Problems Flashcards
(88 cards)
Problem — D was indebted to C for P500. When he died,
he had no property, but he was survived by X, his son, who was
making good in a certain business. As D had no property, C
brought an action against X for the payment of the P500 plus
legal interest thereon on the ground that not only the property
but also the rights and obligations of a person are transmitted
to his heirs upon his death either by will or by operation of law.
Is C entitled to the remedy sought for?
Answer — C is not entitled to the remedy. While it is true
that the inheritance of a person includes not only his property
but also his rights and obligations which are existing at the time
of his death, yet his monetary obligations are excluded by operation
of law. This is so because under our system of procedure for
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, such monetary
obligations of the decedent can only be charged against his estate
and not against his heirs.
Problem – What is meant by a will?
Answer – A will is an act whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.
(Art. 783, NCC.)
Problem – Clara, thinking of her mortality drafted a will
and asked Roberta, Hannah, Luisa and Benjamin to be witnesses.
During the day of the signing of her will, Clara fell down
the stairs and broke both her arms. Coming from the hospital,
Clara insisted on signing her will by thumbmark and said
that she can sign her full name later. While the will was being
signed, Roberta experienced a stomach ache and kept going to
the restroom for long periods of time. Hannah, while waiting for
her turn to sign the will, was reading the 7th Harry Potter Book
on the couch, beside the table on which everyone was signing.
Benjamin, aside from witnessing the will also offered to notarize
it. A week later, Clara was run over by a drunk driver while
crossing the street in Greenbelt. May the will of Clara be admitted
to probate? Give your reasons briefl y (2007).
Answer — Yes, the will of Clara may be probated.
A thumbmark has been considered by the SC as a valid
signature if intended by the testator to be his signature (Garcia
vs. La Cuesta, G.R. No. L-4067, Nov. 29, 1951; De Gala vs. Gonzales,
G.R. No. L-37756, Nov. 28, 1933).
61Art. 804,
Problem – What is the effect of the failure to state the
number of pages on which the will was written?
Answer – The failure of the attestation clause to state the
number of pages on which the will was written is a fatal fl aw,
despite Art. 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or
some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with
the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses
as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution
of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to.
There is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will
states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of. However,
in the case of Felix Azuela vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 122880,
April 12, 2006 , there could have been no substantial compliance
with the requirements under Art. 805 since there is no statement
in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as
to the number of pages which comprise the will.
Problem – What is the effect of an unsigned attestation
clause?
Answer — An unsigned attestation clause results in an
unattested will. The attestation clause is a “memorandum of the
facts attending the execution of the will” required by law to be
made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear
their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered
as an act of the witnesses since the omission of their signatures
at the bottom thereof negates their participation. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify that the
witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part
of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation
clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements
contained in the attestation clause itself. An unsigned
attestation clause results in an unattested will (Felix Azuela vs.
CA, et al., supra).
Problem – What is the effect of a notarial will that has
been subscribed and sworn to before a notary public but has not
been acknowledged before the notary public by the testator and
the witnesses?
Answer — A notarial will that is not acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective,
even if it is subscribed and sworn to before the notary
public.
A jurat is that part of an affi davit where the notary public
certifi es that before him, the document was subscribed and
sworn to by the executor. On the other hand, an acknowledgment
is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent offi cer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor
actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document
has attested to the notary that the same is his own free act and
deed. (Ibid).
Problem — X, a Spanish citizen but a resident in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., executed a will in Tokyo, Japan.
May such will be probated in the Philippines and his estate in
this country distributed in conformity with the provisions of the
will? Explain your answer. (1973 Bar Problem)
Answer — Yes, the will of X may be probated in the Philippines
and his estate in this country may be distributed in conformity
with the provisions of the will, provided that said will
was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
any of the following laws:
(1) The law of the place where X resides (San Francisco,
California); or
(2) The law of his own country (Spain); or
(3) The Civil Code of the Philippines; or
(4) The law of the place where the will was made (Tokyo,
Japan). (Arts. 17, par. 1, 816, Civil Code).
The fi rst three are stated in Art. 816, while the last is stated
in the fi rst paragraph of Art. 17 of the Civil Code.
Problem — A and B, a married couple of French citizenship
but residents of the Philippines, went to Argentina and
there executed a joint will, mutually instituting each other as
sole heir, which will is valid according to the law of the state.
