Peikoff - Concept-Formation - Concepts Of Consciousness As Involving Measurement-Omission Flashcards
(26 cards)
So far, we have discussed first-level concepts, as we may call them.
A first-level concept …
Such as “table” or “man”, is one formed directly from perceptual data.
==> Starting from this base, concept-formation proceeds by a process of ABSTRACTING FROM ABSTRACTIONS.
The result is (increasingly) higher-level concepts, which …
Cannot be formed directly from perceptual data, but ONLY FROM EARLIER CONCEPTS.
Example: A child may integrate first-level concepts into wider ones, which identify more EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE, such as integrating “cat”, “dog”, “horse” into “animal” (and later, “animal”, “plant”, “man” into “living organism”).
OR he may SUBDIVIDE first-level concepts into narrower ones, which identify more PRECISE DIFFERENTIATIONS, such as subdividing “man” according to profession, into “doctor”, “policeman”, “teacher” etc.
Higher-level concepts represent a relatively advanced stage of knowledge:
They represent knowledge available only to a mind that has already engaged in the requisite CONCEPTUALIZATION.
==> For instance, a child just emerging from the perceptual period cannot start conceptualizing by uniting his father, his dog, and a rosebush into the concept “organism”.
==> Only when the child has first conceptualized separately the various perceptually given entities is he capable of the more extensive acts of abstraction and integration to identify THEIR common denominators.
These latter are NOT available on the perceptual level, because only concretes exist:
There are no such things as “organisms” to be seen-there are only men, dogs, and roses.
Similarly, a child cannot identify distinctions among men-he cannot grasp TYPES OF MEN, such as doctor or teacher-until …
He has first grasped and conceptualized MAN.
The process of abstracting from abstractions continues on successively higher levels …
Each representing a greater (EXTENSIVE or INTENSIVE) knowledge than the preceding level and presupposing a LONGER CHAIN OF EARLIER CONCEPTS.
Concepts, therefore, differ from one another not only in their referents, but also …
IN THEIR DISTANCE FROM THE PERCEPTUAL LEVEL. (See next chapter)
In one sense, all concepts of consciousness are higher-level abstractions, since …
None can be formed without an abundance of earlier existential concepts.
==> Given the latter, however, many concepts of consciousness may correctly be described as “first-level”, since they are formed DIRECTLY from one’s observations of the MENTAL STATE involved, with no previous concepts of consciousness required.
In general, concepts of consciousness are formed by the same method as existential concepts.
The key to this realm lies in the fact that …
Every process of consciousness involves 2 fundamental attributes:
- CONTENT.
- ACTION.
“Content”, here, means the …
OBJECT of consciousness.
That of which it is aware, whether by EXTROSPECTION or INTROSPECTION.
==> Directly or indirectly, the object must be SOME ASPECT of existence.
==> Even states of consciousness can be grasped ultimately only in relation to the EXTERNAL WORLD.
“Action” here means the …
Action of consciousness in regard to its content, such as thinking, remembering, imaging.
==> Awareness, as we know, is not a passive condition, but a process of continuous activity.
The formation of the concept “thought” will illustrate the role of these two attributes in the present context.
Let us assume that a child has learned to speak and often performs the activity of thinking.
Now he is ready to conceptualize that activity:
By what steps does he do it?
As in the case of forming existential concepts, the child begins by observing similarities and differences ==> Similarities uniting several instances of thinking and differentiating them from his other mental activities.
==> In the present context, observation means a process of INTROSPECTION, ie, of looking inward and directing one’s cognitive focus to the facts of one’s own consciousness.
The child, let us say, is given a problem in arithmetic at school; he tackles it by asking himself a series of questions, each answer leading to the next step, until he reaches the solution.
So far he is thinking, but not yet conceptualizing the activity:
Then he goes home to play, but finds that his wagon is broken; again, he asks a series of questions, learning in experimental stages, say, as one strategy of repair suggests a better one.
==> This kind of process recurs often. In each instance, although the content varies there is a SIMILARITY he can note:
==> A certain kind of PURPOSEFUL PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE.
During the school assignment, the child may have felt dismay; during the wagon episode, excitement.
In the first case, he may have produced little imagery, in the second, imagery may have been vivid and abundant.
What the child needs to grasp, however, is that …
The SIMILARITY uniting the thinking processes differentiates them from these other mental activities, which may or may not accompany any given instance.
==> At this point, the child has isolated several instances of thinking.
==> These are the first units of his future concept.
Despite their similarities, the instances differ in various ways.
What is required now, therefore, is …
AN ACT OF ABSTRACTION.
==> OF MEASUREMENT-OMISSION.
==> In regard to a thought process, this involves 2 aspects.
One pertains to CONTENT:
Thought it thought regardless of its content.
==> The latter is a variable not specified in the concept.
==> The concept “thought” thus omits all measurements that distinguish one content from another.
***Content is a measurable attribute, because it is ultimately some aspect of the external world. As such, it is measurable by the methods applicable to physical existents.
The 2nd measurable attribute of thought is its …
INTENSITY.
“The intensity of a psychological process is the automatically summed up result of many factors: of its scope, its clarity, its cognitive and motivational context, the degree of mental energy or effort required, etc”
Thought processes, to continue the example, vary in the scope of the material they encompass, and (a related issue) in the length of the conceptual chain required to deal with such material:
Some thoughts deal with broad aspects of reality and involve complex abstractions from abstractions.
Other thoughts deal with fewer elements and employ concepts that are CLOSER TO THE PERCEPTUAL LEVEL.
We are describing thought here in quantitative terms: we are speaking of more or less-of how many elements and home much one has to know.
We are thus …
Locating thought process on a CONTINUUM of intensity and comparing them to one another by means of APPROXIMATE measurement.
==> As we know, this is all that is required for conceptualization.
***The latter does not involve the use of numbers.
There are other measurable aspects of the intensity of a thought process, such as …
The degree of EFFORT a given thinker expends on it OR the degree of CLARITY his thought attains.
And different factors are involved in measuring the intensity of other kinds of mental processes.
But it is enough to indicate that the instances of a thought process vary in the measurements both of their content and of their intensity.
Yet …
The concept “thought” subsumes ALL such instances.
==> What makes such an integration possible? Our minds omit the measurements, retaining thereby only the characteristics of every unit, which are the same.
Here is AR’s formulation of the general principle in this realm:
A concept pertaining to consciousness is a mental integration of two or more instances of a psychological process possessing the same distinguishing characteristics, with their particular contents and the measurements of action’s intensity omitted.
==> On the principle that these omitted measurements must exist in SOME quantity, but may exist in ANY quantity.
Some concepts of consciousness do NOT denote psychological processes:
For example, there are concepts that denote PRODUCTS of psychological processes (such as “knowledge”, “science”, “concept”).
==> One subcategory of them is concepts that denote METHODS, such as “logic”.
==> These kinds of concepts are essential to human development-and to philosophy.
==> Epistemology is concerned only with METHODOLOGY; one of its basic tasks is to analyze the concept of “concept”.
AR observes, that there is a vast and complex category of concepts that represent integrations of existential concepts with concepts of consciousness:
A category that includes most of the concepts pertaining to man’s actions.
==> Concepts of this category have no direct referents on the perceptual level of awareness (though they include perceptual components) and can neither be formed nor grasped without a long antecedent chain of concepts.
