Section 2: Costas Flashcards

(55 cards)

1
Q

Title: Katz & Murphy (1992)

A

Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors

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2
Q

Motivation: Katz & Murphy (1992) - Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors

A

US wage gaps between high and low skill workers exploded after the late-1970s. Are those gaps mainly due to a flood of college grads (supply) or to rising employer demand for skill (skill-biased technological change)?

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3
Q

Setting: Katz & Murphy (1992) - Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors

A

United States, 1963-87. Annual March Current Population Survey files track wages and hours for the whole workforce

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4
Q

Supply-Only Test: Katz & Murphy (1992) - Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors

A

Compute the dot-product of wage changes and quantity changes for every five-year window. If only supply moved, the product should be negative; a positive sign means demand must have shifted.

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5
Q

2-Part CES: Katz & Murphy (1992) - Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors

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Collapse labour into “college-equivalent” and “high-school-equivalent” units. Estimate the substitution elasticity (how fast or how slow do college equivalent workers substitute high-school workers), then back out the trend in the relative demand shifter (interpreted as skill-biased tech change.

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6
Q

Decomposing Demand Shift: Katz & Murphy (1992) - Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors

A

Build counterfactual indices to ask how much of the demand shift comes from inter- or intra industry reallocation, labour up-skilling or trade.

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7
Q

Robustness: Katz & Murphy (1992) - Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors

A

CES results unchanged when adding union density, import penetration, or alternative industry splits; trade-only and sectoral reallocation stories explain at most a minor share of the overall demand shift.

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8
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Results: Katz & Murphy (1992) - Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors

A

After 1980 demand for college-type skill rises steadily, overrunning earlier supply booms and pushing the wage premium up again. Most of the extra demand appears within industries, consistent with technology-driven up-skilling

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9
Q

Title: Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003)

A

The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration

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10
Q

Motivation: Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003) - The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration

A

Since the 1970s the “middle” of the U.S. job market has thinned out: office clerks and factory workers have become scarcer, while well-paid professional jobs have multiplied. This paper asks whether the spread of cheap computers is the reason.

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11
Q

Setting: Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003) - The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration

A

US Census and CPS micro-data from 1960-1998 are merged with occupation-level routine scores (from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles)

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12
Q

Adoption Pattern: Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003) - The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration

A

The 1st regression tests whether industries that were more routine-intensive in 1960 experienced faster computer uptake in subsequent decades; routine share in 1960 serves as a pre-treatment predictor

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13
Q

Re-allocation Tests: Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003) - The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration

A

(i) Industry-level test relates decade-by-decade changes in computer use to shifts in routine versus non-routine hours; (ii) the same specification is run separately for college and non-college workers to verify that job content, not education mix, is moving; (iii) a within-occupation version confirms that tasks inside job titles re-balance as computer use rises.

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14
Q

Robustness: Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003) - The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration

A

Common computer-price shock applies to all sectors; placebo decades show no effect; identical patterns appear across industries, education groups and occupations

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15
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Results: Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003) - The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration

A

Routine-heavy industries adopt computers earlier, automate clerical/assembly work and expand analytic and interactive tasks — both between and within occupations. This task re-allocation explains the bulk of the post-1970 surge in demand for college-educated labour.

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16
Q

Title: Autor & Dorn (2013)

A

The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market

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17
Q

Motivation: Autor & Dorn (2013) - The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market

A

Since 1980 the U.S. job distribution has formed a U-shape: middle-wage clerical posts shrank, while both high-pay professional roles and low-pay service jobs grew. The paper asks whether cheap computers, by automating routine office and production work, pushed displaced workers into in-person services

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18
Q

Setting: Autor & Dorn (2013) - The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market

A

The authors follow roughly millions of workers in every Census from 1950 to 2005 in the United States

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19
Q

Economic Mechanism Autor & Dorn (2013) - The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market

A

A goods sector combines routine labour with computer capital, while a face-to-face service sector uses only manual non-routine labour. If computers substitute for routine work more easily than households swap expenditures between goods and services, cheaper computers should push all low-skill labour toward services and raise wages at the top (abstract tasks).Factories and offices often rely on rule-based jobs like typing invoices or operating simple machines, and those tasks can now be done by cheap computers. By contrast, hairdressers, waiters or cleaners perform hands-on, people-facing work that machines still can’t handle. When computer prices fall, firms swap out their rule-based workers for machines. Displaced workers drift into in-person service jobs at the bottom of the pay scale, while demand (and pay) rises for highly educated people whose abstract, problem-solving tasks are helped—not replaced—by technology.

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20
Q

Empirical Tests: Autor & Dorn (2013) - The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market

A

a. Early adopters: First, see whether places that were loaded with routine jobs back in 1950 were the quickest to start using PCs once the technology became cheap in the 1990s.
b. Job reshuffle: Next, ask if those same places subsequently lost a bigger share of routine clerical and production posts and gained more low-skill service work between 1980 and 2005.
c. Wage and talent polarisation: Finally, test whether pay spreads out into a deep “U” in those areas—middle wages sag while both bottom and top rise—and whether they attract extra college-educated workers drawn by the growing need for abstract skills.