Subsequently, they returned to the Philippines where A died.
May the joint and mutual will executed in Argentina be probated
as valid in the Philippines? Reasons. (1971 Bar Problem)
Answer — The joint and mutual will executed in Argentina
by A and B may be probated as valid in the Philippines.
True, Art. 818 of the Civil Code of the Philippines prohibits two
or more persons from making a will jointly, or in the same instrument,
either for their reciprocal benefi t or for the benefi t
of a third person, and Art. 819 of the same Code extends this
prohibition to joint wills executed by Filipinos in a foreign country,
even though authorized by the laws of the country where
they may have been executed. But then, from the phraseology of
Art. 819 itself, there is a clear implication that the prohibition
does not apply to foreigners, and certainly, A and B are foreigners.
Therefore, the provision of the third paragraph of Art. 17 of
the Civil Code which declares that prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country,
cannot be applied in the instant case. What is applicable is the
fi rst paragraph of the same article, which declares that forms
and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
Problem — Would a person who is qualifi ed to make a will
necessarily be qualifi ed to be a witness to the will of another?
Explain. (1968 Bar Question)
Answer — A person who is qualifi ed to make a will is not
necessarily qualifi ed to be a witness to the will of another.
In order that a person can make a will, two requisites are
necessary. They are: fi rst, that the testator is at least 18 years
old; and second, that he is of a sound mind. (Arts. 797, 798, Civil
Code). In order that a person can act as a witness to the will of
another, four requisites are necessary. They are: fi rst, that he is
at least 18 years of age; second, that he is of a sound mind; third,
that he is not blind, deaf, or dumb; and fourth, that he is able to
read and write (Art. 820, Civil Code). In addition, the law also
declares the following are disqualifi ed from being witnesses to a
will: fi rst, any person not domiciled in the Philippines; and second,
those who have been convicted of falsifi cation of a document,
perjury or false testimony (Art. 821, Civil Code). It is clear, therefore,
that even if a person can make a will because he can comply
with the age and mental requirements imposed by law, he cannot
be a witness to the will of another in four specifi c cases. They are:
(1) where he is not domiciled in the Philippines; (2) where he had
been convicted of falsifi cation of a document, perjury or false testimony;
(3) where he is blind, deaf, or dumb, and (4) where he is
not able to read and/or write.
Problem — “A” instituted “B” (his son) and his brothers
“C” and “D” as his heirs to an estate of P600,000. Distribute the
estate. Reasons. (1972 Bar Problem)
Answer — Art. 846 of the Civil Code, which declares that
heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in
equal parts, is applicable. It must be noted, however, that one of the instituted heirs (“B”) is a compulsory heir while the other two (“C” and “D”) are voluntary heirs. All commentators in this country agree that the rule enunciated in Art. 846 is applicable only to the disposable free portion and not to the legitime of compulsory heirs. Therefore, the estate of P600,000 of “A” shall be divided as follows: “B,” being the son of the testator, shall be given his legitime of 1/2 of the estate, or P300,000. That leaves a disposable free portion of 1/2 of the estate, or P300,000. It is this portion which will be divided in equal parts among the three instituted heirs pursuant to Art. 846 of the Civil Code. Thus, the
division will be as follows:
“B” ……………………… P 300,000, as compulsory heir
100,000, as voluntary heir
“C” ……………………… 100,000, as voluntary heir
“D” …………………….. 100,000, as voluntary heir
P 600,000
Problem — A died in 1980. He left a will which contains
the following institution of heirs: “I designate as my heirs my
son B, my daughter C, the children of my deceased son D, and
my friend X.” D, who died in 1969, is survived by his three legitimate
children E, F and G. The net residue of A’s estate is
P180,000. How shall the distribution be made?
