1.7 International Environmental Problems Flashcards
(15 cards)
Nash equilibrium
No country can gain from unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium outcome
Outcome isn’t efficient; both would be better off if they chose the other solution
self-enforcing agreements
agreement where the terms create incentives on all parties to adhere to the agreement once it has come into effect
- NO single country faces incentive to deviate from the agreement or to negotiate
- through penalties and rewards
- can lead to Nash equilibrium if penalty or reward is sufficient
IEA
international environmental agreements
= cooperative solution to regional and global environmental problems
ex.
early: marine fishing, transport international waters, exploitation see beds, …
later: pollution, atmosphere composition, biodiversity conservation, climate change, …
intergovernmental conference
example: United Nations (UN) on GLOBAL LEVEL
- formal, financial and political pressure”
ex: SDG’s => envioronmental agreement
mechanisms to support international environmental agreement
- commitment
- transfers & side-payments
- linkage of benefits & costs & reciprocity
- repeated games
reciprocal externality
Both generate pollution and they effect eachother
commitment
an unconditional undertaking made by an agent about how it will act in the future, irrespective of what others do
ex. performance bonds
= limit/constraint on the behavior outcomes; penalty >= benefit cheating/free-riding
transfers and side-payment
Signatoires offer side-payment to induce non-signatories to enter
ex. financial support from developed countries to developing countries, montreal protocol, phasing out CFK’s
linkage benefits and cost an reciprocity
- bringing other benefits into consideration jointly
- can also add additional costs; transaction and enforcement costs
ex. trade restrictions, anti-terrorism, health & safety standards
repeated games
repeated interaction between nations may extent the degree of cooperation
- long-lasting, repeated decisions
- communication and tit-for-tat strategies
IPCC
International Panel on Climate Change (UN)
- information on climate change to policy makers
kyoto Protocol (1997)
First agreement (legally binding) UNFCCC that required developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions
- introduced market economics ex. carbon-market
- imposes requirements without creating conditions for mutual trust
- structured like prisoner’s dilemma
Paris Agreement
More inclusive and flexible framework to combat climate change
- limit global warming to 2°C; signed by 196 countries
- self-defined voluntary set targets to reach the goal
- transparant framework
- climate finance = some costs are more costly for some countries
loss and damage fund
form of transfer and side-payment determined in COP27 (most recent COP)
- financial mechanism to ASSIST vulnerable countries against climate change related impacts
- poorer and developing countries are more vulnerable
THE AGREEMENT IS A MIDDLE GROUND
- making poor fight the poor? Who has right at the fund
G77: Want developed countries to take responsibility for the negative consequences of their past emissions
developed countries: don’t want it to be a financial compensation for past emissions (moral duty?)
Montreal protocol
International treaty designed to protect the ozone layer by phasing out the production of numerous substances that are responsible for ozone depletion
- problem: CFC’s (ned: CFK’s)
- protocol is ratified
- ozone hole is slowly recovering
=> chicken game
