WEEK TWO – Exploring “Root Causes” of Conflict: Macro-Theories of Development, Underdevelopment and Societal Change Flashcards
(10 cards)
Huntington (1968) – Political Order in Changing Societies
Huntington challenges modernization theory (Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Rostow), arguing that political development does not naturally follow economic growth, against the sunny view that good things go together. Without a balance between social mobilisation and institution-building, societies experience disorder. In places like Iran and parts of Latin America, weak institutions led to instability. He claims political order is a prerequisite for economic growth in poorer states. His model supports the idea of an ‘authoritarian transition,’ where strong, modernising regimes lay the groundwork for later democracy, as seen in Korea and Singapore. Critics question the framework’s fit with examples like the USSR and its Western-centric assumptions.
Rostow (1960) – The Stages of Economic Growth
Rostow outlines five linear stages of development: traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and high mass consumption. Each stage reflects increasing industrialisation and technological complexity. Growth depends on external influences, centralised governance, and acceptance of modernisation. In the final stage, societies focus on welfare and services over basic needs. Rostow ends with concerns about spiritual stagnation and the limits of economic growth. The model of modernisation theory is influential but criticised for its generality and reductionism.
Kołakowski (2008) – Main Currents of Marxism: The Breakdown
Kołakowski calls Marxism the “greatest fantasy” of the 20th century, comparing it to religion for its ideological appeal. He critiques its claim to scientific socialism, highlighting its irrational elements and appeal as political prophecy. While not solely responsible for Communism, Marxism contributed to despotic systems by justifying a central authority to define equality. It offers mobilising slogans but lacks the analytical tools for understanding modern Western societies. He questions its philosophical foundation and warns of its adaptability to serve shifting political agendas.
Huntington (1968) – Political Order and Political Decay
Huntington argues that political instability in developing states stems from weak institutions, not economic underdevelopment. Political order depends on institutional strength, not whether a regime is democratic or authoritarian. Rapid social change without institutional adaptation leads to decay. He critiques U.S. policy for prioritising economic growth over political development. Strong institutions must be coherent, autonomous, complex, and adaptable. He insists authority must precede limits on it. The chapter also acknowledges the Western bias in his framework, overlooking non-Western paths like Singapore’s authoritarian stability. Order matters above all, more than liberty.
Harris – Development Theories
Harris, following Edwin Brett, contrasts structuralist and neoliberal development theories, noting a recent shift toward institutional pluralism. Inspired by Amartya Sen (who criticizes the notion of development as economic growth because she says that “commodities” are only of value to us in terms of what they allow us to do, instead she sees development as what allows people to enjoy their freedoms), he frames development as expanding freedoms—both freedom from coercion and the ability to act on one’s values. Harris stresses the importance of context, arguing that neither state-led nor market-led models alone suffice. He critiques past strategies and structural adjustment programs, while recognising the success of East Asian developmental states. He also questions whether post-development movements truly reject development or merely redefine it.
Seligson & Passe-Smith – The Dual Gaps
This chapter introduces the growing wealth and income gaps between and within countries, identifying a global inequality crisis. The authors reject the idea that a few poor countries skew the data, noting that 36 nations contain 817 billion people in ‘double jeopardy’—facing both global and domestic inequalities. Foreign aid is largely ineffective, though post-WWII recoveries like Japan and England show what’s possible. The rise in liberal democracies parallels growing inequality, raising questions about their ability to implement long-term developmental agendas compared to authoritarian regimes.
Kaldor – Introduction to New and Old Wars (1999)
Mary Kaldor argues that globalization has given rise to “new wars,” marked by the breakdown of boundaries between war, organized crime, and human rights violations. Unlike traditional inter-state wars, new wars are decentralized, driven by identity politics, and often involve non-state actors such as militias and mercenaries. These conflicts aim to control populations rather than territory, using fear and destabilization. Kaldor highlights how globalization weakens state sovereignty and the monopoly on violence, creating a globalized war economy. She calls for a cosmopolitan alternative rooted in democratic, inclusive values to counter identity-based fragmentation and violence in the modern conflict landscape.
Francis Fukuyama’s Foreword to Samuel P. Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies (1996)
Francis Fukuyama’s foreword introduces Huntington’s critique of modernization theory, which presumed that economic growth naturally leads to democracy. Huntington argued that rapid social mobilization without corresponding political institutional development breeds instability—a condition he termed “praetorianism.” He emphasized that political order is essential for sustainable development and that modernization must be institutionally managed. His work supported the controversial “authoritarian transition” theory, where strong, orderly regimes precede democratization. Huntington’s insights remain relevant today, as globalization weakens state sovereignty through transnational threats like arms, drugs, and illicit finance, reminding us that state-building is rooted in conflict, not just idealism.
Samuel P. Huntington’s “Civil Violence and the Process of Development” (1972)
Huntington argues that rapid modernization without robust political institutions leads to civil violence. He dismisses poverty as the root cause, instead attributing unrest to relative deprivation—a gap between rising aspirations and stagnant capabilities during socio-economic transformation. Factors like education, media, and urbanization heighten desires, while uneven wealth distribution and expanding political participation increase instability. Huntington introduces praetorian violence—group violence aimed at gaining rewards like power or recognition without altering the system itself. He concludes that while modernization heightens political engagement and potential unrest, established democratic institutions better contain violence compared to weak or authoritarian regimes.
Menkhaus’s “Vicious Circles and the Security-Development Nexus in Somalia”
Menkhaus reinterprets Somalia’s protracted conflict by arguing that such crises can generate emergent local governance rather than perpetuating only instability. He critiques the “vicious circle” narrative of security-development failure, showing how shifting economic interests—especially among Somali business actors—have encouraged stability over war. In places like Mogadishu and Somaliland, local governance and demobilization have progressed without formal international intervention. These changes reflect evolving local priorities. Menkhaus concludes that effective aid should support, not supplant, organically emerging governance structures and align with local dynamics, recognizing that conflict itself can catalyze adaptive, if imperfect, political orders.
