WEEK 7: Natural Resources and Conflict

Question 1

Cheng (2018) – Extralegal Groups in Post-Conflict Liberia: How Trade Makes the State, Ch. 4

Answer 1

Cheng examines how resource exploitation — particularly of rubber, timber, and diamonds — sustained the NPFL’s war efforts in Liberia. Charles Taylor used economic networks to consolidate power, normalising illicit trade and taxation systems outside the formal state. His regime controlled vital industries and negotiated directly with foreign actors, while even peacekeeping forces (like ECOMOG) became entangled in the war economy. Timber exports helped sustain rebel militias, while Monrovia became a hub for cross-border diamond trafficking. These dynamics show how resource economies can circumvent state institutions and entrench war economies.

Question 2

Menkhaus & Williams – The Political Economy of Civil War and UN Peace Operations (Somalia Chapter)

Answer 2

This chapter charts Somalia’s “durable disorder,” showing how UN and AU peace operations became embedded in local conflict economies. UNOSOM’s early interventions were manipulated by local clans, who extracted financial and political benefits from aid contracts. Peacekeeping introduced new economic opportunities (e.g., demining contracts), often reinforcing the very dynamics they were meant to change. AMISOM, while more restrained in direct economic involvement, still became enmeshed in Somalia’s fragmented governance and informal economies. The chapter highlights how peace operations can unintentionally reproduce the conditions they aim to resolve.

Question 3

Le Billon (2005) – Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts

Answer 3

Le Billon argues that while resource-rich countries are not always conflict-prone, weak institutions make them vulnerable. He explores the “resource curse,” showing how elite control over resources can undermine taxation, breed authoritarianism, and provoke grievances. The nature of a resource — whether it’s lootable like diamonds or infrastructure-heavy like oil — shapes the dynamics of conflict. He suggests better governance, equitable distribution, and international regulatory mechanisms (like sanctions and resource certification schemes) as potential tools for mitigating the risk of conflict.

Question 4

Aloa (2007) – Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment

Answer 4

Aloa challenges the idea that resources themselves cause conflict, instead locating the problem in governance. Mismanagement, corruption, and clientelist networks fuel grievances. Many African states inherited extractive logics from colonial regimes and have continued to exploit resources through elite control and multinational collusion. Resource management has even shaped peace processes — e.g., through diamond control clauses in peace agreements. Though reforms like the Kimberley Process aim to prevent “conflict diamonds,” they remain limited in scope.

Question 5

Gillies & Dykstra (2011) – International Campaigns for Extractive Industry Transparency in Post-Conflict Settings

Answer 5

This chapter assesses the role of initiatives like EITI and PWYP in improving governance and peacebuilding in post-conflict settings. These movements push for transparency and accountability in the extractive sectors to prevent revenue misuse. While such initiatives can enhance dialogue between stakeholders, their impact on corruption and governance remains debated. Timing matters: EITI was more effective in Liberia post-transition, less so in DRC where conflict persisted. Despite criticisms, these initiatives remain central to international post-conflict governance efforts.

Question 6

Lasslett (2014) – State Crime on the Margins of Empire

Answer 6

Focusing on Bougainville, Lasslett argues the conflict stemmed from local resistance to Rio Tinto’s copper mining operations, which caused environmental and social harm. The Papua New Guinean state violently repressed this resistance, prioritising corporate interests over human rights. Lasslett frames the conflict as part of a global capitalist system that tolerates state violence for resource extraction. Australia’s military support further illustrates how regional powers uphold these economic arrangements, often at the expense of indigenous sovereignty.

Question 7

Lujala & Rustad (2012) – High-Value Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse for Peace?

Answer 7

This piece synthesizes research on the effects of natural resources on conflict onset, duration, and post-conflict relapse. Resources can motivate rebellion, prolong conflict via financing, and undermine peace by generating competition. The type of resource matters: lootable resources like gems are more destabilising than those requiring state infrastructure. While resource wealth poses risks, the authors argue that tailored peace processes and resource governance reforms can help harness them for peacebuilding.