Reasoning and Decision Making II Flashcards
(21 cards)
two types of reasoning
inductive reasoning
- drawing general conclusions from particular instances
deductive reasoning - drawing conclusions which follow necessarily from the premises, rules of logic
propositional
about propositions containing the conditionals: if/and/not/or
4 types of inference
modus ponens (if p then q)(It is raining.
Conclude I took the
bus.)
Denial of the
antecedent (if not p then not q) (It is not raining.
Conclude I did not
take the bus.)
affiriming the constant p(A | B) =/= p(B | A) (I took the bus. Conclude it is raining.)
modus tolens
(I did not take the bus.
Conclude it is not
raining.)
study of how often people make 4 inferences
Denial of the
antecedent (DA) - 56%
Affirmation of the
consequent (AC) - 64%
people frequently commit these fallacies
possible explanation: we interpret “if” as “if and only if” (not that convincing)
other study of poor reasoning
Wason (1968) Selection Task
D K 3 7
“if there is a d on one side, there is a 3 on the other”
correct answer: D and 7
but only 1 out of 34 people choose D and 7
possible explanation: confirmation bias
experiment which shows confirmation bias is not a good explanation
Evans and Lynch (1973) Selection Task
“if S then 9”
“if 2 then not-9” -> participants chose 9, the logically correct answer (not conf bias)
card task silly, can work with thematic social rules
Griggs and Cox (1982) Selection Task
“If a person is drinking beer, then the person must be
over 19 years of age”
abstract - 0 out of 40 correct
thematic - 29 out of 40 correct
concluded it is about PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE
deontic reasoning
about obligations and permission
Support for previous experience hypothesis
cross-cultural studies in which thematic framing only improved performance for participants whose country has a rule of that kind
cheater detection/social contract hypothesis
Cosmides (1989) Selection Task
- abstract (25%)
- familiar experience (46%)
- unfamiliar experience about polynesian social rules (21%)
- unfamiliar social contract (cast as member of tribe) (75%)
other experiment: if people are on the hunt for cheats the correct answer will increase
problems with cheater detection task
- doesn’t identify mental operations
- people get correct answer
relevance/utility hypothesis
Girotto et al. (2001) Selection task
- True descriptive (9%)
- True deontic (62%)
- false descriptive (47%)
- false deontic (15%)
people have been led to the correct P,not-Q selection
by the perceived relevance of those options
limitations of selection task
- understanding
1. think it means if there is a D on TOP
2. “If there is a D on one side, then there is a 3 on the other and vice-versa” - doesn’t require any interference
- studies don’t report combinations of answers
syllogisms problems
again, there are understanding issues
when being more explicit with language, correct answers rose from 1 in 40 to 27 out of 40
atmosphere theory + problem
Begg and Denny (1969)
focused on problems where problems had NO valid solutions
positive premise = more likely to draw positive conclusion
negative
universal
particular
the “atmosphere” (quality and quantity) of the premises shapes beliefs about
the validity of different possible conclusions
issue: fails to explain why/how participants decide whether a syllogism has a valid conclusion
mental models framework by Philip Johnson-Laird
- comprehension- contrust model
- description - combine models
- validation - search for alternative models
If a reasoner fails to consider all of the alternative models, he or she is less likely to draw the correct inference
therefore, one-model syllogism easier
multiple-model syllogisms harder
(indirect) evidence for mental models account
Copeland and Radvansky (2004)
more mental models = less accuracy, more slowly
participants with higher working memory span were more accurate and faster
(more direct) test of mental models account
Newstead, Handley, and Buck (1999)
asked participants to indicate all the possible conclusions they had considered
- people did not construct more models for multiple-model syllogisms
- more models =/= higher proportion of correct answers
conclusion: people normally construct just one model
how do we construct initial model answer? belief bias
Evans et al. (1983)
valid/invalid + believable/unbelievable
= plausibility increased the judged validity of both valid and invalid arguments.
explanations of belief bias
SELECTIVE SCRUTINY HYPOTHESIS
- if conclusion is plausible, people accept it; reasoning occurs more when conclusion is unbelievable
- but no, Evans showed that people reject invalid arguments with plausible conclusions
MISINTERPRETED NECESSITY HYPOTHESIS
-if a conclusion isn’t logically necessary, people use believability more
integrating belief and reasoning
Klauer et al. (2000)
- people make mental modes, usually just one
- if conclusion is believable, people try to construct model around this
- if conclusion is unbelievable, they attempt to construct a model which refutes it (alt model)
- when they fail to find one, they are swayed by their belief about the base-rate probability that the conclusion is valid