Week 5 - Compatablism Flashcards
(28 cards)
What is compatibilism?
The view that free will and determinism can both be true at the same time.
According to compatibilists, does determinism mean we have no free will?
No—our actions can be caused and still be free.
What makes an action free, according to compatibilism?
If it is caused by the person’s own desires, intentions, or character.
Do compatibilists believe in a special kind of causation?
No—they think all events, including human actions, follow normal causation.
Why do compatibilists reject uncaused or random actions as free?
Because random actions aren’t truly ours—they’re not guided by our will.
What did Hume say about free actions?
They must be caused by the person’s character or will to be free.
What is Dennett’s view of brain activity and decisions?
Brain activity is the process of deciding—it doesn’t replace or undermine it.
What did Libet’s experiment find?
Brain activity begins before people feel conscious of deciding to act.
How do compatibilists respond to Libet’s experiment?
It doesn’t reflect real-life decisions, which are usually made for reasons.
Why is the Libet task not a good example of a free action?
Subjects were told not to plan—so they gave up control on purpose.
What does the Principle of Alternate Possibilities say?
You are only morally responsible if you could have done otherwise.
What did Frankfurt argue about this principle?
It’s false—you can be responsible even if you couldn’t have done otherwise.
What matters for moral responsibility, according to Frankfurt?
Whether the action came from your own reasons and desires.
What kinds of things truly reduce freedom?
Being locked up, coerced, addicted, or acting under a compulsion.
Do compatibilists think determinism is a restriction like those?
No—determinism isn’t like being physically or mentally forced.
Is freedom all-or-nothing in compatibilism?
No—freedom comes in degrees.
What is a higher-order desire?
A desire about another desire (e.g., wanting to want to quit smoking).
When do internal obstacles (e.g., addiction) reduce freedom?
When they make it hard to act on higher-order desires.
What does the case “I robbed the bank on purpose” show?
That actions can be caused and still be free—if they reflect your will.
Does neuroscience disprove free will?
Not for compatibilists—it just shows the causes of our mental processes.
What does social psychology (like Milgram’s study) challenge?
How much control we really have, not whether determinism is true.
How might evolutionary psychology reduce freedom?
By showing we act on automatic desires that may conflict with our values.
Does lack of information reduce free will?
Yes—bad decisions made with poor knowledge can limit your freedom.
What is a compatibilist worried about?
Whether you can act on your own values and reasoning—not whether the action had a cause.