Answer — The provisions of Arts. 846 and 847 of the New
Civil Code are applicable to the instant case. Manresa, commenting
on Art. 846, maintains that where there are compulsory
heirs among the heirs instituted, the rule that the heirs
shall inherit in equal parts should be applied only to the disposable free portion (6 Manresa, 7th Ed., pp. 116-117). Correlating
this with the provision of Art. 847, the distribution of the estate
shall be as follows:
First satisfy the legitime of B, C, E, F, and G. B and C
shall be entitled to P30,000 each, in their own right, while E, F
and G shall be entitled to P10,000 each, by right of representation
(Arts. 888, 902, Civil Code). The disposable free portion of
P90,000 will then be divided equally among the instituted heirs
B, C, E, F, G, and X. Therefore, the shares of each will be:
B – P30,000, as compulsory heir
15,000, as voluntary heir
C – P30,000, as compulsory heir
15,000, as voluntary heir
E – P10,000, by right of representation
15,000, as voluntary heir
F – P10,000, by right of representation
15,000, as voluntary heir
G – P10,000, by right of representation
15,000, as voluntary heir
X – P15,000, as voluntary heir
180,000
Problem — The testator institutes A to 1/3 of the entire
inheritance, B to 1/4, and C to 1/4, with the intention that all of
them shall become the sole heirs of the whole estate. The net remainder
of the estate after the death of the testator is P120,000.
How much is the share of each of the instituted heirs?
Solution — Before we can compute the share of each of
the instituted heirs, each aliquot part to which each heir was
instituted shall have to be increased proportionately. According
to the institution, A shall receive 1/3 of P120,000, or P40,000, B,
1/4 of P120,000, or P30,000, and C, 1/4 of P120,000, or P30,000,
the aggregate amount of which is P100,000, which is less by
P20,000 than the aggregate amount available for distribution. It
is this amount of P20,000 which shall be distributed proportionately
among the three heirs. The method which is used may be:
Arithmetical: Since the proportion in which A, B, and C
had been instituted is 4:3:3, respectively, therefore, A shall be
entitled to an additional 4/10 of P20,000 or P8,000, B to an additional
3/10 of P20,000, or P6,000, and C to an additional 3/10
of P20,000, or P6,000. Thus, A shall be entitled to a total amount
of P48,000, B, to a total amount of P36,000, and C, to a total
amount of P36,000.
Problem — X died leaving a will wherein he instituted as
his heirs his three daughters, A, B and C without designating
their shares. His widow, W, is omitted without being disinher-ited. In the will, X also bequeathed a legacy of P20,000 to A.
The net value of his estate is P240,000. How shall such estate
be distributed?
Answer — It must be observed that the omission of W in
X’s will does not constitute preterition within the meaning of
Art. 854 of the Civil Code. The reason is obvious. She is not a
compulsory heir in the direct line. Therefore, the only effect of
her omission is a partial annulment of the institution of heirs to
the extent that her legitime is prejudiced; in other words, she
is still entitled to her legitime. Thus, the legitime of A, B and C
is 1/2 of the entire estate of P240,000, or P120,000, or P40,000
each, while the legitime of W is the same as that of each of the
legitimate children, or P40,000 also. Consequently, the disposable
free portion is P80,000. It is clear that the legacy of P20,000
given to A is not inoffi cious because it can easily be contained
in said dispos able free portion. Therefore, it must be paid to her
thus leaving a balance of P60,000. This balance shall then be
divided equally among A, B and C in accordance with the testator’s
will. The distribution shall, therefore, be as follows:
A …………………………… P40,000, as compulsory heir
20,000, as voluntary heir
20,000, as legatee
B ………………………….. P 40,000, as compulsory heir
20,000, as voluntary heir
C ………………………….. P 40,000, as compulsory heir
20,000, as voluntary heir
W …………………………. P 40,000, as compulsory heir
Problem — A has two compulsory heirs in the direct line
— B, a legitimate child, and C, an acknowledged natural child.
During his lifetime, A donated a parcel of land, worth P10,000,
to C. Before his death, he executed a will wherein he instituted
as sole heir B, omitting C altogether. The net residue or remainder
of his estate is P50,000. Shall the omission of C in the will
result in the annulment of the institution of B in accordance
with the provisions of Art. 854?
Answer — It is submitted that in this case there is no preterition
within the meaning of Art. 854 of the Civil Code. It is
true that there is a total omission of the acknowledged natural
child in the testator’s will, and apparently the rule regarding
preterition should, therefore, be applied. But then, we must consider
the fact that a donation inter vivos is actually given to a
compulsory heir as an advance on his inheritance. That is why
in the partition of the estate of the donor upon the death of the
latter, it must be collated and subsequently, it must be charged
against the legitime of such compulsory heir. Consequently,
there is no omission in this case which is complete and total in
character. Hence, if there is an impairment of the legitime of
the acknowledged natural child because the value of the property
donated is less than the legitime to which he is entitled by
operation of law, his remedy lies in the right granted in Art. 906
of the Civil Code. He can ask for the completion of his legitime.
