Section 1: Lavy Flashcards
(120 cards)
1
Q
Title: Altonji, Bharadwaj & Lange (2012)
A
Changes in the Characteristics of American Youth: Implications for Adult Outcomes
2
Q
Motivation: Altonji, Bharadwaj & Lange (2012) - Changes in the Characteristics of American Youth: Implications for Adult Outcomes
A
Ask whether 1990s teens are really more “work-ready” than 1970s teens and how that could shape future wage gaps
3
Q
Setting: Altonji, Bharadwaj & Lange (2012) - Changes in the Characteristics of American Youth: Implications for Adult Outcomes
A
Two U.S. youth panels — one starting in the late-1970s, one in the late-1990s — tracking family background, AFQT scores, schooling, and actual or forecast adult wages
4
Q
Methodology: Altonji, Bharadwaj & Lange (2012) - Changes in the Characteristics of American Youth: Implications for Adult Outcomes
A
Re-weight 1970s cohort’s mix of race, parental education, AFQT, etc. to match the 1990s group, then feed into the 1970s wage equation. Then, add blocks of traits one at a time (parent ed. → test scores → own schooling → work timing) to see which shifts move predicted wages most.
5
Q
Robustness: Altonji, Bharadwaj & Lange (2012) - Changes in the Characteristics of American Youth: Implications for Adult Outcomes
A
Repeat with simple OLS/probit models; findings hardly move.
6
Q
Results: Altonji, Bharadwaj & Lange (2012) - Changes in the Characteristics of American Youth: Implications for Adult Outcomes
A
Skill-adjusted wages rise only a little; gains bigger at the top. Minorities and women narrow gaps (mainly via better-educated parents). Without faster skill growth, wage inequality is likely to keep widening.
7
Q
Title: Abramitzky & Lavy (2014)
A
How Responsive is Investment in Schooling to Changes in Returns? Evidence from an Unusual Pay Reform in Israel’s Kibbutzim
8
Q
Motivation: Abramitzky and Lavy (2014) - How Responsive is Investment in Schooling to Changes in Returns? Evidence from an Unusual Pay Reform in Israel’s Kibbutzim
A
Theory says students work harder in school when the payoff to education rises, yet clear real-world tests are rare
9
Q
Setting: Abramitzky and Lavy (2014) - How Responsive is Investment in Schooling to Changes in Returns? Evidence from an Unusual Pay Reform in Israel’s Kibbutzim
A
Israeli kibbutzim before vs. after a switch from equal pay to individual, performance-based pay. Two waves of 10th-graders tracked in admin records for school completion and exam results
10
Q
Methodology: Abramitzky and Lavy (2014) - How Responsive is Investment in Schooling to Changes in Returns? Evidence from an Unusual Pay Reform in Israel’s Kibbutzim
A
Difference-in-Differences: Early-reform kibbutzim are “treated,” late-reform ones are “controls.” Compare how student outcomes change over time across the two groups, checking that pre-trends match and that effects grow with longer exposure
11
Q
Robustness: Abramitzky and Lavy (2014) - How Responsive is Investment in Schooling to Changes in Returns? Evidence from an Unusual Pay Reform in Israel’s Kibbutzim
A
Parallel-trend and balance tests, very little in- or out-migration
12
Q
Results: Abramitzky and Lavy (2014) - How Responsive is Investment in Schooling to Changes in Returns? Evidence from an Unusual Pay Reform in Israel’s Kibbutzim
A
After pay reform, high-school completion, test scores, and both basic and college-track diplomas all move up. Gains are bigger for students from less-educated parent backgrounds, stronger for boys, effect rises with more years under the performance based system.
13
Q
Title: Abramitzky, Lavy and Segev (2024)
A
The Effect of Changes in the Skill Premium on College Degree Attainment and the Choice of Major
14
Q
Motivation: Abramitzky, Lavy and Segev (2024) - The Effect of Changes in the Skill Premium on College Degree Attainment and the Choice of Major
A
When the payoff to a degree suddenly jumps, do young adults finish college more often and steer toward better-paid majors?
15
Q
Setting: Abramitzky, Lavy and Segev (2024) - The Effect of Changes in the Skill Premium on College Degree Attainment and the Choice of Major
A
Israeli kibbutzim before vs. after a switch from equal pay to individual, performance-based pay. Records track high-school ability, BA completion, chosen major (STEM vs Humanities, etc.) and later wages.
