Cases Flashcards
INS v. Chadha
Legislative veto unconstitutional b/c it didn’t comply with Article I (bicameralism, presentment). Only legislative acts (alter legal rights, duties, and relations of persons) subject to Article I.
United States v. Fla. East Coast Railway
Hearing can mean any number of things, but a hearing used to elicit facts for a legislative-type judgment, for prospective application only, rather than adjudicating a particular set of disputed facts, is less likely to impute formal rulemaking.
Vermont Yankee v. NRDC (1978)
Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but courts may not impose them absent constitutional constraints/extremely compelling circumstances.
Universal Camera Corp v. NLRB (1951)
The substantial evidence test applies to evidence in the whole record on both sides (even evidence contradicting agency’s decision).
NLRB v. Hearst (1944)
When reviewing mixed questions of fact and law, an agency’s factual findings must have “warrant in the record,” while its explanation for its decision must have a “reasonable basis in the law” i.e. further the agency’s enabling statute.
SEC v. Chenery I (1943)
When an agency has not provided an adequate explanation (a+c), even if the court can discern an adequate explanation from the record, the court should remand the case back to the agency.
SEC v. Chenery II (1947)
Agencies can use adjudication to create new policy retroactively if the unfairness of retroactivity on ∆ is outweighed by the benefit to the public/statutory goals.
In this case, it was officers of a utility trading stock while the utility was being restructured. They weren’t breaking any laws, but the SEC recognized that what they were doing (insider trading) was sus. Rather than just let it slide and make a rule, SEC ordered them to sell all their shares [order=adjudication!], holding they had a fiduciary duty to the company.
Chevron v. NRDC
When an agency is interpreting its enabling statute*, (1) Court reviews the enabling statute to determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If intent is clear, that’s the end.(2) If intent is not clear, then the agency’s interpretation is upheld if it is permissible or reasonable (arbitrary and capricious).
Applies to legislative rulemaking and some other weird scenarios (whether formal adjudication/rulemaking is required, for example).
Skidmore v. Swift (1944)
Rulings, interpretations, and opinions of an agency, while not controlling on courts, constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts may look to for guidance. Weight depends on the thoroughness, validity, consistency of interpretation.
United States v. Mead
Administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision [agency non-legislative rules] qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.
Usually requires formal administrative procedure intended to foster fairness and deliberation; precedential value.
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand (Auer)
An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
Kisor limits: 1) Regulation ambiguous? 2) Agency reading must be reasonable. 3) Court must judge the “character” of agency interpretation. 4) Must be agency’s “authoritative” position. 5) Must invoke agency’s expertise. 6) Must be fair.
Ctzns to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe
In reviewing agency decision Courts:
1) Determine whether agency acted within the scope of its authority.
2) Arbitrary and capricious: “Substantial inquiry . . . probing, in-depth review”: Court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.
3) Determine whether the agency followed the necessary procedural requirements.
Goldberg v. Kelly
Termination of welfare benefits implicates due process and all of the requirements of formal adjudication. Abandonment of rights/privileges distinction. Limited to its facts.
Chrysler Corp v. Brown
FIOA exemptions are discretionary—not mandatory bars to disclosure.
Mathews v. Eldridge
In determining whether due process requires a pre-deprivation hearing, courts must consider:
1) Interests of the party facing deprivation
2) Gov’t interests
3) Risk of erroneous deprivation/value of additional procedures
