WEEK 10: Peace Processes Flashcards
(16 cards)
Call, C. T. (2012). Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence
Call critiques liberal peacebuilding for its neglect of state institutions and warns against externally driven, one-size-fits-all models. Call identifies exclusion, flawed elite bargains, and mismatched international interventions as key reasons peace processes unravel. He proposes a legitimacy-focused peacebuilding model that incorporates broader political inclusion, elite incentives, and contextual understanding. Using Mozambique as a success case, Call praises its political inclusion—30% of the military incorporated RENAMO ex-combatants—and local ownership. However, he warns that durable peace requires both elite accommodation and popular engagement. Exclusionary practices, especially in institutions like the police or military, often undermine peace. Call urges nuanced, context-sensitive approaches that go beyond surface-level reforms and address deeper power dynamics, identity conflicts, and structural inequalities.
Cheng, C., Goodhand, J., & Meehan, P. (2018). Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Violent Conflict
This synthesis paper outlines how elite bargains underpin post-war peace. Drawing on 21 cases, the authors show peace can fail, be captured by elites, or become developmental. They emphasise the importance of aligning elite deals with broader political settlements. External actors must engage carefully with local dynamics. Gradual “mini-bargains” and long-term political inclusion are recommended to sustain peace. This synthesis paper explores elite bargains as mechanisms for ending violent conflict, noting that not all bargains lead to lasting peace. It identifies three violence types—competitive, embedded, and permissive—and warns that bargains struck in bad faith or skewed toward narrow elites can perpetuate violence. Using cases like Guatemala and Colombia, the paper shows how wartime tactics and inequalities become embedded in postwar governance, often marginalizing women and minorities. Successful peace requires acknowledging localized violence and reconfiguring elite power.
Berdal (2019) – Chapter 6 in De Coning (UN Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians)
UN peacekeeping evolved from traditional missions emphasizing consent and impartiality to robust operations with civilian protection mandates. He critiques UN limitations amid civil conflict, highlighting structural barriers, vague mandates, and gaps between political aims and operational capacity. The Sierra Leone intervention showed tactical success with well-equipped forces, but peacekeeping without political strategy can destabilize situations, as seen in the DRC. Berdal urges cautious use of force, better conflict analysis, and greater alignment between military action and political objectives. Ultimately, UN missions must be politically smart, context-aware, and strategically designed to address deep-seated causes of violence, not just symptoms.
“Mediating Peace in Mozambique” by Andrea Bartoli from Herding Cats (1999):
Bartoli examines the unique role of the Community of Sant’Egidio in mediating the 1992 Mozambican peace accord. Lacking formal political power, Sant’Egidio acted as a flexible and morally authoritative mediator, facilitating trust and synergy between FRELIMO and RENAMO. Their informal style, neutrality, and ability to foster emotional intelligence in negotiations helped enlarge the political space and promote inclusivity. Mediation succeeded because it captured the people’s peaceful will, engaged civil society, and reflected local realities. Unlike traditional diplomacy, the mediators avoided imposing solutions, enabling Mozambicans to reach an internally legitimate and widely supported settlement grounded in reconciliation, not retribution.
Berdal, Mats – “The State of UN Peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo” (2016)
Berdal critically assesses UN peacekeeping operations through the protracted case of the DRC. He highlights MONUC and MONUSCO’s expansive mandates and their failure to bridge military protection with political strategy. Weaknesses include overstretched troops, donor-driven agendas, inadequate local understanding, and fragmented mandates. Berdal underscores the need to align peacekeeping with diplomacy and local political realities, warning that robust peacekeeping cannot substitute for long-term political solutions. He critiques the “dual line of command” by troop-contributing countries and warns that operational fragmentation and misaligned goals hinder effective peace implementation, particularly in fragile states like the DRC.
Lundin – Mozambique and the Construction of Peace (2004)
Lundin presents Mozambique’s peace process as an indigenous achievement, rooted in civil society, local culture, and mutual recognition between enemies. He highlights the emotional and symbolic elements of reconciliation, including spiritual healing ceremonies and community-led reintegration. The 1992 Rome Agreement emerged from domestic pressures, a military stalemate, and civil society interventions, not solely external influence. Unlike legalistic models, Mozambique prioritized forgiveness and pragmatic coexistence. Traditional norms replaced formal justice, and no truth commission was established. Lundin stresses that peace must resonate culturally, and be inclusive, iterative, and context-specific—lessons contrasting sharply with technocratic, externally imposed models elsewhere.
Arnault, Jean – Legitimacy and Peace Processes (2014)
Arnault examines the importance of legitimacy in peace processes, focusing on how to secure mass support in low-intensity conflicts. He critiques overreliance on international norms and suggests legitimacy must be locally grounded. Drawing on Guatemala and Afghanistan, Arnault shows that elite acceptance alone isn’t enough—peace needs broader social validation. Performance legitimacy, such as human rights verification missions, can help. He warns against romanticizing local legitimacy, arguing for nuanced approaches that balance international support with grassroots inclusion. Arnault highlights the difficulty of achieving national legitimacy amid trade-offs between justice and stability, particularly when negotiations involve former insurgents or criminals.
Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois – Making Sense of Violence (2004)
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois reconceptualize violence as a continuum—ranging from overt physical violence to systemic and symbolic forms. Rooted in anthropology and critical theory, the chapter critiques essentialist views and emphasizes violence as a product of social norms, power, and inequality. Drawing from Bourdieu and Foucault, they expose how violence is normalized in statecraft and institutions. Their work is foundational in analyzing how structural injustices—like poverty and marginalization—fuel conflict and undermine peacebuilding. This broader framing is especially useful when assessing peace processes in postcolonial contexts like Mozambique, where unresolved structural violence can destabilize peace despite formal agreements.