16
Q
Methodology: Abramitzky, Lavy and Segev (2024) - The Effect of Changes in the Skill Premium on College Degree Attainment and the Choice of Major
A
Difference-in-Differences: compare early-reform youths with late-reform youths before vs after the switch, using kibbutz and cohort fixed effects. Split outcomes by major type to see if students re-sort toward high-return fields.
17
Q
Robustness: Abramitzky, Lavy and Segev (2024) - The Effect of Changes in the Skill Premium on College Degree Attainment and the Choice of Major
A
Parallel pre-trends, balanced backgrounds, placebo tests on non-treated outcomes, external comparison with Tel-Aviv youth.
18
Q
Results: Abramitzky, Lavy and Segev (2024) - The Effect of Changes in the Skill Premium on College Degree Attainment and the Choice of Major
A
After pay reform, BA completion rises sharply, driven almost entirely by STEM fields; low-return majors stay flat. Men flock to computing/engineering, women to bio/chem and computing. Gains are biggest for students who already met advanced-math prerequisites. Expected and realised wages move up.
19
Q
Title: Jensen (2010)
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The Perceived Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling
20
Q
Motivation: Jensen (2010) - The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling
A
Students often drop out after primary even though finishing secondary pays a lot more. The study asks: (i) How wrong are students’ wage beliefs? (ii) If you simply tell them accurate returns, do they stay in school?
21
Q
Setting: Jensen (2010) - The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling
A
8th-grade students in public schools spread across Dominican Republic — capturing pupils right before the stay/leave decision for Grade 9
22
Q
Methodology: Jensen (2010) - The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling
A
RCT: half the schools hear a speaker read official stats showing secondary school grads earn much more; the other half hear nothing. Difference-in-difference within each student a few months later for belief shifts, then track schooling for four years.
23
Q
Robustness: Jensen (2010) - The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling
A
Results survive alternative controls and comparison with non-surveyed classmates. Randomization balances backgrounds.
24
Q
Results: Jensen (2010) - The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling
A
Beliefs jump sharply — students now expect far bigger wage gains. Enrollment in Grade 9 increases, and total schooling inches higher, but mainly among boys from better-off families; poorer students revise beliefs yet do not stay longer, pointing to credit constraints
25
Title: Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004)
Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? — A Field Experiment on Labor-Market Discrimination
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Motivation: Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) - Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labour Market Discrimination
Despite equal paper credentials, Black job-seekers face lower pay and higher unemployment. The authors test whether race cues alone sways employers at the very first screen
27
Setting: Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) - Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labour Market Discrimination
Resumes were randomly given either a White-sounding or a Black-sounding first name and mailed to job ads in Boston and Chicago. Researchers tracked whether firms responded back.
28
Methodology: Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) - Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labour Market Discrimination
RCT: Within each ad, the only thing that changes across otherwise identical CVs is the first name’s race signal (plus, independently, résumé quality). Regressing Callback likelihood on Black, credentials, Black x Credentials variables, adding ad, city and occupation controls.
29
Robustness: Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) - Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labour Market Discrimination
Gaps look the same across both cities, job types, good and bad neighbourhoods, and among firms that claim to be equal-opportunity employers
30
Results: Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) - Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labour Market Discrimination
Resumes with White-sounding names get substantially more interview calls than identical resumes with Black-sounding names. Improving credentials boosts callbacks mainly for White names.
31
Title: Lavy (2008)
Do Gender Stereotypes Reduce Girls’ or Boys’ Human-Capital Outcomes? Evidence from Teacher Grading Bias
32
Motivation: Lavy (2008) - Do Gender Stereotypes Reduce Girls’ or Boys’ Human Capital Outcomes? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Teachers are thought to grade girls and boys differently, but hard proof is scarce. Do marks shift once the grader can infer gender?
33
Setting: Lavy (2008) - Do Gender Stereotypes Reduce Girls’ or Boys’ Human Capital Outcomes? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Israel’s matriculation system allows a clean test: every student gets one blind state exam mark and one non-blind school mark. Hundreds of thousands of paired blind vs. non-blind scores across 9 subjects.
