Zen Buddhism Flashcards
(32 cards)
What are the Four Noble Truths in Buddhism, and how does Zen reinterpret them?
The Four Noble Truths are: (1) Life is dukkha (unsatisfactory/suffering), (2) Dukkha arises from craving/desire, (3) Dukkha can cease (nirvana), (4) The Noble Eightfold Path leads to liberation. Zen radicalizes this by rejecting gradual progression (e.g., Huineng’s sudden enlightenment), arguing that nirvana is already present in one’s original mind (benxin), not achieved through effort.
Explain the Northern vs. Southern School debate in Zen, referencing The Platform Sutra.
The Northern School (Shenxiu) advocated gradual enlightenment, viewing Buddha nature as a potential to be cultivated through meditation and moral discipline. The Southern School (Huineng) argued for sudden enlightenment, claiming Buddha nature is innate and fully realized—not developed. The Platform Sutra frames Huineng as the true Sixth Patriarch, dismissing Shenxiu’s approach as dualistic (e.g., “polishing the mirror” metaphor).
What is Buddha nature (foxing), and how do Huineng’s teachings redefine it?
Buddha nature is the inherent capacity for enlightenment. Huineng’s Southern School claims it is always already present—not a potential to be purified (as in the Northern School). He uses the metaphor of a mirror-like mind: enlightenment is not “achieved” but recognized when the mind stops distinguishing between self/other, subject/object.
How does The Platform Sutra critique language and texts in Zen practice?
The text states: “The sutra is not the teaching… the teaching is visible to the eye of insight” (Cleary). It compares words to “pointing fingers”—useful only to direct attention, not to grasp truth. This aligns with Zen’s anti-textual stance: enlightenment is non-conceptual, beyond words.
What is the conditioned mind (yuanxin) vs. the original mind (benxin)?
The conditioned mind divides reality into categories (e.g., “chair” vs. “table,” “self” vs. “other”), reinforcing dukkha by craving fixed identities. The original mind is pre-conceptual—it perceives emptiness (śūnyatā) and non-duality. Huineng teaches that enlightenment is the original mind seeing itself, collapsing subject/object distinctions.
How does Zen’s view of non-self (anatta) differ from early Buddhist teachings?
Early Buddhism defines anatta as the absence of a permanent self, citing impermanence (anicca). Zen radicalizes this: the self is an illusion created by language (e.g., “I think”). Huineng’s Platform Sutra ties this to emptiness (śūnyatā): nothing exists independently, including the “self.
Why is The Platform Sutra considered a hagiography, and what political role does it serve?
It idealizes Huineng as the Sixth Patriarch, likely fictionalizing events to legitimize the Southern School’s authority. By depicting Huineng as an illiterate woodcutter who surpasses scholarly monks, it critiques institutional Buddhism and asserts Zen’s egalitarian ethos (though later Zen became hierarchical).
How does Zen “daoise” Buddhism, according to the lectures?
Zen mirrors Daoism by:
Rejecting rigid rituals/texts (wu-wei: effortless action).
Emphasizing naturalness (e.g., enlightenment in everyday acts like chopping wood).
Prioritizing direct experience over doctrine (like Daoist “unnameable” truth).
Critics argue Zen also “Confucianises” Buddhism via patriarchal lineages (e.g., Huineng’s succession).
What are koans, and what are their four primary functions in Zen?
Koans are paradoxical riddles/dialogues (e.g., “What is Buddha? Three pounds of flax”). Functions:
- Induce puzzlement to halt rational thought, triggering sudden insight (satori).
- Perform the futility of language (Austin’s performative utterances).
- Embody anatta and śūnyatā (e.g., Yunmen’s “dried shitstick” negates sacred/profane binaries).
- Reinforce patriarchal authority—masters use koans to test disciples’ legitimacy.
Analyze Linji’s koan: “If you meet the Buddha, kill the Buddha.”
This koan subverts attachment to authority: even the Buddha is a conceptual idol obstructing enlightenment. It exemplifies Zen’s radical non-duality—truth is beyond symbols, including Buddhist ones. Historically, it also asserts the master’s authority to define orthodoxy.
How do koans “perform” emptiness (śūnyatā)? Give an example.
Koans collapse meaning to reveal reality’s ungraspability. Example: Emperor Wu asks Bodhidharma, “What is the ultimate meaning of holiness?” Reply: “Empty, nothing holy.” This negates dualistic thinking (holy/profane), performing śūnyatā as absence of inherent distinctions.
Explain the patriarchal lineage system in Zen and its link to koans.
