capability? Subsequent planning will identify new assumptions while confirming or disproving prior assumptions. Planners should keep a record of all assumptions and their resolution. Operation plans can and will likely contain assumptions; but OPORDs should not. Unresolved assumptions carried into execution become a risk to operations. Where appropriate, planners forward assumptions to HHQ for validation. This ensures that the HHQ commander understands the potential risks that a subordinate command is accepting. It may prompt the HHQ to pursue facts that support the assumption or to request additional information. MCWP 5-10, 22

Answer 64

Restraints (what cannot be done) and constraints (what must be done) that do not qualify as specified tasks require identification. Planners often find restraints and constraints in the rules of engagement, commander’s guidance, and instructions from higher headquarters. Planners then must address these limitations during COA development and subsequent planning as they affect the conduct of operations MCWP 5-10, 22

Answer 65

Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) link to decisions. The staff may propose and will continually review and update CCIRs, which fall into two categories—priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs). The PIRs are key components of the IPB process and the collections plan. Each CCIR asks a question that, when answered, assists the commander in making a key decision. As planning continues, planners identify and list likely decisions associated with each CCIR. Planners then create branch plans that facilitate the timely execution of the decisions tied to CCIRs MCWP 5-10, 26 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements The CCIRs identify information the commander deems critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and assisting in timely and informed decision-making. Each numbered PIR and friendly force information requirement will include anticipated decisions and their associated branches and sequels as developed during the MCPP. Operations divided into multiple phases may have separate CCIRs for each phase. Each PIR must be represented on the decision support matrix. MCWP 2-10 Intelligence Operations, 2-7 Priority intelligence requirements and IRs share the following characteristics: * They ask only one question. * They solicit an answer related to specific facts, events, or activities concerning the enemy or the operational environment. * They are tied to a specific unit, time, terrain, decision point, or target. * They contain geographic and time elements to limit the scope of the requirement MCWP 2-10, 2-6

Answer 66

At a minimum, the green cell provides for the independent wills and needs of the various groups or neutral networks that may affect the MAGTF’s operations. The green cell may also provide considerations for non-Department of Defense (DOD) entities, such as private sector or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Green cell composition can range from an individual to a task-organized group of SMEs that may include liaisons from the local populace and non-DOD agencies. MCWP 5-10, 23

Answer 67

The red cell “employs” enemy/adversary forces to help the commander assess friendly COAs. A red cell can range in size from an intelligence officer to a task-organized group of SMEs. While a red cell’s principal duties center on COA development and the COA war game, it participates in the analysis of COGs and also supports the commander’s understanding of the problem during the initial stages of design. Determining which enemy/adversary forces and echelons on which to focus is an important decision of the red cell. As planning continues, the red cell develops its own enemy/adversary mission, intent, and COAs in accordance with the enemy’s doctrine, history, goals, and IPB. The red cell is different than a red team. MCWP 5-10, 23

Answer 68

Red team, or in capability terms, red teaming is a broadly applicable resource that supports the inclusion of independent, critical thought, and alternative perspectives to help facilitate problemsolving and decision making processes, to include planning. In addition to support to planning, red teams can fully explore alternatives in operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities within the context of the operational environment. MCWP 5-10, 23 What if? Why not? 5 whys, pre-mortem, devil's advocate.

Answer 69

Relative combat power assessment (RCPA), which includes emerging capabilities never considered before—such as cyberspace units—provides planners with an understanding of friendly and enemy forces’ strengths and weaknesses relative to each other. To assess relative combat power, planners generally analyze force ratios two levels below the planning unit. For example, division planners will compare numbers, readiness, etc. of friendly and enemy battalions (infantry, artillery, etc.). The RCPA provides insight on the types of operations possible for friendly and enemy forces, weaknesses, and additional resources that may be required. While force ratios may be important, the numerical comparison of personnel and major end items is one factor among many, such as leadership, morale, equipment maintenance, training levels, and the effects of weather. Planners present RCPA conclusions and key findings during the problem framing brief. MCWP 5-10, 21

Answer 70

The battlespace framework depicts how the commander may organize his/her battlespace so he/she can relate his/her forces to one another in time, space, event, and purpose. The battlespace framework consists of envisioned deep, close, and rear operations (shown in fig. 3-2) as well as the organization of the force into the main effort, reserve, and security. The nature of the mission may also mean organizing into contiguous or noncontiguous deep, close, and rear areas. The battlespace framework provides the commander and staff with a means to ensure they consider all essential elements of military operations while in the planning and execution phases. MCDP 1-0, p. 3-10 Spatial - deep, close, rear Functional - shaping, decisive, sustaining Force - main, supporting, reserve

Answer 71

The essential goal of an assessment cell is to explain the command’s progress toward a desired state. In design terms, an assessment cell will update its environmental frame via measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. The difference between the desired state and the ever-changing current state is the basis for assessment reporting. To explain why the unit is progressing or not, the assessment cell must interact with sufficient battle rhythm events and other sources of information to obtain the feedback necessary to inform a rational narrative that may include recommendations for change. MCWP 5-10, p. 25

Answer 72

Part of Problem Framing Staff estimates provide key information (e.g., facts, assumptions, asset locations and availability, forecasted shortages) that will increase the commander’s understanding and aid decision-making. Staff estimates depict how each staff section or warfighting function supports each COA. The staff estimates also list, in prioritized order, the key concerns and issues (e.g., availability of a particular port or airfield) of the associated staff officer. Staff estimates must clearly differentiate between concerns and problems that can be resolved through subsequent staff coordination, and any that require the commander’s personal intervention. MCWP 5-10, p. 24

Answer 73

measure of effectiveness—A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (JP 1-02)

Answer 74

measure of performance—A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 1-02)

Answer 75

Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. 2. The chance of hazard or bad consequences resulting in exposure to possible injury or loss. Risk level is expressed in terms of hazard probability or severity.