34
Methodology: Lavy (2008) - Do Gender Stereotypes Reduce Girls’ or Boys’ Human Capital Outcomes? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Within-pupil DiD: compare each child’s non-blind score with their own blind score, then see whether that gap is different for boys and girls across subjects.
35
Robustness: Lavy (2008) - Do Gender Stereotypes Reduce Girls’ or Boys’ Human Capital Outcomes? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Add past scores and parent education, split by ability quartile, school type is not important and timing is checked, using later tests. DiD removes teacher inflation, SEs clustered at class level.
36
Results: Lavy (2008) - Do Gender Stereotypes Reduce Girls’ or Boys’ Human Capital Outcomes? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
When teachers know the name, boys’ marks fall relative to blind grading in almost every subject (especially languages and science labs). The penalty shows up for high and low achievers alike, is stronger under male or younger graders.
37
Title: Alesina et al. (2024)
Revealing Stereotypes: Evidence from Immigrants in Schools
38
Motivation: Alesina et al. (2024) - Revealing Stereotypes: Evidence from Immigrants in Schools
Immigrant pupils often get lower report-card marks than natives who score the same on blind tests. Is that gap linked to teachers’ hidden anti-immigrant bias? And can simple feedback make grading fairer?
39
Setting: Alesina et al. (2024) - Revealing Stereotypes: Evidence from Immigrants in Schools
Students' marks from Italian middle schools, linked to each pupil’s blind INVALSI test score. Teachers also took a 5-minute Implicit-Association Test (IAT).
40
Methodology: Alesina et al. (2024) - Revealing Stereotypes: Evidence from Immigrants in Schools
(i) Compare student’s teacher mark minus blind score and see if the gap is larger for immigrants. (ii) Treatment teachers saw their own IAT score 1 week before grading; control teachers saw it 1 week after. Measure how the immigrant-native grade gap changes.
41
Robustness: Alesina et al. (2024) - Revealing Stereotypes: Evidence from Immigrants in Schools
Pupil & class controls, placebo re-labels, parallel-trend tests; online grading exercise replicates patterns.
42
Results: Alesina et al. (2024) - Revealing Stereotypes: Evidence from Immigrants in Schools
Immigrant pupils get lower marks, and the penalty grows with the teacher’s bias score. Seeing one’s own IAT number roughly halves the gap — mostly among the most biased graders.
43
Title: Hanna & Linden (2012)
Discrimination in Grading
44
Motivation: Hanna and Linden (2012) - Discrimination in Grading
Check if teachers unconsciously mark identical work lower when they think it comes from a low-caste child, reinforcing inequality.
45
Setting: Hanna and Linden (2012) - Discrimination in Grading
An exam contest in an Indian city, where children sat maths, language and art papers.
46
Methodology: Hanna and Linden (2012) - Discrimination in Grading
RCT: treatment scripts carry a low-caste name. Identical control scripts carry a high-caste name. Random assignment inside each teacher’s pile means any score gap is pure grading bias. Teacher fixed-effects complement regressions.
47
Robustness: Hanna and Linden (2012) - Discrimination in Grading
Balance checks show labels unrelated to blind marks; adding pupil covariates or blind scores leaves the caste penalty unchanged; placebo relabellings and alternative clustering give the same result. Grader fixed-effects.
48
Results: Hanna and Linden (2012) - Discrimination in Grading
Scripts tagged low-caste receive slightly lower marks on average. The difference is largest in the first few papers graded and disappears as they see more scripts, suggesting statistical discrimination under greater uncertainty. With the penalty driven by low-caste graders to low-caste students.
49
Title: Lavy & Sand (2018)
On the Origins of Gender Gaps in Human Capital: Short- and Long-Term Consequences of Teachers’ Biases
50
Motivation: Lavy and Sand (2018) - On The Origins of the Gender Human Capital Gap: Short and Long Term Effect of Teachers’ Stereotypes
Ask whether tiny, often hidden, pro-boy marks that primary-school teachers give can snowball into the big gender gaps we see later
51
Setting: Lavy and Sand (2018) - On The Origins of the Gender Human Capital Gap: Short and Long Term Effect of Teachers’ Stereotypes
Tel-Aviv pupils first sit a blind national maths test in Grade 5, then an almost identical non-blind school test in Grade 6 that their own teacher marks.
