Mukand (Maks) Flashcards

(48 cards)

1
Q

Rustagi et al. (2010)

A

Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Motivation: Rustagi et al. (2010) - Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management

A

Forest-user groups differ dramatically in how well they protect common woodland. Classic free-rider theory can’t explain such variation. The authors test whether the mix of behavioural types — especially the share of conditional cooperators and their willingness to monitor & punish — accounts for success.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Data/Setting: Rustagi et al. (2010) - Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management

A

49 forest-user groups (679 villagers) in Ethiopia’s Bale Mountains. Outcomes are ecological (health of young trees) and behavioural (patrol hours).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Methodology: Rustagi et al. (2010) - Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management

A

(i) Each villager is classified via a public-goods “strategy method” game into a conditional co-operator, weak CC, free-rider, or altruist.

(ii) Regress forest health on the share of conditional cooperators, with controls for geography, demographics and programme years

(iii) Regress patrol hours on the share of conditional cooperators, with the same controls.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Robustness Checks: Rustagi et al. (2010) - Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management

A

Results robust to full set of geographic & demographic controls:

(i) Structural factors (e.g. distance to market, year of enrolment) entered separately; CC share effect persists.

(ii) Free-rider share included: more free-riders and significantly lower PCT, confirming opposite channel.

(iii) Alternative outcome specifications (e.g., patrol hours, forest plot fixed effects) yield similar elasticities.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Results: Rustagi et al. (2010) - Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management

A

Forests thrive when many villagers are conditional cooperators—these groups patrol more and suffer less from free-riding—whereas a higher share of free-riders undermines monitoring and degrades forest health.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Greif (1994)

A

Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Motivation: Greif (1994) - Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies

A

Why did the Maghribi Jewish coalition and the Genoese — trading the same goods on the same Mediterranean routes — adopt opposite ways to keep agents honest? Greif shows that shared cultural beliefs about others’ behaviour (individualist vs collectivist) dictate which enforcement institutions are feasible and, in turn, steer long-run trajectories.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Data/Setting: Greif (1994) - Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies

A

(i) Maghribi evidence: Cairo Geniza letters and account books describe coalition-wide boycotts of any agent who cheated even once.

(ii) Genoese evidence: Notarial contracts reveal high incentive wages, reliance on courts and no collective-punishment norm.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Methodology: Greif (1994) - Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies

A

Greif recreates the merchant–agent relationship as a repeated principal–agent game with hidden action. Two self-enforcing equilibria emerge, each anchored in a cultural belief system:

(i) Collectivist: everyone expects peers to punish a cheater, so reputational ostracism (a boycott) keeps agents honest at low cost.

(ii) Individualist: nobody expects peer punishment, so honesty must be bought with high wages and backed by courts.

A collectivist equilibrium is sustainable only when the prior belief that “others will punish” is strong enough; otherwise the individualist system prevails.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Robustness Checks: Greif (1994) - Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies

A

(i) Both groups traded identical goods over the same Mediterranean routes, so technology, geography and product mix cannot explain their institutional split.

(ii) Archival triangulation—letters, ledgers and court contracts—avoids single-source bias.

(iii) Prediction match: boycott vows, network structure and wage patterns align with the model.

(iv) Scale test: collective enforcement weakens as networks grow, mirroring Maghribi decline and Genoese resilience.

(v) Alternative channels (legal capacity, market power) assessed and found insufficient once beliefs are included.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Results: Greif (1994) - Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies

A

Cultural beliefs shape institutions and long-run development.

(i) Maghribis’ shared expectation that “everybody boycotts a cheater” sustains low-cost, reputation-based trade — but it remains fragile when the community scales up.

(ii) Genoese scepticism about peer punishment drives them toward costly wage incentives and formal legal contracts, which are durable and scalable.

These contrasting enforcement regimes steer network structure, contract form and economic trajectories for centuries.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Motivation: Ostrom et al. (1999) - Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges

A

Hardin’s “tragedy” argued that common-pool resources must be privatised or nationalised to avoid ruin. Three decades of fieldwork reveal many communities that do conserve forests, fisheries and canals without either extreme. The paper distils why local self-governance sometimes works and probes whether those insights can be adapted to “planetary” commons like climate and oceans.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Ostrom et al. (1999)

A

Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Data / Setting: Ostrom et al. (1999) - Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges

A

(i) Synthesises hundreds of well-documented cases spanning farmer-run irrigation in Nepal, communal forests in Germany, Mongolian grasslands, Pacific fisheries and more.