In the words of Manresa — “If Art. 906 is not applicable in such
case, we do not know what article applies.’’44 Thus, in the above problem, after collating the P10,000 donation inter vivos given
to C to the net value of the estate of A it is clear that the legitime
of B is P30,000, while the legitime of C is P15,000 (Arts. 888,
895, New Civil Code). Consequently, C can still demand for an
additional P5,000 in order to complete his legitime. The balance
of the estate shall be given to B.
Problem — Jandon is twice a widower. He has three children
by his fi rst marriage, and two children by his second marriage.
In his will, Jandon institutes as his exclusive heirs the
children of his second marriage. What is the effect on the will of
the preterition of Jandon’s children by the fi rst marriage? Upon
Jandon’s death, how will the hereditary estate be divided? (1974
Bar Problem)
Answer — The preterition of Jandon’s children by the fi rst
marriage in his will shall annul entirely the institution of heirs
as ordained by Art. 854 of the Civil Code. All of the three requisites
of preterition or pretermission are present. The omitted
heirs are compulsory heirs in the direct line; the omission is total
and complete; and the omitted heirs have survived the testator.
Assuming then that there are no legacies and devises in
Jandon’s will and that the only testamentary disposition thereof
is the institution of the children of the second marriage, since
such institution is void, the will itself, as far as the distribution
of the hereditary estate is concerned, becomes useless. Total intestacy
results. (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449).
The estate, therefore, shall be divided among the three
children of the fi rst marriage and the two children of the second
marriage in accordance with the rules of intestate succession.
Each of the fi ve shall be entitled to one-fi fth (1/5) of the entire
(Art. 980, Civil Code).
Problem No. 1 — A, a very wealthy man, executed a will
wherein he instituted as his only heirs his three brothers, B, C
and D without designating their shares. Before A died, both C
and D were killed in a vehicular accident. C is survived by a son,
E, while D is survived by two daughters, F and G. A died two
days later without changing his will, survived only by B and the
children of C and D. The net value of his estate is P6,000,000.
How shall such estate be divided?
Answer — B alone is entitled to the entire estate. It must
be noted that both C and D are voluntary heirs; they are not
compulsory heirs. Consequently, they cannot transmit any right
to their own heirs (Art. 856, Civil Code). In other words, their
children cannot inherit from the testator by right of representation.
It would have been different had A died intestate. In such
a case, the children of C and D would then represent them in
the succession (Arts. 972, 975, Civil Code). As it is, since A died
testate and since both of the requisites prescribed by law for
accretion to take place in testamentary succession are present,
the shares of C and D, which were rendered vacant by reason of
predecense, shall now pass to their co-heir B by right of accretion.
(Arts. 1015, et seq., Civil Code).
Problem No. 2 — In his will, widower Kano instituted his
only child Luis and a friend Mario as his heirs. Mario died ahead
of Kano. If Kano dies without changing his will, would the children
of Mario step into the shoes of their father and inherit from
Kano? (1974 Bar Problem)
Answer — The children of Mario cannot step into the shoes
of their father and inherit from Kano; in other words, they cannot
inherit from Kano by right of representation.
The following reasons are decisive:
(a) In testamentary succession, only a compulsory heir
may be represented. Mario is not a compulsory heir; he is merely
a voluntary heir whose share is chargeable against the free
portion. Under the law, a voluntary heir who dies before the
testator transmits nothing to his heirs (Art. 856, Civil Code).
(b) The above case is one involving accretion and not representation.
It must be observed that had Mario survived the
testator, Luis would have been entitled to his legitime of onehalf
(1/2) of the hereditary estate in his capacity as compulsory heir and one-half (1/2) of the one-half (1/2) dis posable free portion
in his capacity as voluntary heir; Mario, on the other hand,
would have been entitled also to one-half (1/2) of the one-half
(1/2) disposable free portion as voluntary heir. But then, the
latter died before the testator. Therefore, the provisions of the
Civil Code on accretion (Art. 1015, et seq.) are applicable and
not the provisions on representation (Art. 970, et seq.). Since the
requisites of accretion in testamentary succession are present,
Mario’s share shall now accrue to Luis
Problem — The testator instituted A to 1/2 of the entire
inheritance, B to 1/4, C to 1/6, and D to 1/12, and, at the same
time, designated each and everyone of them as a substitute of
the others. The net remainder of the estate is P36,000. B, however,
repudiated his share. What will happen to this vacant
share?