52
Methodology: Lavy and Sand (2018) - On The Origins of the Gender Human Capital Gap: Short and Long Term Effect of Teachers’ Stereotypes
1) Build a teacher-bias index by comparing, within each class, the boy-girl gap on the teacher-marked test to the gap on the blind test. 2) Use within-school regressions that link this bias index to each child’s later scores and choice of advanced STEM courses, controlling for prior achievement and fixed school factors.
53
Robustness: Lavy and Sand (2018) - On The Origins of the Gender Human Capital Gap: Short and Long Term Effect of Teachers’ Stereotypes
Jack-knife versions of the bias index, pupil covariates, placebo tests, class and subject fixed effects, and balance checks all leave the pattern intact
54
Results: Lavy and Sand (2018) - On The Origins of the Gender Human Capital Gap: Short and Long Term Effect of Teachers’ Stereotypes
A small tilt that inflates boys’ maths marks in Grade 6 raises their later test scores and steers them into STEM tracks, while the same tilt holds girls back. The advantage persists for years. Removing the average pro-boy bias would close a noticeable share of the gender gap.
55
Title: Nunn & Qian (2011)
The Potato’s Contribution to World Population and Urbanization
56
Motivation: Nunn and Qian (2011) - The Potato's Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence from a Historical Experiment
Global population and city growth surged after the 1700s. The authors ask whether the arrival of the potato—an energy-dense New-World crop—was a key causal driver.
57
Setting: Nunn and Qian (2011) - The Potato's Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence from a Historical Experiment
Country-level panel from the Old World, 1000-1900: maps showing how much of each country could grow potatoes, matched to long-run population counts
58
Methodology: Nunn and Qian (2011) - The Potato's Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence from a Historical Experiment
Calculate the land area within countries, where potatos can be grown. Continuous “dose” DiD: regress outcomes on country and time fixed effects and controls (other crops, climate, etc.), interacting suitability with a post-1700 indicator. The coefficient measures extra growth in more potato-friendly places once the crop is available.
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Robustness: Nunn and Qian (2011) - The Potato's Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence from a Historical Experiment
i) Geography, institutions and other crops as controls
ii) French soldier heights as a nutrition check — all confirm the pattern.
60
Results: Nunn and Qian (2011) - The Potato's Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence from a Historical Experiment
Countries that could grow potatoes saw faster population increases and urban expansion after 1700. Timing matches the crop’s diffusion, and supporting evidence on height and city growth points to better nutrition and food surplus as the mechanism.
61
Title: Jayachandran & Pande (2017)
Why Are Indian Children So Short? The Role of Birth Order and Son Preference
62
Motivation: Jayachandran and Pande (2017) - Why Are Indian Children So Short? The Role of Birth Order and Son Preference
Indian children are shorter than peers in poorer regions. The study asks whether unequal treatment of later-borns, fueled by a cultural bias toward eldest sons, can explain this puzzle.
63
Setting: Jayachandran and Pande (2017) - Why Are Indian Children So Short? The Role of Birth Order and Son Preference
National health surveys covering hundreds of thousands of children across India and many African countries provide height-for-age scores
64
Methodology: Jayachandran and Pande (2017) - Why Are Indian Children So Short? The Role of Birth Order and Son Preference
1) Regress height-for-age (z-scores) on birth-order dummies, an India dummy, and the interactions India × 2nd-child and India × 3rd-ect. negative interaction coefficients show later-born Indian kids lose extra height relative to later-born African kids
2) Adding neighbourhood, mother, and child fixed effects, limiting the sample to mothers past child-bearing, and replacing Africa with other country groups—confirming the extra penalty survives every “apples-to-apples” check.
3) To trace the mechanism, they looked at
i) Indian groups with weaker son preference (Muslim, Kerala),
ii) Whether the penalty hinges on the gender mix of older siblings,
iii) Compare prenatal and post-natal inputs that taper off for later-borns;
The consistent patterns point to parental eldest-son bias, not biology or poverty, as the source of the gap.
65
Robustness: Jayachandran and Pande (2017) - Why Are Indian Children So Short? The Role of Birth Order and Son Preference
Alternative country benchmarks keep the steep Indian gradient intact. Add mother fixed effects to contrast siblings within the same family, so any extra Indian penalty reflects parental behaviour, not poverty or genetics.