(ii) Contrasts four property rights regimes (open access, group, private, and state) and reports typical incentives and failure modes.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Methodology: Ostrom et al. (1999) - Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges

A

Conducts a qualitative analysis: compares successful and failed commons and matches their institutional traits to ecological performance. The authors then extend the framework to global resources.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

Robustness Checks: Ostrom et al. (1999) - Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges

A

(i) Cross-Ecosystem Consistency: the same 8 principles recur in forests, fisheries, irrigation and groundwater.

(ii) Predictive Power: cases missing several principles almost always collapse; those with most principles endure over decades or centuries.

(iii) Comparative Counter-Examples: top-down Soviet grassland schemes and poorly tailored market fixes degraded resources faster, highlighting the cost of ignoring local context.

(iv) Behavioural Foundations: lab evidence on conditional cooperation and reciprocal punishment supports the need for cheap monitoring and flexible sanctions.

(v) Scalability Probe: nested, information-sharing governance already underpins successful regional water treaties, suggesting the principles can scale when properly layered

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

Results: Ostrom et al. (1999) - Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges

A

(i) Local self-governance works, and the paper illustrates this with concrete cases.

(ii) Across these cases, successful systems consistently exhibit 8 design principles: clear boundaries, including user monitoring, graduated sanctions, and nested layers of governance.

(iii) Identify 4 extra hurdles when managing planetary commons: scale, cultural diversity, interlinked systems, rapid change and treaty unanimity.

(iv) Argue for polycentric solutions that embed local knowledge in multiple tiers of self-governance when managing global resources.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
19
Q

Almås et al. (2022)

A

Attitudes to Inequality: Preferences and Beliefs

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
20
Q

Motivation: Almås et al. (2022) - Attitudes to Inequality: Preferences and Beliefs

A

There is a public debate on how big income gaps are, yet citizens mostly care whether the gap feels fair. The authors ask:

(i) Which sources of inequality (merit / luck) do people deem legitimate?

(ii) Does fairness outweigh efficiency?

(iii) How do these views vary across countries, income classes and age?

21
Q

Data / Setting: Almås et al. (2021) - Attitudes to Inequality: Preferences and Beliefs

A

(i) Cross-country panel data on 60 countries.

(ii) Records track how participants split the money between two workers after treatments that vary the source of earnings (merit / luck).

(iii) The survey also tracks personal characteristics of participants (age, gender, education, etc.). An additional youth panel is compiled.

22
Q

Methodology: Almås et al. (2021) - Attitudes to Inequality: Preferences and Beliefs

A

Treatment assigns how two workers get paid: based on merit or luck. Participants are then asked to split the money between them, if they feel so necessary.

Choices reveal whether they fall into 1 of 3 types: egalitarian (close every gap), meritocratic (respect effort-based gaps) and libertarian (respect all initial earnings).

Occasional trade-off tests insert a 50% deadweight loss of redistribution to see if fairness beats efficiency.

The authors also link these choices to personal characteristics and country.

23
Q

Robustness Checks: Almås et al. (2021) - Attitudes to Inequality: Preferences and Beliefs

A

(i) The design separates normative fairness from self-interest because participants never receive any money themselves.

(ii) No matter the person, each participant always falls into 1 of 3 types.

(iii) Stability tests replicate the results in follow-up panels.

24
Q

Results: Almås et al. (2021) - Attitudes to Inequality: Preferences and Beliefs

A

(i) Spectators are generally comfortable with inequality that reflects merit, but not luck

(ii) Lower-income and younger respondents lean more egalitarian; richer or older groups tilt meritocratic or libertarian (even after controlling for gender and schooling).

(iii) Richer countries lean more meritocratic/libertarian, while poorer contexts see more egalitarianism.

(iv) Fairness often trumps efficiency: many spectators erase luck gaps even when redistribution burns resources.

