Lecture 6 (Europeanisation, Globalisation, and National Policies)

Question 1

The result of neoliberalist policies regarding citizens and the labour market (Crouch)

Answer 1

Neoliberal policies facilitate people’s adaptation to market risks, rather than protecting them from exposure to it. Neoliberalist policies make the individual responsible for his employability and making wise decisions within the labour market (assuming people have the capacity to predict or identify what will be good for them on the long term)

Question 2

Explanation of “If everyone stands on their tiptoes, none can see better” by Hirsch

Answer 2

Neoliberalist policies force individuals to seek education and training to improve their positions on the labour market. However, if everyone starts to do that, it no longer is an advantage.

Question 3

Neoliberalist policies and self-employment

Answer 3

Self-employment is like a loophole in these neoliberalist policies, as you are neither employed or unemployed. Self-employment is usually encouraged by neoliberalist policies as self-employment lowers the risks of workers forming a collective against the policies, and also reduces welfare costs as the self-employed are not eligible for (un)employment benefits.

Question 4

Post-democracy (Crouch)

Answer 4

A political system in which democratic forms persist, but the power and influence of ordinary citizens is diminished in favour of powerful actors (e.g. privatisation and residualisation could be tools of post-democracy as citizens no longer can complain at a central point about the quality and availability of services - the government is not responsible for them anymore)

Question 5

New public management (NPM) (Crouch)

Answer 5

A neoliberalist government model to make public services more efficient, and lessen government intervention. NPM redefines the boundary between government and private interests, often resulting in regulatory capture.

Question 6

Intellectual rationalisation (Crouch)

Answer 6

Rational arguments given in favour of wisdom of the markets, describing governmental idiocy (the government knows little about market mechanisms, so let’s just leave it up to markets themselves)

Question 7

Pseudo-commodification (Crouch)

Answer 7

The government going along in the ideas of intellectual rationalisation, and mimicking commercial firms by creating small, internal markets in which government tasks and responsibilities are outsources to private companies.

Question 8

The self-fulfilling prophecy of government idiocy

Answer 8

The government engaging in pseudo-commodification results in a self-fulfilling prophecy of the notion of government idiocy. Because the government outsources many of its tasks and responsibilities to private companies, it will eventually not have civil servants anymore that have the ability to handle these tasks and responsibilities. In this way, the government does become increasingly incompetent, and the market becomes increasingly competent.

Question 9

Policy making institutions of the EU (Anderson) (5)

Answer 9

1. The European Court of Justice (ECJ)
2. The European Commission (EC)
3. The European Parliament (EP)
4. The European Council
5. The European Central Bank (ECB)

Question 10

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) characteristics (4)

Answer 10

1. Pro-European federalism (states forming a large unit)
2. Constitutionalises decisions and incorporates them into laws, treaties, etc. - public has no say
3. Mostly lawyers that may lack expertise about implemented decisions
4. Deprives EU-member states of the power to define border between public and private (e.g. school lunch example)

Question 11

The European Commission (EC) characteristics (2)

Answer 11

1. Power to propose legislation (new laws)
2. Holds over the Acquis Communitaire (contains all EU-laws and regulations)

Question 12

Two meaningful members of the EC and their contributions

Answer 12

1. Walter Hallstein: federalist, wanted more homogeneity between nation state governments but did not want a free market
2. Jacques Delors: introduced the European Act, preparing a monetary union by removing barriers to trade and promoting economic integration among EU-member states.

Question 13

The European Parliament (EP) characteristics (3)

Answer 13

1. Resembles a parliament, has limited powers
2. Allowed to co-decide on new laws proposed by EC, reject budged but not change it, and reject but not elect EC’ers (Anderson believed that the EP should get these rights)
3. Low voter turnout and low attendance

Question 14

The European Council characteristics (2)

Answer 14

1. Composed of the heads of EU-member states
2. Sets EU’s over-all political direction and priorities

Question 15

The European Central Bank (ECB) characteristics

Answer 15

1. One of the most powerful EU institutions
2. Ensures monetary stability in the Eurozone (keeps inflation at bay as much as possible)
3. Does not have to counterweigh for employment when setting interest rates
4. Operates acc. logic of discretion, does not justify decisions in deciding interest rates

Question 16

Hayek’s blueprint for interstate federalism

Answer 16

Proposes limited European federation, the EU should be more decentralised and committed to free markets to safeguard individual freedom as well as economic competition. The European federation would primarily serve as a protector of peace and open markets, but not for political or economic centralisation.