Solution — It is evident that as a result of B’s repudiation,
1/4 of the inheritance, or P9,000, is rendered vacant. This vacant
share shall pass to A, C, and D in proportion to their respective
shares in the institution. Reducing such shares to their lowest
common denominator, the share of A in the vacant portion becomes
6/12, the share of C becomes 2/12, while the share of D
is 1/12. The proportion of their respective shares is, therefore,
6:2:1. As substitutes, A is entitled to 6/9 of P9,000, or P6,000,
C is entitled to 2/9 of P9,000, or P2,000, and D is entitled to 1/9
of P9,000, or P1,000. As instituted heirs, A is entitled to 1/2 of
P36,000 or P18,000, C is entitled to 1/6 of P36,000, or P6,000,
and D is entitled to 1/12 of P36,000, or P3,000. Hence, A shall
receive a total amount of P24,000, C, P8,000, and D, P4,000.
Problem — X died in 1960 leaving a will wherein he devised
a house and lot, now valued at P2,000,000, to his friend,
A, as fi duciary heir and to B, the eldest son of A, as fi deicommis-sary substitute or second heir. B died in 1975, survived by two
legitimate children, E and F. In 1980, A died intestate survived
by: (a) his two sons, C and D, and (b) his two grandchildren,
E and F. C and D now claim that the house and lot (subject
matter of the fi deicommissary substitution) should be divided
in accordance with, the rules of intestacy; in other words, C is
entitled to 1/3 of the property; D, to 1/3; and E and F, also to 1/3
by right of representation. E and F, on the other hand, contend
that they are entitled to the property to the exclusion of all others.
Decide.
Answer — E and F are correct. It must be observed that B,
as fi deicommissary substitute or second heir, acquired a right to
the subject property upon the death of the testator, X. This is ordained
by Art. 866 of the Civil Code. When he died in 1975, this
right passed to his children, E and F. This is also ordained by
Art. 866 of the Civil Code. Therefore, E and F are now entitled
to the subject property to the exclusion of all others.
Problem — Don died after executing a Last Will and Testament
leaving his estate valued at P12 Million to his commonlaw
wife Roshelle. He is survived by his brother, Ronnie and his
half-sister Michelle.
1. Was Don’s testamentary disposition of his estate in
accordance with the law on succession? Explain your answer.
2. Assuming further that he died intestate, survived by
his father Juan, his brother Ronie, his half-sister Michelle and
his legitimate son Jayson. How will you distribute his estate?
Explain.
Answer – 1. Yes. Don’s testamentary disposition of his estate
is in accordance with the law on succession. Don has no
compulsory heirs not having ascendants, descendants nor a
spouse (Art. 887, NCC). Brothers and sisters are not compulsory
heirs. Thus, he can bequeath his entire estate to anyone who is
not otherwise incapacitated to inherit from him. A common-law
wife is not incapacitated under the law as Don is not married to
anyone.
2. Jayson will still be entitled to the entire P12 Million
as the father, brother and sister will be exluded by a legitimate
son of the decedent (Art. 887, NCC). This follows the principle
that the descendants exclude the ascendants from inheritance.
(Suggested Answers to the 2006 Bar Examination Questions,
PALS)
Problem No. 1 — In 1970, O, a son of A by his fi rst wife,
B, donated a valuable lot located in Metro Manila to his halfbrother,
P, a son of A by his second wife, C. In 1975, both A and
O were killed in a vehicular accident. In 1978, P died intestate.
The lot passed to his mother, C, who was the only intestate heir.
In 1980, C also died intestate. The lot is now claimed by: (1) X,
a brother of A; (2) Y, a sister of B; and (3) Z, a sister of C. Who is
entitled to the property? Why?
