Functionalism Flashcards
(7 cards)
What does functionalism claim about mental state
All mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised.
What is a functional property?
A functional property is a property defined by its causal role within a functional system, rather than by its ontological nature. Functional properties are relational, i.e. they relate to certain inputs and certain outputs.
Explain the ‘inverted qualia’ objection to functionalism
The inverted qualia objection to functionalism is a thought experiment which aims to establish the existence of qualia (intrinsic, non-relational properties of mental states) and to thereby show that functionalism does not give a complete account of mental states/mind, given that functional properties are relational properties. The thought experiment supposes that two functional duplicates (who think and behave in identical ways) can have inverted qualia. Person A and Person B are functional duplicates since they produce the same output (they both say ‘the tree is green’) in response to the same input (seeing a green tree). But the intrinsic properties (qualia) of their experiences of colour differ - Person A sees the tree as green and Person B who has inverted qualia, sees the tree as red. The same output ‘the tree is green’ is produced by both individuals as they have grown up in the same linguistic community and have learned to call the tree ‘green’. Person B, despite being functionally identical to Person A, has a mental state with a different quale, meaning that functionalism does not give a complete account of mental states.
Explain how Block’s China thought experiment can be used to argue against functionalism
Functionalists claim that if two things are functionally identical (they have all the same functional properties) then they must be mentally identical (they must have all the same mental properties). This would include qualia. Ned Block’s China thought experiment aims to show that a system that is functionally identical to a human mind/brain can lack qualia. This means that functionalism cannot account for / explain qualia, i.e. qualia cannot be explained in terms of (reduced to) functional properties, and by extension functionalism cannot account for our phenomenal consciousness. Block supposes that an artificial body is connected, via sensory and motor nerves, not to a human brain but to the entire population of China, and that the people in China are linked to each other and the artificial body via two-way radios. This system then realises the machine table which describes the functions of a person’s mental states. Block argues that the system would be functionally equivalent to a human mind, at least for a short time. Despite being functionally equivalent, there is a crucial difference between a human mind and the China Brain – when it comes to the mental state of, e.g. pain, the human mind experiences the quale of ‘what it is like to feel pain’, the subjective qualitative aspect of this mental state, whereas the China Brain does not. While the China Brain can realise functional states (which are relational), it cannot account for intrinsic properties of mental states (qualia), and thereby cannot account for our phenomenal consciousness.
Explain how the knowledge argument can be used against functionalism (5m)
Functionalism claims that all mental properties, including phenomenal properties, can be understood as functional properties (or functional + physical properties). This means that all facts are therefore functional facts (or functional + physical facts). Jackson’s knowledge argument or Mary’s room can be used to argue against Functionalism. Mary, a neuroscientist specialising in colour vision, has spent her entire life in a black and white room and has never seen any colour. She knows all of the physical facts about colour vision that a completed physics would discover. She also knows all of the functional facts entailed by those physical facts. One day, Mary sees a red tomato and, as Jackson argues, gains new propositional knowledge (‘this is what it’s like to see red’) of a new phenomenal fact ‘redness has this phenomenal property’. By gaining new propositional knowledge of a phenomenal fact, this shows that not all facts about colour vision are physical facts, nor are they functional facts, since functional facts are entailed by physical facts. Mary’s room therefore challenges functionalism’s claim that all mental properties are functional properties (or functional + physical properties), and that all facts are functional facts (or functional facts + physical facts)
Explain the ‘inverted qualia’ objection to functionalism AND one response to the objection (12m) –> just give response here
Although not directly defending functionalism, Patricia Churchland’s point about the simplicity of this thought experiment and appeal to the science of colour experience can be used to respond to this objection. The Inverted qualia case only seems possible because our concept of colour experience is too simple. With a more scientifically informed concept of colour experience, we will see that two people with different colour experiences (different qualia) will have different behaviours (so different functional properties). Similarity and dissimilarity judgements about (experienced) red will be different from similarity and dissimilarity judgements about (experienced) green. So the two people will not be functionally identical. They differ in their functional outputs, specifically their judgement behaviour. Drawing on Churchland, the functionalist can therefore respond to the ‘inverted qualia’ objection by showing that it is empirically impossible to have functional duplicates with different qualia.
Explain Block’s China thought experiment objection to functionalism AND one response to the objection ( 12m–> just give the response here)
Functionalists can combine functionalism about mental states with ‘narrow’ type identity theory about phenomenal properties of those states. Phenomenal properties – but not the rest of the mental states to which they belong – are identical to specific human brain properties. This avoids the Chinese Brain objection because the Chinese Brain is no longer a full duplicate of the mind, since it lacks specific human brain properties which are identical to phenomenal properties. This would explain why the China Brain thought experiment lacks phenomenal properties in a way which is coherent with both functionalism and mind-brain type-identity theory. Block’s objection relies on the China Brain being a functional duplicate but this response shows that this is not the case, and therefore his ‘absent qualia’ objection fails.
