WWII Flashcards

1
Q

What did Italian scholar Filippo Donini say about M’s declaration of war

A

There was enthusiasm on the part of young fascists, who had been trained for months to sing their outrageous bellicose songs against the French and English. I remeber well my horror and disgust to hear those stupid lads cry out ‘with the heads of the French they would make chamber pots’ and that they would go to Nice and Corsica and Tunis and ‘show them we are the masters’. As for the English, most songs were on the theme of Chamberlain missing the bus and being left behind with his umbrella - which obviously meant the end of England was approaching

From a group of ex servicemen near us we could hear some angry voices. This discussion was about the difference between today and 1915. A former middle aged captain shouted about how those were the times, ‘Then we knew with whom are heart was! War against the Germans, to help the French, war to liberate Trento and Trieste

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2
Q

What did M say in Apr 1940 supporting the idea that Italy should go to war

A

To make a people great it must be sent into battle even if it has to be kicked in the ass

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3
Q

How did M respond to Badoglio’s comment that the army did not have enough shirts

A

I know, but I need only a few thousand dead, so that I shall be able to sit at the peace table with the victor

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4
Q

M to Roosevelt in May 1940…

A

Italy cannot remain absent at a moment in which the fate of Europe is at stake

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5
Q

What did M say in support of the idea that Italy could not remain neutral

A

Italy cannot remain neutral for the entire duration if the war withour reducing herself to the level of Switzerland x10

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6
Q

What did M say to Ciano in support of war in March 1940

A

Neutrality would take Italy out of the class of great powers for a century, and discredit her for all eternity as a fascist regime; Italy would become a grade B country

When a people is dominated by the instincts of a vegetative life, there is only one way to save it; by the use of force. Even those whom it strikes down will be grateful for it. The Italian race is a race of sheep, and 18 years are not enough to change it

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7
Q

Explain how economically dependent upon Germany Italy became

A

Germany had turned Italy into a virtual economic colony, purchasing its food and textiles. By Aug 1939 Germany owed Italy $40 million. In return Italy was increasingly dependent on German rather than British coal. It had to get 7 million tonnes per year, and two thirds of this came from Germany by sea. In March 1940 GB blockaded all German coal ports. Italy had to rely on 5000 trains a day carrying German coal across the alps. Much of Italy’s Mediterranean trade was disrupted

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8
Q

What does Absalom say about his reasons for joining Germany

A

Boxed in by his sturctural compromises at home, he backed his instinct for joining the winning side in the struggle between two world systems

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9
Q

What does Clark say about his reasons for joining war

A

Fear mingled with greed in M’s frenetic mind. Important too were his sense of honour, his urge to transform his sheeplike people into wolves, and above all his need to be doing something. M was a bellicose nationalist. He could not sit around in Rome while the map of Europe was being redrawm. His whole past, his whole propaganda, his whole regime had glorified war. Now there was one, and he had to join it

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10
Q

What does Gallo say about the decision to join the war

A

Non belligerance meant the defeat not only of M but also of the party and the system, and the longer inaction continued, the greater was the repudiation of 18 years of war like oratory and all those who had engaged in it. Neutrality could only lead to crisis for M, the party and the govt. On the other hand, intervention on Germany’s side offered to chance of winning the gamble of war and hence saving M, the party and the system. Either way, the fate of fascism was at stake, whether Italy entered the war or stayed out

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11
Q

Memorandum written by M in March 1940, quoted in N Farrell: M: A New Life

A

Even if Italy changed attitude and passed over to the Franco English side, it would not avoid war with Germany. There remains the other scenario, which is a war parallel to that of Germany to achieve our own objectives which are summed up as follows: liberty at sea and a window on the ocean

The problem therefore is not a question of knowing whether Italy will enter the war. It is only a question of knowing when and how. It is a question of delaying our entry into the war as long as possible, compatible with our honour and dignity…

  • To prepare in such a way that our intervention determines the outcome of war
  • Because Italy cannot fight a long war and cannot spend hundreds of billions
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12
Q

M to Hitler on 25 Aug 1939

A

Given the state of military preparations in Italy, I cannot take the initiative in any warlike operations. The war was planned for 1942 and at that date I should of been ready

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13
Q

How does DMS explain the shift away from GB and France and towards to Nazi Germany

A

Blames the errors and muddled thinking of M himself

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14
Q

How does Nicholas Farrell explain this

A

Blames British policy makers, particularly Anthony Eden, for missing numerous opportunities to maintain good relations with M. He says that it was only when M became convinced there was no possiblility of making a worthwhile deal with the British and French that M decided it was necessary to side decisively with Germany