(So, the member-states are quite free agents economically and politically, but stick up for each other in case of threats)

Question 17

Democracy functioning well if not overloaded (Hayek)

Answer 17

Hayek’s blueprint for interstate federalism is based on the idea that democracy can only function well for as long as it is not overloaded with tasks. Interstate federalism protects democracy by preventing it from becoming overloaded with tasks by, for example, leaving certain decisions up to the market (hence the free markets part of interstate federalism). If democracy becomes overloaded, the majority will be able to impose its will and undermine individual freedom.

Question 18

Two alternatives for the future of the EU (Habermans vs. Streeck)

Answer 18

1. Defensive nostalgia of the national democratic rule (favoured by Streeck)
2. Offensive extending of the supranational democracy (favoured by Habermans)

Question 19

Defensive nostalgia of the national democratic rule (Kleinstaaterei)

Answer 19

Streeck argues pro-small statism (kleinstaaterei) that rebuilding national sovereignty (autonomy) is a way to get back the democratic control over markets. Streeck believed that taking back control is important in order to protect social life, the environment, and financial stability.

Streeck does acknowledge that this is a large challenge because global markets have become so powerful, perhaps too powerful to handle for a nation state alone.

Question 20

Offensive extending of the supranational democracy and rule (Großstaaterei)

Answer 20

Habermans argued for supranational democracy, talking about a strong and democratic supranational Europe, like a superstate. Habermans is convinced that only a EU-superstate is powerful enough to take control over the global market. He also believed that a European superstate would result into a much larger voice in global affairs.

Question 21

Two main arguments against großstaaterei

Answer 21

1. Viability and stability concerns (concerns about even being able to establish close political union/a superstate)
2. Desirability concerns

Question 22

Viability and stability concerns with forming close political EU union (3)

Answer 22

1. Effectiveness of regional economic programmes
2. Heterogeneity of business cultures
3. Fragile social integration in imperfect nation states

Question 23

Effectiveness of regional economic programmes (against großstaaterei)

Answer 23

Not all regions will benefit from centralised economic policies, some will continue to struggle financially despite aid from other states.

Question 24

Heterogeneity of business cultures (against großstaaterei)

Answer 24

Different regions and countries all have their own ways of handling economic practises making it hard to create one-size-fits-all policies.

Question 25

Fragile social integration in imperfect nation states

Answer 25

Some nation states already have problems uniting the people within their own state, how would it ever be possible to unite those nations if they cannot unite themselves internally? On nation-level, cultural, historical, etc. differences are even larger.

Question 26

Desirability concerns with forming close political EU union (2)

Answer 26

1. Levelling may not be desirable 2. Egalitarian ethos and national solidarity

Question 27

Levelling may not be desirable (against großstaaterei)

Answer 27

It can be considered undesirable or even repressive to force cultures, traditions, and lifestyles to form a more unified whole (you surpress diversity)

Question 28

Egalitarian ethos and national solidarity (against großstaaterei)

Answer 28

Because many nation-states do not have much in common (e.g. in terms of shared history), it may be difficult to make their inhabitants feel emotionally attached to the unification of EU-states

Question 29

Streeck's argument against an European Volk

Answer 29

It would surpress individual identities of member-states. Streeck would even want to have dual currencies to help member-states protect their economical autonomy whilst being member of EU.

Question 30

Habermans' argument for an European Volk

Answer 30

You can create national identity and solidarity via state institutions, this must be generalisable to the level of an European Volk. Habermans even would want to introduce dual citizenship, with an European and nation citizenship.

Question 31

Rally around the flag (Nicoli et al.)

Answer 31

A crisis can strengthen group identity through the identification of an external threat or enemy

Question 32

Polycrises (Streeck 'buying time')

Answer 32

When multiple crises (economic, political, environmental, etc.) occur simultaneously, overlap, and interact. Streeck argues that 'buying time' dopes not resolve these crises, nut results into their accumulation and interconnection.

Question 33

Buying time (Streeck)

Answer 33

Buying time refers to governments trying to manage the contradictions between capitalism and democracy (and welfare states). They 'buy time' by using strategies such as inflation, public debt, and private debt. This eventually leads to more problems, possibly resulting into polycrises.