Answer 76

* Before the planners begin the COA war game, the commander must choose the evaluation criteria that will be used to select the COA that will become the CONOPS. The commander establishes evaluation criteria based on judgment, personal experience, and the overall understanding of the situation and problem. The COA evaluation criteria focuses the wargaming effort and provides the framework for data collection by the OPT and staff. The commander will use the data collected in wargaming during the COA comparison and decision step. The COA evaluation criteria may include— * Warfighting functions * Principles of war. * Limitation on casualties. * Exploitation of enemy weaknesses/friendly strengths. * Defeat of the enemy’s COG. * Protection of the friendly COG. * Degree of asymmetrical operations. * Operations in the information environment * Risk. * Earliest date and time the operation can begin. * Duration of the operation. * Political considerations. * Impact on local population and/or issues. MCWP 5-10, p. 35

Answer 77

Branches are planned contingencies that provide a range of alternatives often built into the basic plan. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. JP 5-0, IV-38 The contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. MCWP 5-10 p. 192

Answer 78

Sequels anticipate and plan for subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation—victory, defeat, or stalemate. JP 5-0, IV-38

Answer 79

Apportioned forces provide an estimate of the capacity to generate capabilities that can reasonably be expected to be available along general timelines. This estimate informs and shapes CCDR resource-informed planning but does not identify the actual forces that may be allocated for use if a plan transitions to execution. This informs senior leadership’s assessment of plans based on force inventory, force generation capacity, and availability. The apportionment of a force does not establish a command relationship. Apportionment is dependent on the number of operational forces, the readiness and availability of the forces, and the number of forces employed globally. Apportioned forces not only support planning but, when compared to the DRTs, the apportionment tables provide a periodic measurement of DOD’s ability to meet its level of readiness. The GFMIG provides strategic guidance with respect to the apportionment process. JP 5-0, p. D-3

Answer 80

SecDef provides direction to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to assign specified forces to CCDRs and the United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command to perform missions assigned to those commands per Title10, USC, Section 162. The assignment of forces is conducted annually and documented in the assignment tables of the GFMIG or, in years the GFMIG is not updated, as an attachment to the Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum (short title: “Forces For”).

Answer 81

Per Title 10, USC, Section 162, a force assigned to a CCMD or the United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command under this section may be transferred from the command to which it is assigned only by authority of the Secretary and under procedures prescribed by SecDef and approved by the President. Under this authority, SecDef allocates forces to CCDRs from other CCDRs, Services, and DOD agencies. Two sub-processes, annual and emergent, are used to allocate forces. When complete, the CJCS recommends the allocation of forces to SecDef. SecDef decisions are transmitted in an annual global DEPORD called the GFMAP and its associated annexes. The GFMAP specifies the command relationship the gaining CCDR exercises and the losing CCDR relinquishes, as well as the time the force is to be allocated. The intent is to posture forces against the strategic priorities first and adjust to meet the operational priorities while balancing risk to the force, current operations, and potential future contingencies. JP 5-0, p. D-2

Answer 82

Culmination is that point in time and/or space when the operation can no longer maintain momentum. In the offense, the culminating point is when effectively continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to offensive culmination, then conduct an offensive to expedite the enemy’s defensive culmination. During stabilization efforts, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or a political resolution. JP 5-0, IV-28

Answer 83

A decisive point is key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables a commander to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contributes materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a desired effect, achieving an objective). Decisive points can greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points can be terrain features such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, or a geosynchronous orbit. Decisive points can also be specific things like a weapons of mass destruction material cache or facility, or an air base, but they could also include other elements, such as command posts, a satellite downlink station, or an undersea cable. In some cases, specific key events may also be decisive points, such as achievement of air, space, or maritime superiority, opening a supply route during humanitarian operations, or gaining the trust of a key leader. JP 5-0 IV-33

Answer 84

Level 1 —Commander’s Estimate. It produces multiple COAs to address contingencies. The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command directive, commander’s estimate, or a memorandum with a proposed force list. Level 2 — Base Plan (BPLAN). A BPLAN describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes. A BPLAN may contain alternatives, including FDOs and FROs, to provide multiple options to address contingencies as they develop or to shape the developing situation. Level 3 — Concept Plan (CONPLAN). A CONPLAN is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format. It may require considerable expansion or alteration to be converted into a complete and detailed level 4 OPLAN or an OPORD. Level 4 —OPLAN. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan. The OPLAN identifies the force requirements, functional support, and resources to execute the plan. It contains a full description of the CONOPS, all applicable annexes, a time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) and a transportation-feasible notional TPFDD, as well as analysis of the impact of a potentially contested environment on the joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE) JP 5-0, I-11