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15
Q

Give some historians who counter this view

A

In recent years historians such as MacGregor Knox, Robert Mallett and John Gooch have strongly disagreed with this view of M as a ‘rational opportunist’. They emphasise the vital role of ideology in shaping foreign policy, and the great extent to which links between M and the armed forces from the early 1920s onwards revealed the log term plans fir deliberate wars of aggression. The title of Knox’s book ‘M Unleashed, 1939-41’ reflects the view that M was ideologically driven and had a single minded determination to launch war, even before 1935. Gooch argues that ‘only the poor state of the Italian armed forces held him back’

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16
Q

Why is deciding between the rival views of the motivations behind M’s foreign policy so difficult

A

Because M’s words and actions were so often contradictory and deceptive, even to himself

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17
Q

How did Sep 1939 show how out of step M was with Germany

A

So out of touch with what Hitler intended, that they even attempted, hours before Germany attacked Poland, to call a European Peace Conference for Sep 5

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18
Q

How did M respond to the outbreak of war following this

A

He used German secrecy, which he denounced as treachery, to declare that Italy would be non belligerant in the war that had broken out on 3 Sep 1939. Having to do this offended him greatly, as can be seen by the fact that he refused to use the word neutrality to describe Italy’s was status

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19
Q

Describe the conditions of the armed forces in 1939

A

The Italian army could call on 73 divisions and a legion of blackshirts. This was not as impressive as it might appear, as only 19 of these 73 divisions were at full strength. Of those, 14 were abroad serving in Abyssinia, Tripoli and Albania. Much of the infantry’s weaponry was dated and not suited to the demands of modern warfare. The tanks were too light and inadequately armed. Although M boasted an airforce of 3000 planes, less than 1000 actually existed. The Italian navy was formidable, but, as we shall see, limited by the lack of any aircraft carriers, essential in modern naval warfare. In addition, the fleet only had sufficient fuel to last a year

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20
Q

Describe the invasion of Poland

A

Blitzkrieg or ‘lightening war’ allowed the German armies to advance rapidly across western Poland. As agreed in the Nazi-Soviet Pact, on Sep 17 Soviet forces moved into Eastern Poland. The overwhelmed Polish resistance collapsed and the division of spoils agreed in the secret clauses if the pact were put into practise

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21
Q

What happened after this invasion was completed

A

Hitler then offered peace terms to Britain and France. The allies refused, stating the independence of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria would have to be restored before negotiations could take place

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22
Q

How did the war develop in Nov 1939

A

The USSR invaded Finland. In Italy there was great sympathy for the Finns and M sent aircraft to help their war effort along with GB. M was now aiding a country at war with Germany’s ally

He contacted Hitler to question the wisdom of the Nazi-Soviet Pact as it had clearly contradicted the terms of the anti-comintern pact. In March 1940 Hitler met M at the Brenner Pass and explained his reasons for the Russian alliance while M confirmed his intention to join the war at the appropriate moment

23
Q

How was neutrality a mixed bag for Italy

A

Italian industiralists made good profits selling arms to both sides, including orders for a thousand planes by Britain and France, to the fury of the ill-equipped Italian forces

Despite the economic advantages of neutrality, M increasingly fretted about not being in the war. This was understandable as fascism message had always been about the need for national greatness proven on the battlefield. He saw Italy becoming a second class nation denied its rightful territorial gains in the Balkans and the Med region

24
Q

Why did M not use the term neutrality

A

Because the term non belligerent indicated that Italy was clearly on Germany’s side, but not yet taking part in any fighting

25
Q

List some of the reasons for M deciding not to get involved in 1939

A

Despite his aggressive actions since 1935 and the serious agreements with GB and France, M wanted to keep his options open. He always had mixed feelings about the German alliance, even after entering the war on their side in 1940

Despite all his propaganda boasts about military greatness, he was afraid war might expose the fact that Italy was not militarily or economically ready for major conflicts

M entered the Pact of Steel in terms of making war in 1943 at the earliest. He had not realised how soon Hitler would attack Poland. When the war was imminent in the summer of 1939, M desperately tried to stop Hitler

Hitler did not really need M’s help in Poland. For Germany, the value of alliance with Italy was that Italian forces would tie down the British and French and hinder any attempt they made to invade Germany, while Hitler’s armies were busy in Poland

