WEEK FOUR – The Political Economy of Armed Conflict Flashcards
(7 cards)
Séverine Autesserre (2012) – Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended Consequences
Autesserre critiques three dominant narratives about Congo: conflict minerals as the main cause of violence, sexual violence against women as the main consequence, and state reconstruction as the central solution. These oversimplified stories resonate with foreign audiences but distort policy responses and often worsen conditions. For example, mining bans hurt livelihoods; sexual violence discourse ignores other abuses; and state-building projects strengthen predatory structures. Despite their harms, these narratives persist due to their simplicity and emotional appeal, leaving no space for alternatives grounded in local realities.
Larmer, Laudati & Clark (2013) – Neither War nor Peace in the DRC: Profiting and Coping Amid Violence and Disorder
This article challenges the reductive view of the DRC as a war-torn state by highlighting how communities adapt and sustain life amid disorder. Local actors—including religious groups and civic organisations—fill governance gaps, providing services and building informal stability. However, the authors caution against romanticising these efforts, as they do not replace the need for structural reform. Though vital for short-term survival, grassroots initiatives cannot deliver sustainable peace. True stability requires confronting entrenched divisions and systemic failures at both state and international levels.
Kalyvas (2002) – The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars
Kalyvas argues that civil wars cannot be neatly categorised by “greed” or “grievance.” Instead, they involve complex interactions between political and private motives. Civil wars often feature ambiguous identities and shifting alliances, especially between central political movements and local actors. These alliances help explain inconsistencies in violence and participation. Kalyvas introduces the idea that civil war is a joint process of supralocal power quests and local advantage-seeking. This framework, grounded in alliance-building, explains how personal vendettas and political objectives coexist and shape wartime actions.
Staniland (2012) – Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia
Staniland explores how pre-existing social networks shape the effectiveness of insurgent organisations. Groups with strong, overlapping social bases manage resources better and maintain cohesion under pressure, while fragmented groups often collapse. Case studies like the Taliban, LTTE, and Hizb illustrate how social-institutional theory explains both group endurance and breakdown. Resources—such as foreign aid or illicit trade—are most effective when integrated into cohesive networks. Staniland argues that understanding insurgent dynamics requires analyzing how social structures and resources interact over time.
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) – Greed and Grievance in Civil War
Collier and Hoeffler argue that civil wars are better explained by economic opportunities than political or social grievances. Using econometric analysis, they show that rebellions are more likely where natural resources are abundant, the government is weak, and the costs of rebellion are low. Their findings favour the greed model, showing conflict correlates strongly with access to lootable resources, diaspora funding, and weak states. Grievance factors—like political repression and inequality—were found to have limited predictive power. External funding from diasporas or hostile states also increases conflict risk. While acknowledging both factors coexist, the study prioritises opportunity over motive. Their model distinguishes between motivation and opportunity, asserting that even legitimate grievances require viable means to rebel. Though influential, the model has been criticised for oversimplification and flawed proxy selection.
Berdal (2005) – Beyond Greed and Grievance – and Not Too Soon…
Berdal challenges the greed/grievance dichotomy, arguing it offers a static and culturally blind view of civil wars. Through case studies like Bougainville, Colombia, and Sri Lanka, he shows that war economies are shaped by complex interactions between political grievances, identity, and global economic changes. He critiques the essentialist view of diasporas and suggests that conflict dynamics are context-dependent. Berdal calls for greater humility and attention to local governance forms that emerge during conflict, warning against over-reliance on state reconstruction and external intervention.
Nathan (2005) – The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics: A Critique of Collier and Hoeffler on the Causes of Civil War
Nathan critiques Collier and Hoeffler’s statistical model for using flawed proxies and drawing causality from correlation. He argues that variables like commodity exports and diaspora size do not directly measure rebel behaviour or conflict motivations. The model overlooks political context, rebel strategies, and local dynamics. Data reliability—especially in developing states—is questioned, along with the exclusion of qualitative evidence. Nathan concludes that Collier and Hoeffler’s framework lacks theoretical and empirical depth and cannot meaningfully explain the causes or dynamics of civil war.