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21
Q

Robustness: Autor & Dorn (2013) - The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market

A

Instrument the 1980 routine share with the 1950 mix to avoid mechanical bias; control for entity and time fixed effects; replace PC use with hardware-investment data and obtain similar results.

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22
Q

Results: Autor & Dorn (2013) - The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market

A

Routine-heavy labour markets adopted PCs earlier, then shed clerical and factory jobs while expanding low-skill, face-to-face services such. Within these markets wages stretched into a pronounced U-shape—middle pay fell as both bottom and top wages rose—and the inflow of college-educated workers grew, signalling stronger demand for abstract, non-routine tasks.

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23
Q

Title: Goos et al. (2014)

A

Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring

24
Q

Motivation: Goos et al. (2014) - Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring

A

Why have middle-wage clerical / production jobs vanished while both well-paid professional and low-paid service jobs expanded? Authors test whether automation of routine work and its offshoring abroad can jointly reproduce this polar shape without invoking shifts in education supply.

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Setting: Goos et al. (2014) - Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring
EU Labour Force Survey, 1993-2010, sixteen West-European countries. Ranked by Routine Task Intensity (RTI—share of repetitive rule-based duties) and by an offshorability index (likelihood tasks can be done remotely).
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Methodology: Goos et al. (2014) - Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring
Main OLS: Regress change in employment on RTI, offshorability and the interaction between the interaction RTI and offshorability, controlling for fixed effects. Dynamic panel re-estimated with system-GMM to tackle serial correlation and simultaneity between shrinking occupations and investment in automation. Decomposition isolates within-industry versus between-industry contributions.
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Robustness: Goos et al. (2014) - Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring
Uses clustered-by-occupation SEs, country-specific time trends, alternative RTI scales, person-weight versus hours-weight, exclude surveys that use different standards. Coefficients stable in leave-one-country-out jackknifes.
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Results: Goos et al. (2014) - Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring
Within industries, high-RTI occupations shed the largest employment shares; between industries, sectors intensive in routine tasks also contract, confirming RBTC as dominant mechanism. Offshoring loses significance once RTI entered, implying trade reallocates a modest margin only. In routine-heavy industries, firms will prefer to invest in capital to meet the new demand, instead of labour.
29
Title: Deming (2017)
The Growing Importance of Social Skills in the Labor Market
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Motivation: Deming (2017) - The Growing Importance of Social Skills in the Labor Market
As computers displaced routine cognitive work, returns to pure analytical skill plateaued. Hypothesis: tasks requiring social interaction resist automation, so labour-market demand—and pay—pivot toward social skills, especially when combined with cognitive ability.
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Setting: Deming (2017) - The Growing Importance of Social Skills in the Labor Market
U.S. Census data 1980-2012, O*NET task ratings for social and cognitive content, wages and measured skills between 79-97 cohorts.
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Economic Mechanism: Deming (2017) - The Growing Importance of Social Skills in the Labor Market
Workers differ in which micro-tasks they’re quickest at. They gain by swapping chores—yet each hand-off wastes time, and the loss shrinks when both partners communicate well. As computers automate the routine middle of jobs, what’s left is the messy, uneven edge where swapping helps most. So stronger social skill now lets teams specialise more and, paired with brains, commands ever-higher pay.
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Empirical Approach: Deming (2017) - The Growing Importance of Social Skills in the Labor Market
1) In cross section wage regressions, pay is regressed on cognitive skill, social skill and their product; a positive interaction shows that brains pay more when paired with people-skills. 2) Within a worker’s own career, pay rises with social skill only when the current job is less routine. 3) DiD comparing 1979 (control; early-stage computerisation) and 1997 (treatment; routine automation had advanced) youth cohorts, the social-skill premium grows for the latter, matching the idea that automation raised returns to interaction. 4) Occupations whose tasks involve more interaction (and less maths) gain employment faster, as the model predicts.
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Robustness: Deming (2017) - The Growing Importance of Social Skills in the Labor Market
Standard errors clustered by occupation; results unchanged adding computer-capital, offshoring exposure, union decline, local-labour-market effects. Triple-difference falsification shows no rising premium in cognitive-only roles. IV using sibling fixed effects confirms skill measures not driven by unobserved ability.
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Results: Deming (2017) - The Growing Importance of Social Skills in the Labor Market
Employment shares rise sharply in social-skill-heavy occupations; wage premium for social skill roughly doubles from 1980 to 2012. Pay returns peak when high social content intersects high cognitive content, supporting complementarity. Declining returns to cognitive skills alone explain slowing STEM wage growth.
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Title: Cavounidis et al. (2024)
The Nature of Technological Change, 1960-2016
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Motivation: Cavounidis et al. (2024) - The Nature of Technological Change, 1960-2016
Authors ask which of the 5 basic skills became more important, and whether those skill-specific shocks alone can explain both job flows across occupations and tsk shifts within occupations.