Answer — X alone is entitled to the property. Undoubtedly,
the lot is reservable within the meaning of Art. 891 of the
Civil Code. All of the requisites of reserva troncal are present. In
the fi rst place, the property had been acquired by operation of
law by an ascendant (C) from his descendant (P) upon the death
of the latter; in the second place, the property had been previously
acquired by gratuitous title by the descendant (P) from
a brother (O); and in the third place, such descendant (P) died
without any legitimate issue in the direct descending line who
can inherit from him. Conse quently, when the property passed
by operation of law to C, the latter was obliged to reserve it
for the benefi t of relatives of P who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which the reservable property
came.
The real question, therefore, is — who, among the three
claimants can qualify as reservatorio or reservee? In order to answer
this question, two tests should be applied. They are: fi rst, is
the claimant a relative of the descendant-propositus (P) within
the third degree; and second, does he belong to the line (line of
O) from which the reservable came? Applying these tests to the
case at bar, it is clear that Y cannot qualify because she is not
even a relative of the descendant-propositus, P. Neither can Z
qualify because she does not belong to the line from which the
property came. She is not related by consanguinity to O. But
X can qualify. He is not only a relative of P (being a paternal uncle) within the third degree; he also belongs to the line from
which the reservable property came. Therefore, he alone shall
be entitled to the property.
Problem No. 2 — O and P are the legitimate children of H
and W. H died in 1970. In 1972, O donated to his brother, P, a
valuable lot located in Metro Manila. In 1975, O was killed in a
vehicular accident. In 1978, P died intestate. The lot passed to
his mother, W, who was the only intestate heir. In 1980, W also
died intestate. The lot is now claimed by S, a sister of W, and by
B, a brother of H. Who is entitled to the property? Why?
Answer — Both S and B are entitled to the property in
equal shares. Undoubtedly, the lot is reservable within the
meaning of Art. 891 of the Civil Code. All of the requisites of
reserva troncal are present. In the fi rst place, the property had
been acquired by operation of law by an ascendant (W) from a
descendant (P) upon the death of the latter; in the second place,
the property had been previously acquired by gratuitous title by
the descendant (P) from a brother (O); and in the third place,
such descendant (P) died without any legitimate issue in the
direct descending line who can inherit from him. Consequently,
when the property passed by operation of law to W, the latter
was obliged to reserve it for the benefi t or relatives of P who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which
the reservable property came. Since both S and B are third degree
relatives of P and both belong to the line from whence the
reservable property came, the property should now be given to
them automatically and by operation of law.
(Note: We are, of course, aware of the view of Justice Paras
that the origin of the property must be a half-brother or half-sister,
thus implying that if the origin is a brother or sister of the
full blood, the property is not reservable within the meaning of
Art. 891 of the Civil Code (3 Paras 232). It is respectfully submitted,
however, that the law does not make such a distinction.
As far as the origin of the property is concerned, it speaks only
of “another brother or sister”. Consequently, even if the origin is
a brother or sister of the full-blood, the property is still reservable
although the question of line becomes unimportant. (See
6 Manresa, 7th Ed., 334). Of course, if in the above problem,
W was survived also by, let us say, a son or daughter, who is a
brother or sister of O and P, the question of whether or not the
property is reservable will become moot and academic. Whether
under instestate succession or under Art. 891 of the Civil Code,
the property shall pass to such brother or sister.)
Problem — Before his death in 1945, O donated to his son,
P, a parcel of land. Upon the death of P in 1960 without any
legitimate issue in the direct descending line, the land passed to his mother, R in accordance with the laws of intestate succession.
The latter died in 1970 without a will.
(1) Granting that the property is reservable in accordance
with Art. 891 of the Civil Code, who shall be entitled to
it if the reservista, R, is survived by the following relatives of
the descendant-propositus, P: (a) A, grandfather in the paternal
line; (b) B and C, uncles in the paternal line; (c) F and G, children
of D by a prior marriage, and, therefore, brothers of the
half blood, of P; (d) F and G, children of O and R, and, therefore
brothers of the full blood of P; and (e) H and I, children of F, and,
therefore, nephews of P?
Answer — While it is true that all of the survivors in this
particular case can qualify as reservatarios, since all of them
are relatives of the descendant-propositus, P, within the third
degree and they all belong to the line from which the reservable
property came, yet the property cannot be given to all of
them. This is so because the rules of intestate succession shall
have to be applied. The reason for this is that in reserva troncal,
in reality, the reservatario or reservatarios inherit from the descendant-
propositus, not from the ascendant-reservista. Since,
in intestate succession, those in the direct ascending line shall
exclude those in the collateral line, and since A is the only member
of the direct ascending line among the survivors, therefore,
the entire reservable property shall pass to him automatically
and by operation of law upon the death of R.