Zen lineages (e.g., Linji, Dongshan) trace authority back to Huineng/Bodhidharma. Koans serve as:
- Transmission tools: Masters test disciples with koans to certify enlightenment.
- Literary canon: Commentaries (e.g., Blue Cliff Record) codify patriarchal wisdom.
Critique: This “Confucianises” Zen via hierarchical succession, despite its anti-textual ethos
How does Yuanwu Keqin’s commentary on koans reinforce Zen authority?
Yuanwu (compiler of Blue Cliff Record) adds layered critiques to koans, e.g., mocking Emperor Wu’s question as a “donkey-tethering stake” (pointless fixation). This elevates masters’ interpretive power, making koans a medium for patriarchal control.
Why is the “sound of one hand clapping” koan significant?
It exemplifies Zen’s apophatic (negation-based) pedagogy: the “answer” lies beyond logic, forcing the mind to abandon conceptual frameworks. It also mirrors anatta—no “clapper” implies no independent self.
Contrast Huineng’s doctrinal rejection of language with koans’ performative rejection.
Huineng argues language is secondary to insight (e.g., “labels are not the thing itself”). Koans enact this by rupturing language (e.g., nonsense replies). The latter is more radical, as it embodies the teaching rather than describing it.
How does Masao Abe argue that Zen is not a philosophy?
In Zen and Western Thought, Abe claims Zen transcends logic and dualism, whereas philosophy relies on conceptual frameworks. Zen rejects propositional truth (e.g., “Buddha is X”) in favor of direct, non-verbal experience (satori). Unlike philosophy, Zen’s “answers” are embodied in paradox (e.g., koans).
What is the Kyoto School’s relationship to Zen and Western philosophy?
The Kyoto School (e.g., Nishida, D.T. Suzuki) hybridizes Zen with existentialism (Heidegger) and phenomenology. They frame śūnyatā (emptiness) as an absolute nothingness that underpins reality, critiquing Western metaphysics’ fixation on “being.” Davis (2022) notes this risks over-intellectualizing Zen’s anti-rational core.
How does Henry Rosemont Jr. defend Zen as philosophy?
In Is Zen Buddhism a Philosophy?, he argues Zen’s metaphysical claims (e.g., anatta, śūnyatā) and epistemology (e.g., critique of language) align with philosophical inquiry. Unlike Abe, he sees koans as logical devices to deconstruct ordinary thinking, not reject reason entirely.
Why does D.T. Suzuki call Zen “anti-establishment”?
Suzuki contrasts Zen’s iconoclasm (e.g., “kill the Buddha”) with institutional Buddhism’s ritualism. Zen masters subvert authority—even Buddhist doctrine—to point to unmediated truth. However, critics (e.g., McRae) note Zen’s own hierarchies (e.g., patriarchal lineages) contradict this ethos.
How does Bert W. Davis define the “egoless self” in Zen?
In Zen Pathways, Davis explains the true self is non-fixed—a dynamic, interdependent process (pratītyasamutpāda). Ego is a linguistic construct (“I”) that breeds craving. Koans like “Who is dragging this corpse?” expose the ego’s illusion, freeing one to act spontaneously (wu-wei).
Compare Kierkegaardian irony (Capra) and Zen’s deconstruction of the self.
Capra argues both Kierkegaard and Zen playfully dismantle the self’s pretenses:
- Kierkegaard: Irony reveals the gap between self-image and truth.
- Zen: Koans rupture the “I” (e.g., “What was your face before your parents were born?”). Both reject dogmatic identity but Zen goes further by denying any intrinsic self.
How does Hershock’s “dramatic interdependence” redefine the self in Zen?
Hershock rejects the atomized self, framing identity as co-created in relational acts (e.g., teacher-student dialogues). Enlightenment isn’t individual but social virtuosity—improvising roles without attachment (like an actor). This mirrors Huineng’s non-dual “original mind.”
What is André van der Braak’s argument about self-overcoming in Zen vs. Nietzsche?
Both Zen and Nietzsche reject a static self, but Nietzsche’s Übermensch creates values, while Zen dissolves the creator. Van der Braak notes Zen’s “no-self” avoids Nietzsche’s voluntarism, instead embracing effortless action (wu-wei).
How does Robert H. Sharf critique traditional interpretations of koans?
In How to Think with Chan Gong’an, Sharf argues koans were later formalized—originally spontaneous monastic exchanges. Modern “answers” (e.g., Blue Cliff Record) impose artificial coherence, obscuring their historical ambiguity. This challenges the idea of koans as timeless tools.