66
Results: Jayachandran and Pande (2017) - Why Are Indian Children So Short? The Role of Birth Order and Son Preference
1) Indian First-Borns are just as tall as their African peers: short height only kicks in for later-born kids and deepens with each extra birth order.
2) Post/pre-natal Care: Drop in check-ups, supplements, safe deliveries and vaccinations are much steeper across birth orders in India than in Africa, mirroring the height pattern.
3) Culture is the Mechanism: groups with weaker eldest-son preference: Muslims, matrilineal Kerala show a flatter birth-order penalty.
4) Sibling Gender: A second-born boy thrives only when his older sibling is a girl (making him the first son), while late sibling girls fare worst, confirming an eldest-son bias in parental investment (dont invest until there is a son). Shorter than african girls
5) Girls Lose Overall: Indian girls are disadvantaged from the very first birth and fall further behind with each subsequent birth: “keep-trying-for-a-son”
67
Title: Imberman, Kugler & Sacerdote (2012)
Katrina’s Children: A Natural Experiment in Peer Effects from Hurricane Evacuees
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Motivation: Imberman, Kugler & Sacerdote (2012) – Katrina’s Children: A Natural Experiment in Peer Effects from Hurricane Evacuees
Hurricanes suddenly displaced thousands of pupils. This random shock created a rare natural experiment: schools’ peer mix is quasi-random exogenous (no family influence/academic tacking). The paper exploits this to test whether an exogenous shock to peer quality changes incumbents’ achievement, attendance and discipline.
69
Data/Setting: Imberman, Kugler & Sacerdote (2012) – Katrina’s Children: A Natural Experiment in Peer Effects from Hurricane Evacuees
Louisianna & Houston panels; student records before/after the hurricane; school-level evacuee shares.
70
Methodology: Imberman, Kugler & Sacerdote (2012) – Katrina’s Children: A Natural Experiment in Peer Effects from Hurricane Evacuees
Continious "dose" DID: regress school incumbent outcomes (grades, attendance, discipline) on the Evacuee Share, controlling for time and entity fixed effects.
Re-run the same model after slicing the Evacuee Share into quartiles/medians (based on their pre-Katrina achievement), revealing whether low-ability or high-ability newcomers drive the effects.
71
Robustness Checks: Imberman, Kugler & Sacerdote (2012) – Katrina’s Children: A Natural Experiment in Peer Effects from Hurricane Evacuees
1) Exogenous Shock: evacuee children had almost no school choice, so the jump in each school’s evacuee share is quasi-random once we account for the school fixed effects (family couldn't chose/sort into schools).
2) Parallel Trends & Placebo Check: When the authors regress pre-Katrina outcomes on future evacuee shares, the coefficients are near zero—showing no hidden pre-trends (future share couldn't have influenced prior scores).
3) Houston IV: Since some evacuees reshuffled after the first chaotic weeks, they instrument the October evacuee share, relative to before families could “shop” for schools.
72
Results: Imberman, Kugler & Sacerdote (2012) – Katrina’s Children: A Natural Experiment in Peer Effects from Hurricane Evacuees
Average academic effects are small, but peer quality matters: high-achieving evacuees raise incumbents’ scores, low-achievers lower them.
Secondary schools receiving more evacuees experience higher absenteeism and discipline problems.
Class size, spending and teacher quality stay steady, so the effects are endogenous.
73
Title: Lavy & Sand (2019)
The Effect of Social Networks on Students’ Academic and Non-Cognitive Behavioral Outcomes: Evidence from Conditional Random Assignment of Friends in School
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Motivation: Lavy & Sand (2019) – The Effect of Social Networks on Students’ Academic and Non-Cognitive Behavioral Outcomes: Evidence from Conditional Random Assignment of Friends in School
Tel Aviv’s middle-school choice process often splits sixth-grade friendship groups. The authors ask whether preserving or breaking specific friendship ties during this transition influences later test performance, happiness and behaviour, highlighting the overlooked social-capital cost of school-assignment policies.
75
Data/Setting: Lavy & Sand (2019) – The Effect of Social Networks on Students’ Academic and Non-Cognitive Behavioral Outcomes: Evidence from Conditional Random Assignment of Friends in School
Three cohorts of Tel Aviv pupils list up to eight desired friends when ranking middle-school options. These lists define “reciprocal,” “follower,” and “non-reciprocal” ties. Friend data merge with ministry test scores (GEMS) and student surveys on violence, satisfaction and study time.