After the rapid defeat of Poland, the war in Europe entered the long lull in hostilities known as the ‘Phoney War’. M was able to sit on the sidelines in the winter of 1939-40, waiting for Hitler’s next move. Almost until the last moment of June 1940, M had the opportunity to stay out of Hitler’s war if he wanted to

26
Q

What did the King say to Ciano about war in Aug 1939

A

Said Italy was in no condition to wage war. The army is in a pitiful state. The army officers are not qualified for the job and our equipment is old and obsolete. This must be added to the state of mind of Italians, which is distinctly anti-German

27
Q

What Ciano say to party secretary Starace in 1939

A

Not to keep from M the country’s true state of mind, which is clearly anti-German. The Italian people do not want to fight alongside Germany in order to enhance the German strength that will one day menace us

28
Q

What did Police Chief Bocchini say to Ciano in 1939

A

If there should be public demonstrations in favour of neutrality, the police would make common cause with the people

29
Q

Ciano accounting M’s feelings in Aug 1939

A

13th - At first he agreed with me. Then he said honour required him to march with Germany. Finally he said he wanted his share of the loot in Croatia and Dalmatia

15th - Said it would not be good to irritate the Germans, because we ought to get our share of the spoils too

16th - This time it was war, and we could not take part in it because we were in no position to do so

26th - M was really out of his wits. His military instinct and sense of honour were leading him to war. Reason has now stopped him. But this hurts him very much. In the military field he was badly served by his advisers, who, under the illusion of eternal peace, have fostered dangerous illusions to him. Now he has to confront the hard truth. This is a great blow for M

30
Q

Describe M’s limited contribution in France

A

Barely enough time for the Italian forces to do sufficient fighting and suffer sufficient casualties to justify the military intervention. German forces reached Paris on 14th June, three days before the Italian armies were ordered into action and 6 days before they did any fighting. On 21st June M met Hitler in Munich. The next day the new French Chief of State, Marshal Petain, signed an armistice with Hitler. M was not even invited to this. Italy’s war had lasted 100 hours

31
Q

Describe Italy’s limited gains

A

M had hoped to gain Tunisia and Corsica, occupy south west France and seize the French fleet but his only reward for the invasion was the very small strip of territory his troops had occupied. M made no serious contribution to French defeat and so gained no serious reward

32
Q

Explain the missed opportunity in the Med in 1940

A

M blamed Hitler for not taking control of the Med in the summer of 1940. It would have been relatively easy to take Malta from GB and to occupy the whole coast of southern France and French North Africa. Hitler did not care about the Med. He was happy to leave southern France under the control of Petain’s new French govt at Vichy. As for Malta and the rest of the Med, Hitler’s view was that if M wanted them badly enough he could have sent Italian armies to do the job on their own, instead of wasting resources on an unneccessary invasion of France

M did not take advantage of the opportunity to attack Britain in the Med in the summer of 1940, when he might have been able to seize Egypt and the Suez Canal. Some historians consider that Italy might have acted more aggresively if Italo Balbo had taken charge of the war effort in North Africa. Balbo’s replacement, Marshal Graziani had no intention of taking risks. Instead of acting independenly Italy waited months for Hitler to win the Battle of Britain. It was only in Sep that Graziani began the invasion of Egypt, and this was soon overshadowed by M’s decision to launch the invasion of Greece

33
Q

What cuased the invasion of Greece

A

On 28th Oct 1940 70,000 Italian troops invaded Greece across the border with Albania. Why M chose to attack Greece rather than more strategically important targets like Malta, Crete or Egypt is puzzling. Greece had been low on his list of priorities up to that point, and M had actually said in late Aug that North Africa was more important for Italy than the Balkans. One possible explanations is that Germany invaded Romania two weeks earlier. This infuriated M because once again Hitler had not told him and he considered the Balkans to be an Italian sphere of influence. Some historians claim that he was egged on by Ciano - the invasion of Greece has often been labelled ‘Ciano’s War’

34
Q

Explain how disastrous the Greek campaign was

A

M’s plan depended upon a short victorious war as neither the armed forces or the economy were geared up for a long conflict. But the war went badly. Winter was already approaching when the invasion began. The invasion force was too small. The generals in command were incompetent. On 11 Nov, while the land war was floundering, British naval forces badly damaged the Italian battle fleet in the Gulf of Taranto. Italian forces were pushed out of Greece back into Albania. M sacked his top general, Marshal Badoglio, and sent massive reinforcements but the war continued to go badly. In March 1941 GB inflicted another crushing naval defeat at Cape Matapan off the south coast of Greece, and several Italian warships were sunk