25
Blouin & Mukand (2019)
Erasing Ethnicity? Nation Building, (Mis)Trust and the Salience of Identity in Rwanda
26
Motivation: Blouin & Mukand (2019) - Erasing Ethnicity? Nation Building, (Mis)Trust and the Salience of Identity in Rwanda
After the 1994 genocide, Rwanda’s government tried to replace Hutu-Tutsi labels with a single “Rwandan” identity. Its main tool was a state-run station, Radio Rwanda, that aired daily unity messages while banning ethnic talk. The study tests whether long-term exposure truly lowers ethnic salience and builds cross-group trust or merely enforces surface compliance.
27
Data / Setting: Blouin & Mukand (2019) - Erasing Ethnicity? Nation Building, (Mis)Trust and the Salience of Identity in Rwanda
Natural signal variation created by the country’s steep hills. 1) Simulate FM strength across all 52 villages, tagging them either high- (treated) or low-exposure (control). 2) Run lab-in-field sessions measuring: Salience-of-Identity (SIT) memory test, partner-choice for a cooperation game, private & public trust games, Anonymous trust survey (ethnicity never named).
28
Methodology: Blouin & Mukand (2019) - Erasing Ethnicity? Nation Building, (Mis)Trust and the Salience of Identity in Rwanda
OLS regresses the outcomes of lab-in-field experiements (SIT/Partner Choice) on a radio-signal dummy with rich individual, topographic and district fixed effects; using distance to towers and genocide prosecution as additional controls. A threshold-sweep shows that treatment effects appear only at the engineering cut-off, pinning causality on Radio Rwanda access rather than geography.
29
Robustness Checks: Blouin & Mukand (2019) - Erasing Ethnicity? Nation Building, (Mis)Trust and the Salience of Identity in Rwanda
(i) Other Stations: six private FM channels show no comparable pattern. (ii) Balance Tests: radio and non-radio villages are indistinguishable on 66 baseline covariates. (iii) Placebo Towers: putting “fake” transmitters on Rwanda’s highest peaks yields no effect. (iv) Alternate Thresholds & Continuous Strength: the inverted-U effect centres precisely on the audibility cut-off and fades outside it. (v) Mis-classification & Migration: results robust to stricter ethnicity coding and to excluding recent movers.
30
Results: Blouin & Mukand (2019) - Erasing Ethnicity? Nation Building, (Mis)Trust and the Salience of Identity in Rwanda
Sustained state broadcasting blunts entrenched ethnic divisions and foster real cross-group cooperation. Radio-exposed villagers think of Hutu-Tutsi labels less frequently in SIT, choose more out-group partners, and extend trust and generosity privately as well as publicly, while trust toward their own group stays flat. The usual “public-image” gap vanishes, indicating genuine attitude change, not just fear of punishment.
31
Burgess et al. (2015)
The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya
32
Motivation: Burgess et al. (2015) - The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya
Citizens long claimed that Kenyan presidents allocated public investment into their own ethnic homelands. The authors ask: 1) How large this ethnic bias really is? 2) Whether the very same leader behaves differently when constitutional rules shift between autocracy and democracy. Roads, the single biggest capital item in Kenya’s budget, offer a sharp test-bed?
33
Data / Setting: Burgess et al. (2015) - The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya
(i) Road-budget accounts (financial state records) and Michelin road maps (trace the actual paved-road network growth). (ii) Simulated network: links towns that maximise market potential (provide a no-politics benchmark) (iii) District ethnic majorities considered independent, so a district is co-ethnic if ≥ 50 % shared the president’s tribe.
34
Methodology: Burgess et al. (2015) - The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya
1) Flag co-ethnic districts and years under democracy. 2) OLS regresses the outcomes (road-budget per capita) on time and entity fixed effects, controls (economic & geographic), co-ethnicity dummy, and the interaction b/w co-ethnicity and democracy. 3) Replicate using the actual growth in paved roads and compare with the simulated network to gauge mis-allocation. 4) Split the sample by leadership spells to see whether patterns survive.
35
Robustness Checks: Burgess et al. (2015) - The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya
(i) Paved-Roads: reproduce the budget bias. (ii) Simulated Network: shows zero ethnic tilt → real skew is political, not economic. (iii) Geography Tests: dropping Nairobi corridor, settler highlands, rich districts leaves results intact. (iv) Alternative Specs: continuous ethnicity shares, district-specific trends, spatial clustering, “fake-president” placebos produce same pattern. (v) Placebos for Patronage: cabinet ministers’ homelands, swing-vote districts & mixed-ethnicity areas receive no extra roads; vice-president bias appears only under autocracy. (vi) Within-Leader Switch: Moi allocates heavily to Kalenjin districts under autocracy but reverts to neutral once democracy resumes.
36
Results: Burgess et al. (2015) - The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya
(i) Under autocracy, districts sharing the president’s ethnicity receive roughly double the road budget share and several-fold more new asphalt than their population weight would predict. (ii) When democracy returns, the gap collapses (road money spreads in line with population, and co-ethnic privilege all but vanishes). The same leader (Moi) shifts from heavy favoritism to near-neutral allocation once multi-party rules and a freer press take effect, indicating that democracy constrains executive patronage rather than changing underlying preferences. (iii) Simulated efficient networks reveal that the autocratic bias steered roads away from economically sensible routes, underscoring the developmental cost of unchecked ethnic favoritism.
37
Kaur et al. (2019)
Does Fainancial Strain Lower Productivity?
38
Motivation: Kaur et al. (2019)
Laboratory work shows that money worries can drain attention. The authors test a real-world implication: if short-run cash stress is eased—without raising wages—will workers produce more and make fewer mistakes?
39
Data / Setting: Kaur et al. (2019)
408 male casual labourers in rural Odisha (India) hired for a 12-day contract sewing disposable leaf plates during the agricultural lean season. Treatment: an early-pay group receives all earnings-to-date (≈ one month’s lean-season income) on day 8 or 9; controls are paid only on day 12. Hourly outcomes: accepted plates (speed), plate-quality markers that reveal inattention (extra leaves, stitches, double holes), and self-reports of financial strain and spending.
40
Methodology: Kaur et al. (2019)
RCT: workers are randomly assigned to receive an early cash payment (the “Cash” treatment) or to the control group; all other contract terms (wages, piece rates, hours, job tasks) are held constant. Productivity is compared before vs. after the early payment, using worker and day fixed effects to net out learning and time trends. DiD model regresses productivity outcomes on (EarlyPay × Post-Pay) and (EarlyPay × Post-Announcement), as well as worker and day fixed effects. The coefficient on the 1st interaction identifies the post-pay treatment effect, while the coefficient on the 2nd interaction serves as a placebo test for the announcement window.
41
Robustness: Kaur et al. (2019) – Does Financial Strain Lower Productivity?
No output jump after pay-schedule announcement (placebo term) ⇒ expectations alone irrelevant. Staggered pay-days (Wave A vs Wave B) – early pay in one wave while the other waits: no dip in the waiting controls ⇒ results not due to envy or peer spill-overs. Results survive controls for nutrition, sleep, trust and > 60 balanced covariates. High piece-rate week – triple the marginal reward without changing liquidity: effort rises a bit but attentiveness does not ⇒ pure incentive boosts look different from the cash effect. Debt-salience priming – randomly make workers think about debts before vs after they get cash: priming has either zero or opposite effects ⇒ psychological salience can’t mimic liquidity relief.
42
Results: Kaur et al. (2019)
(i) Once paid early, workers produce more plates and make fewer mistakes; gains appear overnight, persist, and are largest for the most liquidity-constrained (those in debt the most). (ii) The expectation of getting paid early did nothing, only cash-on-hands makes impact. (iii) Relieving short-term financial strain improves cognitive ability and boosts productivity.
43
Mani et al. (2013)
Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function
44
Motivation: Mani et al. (2013) - Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function
Do immediate money worries, rather than low ability or schooling, temporarily drain mental bandwidth and hinder decision-making? The authors test whether financial strain alone lowers attention and problem-solving.
45
Data / Setting: Mani et al. (2013) - Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function
Two complementary samples Mall lab (New Jersey): ≈100 shoppers classified “poor” vs. “rich”; each faces four car-repair vignettes that are low-cost ($150) or high-cost ($1 500), then completes Raven’s matrices and a numeric Stroop test. Field panel (Tamil Nadu): ≈460 sugar-cane farmers tested before harvest (cash-poor) and after harvest (cash-rich) on the same tasks.
46
Methodology: Mani et al. (2013) - Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function
Mall study: random assignment to low- or high-cost scenarios; compare cognitive scores across income groups. Farmer study: compare each farmer to himself pre- vs. post-harvest, holding ability constant; month dummies absorb seasonal shocks. Neither task requires literacy, isolating the effect of money worries.
47
Robustness: Mani et al. (2013) - Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function
Lab: results unchanged when costs are framed as non-financial numbers, when answers are incentivised, or when cognition tests follow a completed vignette (rules out distraction, effort and math-anxiety). Field: effects persist for farmers already harvested but unpaid, after controlling for food intake, vital signs and work effort; no practice effects in a single-test hold-out group. harvest time is staggered for farmers (exogenous since mill decides the timing of havest), therefore time fixed effects control for month differences. Validation: pawned goods, loans and other strain markers drop sharply after harvest, confirming the cash-cycle.
48
Results: Mani et al. (2013) - Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function
Mall: Poor participants score lower only when forced to think about an expensive repair; rich participants are unaffected. Field: The same farmer performs worse when cash-poor and rebounds once harvest income arrives. The drop is sizeable—comparable to a night without sleep—yet fully reversible, showing that acute financial strain directly taxes cognitive capacity.