76
Methodology: Lavy & Sand (2019) – The Effect of Social Networks on Students’ Academic and Non-Cognitive Behavioral Outcomes: Evidence from Conditional Random Assignment of Friends in School
Because schools randomly allocate entrants across classes, conditional on a pupil’s number of friends in the school, the number in her class is random. OLS within school-cohort regresses eighth-grade test z-scores or behavioural indices on counts of reciprocal, follower and non-reciprocal friends in class, controlling for identical friend counts in school plus class and year fixed effects.
77
Robustness Checks: Lavy & Sand (2019) – The Effect of Social Networks on Students’ Academic and Non-Cognitive Behavioral Outcomes: Evidence from Conditional Random Assignment of Friends in School
Chi-square tests confirm random class assignment; balancing shows friend counts uncorrelated with background traits. Results persist with classroom fixed effects, added student covariates, alternative friend definitions and placebo checks using earlier cohorts.
78
Results: Lavy & Sand (2019) – The Effect of Social Networks on Students’ Academic and Non-Cognitive Behavioral Outcomes: Evidence from Conditional Random Assignment of Friends in School
Having more reciprocal friends or followers in class boosts English, maths and Hebrew scores, heightens school satisfaction and lowers violence; additional non-reciprocal friends hurt performance. Effects are confined to the first friendship circle and vary by gender—boys benefit mainly from followers, girls from reciprocal ties.
79
Title: Lavy & Schlosser (2011)
Mechanism and Impacts of Gender Peer Effects at School
80
Motivation: Lavy & Schlosser (2011) – Mechanism and Impacts of Gender Peer Effects at School
The study tackles whether the share of girls in mixed Israeli classrooms shapes learning and behaviour, and it seeks to open the “black box” by tracing channels like disruption, peer relations and teacher fatigue across elementary, middle and high school stages.
81
Data/Setting: Lavy & Schlosser (2011) – Mechanism and Impacts of Gender Peer Effects at School
National Ministry datasets link every pupil’s background and academic performance to grade-level gender ratios within each public school. Complementary student and teacher surveys report classroom climate and staff burnout.
82
Methodology: Lavy & Schlosser (2011) – Mechanism and Impacts of Gender Peer Effects at School
OLS with school fixed effects regresses pupil test scores, matriculation outcomes and climate indices on the proportion of girls in the same grade, controlling for enrolment, average demographics and year dummies; school-specific trends absorb slow shifts. Student fixed-effect models exploit transitions from elementary to middle school.
83
Robustness Checks: Lavy & Schlosser (2011) – Mechanism and Impacts of Gender Peer Effects at School
(i) Monte-Carlo simulations showing cohort-to-cohort girl-share shifts mimic random draws
(ii) Balance tests and very low school-switching prove shifts are unrelated to background or sorting
(iii) Placebo cohorts give null effects
(iv) Estimates endure school-trend controls, alternative grade/class definitions, and exclusion of religious or high-mobility schools.
84
Results: Lavy & Schlosser (2011) – Mechanism and Impacts of Gender Peer Effects at School
A higher girl share lifts boys’ and girls’ academic performance, mainly by reducing disruptions, violence and teacher exhaustion; self-reported individual behaviour barely changes, implying composition, not personal reform, drives gains. Effects are strongest for low-education families and recent immigrants.
85
Title: Gould, Lavy & Paserman (2004)
Immigrating to Opportunity: Estimating the Effect of School Quality Using a Natural Experiment on Ethiopians in Israel
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Motivation: Gould, Lavy & Paserman (2004) – Immigrating to Opportunity: Estimating The Effect of School Quality Using a Natural Experiment on Ethiopians in Israel
Operation Solomon airlift randomly scattered Ethiopian children across Israeli absorption centres. Authors leverage this natural lottery to test whether the quality of the first elementary school influences later high-school persistence and matriculation success.
87
Data/Setting: Gould, Lavy & Paserman (2004) – Immigrating to Opportunity: Estimating The Effect of School Quality Using a Natural Experiment on Ethiopians in Israel
Administrative panels trace each Ethiopian pupil from initial elementary placement in the early nineteen-nineties through high-school careers, linking them to pre-immigration school test averages and to community characteristics such as income and welfare rates.