35
Q

Describe the dire situation in terms of the North African campaign

A

British forces in Egypt were badly outnumbered by Graziani’s army but had superior air power. The Italians were first stopped and then pushed backwards. By the end of Jan 1941, 125,000 Italians had been taken prisoner. The British captured Tobruk and seemed certain to occupy the whole of Libya. Marshal Graziani resigned in Feb. There were similar British counter attacks in Abyssinia. Again the Italian’s suffered defeats at the hands of smaller British forces. By Apr 1941 Italy had lost all the gains made between 1935-6. Emporor Haile Selassie triumphantly returned from exile

36
Q

Describe how M’s notion of a parallel war fell apart in 1941

A

In Feb 1941, a small but well equipped German army, the Afrika Korps, arrived in Libya to rescue the situation. They quickly stabilised the front line in North Africa and started advancing towards Egypt again. This was the beginning of the German takeover of M’s war

He was even more determined to intervene in the Italian war in the Balkans. Wanted to sort out the situation before the launch of Barbarossa, scheduled for the 15th May. German forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia on 6 Apr. Yugoslavia surrendered on 18th May, Greece surrendered on 20th May. The Germans had succeeded within two weeks, Italy had got nowhere in 6 months

M’s parallel war was finished. The Balkans, which M had always seen as an Italian sphere of influence, was under German domination

37
Q

What gains did Italy make from this German success

A

Yugoslavia was divided up and Croatia became a semi free puppet state led by Ante Pavelich, the leader of the fascist militia, the Ustase. Italy was able to exert alot of influence over the Pavelich govt and was able to take control of the long Croation coastline along the Adriatic. It was clear who held the real power i the German-Italian alliance, however

38
Q

What operation began on 22 June 1941

A

Barbarossa

39
Q

Describe the Italian contribution here

A

62,000 Italian troops were sent to the Eastern Front but this was only a symbolic gesture. The Italian forces were tiny compared with the millions of German and Soviet soldiers involved. Later, in the summer of 1942, this number had reached 230,000. Most of them were lost in the terrible defeat at Stalingrad by February 1943

40
Q

Describe how the war had started to turn against the Axis by 1942

A

In Apr, there was a big effort to bomb Malta into surrender but this narrowly failed. Malta could have been easily conquered in 1940 but the opportunity had been missed. Failure to take Malta in 1942 made supplying Axis forces in Africa by sea much more difficult.

In June 1942, the Afrika Korps advance through Egypt was halted at the First Battle of El Alamein. The hope of reaching the Suez Canal disappeared. In Oct, at the 2nd Battle of El Alamein, British forces broke through and started their final advance west

Two weeks later American forces invaded French North Africa in Operation Torch. It was the beginning of the end for the Axis in the North African campaign

In Nov 1942 Hitler ordered the occupation of the whole of France, brushing aside the Vichy govt. The Italians were allowed to do what M had wanted to do in 1940 and occupied south east France and Corsica. However, the war was going badly almost everywhere else. In Yugoslavia, the partisans were becoming a major threat to the occupying armies. The German armies were bogged down in the siege of Stalingrad, and they eventually surrendered in Feb 1943. Many people regarded tyhis as the turning point of the war

The military situation continued to deteriorate. Axis forces pulled out of Africa in May. Everybody knew that an allied invasion of Italy would soon follow

The war was also going badly on the home front. During 1942, there were increasingly heavy bombing raids on northern Italian cities, especially Genoa, Turin and Milan. The economy came under terrific strain and public opinion turned even more against the war

41
Q

Explain the battles of El Alamein

A

The first was fought on 1st July 1942 when British forces halted the adcance of axis armies towards Cairo

Three months later, in Nov 1942, after a big build up of men and weaponry, the British 8th army defeated the German Italian armies under Erwin Rommel and began driving them back to the west. This culminated with the total withdrawal of axis forces from north africa in May 1943

42
Q

Describe how poorly equipped Italy was for war

A

M had previously bragged about Italy having ‘8 million bayonets’ but the armed forces actually amounted to just over 1 million. There were also serious deficiencies in equipment, especially the lack of modern tanks and artillery. To cope with a long war, Italy would need to mobilise all economic resources for the war effort. Other countries like Germany and GB placed great emphasis on running the war economy by central planning but Italy never faced up to the economic requirements of total war. Any advanced economic planning had operated under the assumption that war would be over quickly. There was no serious attempt at economic reorganisation and no attempt to stockpile vital war materials before the war. As a result Italy lagged far behind the other war powers