Zaum, Dominik – Beyond Liberal Peace? (2012)
Zaum critiques liberal peacebuilding for its top-down, technocratic approach, which often fails to resonate with local populations. He argues that liberal peace lacks coherence and is driven more by donor agendas than by grounded needs. Drawing from Timor-Leste and Côte d’Ivoire, Zaum highlights how externally imposed statebuilding models produce alien, illegitimate structures. He contrasts “hybrid peace” and “post-liberal” approaches, which stress context, informality, and bottom-up legitimacy. In Mozambique, where local practices were key to reconciliation, Zaum’s critique reinforces the argument that peacebuilding must adapt to social realities rather than enforce liberal norms that lack cultural resonance or public buy-in.
Tull & Mehler – The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing (2005)
Tull and Mehler challenge the use of power-sharing as a peace strategy in Africa, arguing it incentivizes insurgent violence by rewarding armed actors with political legitimacy. Citing Liberia and DRC, they claim power-sharing often perpetuates violence by creating expectations that violence yields political dividends. Such settlements may entrench warlords and sideline democratic norms. The article contrasts with Mozambique, where inclusion stemmed from domestic compromise, not coercive reward. The authors warn that superficial inclusivity, devoid of accountability or reform, can reinforce conflict dynamics, particularly when international actors pressure fragile states into unbalanced deals that ignore long-term institutional development.
Mehler et al. – Power-Sharing in Africa’s War Zones (2013)
This article evaluates the effectiveness of power-sharing at both national and local levels. It argues that peace agreements often overlook local drivers of conflict, leading to uneven implementation and persistent violence. Using Burundi, Liberia, and the DRC, the authors demonstrate that national-level deals fail without grassroots inclusion. They critique the romanticization of local power-sharing and warn that such arrangements can replicate elite capture and exclusion if not contextually tailored. The findings underscore Mozambique’s relative success, where local engagement and cultural legitimacy complemented the national settlement, supporting the broader claim that durable peace depends on vertically integrated, inclusive strategies.
Autesserre – Peaceland (2014)
Autesserre critiques the disconnect between international peacebuilders and local realities, arguing that technical expertise often overrides local knowledge. She highlights how peacebuilding missions suffer from standardization, bureaucratic inertia, and ignorance of cultural contexts. Drawing on fieldwork in the Congo, Autesserre illustrates that peace processes fail when they neglect the everyday experiences and knowledge of local populations. She advocates for more adaptive, inclusive strategies that blend thematic expertise with local insight. This critique aligns with Mozambique’s locally driven process, where cultural sensitivity and grassroots inclusion were central—suggesting that durable peace emerges when interventions are co-produced with those most affected.
Steadman, Stephen – Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes (1997)
Steadman identifies “spoilers” as leaders or factions who use violence to derail peace processes they perceive as threatening their interests. He classifies spoilers as limited, greedy, or total, each requiring different management strategies. Comparing Rwanda and Mozambique, he argues that Mozambique succeeded due to early identification of spoilers (RENAMO), consistent engagement, and effective use of inducements and legitimacy-building. In contrast, Rwanda failed due to poor diagnostics and inappropriate pressure strategies. Steadman stresses the importance of credible commitments, well-informed mediators, and tailored responses. The Mozambican case shows how personal relationships and sustained international support can neutralize spoiler threats.
Pearce, Justin – History, Legitimacy, and Renamo’s Return to Arms (2020)
Pearce explores why RENAMO returned to violence in 2013 despite the 1992 peace agreement. He argues that grievances tied to historical exclusion, regional marginalization, and elite competition over resources remained unresolved. RENAMO successfully framed its actions as a continuation of the anti-colonial struggle, resonating with rural communities disillusioned by FRELIMO’s rule. The peace process failed to institutionalize balanced power-sharing or address deeper legitimacy concerns. Pearce underscores how symbolic narratives and contested histories influence political behavior and legitimacy in post-war states. The case illustrates the fragility of peace when perceived injustices persist, particularly in structurally unequal and geographically divided societies.
Cramer, Christopher – Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing (2006)
Cramer critiques the myth of “blank slate” reconstruction in post-conflict societies, using Mozambique to expose the limits of externally imposed liberal reforms. He examines how FRELIMO’s modernizing ambitions ignored rural complexity, contributing to social alienation and conflict. Post-war policies—such as privatization and liberalization—benefited elites while deepening inequality. Cramer argues that successful peace cannot be measured solely by elections or economic growth but must address structural violence and popular legitimacy. Mozambique’s apparent success masks underlying tensions, with rural marginalization, corruption, and authoritarian tendencies undermining long-term peace. Cramer’s work highlights how flawed development paradigms can destabilize post-conflict recovery.
The Trouble with the Congo – Autesserre (2010)
Séverine Autesserre argues that international peacebuilding in the DRC failed because it focused too narrowly on top-down, elite-level solutions—like elections and disarmament—while ignoring the local conflicts that fueled ongoing violence. These grassroots disputes over land, power, and identity were central to instability, especially in eastern Congo, yet were sidelined by peacebuilders who prioritized national unity over local realities. Autesserre calls for a fundamental shift toward bottom-up, locally-informed peacebuilding, emphasizing the importance of engaging with community-level actors and addressing everyday sources of conflict.