(2) Suppose that we eliminate A from the list of survivors,
who shall be entitled to the reservable property?
Answer – D, E, F and G shall be entitled to the reservable
property. Since all of the survivors are collateral relatives,
therefore, the rule of proximity, by virtue of which those nearest
in degree to the descendant-propositus shall exclude the more
remote ones, shall apply. D, E, F and G are relatives of the second
degree, while H and I are relatives of the third degree. Consequently,
the former shall exclude the latter. With regard to
the division of the property itself, since F and G are brothers
of the full blood of P, while D and E are brothers of the halfblood,
following the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Padura vs. Baldovino,69 the rule of intestate succession stated
in Art. 1006 of the Civil Code, by virtue of which brothers and
sisters of the full blood shall be entitled to a share double that of
those of the half blood, is applicable. Consequently, the property must be partitioned among D, E, F, and G in the proportion of
1:1:2:2. D and E shall, therefore, be entitled to 1/6 each of the
property, while F and G shall be entitled to 2/6 or 1/3 each.
(3) Suppose that F died before the reservista, R, so that the
only survivors are B, C, D, E, G, H and I, who shall be entitled
to the reservable property?
Answer — Only D, E, G, H and I shall be entitled to the reservable
property. B and C are of course excluded because they
are merely relatives of the third degree, while D, E and G are
relatives of the second degree. While it is true that H and I, who
are nephews of P, should also be excluded because they are also
relatives of the third degree, yet following the doctrine enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Florentino vs. Florentino,70 they
cannot be excluded because they shall represent their deceased
father, F, in the reservable property. Even in reserva troncal,
the right of representation is recognized, provided that the representative
is a relative of the descendant-propositus within the
third degree, and provided further, that he belongs to the line
from which the reservable property came.
Problem — The lot in question originally belonged to A.
With his fi rst wife, B, A had four children, D, E, F, and G, while
with his second wife, C, he had only one child, H. Upon his death
in 1956, said lot was left to H. When H died in 1952, single and
without any descendant, his mother, C, sold the property to X.
Subsequently, D, E, F and G sold the same property to Y. Several
years later, C died. (a) Is the property reservable?
(b) How about the two sales which were executed — are
they valid or not?
(c) Who is now entitled to the property?
Answer — (a) In order that the property shall be considered
as reservable under Art. 891 of the Civil Code, it is necessary
that the following requisites must concur: (1) The property
should have been inherited by operation of law by an ascendant
from his descendant upon the death of the latter; (2) the property
should have been previously acquired by gratuitous title
by the descendant from another ascendant or from a brother
or sister; and (3) the descendant should have died without any
legitimate issue in the direct descending line who could inherit
from him. It is clear that all of these requisites are present in
the instant case. Consequently, when H died in 1952, and the
property passed by operation of law to his mother, C, it became
reservable. In order words, C, who is the reservista, must re-serve the property for the benefi t of the relatives of H who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which
the property came. This reservation, however, is subject to two
resolutory conditions, namely: (1) the death of the ascendant
reservista, and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives
of the descendant-propositus who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which the reservable property
came. (6 Manresa, 268-269; 2 Sanchez Roman 1934; Sienes
vs. Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750.)
(b) As far as the fi rst sale is concerned, undoubtedly, it
is valid, but the reservista can only alienate that which he has
and nothing more — a limited and revocable title to the reservable
property. Hence, the alienation transmits only the conditional
and revocable title of the reservista, the rights acquired by
the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios
at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 279; Sieves vs. Espacio, supra.) Consequently,
in the instant case, inas much as the reservatarios, D, E,
F, and G, were still alive at the time of the death of the reservista,
C, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale
made by such reservista in favor of X became of no legal effect,
and as a consequence, the reservable property passed automatically
and by operation of law to the reservatarios. But then, the
reservatarios had also alienated their right or expectancy over
the reservable property during the pendency of the reserva. Was
this sale valid? This question was answered in the affi rmative
by the Supreme Court in Sienes vs. Esparcia, (supra). But, of
course, it is subject to the same conditions to which the previous
sale is subject.
(c) Premises considered, it is clear that Y is now entitled
to the subject property.
