1.3 Welfare Economics and the Environment Flashcards
(24 cards)
allocative inefficiency
- inefficiency as a result of choices
- may happen even when there are no technical inefficiencies
technical efficiency
With a certain input the output will be maximized
ex. well-insulated houses require less energie to warm the house
social costs
clean up costs, health costs, …
optimality
maximization of overall objectives given any relevant constraints that are operating
- efficiency is a necessary condition for optimality BUT it’s not sufficient
- multiplicity of different efficient resource allocation but only one is the best
allocation
- WHAT goods are produced
- what QUANTITIES are produced
- WHICH COMBINATIONS of resource inputs are used in producing these goods
- HOW are the outputs distributed between persons
externalities
the activity has an impact on someone/something else in an unintended way + no compensation paid
can be beneficial or harmful, source of market failure
Pareto improvement
gains/improvement without anyone else suffering
change in allocation harms no one and improves the condition of at least one person
(-) fairness and equality are not taken into account
economic efficiency
- the Pareto optimal allocation of resources
- no further Pareto improvements are possible
three conditions
- efficiency in consumption
- efficiency in production
- product-mix efficiency
production possibility frontier
output combinations that the economy can produce using all resources
utility possibility frontier
represents possible utility combinations that correspond to efficiency in allocation
optimal combination
The combination that is best form a society point of view
SWF
social welfare function
function of the utility/hapiness level of the society
- rank alternative allocations is possible
- depends on societal objectives and ethical choices
- non decreasing in utility levels of both individuals
- difficult to calculate this, to much ethical considerations
Kaldor compensation test
The best allocation is the one were the winner COULD compensate the loser and still be better off
(-) no requirement of the compensation -> responsibility of policy makers
(-) might support reallocation in two directions
Hicks compensation test
Can the loser compensate the winner for foregoing the move and be no worse than if the move took place
kaldor-hicks-scitovsky test
Combine kaldor and hicks criteria
pure private good
excludable and rivalrous
ex. ice cream
congestive resource
excludable and non-rivalrous
ex. wilderness area
open acces resource
non-excludable and rivalrous
ex. oceaan fishery in international waters
pure public good
non-excludable and non-rivalrous
ex. national defence
not everyone has the same value towards the pure public good
coase theorem
private bargaining can correct externality problems and lead to efficient outcomes
(-) transaction costs are zero; property rights allocation effects wealth
private marginal cost
PMC
= input costs that a firm needs to take into account when deciding there output level
PMC = deltaC/deltaY
marginal external cost
MEC
= sum of the willingness to pay by the ‘sufferers’ to reduce suffering in a small amount
social marginal costs
SMC = PMC + MEC