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Methodology: Gould, Lavy & Paserman (2004) – Immigrating to Opportunity: Estimating The Effect of School Quality Using a Natural Experiment on Ethiopians in Israel
Probit and linear models regress dropout, repetition, school track and matriculation pass on initial school math quality, controlling for age, sex, family size and parental education; arrival-centre fixed effects absorb any locational sorting; sibling fixed-effect specifications purge family unobservables.
89
Robustness Checks: Gould, Lavy & Paserman (2004) – Immigrating to Opportunity: Estimating The Effect of School Quality Using a Natural Experiment on Ethiopians in Israel
Re-estimations with verbal-score quality, alternative socioeconomic indices and community fixed effects give similar patterns; excluding movers or late arrivals, and clustering at school level, does not change conclusions.
90
Results: Gould, Lavy & Paserman (2004) – Immigrating to Opportunity: Estimating The Effect of School Quality Using a Natural Experiment on Ethiopians in Israel
Children sent to stronger math schools are less likely to drop out or repeat grades and more likely to pass the matriculation hurdle, with benefits persisting after extensive controls, underscoring the long-reach importance of early-school environments for disadvantaged migrants.
91
Title: Duflo & Hanna (2005)
Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School
92
Motivation: Duflo & Hanna (2005) – Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School
Teacher absence was nearly half of all school days in rural Indian “one-teacher” centres. The authors test whether a low-tech camera plus pay‐dock scheme can get teachers to show up and, if so, whether children actually learn more.
93
Data/Setting: Duflo & Hanna (2005) – Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School
120 NGO schools in tribal Rajasthan; 60 randomly assigned to the camera contract, 60 kept fixed pay. Monthly unannounced visits record attendance; pupils take independent Hindi-math tests before and after the school year.
94
Methodology: Duflo & Hanna (2005) – Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School
Randomised Controlled Trial: treatment teachers’ pay rises or falls per day above/below 21 verified days; control teachers’ salary fixed. Outcomes—absence rate and test score gains—compared across arms; regressions include school fixed effects and baseline scores.
95
Robustness Checks: Duflo & Hanna (2005) – Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School
Teacher‐attendance gains withstand scrutiny: pre-program covariates are balanced across randomized schools; camera records match unannounced spot-checks, dismissing “photo-only” gaming; effects persist after the formal evaluation, ruling out Hawthorne bias; impact sizes stay stable when clustering by school, trimming outliers, or adding month, inspector and school-trend controls, confirming genuine causal improvements.
96
Results: Duflo & Hanna (2005) – Monitoring Works: Getting Teachers to Come to School
Monitoring halves absence, eliminates extreme truancy and delivers roughly one-third more teaching time. After a year, pupil scores are noticeably higher and regular-school transition rises; no evidence teachers slackened in-class effort.
97
Title: Lavy (2009)
Performance Pay and Teachers’ Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics
98
Motivation: Lavy (2009) – Performance Pay and Teachers’ Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics
Israel piloted cash bonuses for high-school English and maths teachers ranked on exam pass rates and mean scores; study asks whether individual incentives lift real learning and alter teaching behaviour.
99
Data/Setting: Lavy (2009) – Performance Pay and Teachers’ Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics
Forty-nine low-performing comprehensive schools joined the 2001 bonus tournament; student-level matriculation records, rich demographics and teacher surveys observed 2000–2002; comparable schools below the eligibility threshold form the pool of controls.
100
Methodology: Lavy (2009) – Performance Pay and Teachers’ Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics
Quasi-randomised trial from measurement error: among schools near the 45 % pass-rate cutoff, some were mistakenly treated. In this “randomised-treatment” subset, student pass and average scores are regressed on a treatment dummy, controlling for lagged outcomes; complementary RD and DiD estimates provide checks.
101
Robustness Checks: Lavy (2009) – Performance Pay and Teachers’ Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics
Results replicated with regression-discontinuity around threshold, full eligible-school DiD, alternative bandwidths and rich covariates; no rise in internal grading inflation or strategic pupil exclusion detected.
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Results: Lavy (2009) – Performance Pay and Teachers’ Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics
Incentives raise exam participation, conditional pass rates and mean scores; teacher diaries show more after-school tutoring, diversified pedagogy and sharper student feedback. External exam marking rules out score manipulation.
