Theories of Voter Turnout (Pi, Objective, Rational, Altruistic, Information Based (Uninformed Dont Vote)

Question 1

So we have explored voter behaviour based on preferences for policy outcome (median voter)

and non-policy factors (probabilistiic voting)

But in practice voters may vote for other reasons (3)

Answer 1

Money (vote buying)

Coercion (violence/intimidation)

may not just vote!

Question 2

How many countries in 2024 have compulsory voting

Answer 2

27

and 10 of them enforce it e.g Australia $20 penalty, $180 if not paid in time

Question 3

issue with voluntary voting

Answer 3

Turnout varies widely across countries

Question 4

When is voter turnout higher? (2)

Answer 4

higher for general elections

sensitive issues too e.g Brexit

Question 5

When would rational voter i participate in elections

Answer 5

if benefits of participating > costs

PiBi > Ci

Pi is probability of being pivotal
Bi is benefit

Question 6

What are costs of participation for voter i (3)

Answer 6

informational, transportation, opportunity costs of voting: (Aggregate into one cost Ci!)

Question 7

Paradox of voting

Answer 7

Probability of being pivotal pi decreases with number of voters.

Since less likely to be the pivotal vote, however we said turnout rises in general elections!

Question 8

Probability of being the pivotal voter in this example? High or low and why

Answer 8

Very low, it would be the probability of getting each policy to 500k each! So unlikely

Question 9

When does probability of being pivotal voter decrease even more

Answer 9

if vote share isn’t 50/50 e.g 3/4 chance A wins, 25% B wins; i.e no longer assume an equal probability of being voted

Question 10

So Pi falls as number of voters increase, yet we still see high turnout. So voters are not rational

What does this imply

Answer 10

Flaw in voting system since rational agents abstain!

Question 11

4 types of voter turnout theories

Answer 11

Objective function theories (instrumental vs expressive)

voters’ rationality theories (revising the definition!)

altruistic voters (care about others)

information-based theories

Question 12

Objective function theory: 2 explanations

Answer 12

instrumental motivations
expressive motivations

Question 13

First explanation of objective function-based theory: Instrumental motivations

B) what does decision to vote depend on

Answer 13

Voter mainly cares about outcome of vote i.e policy of winner

B)
Decision to vote depends on vote value i.e utility which is discounted by the probability her vote will count (pi), which falls as number of voters increase!

Question 14

Issue with instrumental motivation

Answer 14

Doesn’t explain high turnout, since says decision to vote depends on vote value; which is small in large elections!

Question 15

Expressive motivations

B) How is it expressed

Answer 15

People don’t vote for policy, but vote for the expressive value i.e what a vote says about the voter e.g validating self worth ‘im not a tory!’

B) expressive benefit is given by Di

Question 16

pro (1) and con (2) of expressive motivation

Answer 16

Explains bandwagon effect: more people voting means other people to follow (since vote for expressive value)

difficult to measure expressive benefit (the happiness of voting)

Still doesn’t explain high turnout

Question 17

2nd theory: rationality theory

Questions rationality of voters: why do they continue to vote when Pi falls with numbers of voters? (2)

Answer 17

Perhaps not calculate probability of being pivotal accurately (pi) so cost-benefit analysis wrong

Learn from previous elections e.g turnout depend on opinion polls, last election etc

Question 18

Cons of rationality theory

Answer 18

Still do not explain high turnout

They predict a low turnout, but in reality turnout is high! Does not explain this!

Question 19

Altruism-based theory

assume elections divide population into groups

Answer 19

People get utility from voting but also receives ethical value from helping others in their group

when everyone follows this logic this way maximises chances of this group to win

Question 20

cons (2)

Answer 20

Free rider problem exists - if they believe everyone else will vote for those reasons, they believe they don’t have to incur the costs of voting and still get their desired outcome

Unlikely this is the only feature that explains vote turnout

Question 21

Information-based theory as explanation for absentention

Answer 21

When voters dont have information, they delegate decisions to informed voters

Abstention is rational for uninformed!

Question 22

What is this known as

Answer 22

Swing voters curse - abstention is optimal and RATIONAL when voters are uninformed (even if voting is costless)

Question 23

Swing voter curse example
2 states of nature: 1 (more likely to occur) and 2 (less likely)

2 candidate: A is better for state 1, B better for state 2

3 voters: 1 informed of state

A)
As state 1 is more likely, who should uninformed vote for (if forced to vote)

B) If it is state 1, who does informed agent vote for

C) what if it is state 2.

Answer 23

Uninformed voters should vote for candidate A

B) informed agent votes for A and A wins. Doesn’t matter what uninformed do - they can abstain or vote. (win 3-0 or 1-0)

C) informed agent votes for B, uninformed observe and better to abstain and let B win, rather than become swing voters and have A win (since better to not vote and risk making things worse!)

Thus both scenarios show abstaining is a rational decision for uninformed agents!

Question 24

Voting to tell others: experiment (DellaVigna)

B) how much is motivation worth

Answer 24

Individual would be motivated to vote because of an anticipation of being asked

B) motivation to vote for social image reasons is as large as being paid $5-15 to vote

(Extra: voters report being asked 2x as much for presential elections , so could be aggregated to value 2x i.e $10-30

EXPRESSIVE VALUE OF VOTING

Question 25

Key finding of Della Vigna - voting to tell others

Answer 25

Voters do not feel pride from saying they voted, but non-voters do feel shame, shown by non-voters lie and claim they voted half the time (So supports objective function-based - EXPRESSIVE MOTIVATIONS)

Question 26

Feddersen and Pesendorfer on swing voter’s curse (information-based theory for voting behaviour) (Hint; jars)

Answer 26

Jar 1 has 6 white balls and 2 red Jar 2 has 6 white balls and 2 yellow Some could see the colour, some uninformed. Found informed voters chose correctly, while uninformed abstaining from voting for jars

Question 27

Habit forming in voting - assessing shocks to voting costs (impacting decision to vote) Then see whether future voting behaviour is affected by it Fujiwara findings

Answer 27

Looked at rainfall on election day; found people discourage from voting due to rain in their first election, were less likely to also vote in future I.e initial turnout has a long term impact- voting is habit forming

Question 28

Specific stat in Fujiwara

Answer 28

1% fall in past turnout, decrease current turnout by 0.6-1% If less people turn up initial election, less votes also in future.

Question 29

How to address habit-forming issue

Answer 29

Introducing compulsory voting for short periods, to get people to attend initial elections in order to start positive habits (increased turnout in long run) Since also has multiplier effects - like bandwagon effect, more ppl go so others go too)

Question 30

Findings on age and voting

Answer 30

Big change in turnout from eligible age, so eligible to vote early can allow habit formation early

Question 31

Does introducing compulsory voting affect the policy?

Answer 31

No (see why in part B next FC)

Question 32

Impact of compulsory voting B) implications of this

Answer 32

Increases participation, but interestingly no impact on vote shares between left and right parties, or public spending B) Implying the new voters forced to vote; their preferences aren’t significantly different from voluntary voters (since vote shares did not change) i.e do not have strong policy preferences, so little incentive for candidates to shape policies towards voters. thus explains compulsory voting does not change policy!