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Setting: Cavounidis et al. (2024) - The Nature of Technological Change, 1960-2016
United States, 1960-2016 occupational data. Five aggregate skills analysed: routine-cognitive, dexterous routine-manual, basic manual, abstract reasoning, social interaction.
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Methodology: Cavounidis et al. (2024) - The Nature of Technological Change, 1960-2016
Treat every job as a five-element skill mix. Regress each job’s decade-to-decade employment change on those skill shares. The estimated coefficients reveal which skill technologies raced ahead (negative sign) or lagged behind (positive sign). Translate those signs and sizes into relative tech-growth rates for each skill. Feed those growth rates back into the model to forecast how the surviving jobs should rearrange their own task mix; the predicted rearrangement matches the actual DOT→O*NET shift, confirming the story.
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Robustness: Cavounidis et al. (2024) - The Nature of Technological Change, 1960-2016
Estimates robust to alternative occupation aggregation, dropping recession years, hours vs heads weighting, and augmenting model with occupation-specific capital trends. Out-of-sample validation: skill-growth estimates from 1960-83 accurately forecast 1995-2016 within-occupation task shifts.
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Results: Cavounidis et al. (2024) - The Nature of Technological Change, 1960-2016
Fastest productivity gains occur in routine-cognitive and finger-dexterous tasks, pushing workers out of those jobs and reducing such task shares within survivors. Slowest productivity gains in abstract and social skills increase their intra-job usage and preserve associated employment. Framework reconciles both the cross-industry polarization of employment and the rising share of interactive and problem-solving tasks.
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Title: Acemoglu & Restrepo (2022)
Tasks, Automation, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality
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Motivation: Acemoglu & Restrepo (2022) - Tasks, Automation, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality
Measure displacement (ripple effects / hydrostatics) by automation across industries, linking it to wage and employment hours changes and quantifying rising inequality automation can explain.
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Data / Setting: Acemoglu & Restrepo (2022) - Tasks, Automation, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality
49 U.S. industries, 1987-2016. Industry-level capital type count.
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Task Displacement Index: Acemoglu & Restrepo (2022) - Tasks, Automation, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality
Sums, across industries, how much automation cut routine labour times the group’s initial exposure to those tasks.
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Reduced-form test: Acemoglu & Restrepo (2022) - Tasks, Automation, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality
They regress each group’s real wage change on its task-displacement index while controlling for industry trends and a rich set of group fixed effects. The coefficient shows how much losing one percentage point more of your tasks to automation lowers wages.
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General-equilibrium model: Acemoglu & Restrepo (2022) - Tasks, Automation, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality
The same task-allocation logic is embedded in a multi-sector model that lets automation in one industry spill into others through labour re-sorting and price changes. Fitting the model to the industry data allows the authors to simulate the full distributional impact of automation.
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Robustness: Acemoglu & Restrepo (2022) - Tasks, Automation, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality
Results hold when adding controls for de-unionisation, China import shock, industry mark-ups, and classic skill-bias variables. Split-sample and alternative elasticity checks give similar slopes.
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Results: Acemoglu & Restrepo (2022) - Tasks, Automation, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality
Losing a large share of routine tasks is consistently followed by wage and hours displacement between industries. Automation explains much of the post-1980 widening of wage gaps and most of the rising college premium, even though it boosts overall productivity only modestly.
50
Title: Cavounidis et al. (2024)
Obsolescence Rents: Teamsters, Truckers & Impending Computerization
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Motivation: Cavounidis et al. (2024) - Obsolescence Rents: Teamsters, Truckers & Impending Computerization
When workers know their occupation is likely to disappear (e.g. self-driving trucks), how do wages, hiring and workforce age adjust during the long lead-up? They label the temporary wage premium an obsolescence rent.
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Data / Setting: Cavounidis et al. (2024) - Obsolescence Rents: Teamsters, Truckers & Impending Computerization
1) Horse-drawn teamsters vs motor-truck drivers, 1910-30. 2) Modern U.S. occupations, 2005-19, matched to automation-risk scores. 3) Today’s long-haul truckers facing autonomous vehicles.
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Methodology: Cavounidis et al. (2024) - Obsolescence Rents: Teamsters, Truckers & Impending Computerization
Build a three-state overlapping-generations model (no-shock / anticipatory-dread / aftermath), then test its predictions in the data. Empirics: (1) compare wages, employment and age structure for teamsters in the dread decade (1910-20) versus the aftermath (1920-30); (2) regress decade changes in pay, jobs and mean age on automation-risk × year across modern occupations; (3) DiD, treatment: truck driver 2015-18 (dread), control: truck driver 2005-06 (pre-dread)
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Robustness: Cavounidis et al. (2024) - Obsolescence Rents: Teamsters, Truckers & Impending Computerization
results are consistent for all three settings
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Results: Cavounidis et al. (2024) - Obsolescence Rents: Teamsters, Truckers & Impending Computerization
Rising wages and ageing workers in the occupation can be a warning sign that technology is on the way; labour-market adjustment (obsolence rent / wage premia) begins well before the machines actually arrive