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Title: Duchini et al. (2023)
School Management Takeover, Leadership Change, and Personnel Policy
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Motivation: Duchini et al. (2023) – School Management Takeover, Leadership Change, and Personnel Policy
England lets external “Sponsors” assume control of failing secondary schools. Paper probes whether such takeovers change leadership, teacher workforce and pay architecture in ways that could explain earlier pupil-achievement gains.
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Data/Setting: Duchini et al. (2023) – School Management Takeover, Leadership Change, and Personnel Policy
A large panel links national payroll and census records for teachers to 600 Sponsor-led academy conversions (2005-2022) and to comparable schools that convert later, giving multi-year windows before and after takeover.
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Methodology: Duchini et al. (2023) – School Management Takeover, Leadership Change, and Personnel Policy
DiD traces outcomes from three years before to four years after conversion, with school and calendar-year fixed effects. Key outcomes: head-teacher replacement, teacher exits/entries, pay structure, Ofsted grades and GCSE scores. A timing-based instrument—using the sharp Ofsted trigger for mandatory takeover—bolsters causal interpretation.
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Robustness Checks: Duchini et al. (2023) – School Management Takeover, Leadership Change, and Personnel Policy
Parallel-trend graphs, placebo leads, alternative control windows and re-weighting by pre-takeover traits yield similar coefficients; teacher-level models with individual fixed effects confirm pay-structure findings.
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Results: Duchini et al. (2023) – School Management Takeover, Leadership Change, and Personnel Policy
Takeover doubles probability of a new, better-paid head drawn from outstanding schools; low-value teachers exit while high-quality recruits and Teach First entrants arrive; Sponsors scrap seniority scales, widening performance-related pay spread and coinciding with later GCSE gains.
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Title: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001)
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
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Motivation: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) – The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
They challenge geography-only explanations by arguing that the institutions (inclusive vs. exctractive) Europeans implanted—not climate—explain why some ex-colonies are rich while others remain poor. Secure property rights introduced where settlers could survive fostered long-run growth; extractive regimes imposed in deadly environments stunted it.
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Data/Setting: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) – The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
Cross-country dataset links 18-century European settler mortality figures to 19-century measures of institutional quality and to late-20-century per-capita income for a broad sample of former colonies spread across all continents.
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Methodology: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) – The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
Institutions are endogenous (depending on the enviornment), affecting settler mortality, which is used as an IV. The authors build a 2SLS model. 1st stage regresses institutional quality on mortality; 2nd stage regresses modern GDP per capita on predicted institutions, adding continent and geography controls in a two-stage least-squares framework.
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Robustness Checks: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) – The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
All leave the results intact:
i) Adding climate and natural-resource variables
ii) Using alternative institutional indices
iii) Pre-colonial prosperity measures and religion dummies
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Results: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) – The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
Former colonies with lower settler mortality and early inclusive institutions enjoy far higher present-day incomes once endogeneity is addressed, whereas geography alone has limited predictive power. The evidence supports institutions as the deep driver of comparative development.
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Title: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2002)
Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution
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Motivation: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2002) – Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution
Observing that areas wealthy in the year 1500 are often poor now, the authors ask why colonialism flipped the income ranking and posit an “institutional reversal” – inclusive rules set up where Europeans settled, extractive ones where they exploited dense, rich societies.
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Data/Setting: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2002) – Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution
Records of pre-colonial prosperity and modern GDP per capita, complemented by the earlier settler-mortality and institution quality measures.
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Methodology: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2002) – Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution
Reduced-form OLS shows a negative link between past prosperity (insturmented through urbanisation and population density) and current GDP per capita. 2SLS then instruments institutions with settler mortality and regresses today’s income on predicted institutional quality, controlling for geography and coloniser effects.
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Robustness Checks: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2002) – Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution
Patterns persist within continents, after dropping British settler offshoots, and when alternative pre-1500 prosperity measures or additional geographic variables are used. Timing analysis shows the income reversal coincides with the industrial era, supporting an institutional—not geographic—mechanism.
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Results: Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2002) – Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution
Regions that were densely populated and wealthy before colonisation now lag behind previously poor settler areas because colonisers installed extractive institutions in the former and inclusive ones in the latter, confirming that institutional paths, not inherent geography, drove the dramatic income flip.