The proportion of GDP directed towards war production never reached more than 25%. This was hopelessly inadequate. In Germany the figure was 64%. As a result Italian forces were badly equipped in terms of weapons, food and clothing. Wherever Italian soldiers fought alongside German units, they noticed how much better equipped the Germans were. This is one of the reasons why Italians were often defeated by forces they heavily outnumbered

43
Q

What does Clark say about the impact war had on the regime

A

By 1943 the whole fascist regime was crumbling. Reality had caught up with it. The facades of bellicose activism, of controlling the economy, of youth and patriotism, all were collapsing in the harsh glare of war

44
Q

What does Absalom say about the regime during the war

A

The fascist regime in 1940 was already fundamentally unsound. It was incapable of developing a coherent diplomacy or military strategy, and was politically so fragile that after 20 years of undisputed power its leadership was unable to mobilise its economic and demographic resources to wage an effective war

45
Q

How does DMS say that M hindered the war effort

A

In war, as in peace, M made the mistake of sacrificing substance for effect, preoccupied above all with demonstrating that he alone was in command

Above all the explanation for Italy’s weakness must be sought in his great sense of showmanship and in the propaganda consciousness which allowed him to seize on the dangerous half truth that it was less important to do things in politics than to seem to do things; and in the process he without a doubt; often and demonstrably; confused the two

46
Q

Why is it so hard to understand why Italy performed badly

A

M had been in power for 18 years by 1940. He had constantly stressed the importance of needing to prepare Italy for war, and believed war to be both desirable and inevitable

47
Q

How do the years between 1935-9 go some way in explaining this

A

Italy was involved in two wars during these years that depleted her military capacity. Leading M to warn Hitler he would not be ready for war until 1943 upon signing the Pact of Steel

48
Q

Why did he decide to join in 1940

A

He considered the war to be nearly over

49
Q

Why did he widen the war in 1940 after France had been knocked out by invading both Greece and Egypt and declaring war on the USA and USSR in 1941

A

Thought that these campaigns would be easy victories. Greece was a minor power. The British Empire was weak, so Egypt, trapped between Libya and and Italian East Africa, would fall. The USSR had been desperate to avoid war as it was so weak, and the all conquering Hitler would easily knock it out in 1941 - as he nearly did. America was seen as another feeble democracy, good at jazz but not fighting

50
Q

How does the notion of bluff explain why he entered the war with limited resources

A

He realised that if he could make Italy appear as if it was a great power, he might be able to get his way by bullying and making the major powers see the necessity of appeasing him. Thus he did not actually need to robustly increase Italian military might, but just convince the other powers of it. Hence the great boasts about an airforce that would ‘blot out the sun’, and that he had ‘8 million bayonets. He could get gains for Italy through bluff, and through short campaigns against weak opponents

51
Q

How did M become a victim of his own propaganda

A

He had spent so long telling the world what a great power Italy was that he began to believe it. M went from the skilled realist of the 1920s to the deluded buffoon of the late 1930s

52
Q

How does entrapment by Hitler explain entry into the war

A

He was so impressed by German might that he believed that with his ally he could achieve his grand ambitions

53
Q

How does entry into the war relate to the spirit of fascism

A

M stressed the importance of ‘will’ in history; that if the spirit was strong, then assertive people’s could achieve their aims. This was evident in his economic policies, such as autarky, and can explain how he took Italy into situations beyond its objective ability to tackle. While M’s will might have been strong, that of the Italian people certainly wasn’t

In this regard failure in war can be seen as evidence of the limited impact of fascistisation. M would admit that he had failed to create a nation of warlike Italians. Furthermore, his tactical reliance on the traditional elite meant the regime could not withstand the loss of that support which military failure caused. Hence his overthrow

54
Q

Give that more traditional view that Italy failed due to a lack of economic and military resources

A

Italy did not have the military hardware to win major wars. This was partly due to its comparative lack of vital economic resources, such as coal, iron and oil. However, this was increased by his failure to use the resources he did have available effectively, and to give military production sufficiently high priority. This is partly explained by his belief that his campaigns would be short and he would not need to use great resources. M also failed to acknowledge the extent of administrative inefficiency and corruption, which further sapped the war effort