eliminative materialism Flashcards
(8 cards)
· What is physicalism?
The theory that only physical substance exists, and that everything that exists is either physical or depends (supervenes) on the physical. In other words, the physical is ontologically fundamental, and everything comes under the laws and investigation of physics.
· What is elimination?
Elimination is where we cease to use (eliminate) a concept on the grounds that what it refers to no longer exists, e.g. we have eliminated the concept of ‘caloric fluid’ as caloric fluid does not exist.
· What is supervenience?
Supervenience is a relation between two types of properties. Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B just in case any two things that are exactly alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties.
[5 marks]
· Explain the argument that it would self-refuting to articulate eliminative materialism as theory
The attempt to articulate eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting, i.e. proves itself to be false. This is due the fact that when outlining a theory and putting forward arguments for the theory, we give a set of claims which lead to a conclusion. When we assert claims, we believe them. These beliefs are Intentional because they are ‘about’ the content of our claims, specifically that the content is true. In asserting that folk psychological concepts, specifically Intentional mental states, should be eliminated, as they do not refer to anything that exists, the eliminative materialist has a belief about the assertion, i.e. believing that it is true that we should eliminate such concepts. The eliminative materialist therefore makes use of the very concept – a belief (an Intentional mental state)- that they argue ought to be eliminated. So, articulating the argument for EM is self-refuting.
· Explain how eliminative materialism differs from mind-brain type identity theory
Eliminative materialism and type-identity theory differ in their views on 1) the existence and nature of mental properties, 2) the concepts used to refer to mental properties, and 3) the meaning and veracity of statements about mental properties. EM argues that at least some mental properties (as understood by folk psychology) do not exist, e.g. Intentionality, and as such we should eliminate folk psychological concepts of those mental properties. Statements about the mind which rely on these folk-psychological concepts are therefore false according to EM. Type I-T however asserts that those mental properties do exist and that they are ontologically reducible to neuro-physical properties, i.e. they are identical to specific brain properties. Type- IT therefore retains the folk-psychological concepts of those mental properties as they pick out neuro-physical properties. With regards to statements about the mind, Type-IT views statements that use folk-psychological concepts as making claims that are meaningful and true.
· Explain what is meant by ‘folk psychology’
Folk psychology is a body of knowledge or theory regarding the explanation and prediction of people’s behaviour constituted by the platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse, e.g. if someone hates Paris in summer, they will not book a trip to Paris in August. Folk psychology claims that mental states are to be understood as Intentional, i.e. mental states are ‘about’ something. For example, a belief that Paris is the capital of France is a belief about Paris. Intentional mental states represent the world in particular and partial ways, and folk psychology claims that this feature of mental states is what explains their motivational force, i.e. why mental states cause us to behave and interact with the world in certain ways. In the example of the person who hates Paris in summer and will not therefore book a trip there in August, the object of Paris is represented by this mental state as hot, humid, and uncomfortable.
outline eliminative materialism
EM is a physicalist theory which endorses a future picture where mental states are described and explained purely in terms of neuroscience. This implies that mental states either are identical to or are supervenient upon physical (brain) states. EM argues that at least some of our basic mental concepts such as consciousness and Intentionality are fundamentally mistaken and should be eliminated as they do not refer to anything that exists. Such concepts come from Folk Psychology: a body of knowledge or theory regarding the explanation and prediction of human behaviour constituted by the platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse. Folk psychological concepts of mental states tend to understand mental states as Intentional. Intentionality is the property of mental states whereby they are directed towards an Intentional object, in other words, Intentional mental states are ‘about’ something, e.g. a belief that Paris is the capital of France is a belief about Paris. Examples of Intentional mental states include beliefs, desires, emotions. Advocates of EM such as Patricia Churchland argue that if we unable to ontologically reduce concepts like Intentionality to physical brain states, then we must eliminate them.
Outline eliminative materialism and explain the issue that our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations.
The objection that our introspective certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations challenges EM’s call to eliminate our concepts of Intentional mental states and argues that this is deeply counter-intuitive. Via introspection, we gain direct, first-personal awareness of our own mental states. The objection claims that, when we introspect, nothing could be more certain to us than the fact that we have Intentional mental states like beliefs, desires, emotions etc. It is just immediately and directly obvious to us that we have, e.g. beliefs that are ‘about’ something. This certainty is such that no argument could be strong enough to justify giving up the concept of Intentional mental states, including arguments that such mental states are not reducible to physical brain states (e.g. Paul Churchland argues that Intentionality is irreducible as physical processes are not ‘about’ anything). The certainty we gain from introspection of these mental states’ existence takes priority over any such considerations.
